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1. Why Consider Multi-Hazard Risk?
The term multi-hazard is closely related to the international political context with one of
the first references in the United Nations’ Agenda 21. In this document, focused on the in-
tegration of environment and development concerns, “complete multi-hazard research” for
sustainable human settlement development is called for (UNEP, 1992, paragraph 7.61). In
the field of sustainable development (Johannesburg Plan) the term reappears in the follow-
ing statement: “[a]n integrated, multi-hazard, inclusive approach to address vulnerability,
risk assessment and disaster management, including prevention, mitigation, preparedness,
response and recovery, is an essential element of a safer world” (UN, 2002, p. 20). In the
Hyogo Framework for Action again, the ideas presented in the Johannesburg plan were
further specified to the risk reduction focus: “[a]n integrated, multi-hazard approach to
disaster risk reduction should be factored into policies, planning and programming related
to sustainable development, relief, rehabilitation, and recovery activities in post-disaster
and post-conflict situations in disaster-prone countries” (UN-ISDR, 2005, p. 4). This
illustrates that the term multi-hazard was primarily used in the broader context of risk
reduction and it is strongly characterised by the practical objective of risk reduction. In
the following, the connection between the threat natural hazards pose, measures to reduce
the risk and the need for a joint multi-hazard risk consideration is outlined.
Background for these calls for a safer world is the assumption and notion of increas-
ing confrontation between humans and the natural environment with the result of severe
consequences for human life, wellbeing and economic productivity. Events such as the
Wenchuan-Earthquake in China (2008), the earthquake in Haiti (2010), the heavy floods
in Pakistan (2010), the earthquakes in New Zealand (2010 & 2011) or the combination of
earthquake and tsunami in Japan (2011) cause high damage and severe losses. Due to the
worldwide acting media these high-magnitude events with serious impacts are the most
noted examples of the threat posed by natural hazards1. However, also the high level
of overall damages and losses is alarming. Statistics derived from disaster databases of
Munich Re, Swiss Re, the Emergency Disaster Data Base (EM-DAT) and others show two
recurring trends, although the specific numbers differ due to distinct selection criteria2 for
1Especially in a multi-hazard context the clear definition of key terms poses a challenge. Therefore,
detailed definitions will be presented in chapter 2. Preliminarily, natural hazard refers to a “[n]atural
process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage,
loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage” (UN-ISDR,
2009b, p. 9).
2For each database, criteria are defined according to which a damaging event is considered a disaster and
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the events which are included and the unequal quality of the loss assessments (Fuchs,
2009a): losses of live are decreasing while the direct economic damage is still increasing
(Munich Re, 2000; White et al., 2001; Arnold et al., 2006; EM-DAT, 2009). Ac-
cording to statistics derived from the Munich Re disaster database MRNatCat this rise
of economic damages is notable. An increase is indicated from about e27 billion (US$
38.5 billion) in the decade 1950-1959 to about e375 billion (US$ 535.8 billion) in the
decade 1990-1999 (Munich Re, 2000). An upward trend is also mentioned for indirect
losses (PLANAT, 2004; Arnold et al., 2006; The World Bank, 2010), but verifica-
tion on basis of detailed longterm statistics is still not possible since indirect losses are
very difficult to quantify and are not included in the majority of the databases. However,
Arnold et al. (2006, p. xiii) state that “the number of those affected in terms of disrup-
tions to daily life, loss of livelihoods, and deepening poverty continues to increase” and
the The World Bank (2010) identifies a general trend of an overproportional rise of
indirect losses with increasing direct losses. Munich Re (2000, p. 70) highlights different
factors causing these high and still increasing economic damages including “the global
increase in population and other related developments like urbanization, the utilization of
highly exposed regions, and alterations in the environment”. Nevertheless, the identified
upward trends need careful interpretation and consideration of the influence of inflation,
increased reporting activity of damages and losses and time-varying socio-economic factors
(Barredo, 2009; Fuchs, 2009a). In summary, it can be stated that, even though the
previously estimated increase of damages may turn out to be lower or even non-existent
after a normalisation procedure, the level of damages due to natural hazards does still not
show a clearly decreasing trend.
White et al. (2001) pose the question how this is possible although scientific knowledge
about natural hazards has been increasing continuously as the large number of articles
and books they reviewed indicate. Should not play knowledge and understanding of the
causes of the losses a key role in their reduction (White et al., 2001)? To be able to assess
the role of scientific knowledge for the reduction of risks3, it is necessary to examine the
overall framework of efforts in this field, subsumed under the term risk management. Risk
management is composed of the risk analysis, assessment and all “strategies and specific
actions to control, reduce and transfer risks” (UN-ISDR, 2009b, p. 11). It can be struc-
tured in the four interlinked components of risk assessment, prevention, event management
and regeneration (Figure 1.1). That implies, risk management should ideally start with
risk assessment, composed of risk analysis and valuation, to supply important information
inserted as record. In the case of EM-DAT this refers to: ≥10 people are reported killed or ≥100 are
reported affected or a state of emergency is declared or international assistance is called for (CRED,
2009). By contrast, criteria for Sigma from Swiss Re for the year 2010 are: ≥20 casualties or ≥50
dead or missing or ≥2,000 homeless or total economic losses ≥US$86.5million or ≥US$17.4 million for
maritime disasters or ≥US$34.8 for aviation or ≥US$43.3 in case of other losses (Swiss Re, 2011)
3The term risk is defined as the “[e]xpected losses (of lives, persons injured, property damaged and
economic activity disrupted) due to a particular hazard for a given area and reference period” (WMO,
1999, p. 2).
2
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Figure 1.1.: Risk management cycle according to Swiss Virtual Campus (2008)
for all further steps (Kienholz et al., 2004). Thereby, the risk analysis provides informa-
tion on the potential effects of interaction between nature and society. Thus, the potential
consequence natural hazards can have on the human sphere is studied to identify “[w]hat
could happen ?” (Kienholz et al., 2004, p. 9). The subsequent risk valuation serves to
determine “[w]hat is allowed to happen ?” (Kienholz et al., 2004, p. 9) and where risk
reduction measures have to be applied. The valuation is therefore a fundamental step for
decision-making if and where measures and activities have to be performed (please refer
to Figure 1.1 for the sequence of risk management steps explained in the following). For
instance, in the prevention phase the central issue is the elimination or reduction of risks
by means of active measures such as dykes or avalanche defense structures, or passive
measures such as land use regulation (Kienholz et al., 2004). Thereby, the informa-
tion provided by risk assessments facilitates the identification of those locations with the
highest risk levels and supports the determination of adequate risk reduction measures. In
contrast to prevention, preparedness deals rather with the potential damages than with the
hazard and includes for instance the preparation of resources required during an event,
training initiatives or the establishment of an early warning system (Kienholz, 2003;
Kienholz et al., 2004). Again, risk assessments provide important information e.g. for
the design of early warning systems or the identification of resource requirements. Also
in the case of an event, risk information is highly valuable for the coordination of the
emergency management, in particular for evacuation purposes. Moreover, the recovery
and reconstruction following a hazard event should be based on risk information and ac-
companied “by efforts to learn from recent experience” (Kienholz et al., 2004, p. 1). This
refers especially to the choice of the reconstruction location for buildings or infrastructure
and the determination of building codes. Based on risk assessments which are amplified
by recent experience, sustainable planning and redevelopment should be the first priority
3
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to reduce risks. Finally, the newly gained experience from the incidence shall support the
improvement of the risk assessment and prevention activities to turn “the risk manage-
ment cycle into an ascendant [...] spiral” (Kienholz et al., 2004, p. 1).
However, the reduction of risks cannot only be based on better knowledge about natural
hazards, “technical assessment and the optimisation of the risks as quantified entities”
since risks have also “social and psychological dimensions, and are shaped by values, be-
liefs, political systems and cultural factors” (Assmuth et al., 2010, p. 3943; refer also to
Kasperson et al., 1988; Felt et al., 2007). With a wider participation of stakeholders
in the risk reduction efforts, especially the general public, and communication between all
actors, these social and psychological aspects can be better considered. However, while
the risk management concept does not account for these issues in depth, the still rather
young concept of risk governance shows a broader and more interlinked view of dealing
with risks and clearly emphasises participation and communication. According to a de-
scription of the IRGC (2005, p. 4) risk governance “includes the totality of actors, rules,
conventions, processes and mechanisms and is concerned with how relevant risk informa-
tion is collected, analysed and communicated, and how management decisions are taken”.
In short, De Marchi (2003, p. 171) describes it as a combination of “sound science” with
democratic participation. The components it consists of are (1) risk assessment and (2)
risk management which are embedded in (3) risk communication. Communication refers
in this context not only to the transfer of information on risk or risk management decisions
but to “establishing the two-way dialog needed at all stages of the risk handling process”
(IRGC, 2005, p. 6) within a “diverse yet interdependent set of actors organised as part
of a network” (Walker et al., 2010, p. 8). Expected advantages of this approach are
increasing public awareness, change of attitude towards the risks as well as more trust and
less conflict between different stakeholders (Wanczura, 2006; De Marchi, 2003; IRGC,
2010).
Thus, referring again to the question of White et al. (2001) how losses can still rise
although scientific knowledge is increasing: knowledge about hazards and risks is obvi-
ously indispensable for the performance of risk assessments which are “a required step for
the adoption of adequate and successful disaster reduction policies and measures” (UN,
1994, p. 5). Despite the differences between risk management and risk governance, the
components and structure of both concepts indicate that risk analysis has an important
part in terms of providing the basis for further strategies and actions in the context of
risk reduction. Though, this does not mean that risks will directly decrease on basis of
knowledge about risks and the information obtained by profound risk analyses, but it
indicates the importance of this step. It is thus reasonable to investigate the role increas-
ing scientific knowledge plays in a framework of non-decreasing levels of economic losses.
White et al. (2001) examine several possible explanations, amongst them the possibilities
that although much is already known still much knowledge is lacking, knowledge is not
4
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used or knowledge is used ineffectively. In the following, they reject the first explication
stating that especially in developed countries “a lack of knowledge is not a major contrib-
utory factor to the growth of disaster losses” while the second and third possibility may
apply (White et al., 2001, p. 89). With respect to the first explication, White et al. are
probably right regarding knowledge about single hazards and approaches to analyse them.
Already extensive knowledge about the processes and a huge variety of models to analyse
the hazard and risk they pose is available. The detailed review of the state of the art
for meteorological, hydrological, volcanic and seismic hazards of the WMO (1999) give a
good overview of the multitude of methods and models, although there is always potential
for further improvements. However, many regions of the world are not only subject to
a single hazard but to multiple hazardous processes, such as mountain regions, coastal
zones or volcano vicinities. For instance, the Principality of Andorra is a small country
(470 km2) entirely situated in the Pyrenees that suffers from a combination of different
landslide types, snow avalanches and floods (Corominas et al., 2003; Cascini et al., 2005;
Planas, 2007). Another example is Mount Cameroon, an active volcano around which
about 450,000 people live or work although the area is prone to volcanic eruptions with
lava flows and lapilli ejection, slope instabilities and earthquakes (Thierry et al., 2008).
The risk analysis of such areas cannot be restricted to single processes since this would
lead to a misestimation of the overall risk and the risk patterns but has to consider all
relevant4 perils in a multi-hazard approach (Greiving et al., 2006). This indicates, that
the necessity for a multi-hazard approach in the risk reduction context emerges from the
spatial aspect: risk reduction measures are the task of administrative bodies and units that
are responsible for “territorial entities (e.g. administrative area)” such as municipalities,
federal states, the complete country etc. (Carpignano et al., 2009, p. 514). To effectively
reduce the overall risk in a defined area, risk assessment and management cannot be re-
stricted to one or few single hazards, on the contrary, “a spatially oriented [approach] has
to take into account all risks that are related to a specific area” (Greiving et al., 2006,
p. 1). In other words, “[m]ulti-hazard cases can be described as settings where a multitude
of hazards need to be included in the risk management of a certain area” (Olfert et al.,
2006, p. 128) and Hewitt & Burton (1971, p. 5) refer to a “all-hazards-at-a-place”
approach. For instance, the structure of the risk management framework in France is
a clear example of the relation between the spatial aspect of risk reduction and multi-
hazard consideration. There, risk management tasks are clearly allotted to the different
administrative levels. The Prefect of a De´partement is responsible to decide, based on the
particular natural hazard situation, which municipalities have to develop risk prevention
plans (Fleischhauer et al., 2006). Thereupon, the assigned municipalities perform the
necessary analyses for the relevant natural hazards and the final risk prevention plan has
4The definition of relevant depends on the knowledge about hazards, risk perception and in case of risk
analyses on the objective of such a study. This topic will be discussed in more detail later in this
chapter.
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to be approved by the Prefect (Fleischhauer et al., 2006).
In the description of a spatial approach to risk reduction discussed above, the terms multi-
hazard, a multitude of hazards, all risks or relevant hazards were used. Thereby, the ques-
tion arises, as to the processes that these descriptors refer to. The selection of the hazards
to be considered in a multi-hazard approach is in the first place related to the characteris-
tics of the specific region for which risk analyses, management and finally risk reduction is
required. That implies, the environmental setting gives rise to a range of natural hazards
that pose a threat on that area. To identify those hazards, a multitude of methods is in
use such as the examination of different maps, aerial photos, field surveys, measurements
carried out in the past and inventories, but also interviews with contemporary witnesses,
the review of newspaper articles etc. (Kienholz & Krummenacher, 1995; Loat &
Petrascheck, 1997; Camenzind-Wildi et al., 2005). However, it is important to keep
in mind, that the resulting list of hazards will always be restricted to the known per-
ils (Hewitt & Burton, 1971; Camenzind-Wildi et al., 2005). Thereby, for instance
extremely rare events or new perils emerging with changes of the socio-environmental
setting may be neglected. Nevertheless, the simple listing of all identifiable and identi-
fied hazards gives no indication about their relevance. Not all hazards active in a certain
area may be relevant in the specific context and related to the objective and responsibil-
ities of the stakeholders. For instance, in the spatial planning context, Greiving et al.
(2006, p. 4) restrict the set to spatially relevant hazards. This refers to “hazards that are
closely tied to certain areas that are especially prone to a particular hazard” and exclude
the ubiquitous risks such as meteorite impacts since they show no spatially differentiated
patterns. Another example for the specification of relevance are the parameters of the
European Commission (2011, p. 24) for the determination of all significant hazards for
risk assessments at a national level: threats with an annual probability of at least 1% and
“significant potential impacts, i.e.: number of affected people greater than 50, economic
and environmental costs about e100 million, and political/social impact considered sig-
nificant or very serious [...]. Where the likely impacts exceed a threshold of 0.6% of gross
national income (GNI) also less likely hazards or risk scenarios should be considered (e.g.
volcanic eruptions, tsunamis)”. In Switzerland, those processes posing no relevant damage
to humans, buildings, infrastructure, livestock, agricultural areas, protection forest, parks
or cultural assets can be excluded from the multi-hazard risk analysis (Borter, 1999).
Moreover, Hewitt & Burton (1971) mention a strong dependence on the extent of the
area to be covered with the analysis. The larger the area under consideration, the higher
the cut-off point of the related damages, that implies, the higher the threshold of damages
and losses above which hazards are considered relevant at this scale. Consequently, the set
of hazards finally taken into account in a multi-hazard approach consists of those processes
present in a certain area that are known and considered relevant for the specific objective
of the study.
In summary, a first definition for the term multi-hazard in a risk reduction context could
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read as follows: the totality of relevant hazards in a defined area, whereby relevant has
to be clearly defined according to the specific situation and setting. Another expression
appearing in this context is that of all-hazards. All-hazards as used by FEMA (1996),
Britton (2002), Ritchey (2006), Rural Alaska Mitigation Planning (2009), Tate
et al. (2010), European Commission (2011) indicates an equivalence with multi-hazard
according to the proposed definitions given above.
In a wider sense, multi-hazard could also be defined as more-than-one-hazard, as for exam-
ple the multi-hazard sessions of the European Geoscience Union Meetings suggest (sessions
bringing together >1 hazard; EGU, 2011). While in the scientific sector only few studies
deal with all relevant hazards present in an area, many studies fall under the definition
of more-than-one-hazard. The strict separation of disciplines in science does not really
facilitate the joint consideration of many, and especially not of very different, hazards (cf.
WMO, 1999). However, in various contexts it is not possible to restrict the analyses to
only one process. This refers for example to the triggering of one hazard by another as in
the case of landslides being triggered by earthquakes (e.g. Bommer & Rodr´ıguez, 2002;
Keefer, 2002; Lin et al., 2006; Chang et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2008; Miles & Keefer,
2009). Although the focus of this type of study might not be equally on both processes,
they can, with this wider definition, be considered as multi-hazard studies. In other cases
one event might cause several different threats which are considered jointly as in the case
of a volcanic eruption with ash and lapilli fallout, lava flows, lahars etc. (e.g. Zuccaro
et al., 2008; Thierry et al., 2008). Likewise, certain research topics, for example the
examination of the complete sediment cascade including soil erosion, rock falls, full-depth
avalanches, shallow landslides and debris flows (Wichmann et al., 2009) or the modelling
of rapid mass movements (RAMMS) comprising snow avalanches, debris flows and rock
fall (Christen et al., 2007), lead to the joint consideration of several hazards. This means
the hazard combination is primarily not determined spatially, as in the framework of risk
reduction, but thematically. This may result in the consideration of only very few hazards,
nevertheless these studies offer a great know-how and knowledge potential.
However, the joint examination and quantification of multiple hazards is a difficult task
since hazards exhibit a wide range of characteristics and are analysed by strongly dif-
fering models (WMO, 1999). Thereby, contrasting hazard characteristics refer to their
time of onset, duration, extent, intensity and return period and parameters of influence
on the built environment and humans (Tyagunov et al., 2005; Carpignano et al., 2009;
Kappes et al., 2010). These contrasts are reflected in the modelling approaches. Del-
monaco et al. (2006b) undertook a comparison of modelling methods for different hazard
types at distinct scales and identified huge distinctions in the approaches. For instance,
statistical analyses are generally used for landslide susceptibility analyses at a national
scale while for volcanic hazards deterministic methods are common. Moreover, not for
each hazard models are available at each scale, e.g. no models exist for local level forest
fire analyses. Furthermore, separate analyses will most probably apply “disparate proce-
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dures and time-space resolutions” and thus “it is difficult, if not impossible, to compare
the risk of different origins” (Marzocchi et al., 2009, p. 7). That implies, emphasis is
still primarily on the constant improvement of single hazard approaches, however, there is
a great need for multi-hazard approaches to consider the challenges outlined above. This
situation has already been identified by Hewitt & Burton in 1971. Hewitt & Burton
(1971, p. 5) noticed on basis of a quick literature review, that “most work has been done
on single hazards, whereas the expanded concern demands a more systematic cross-hazard
approach”. Obviously rather little has changed since then in the scientific sector. Also
in practice, the joint analysis of multiple hazards is still rare and instead separate com-
putation of single-hazards is commonly performed. The survey and management of the
natural environment including the assessment and management of natural hazards is in
many countries traditionally subdivided according to the disciplines (i.e. hydrology, geol-
ogy, meteorology etc.) and assigned to the institution responsible for respective discipline
(geological surveys, institutes for meteorology or hydrology). This is a hindering aspect
for jointly considering multiple hazards since the combination of threats will transverse
a range of disciplines, departments, laws etc. For example, in Germany, risk assessment
and management activities refer primarily to the fields of planning processes, building
permissions and/or emergency response, and several sectoral planning divisions are in
charge (Fleischhauer et al., 2006). While the task of the Geological Survey is landslide
assessment, the water management authorities of the different federal states are responsi-
ble for river floods, and forest fires fall into the field of duties of the Federal Agency for
Agriculture and Food (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Landwirtschaft und Erna¨hrung). This situation
does not only affect the risk assessment but in further consequence the management and
effective reduction of risks.
In summary, the joint consideration of multiple hazards to achieve risk reduction is a ne-
cessity since many regions are prone to different types of threats. However, this is neither
simple and straightforward nor commonly undertaken at present since different natural
hazards are usually analysed and managed by different institutions.
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This situation gives rise to the first hypothesis examined in this thesis:
I) Multi-hazard (risk) analyses are not just the sum of single-
hazard (risk) analyses.
Three objectives issue from this hypothesis:
1. To investigate aspects and challenges emerging in the
multi-hazard risk environment.
2. To review the recent approaches used to cope with the
identified challenges.
3. To develop an analysis scheme considering the knowledge
gained in the previous two steps.
The analysis of risks is usually carried out as a three-part procedure consisting of (1) the
hazard analysis, (2) the appraisal of the vulnerability and value of elements at risk, and
(3) the computation of risk as combination of hazard, vulnerability and value of elements
at risk (Varnes, 1984, refer to the definition of total risk as proposed by ). Furthermore,
each step requires data preparation and computation of intermediate products. For multi-
hazard risk analyses, these three steps, including all single operations, multiply with the
number of hazards taken into account. That implies, already in case of three processes
nine steps are necessary to analyse the risk they pose, not yet including preparative and
intermediate steps. This makes multi-hazard risk analyses rather time-consuming, error-
prone and unwieldy. Moreover, a risk analysis should not be a one-time issue because
hazards, vulnerabilities, values of elements at risk and thus risks change over time. Es-
pecially in the context of global environmental change hazard levels are not static but
dynamic. Shifts in temperature, precipitation patterns, glacier cover or permafrost due to
climate change cause effects on landslides, floods, avalanches etc. (Keiler et al., 2010),
and land use changes, such as removal of the vegetation cover, lead among other effects to
erosion and slope destabilisation (Slaymaker & Embleton-Hamann, 2009). Likewise,
vulnerabilities and values of elements at risk are subject to changes: long-term shifts due
to socio-economic development as well as short-term changes resulting from seasonal or
diurnal variability, especially of mobile values or intangible assets (Fuchs et al., 2005;
Keiler et al., 2005; Zischg et al., 2005; Fuchs & Keiler, 2006). Thus, an occasional
or even periodical repetition of the analysis procedure is needed to be informed about the
current risk level and projections of future risk as a consequence of global environmental
change, socio-economic variation, and different management strategies are recommendable
to support provident and sustainable decision-making.
An aspect closely linked to the fast, user-friendly and repeatable analysis of multiple haz-
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ards is the subsequent visualisation. To support decision-making effectively and commu-
nicate the results of a multi-hazard risk analysis comprehensibly, the clear representation
of the modelling output is very important. However, without profound experience with
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and knowledge of cartographic rules, the clear
and intelligible display of multiple hazards and risks is very challenging (Kunz & Hurni,
2011a). Not only the single-hazard and -risk patterns have to be shown but also their
joint distribution and overlapping etc. while an overloading of the maps has to be avoided
(Kunz & Hurni, 2011a).
These considerations lead to the second hypothesis of this thesis:
II) A software platform provides practical advantages for repro-
ducible multi-hazard risk modelling and visualisation.
Two objectives originate from this hypothesis:
1. To implement the developed analysis scheme into a
modelling tool.
2. To develop a visualisation tool to present the modelling results.
According to the previously presented hypotheses and objectives, the present study
is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review of the current situation in the
multi-hazard risk analysis field as foundation for all following steps. Therein, particular
issues and challenges emerging in this sector are compiled and prevailing approaches to
cope with these challenges are presented (hypothesis I, objectives 1 and 2). In chapter 3
the methodology is outlined by means of which an analysis and visualisation scheme is
developed (hypothesis I, objective 3) and implemented in a modelling software (hypothesis
II, objective 1 & 2). Chapter 4 presents the completed concepts and the finished analysis
and visualisation tools. In chapter 5 a case study is performed in the Barcelonnette
basin to test the usefulness of the developed concepts as well as the applicability and
user-friendliness of the software. Chapter 6 discusses the hypotheses in the light of the
developed methodology, the elaborated software tools and the experiences gained in the
case study and chapter 7 provides an outlook on future challenges.
Those articles written by the author of the present study, cited in the text and forming
part of this PhD-thesis are attached as appendix.
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2. Challenges and Current Approaches in
the Multi-Hazard Field
The fundamental aim of this work is the identification of challenges and difficulties arising
in the multi-hazard risk analysis field and current approaches to solution as basis for all
subsequent steps (hypothesis I, objectives 1 & 2). On that account, a detailed literature
review has been carried out to get an overview of the current state of the art. Thereby, all
studies falling under the multi-hazard definition more-than-one-hazard have been involved.
Despite the fact, that the present study is rather approaching the topic from the definition
totality of relevant hazards in a defined area, studies with a wider multi-hazard definition
provide very interesting ideas and methods especially on specific hazard combinations and
challenges. A detailed review is presented in Kappes et al. (subm.b, A.1) of which the
principal findings are presented in this chapter.
This review is structured according to the three main pillars of general risk analyses
(according to the definition of risk after Varnes, 1984): the hazard (section 2.1) and vul-
nerability of elements at risk (section 2.2) analyses and their combination to risk (section
2.3). These three issues are complemented by a fourth item which is composed by several
additional and rather practical aspects arising in the multi-hazard context (section 2.4).
The emphasis is clearly put on the hazard step, since at this stage the challenges originate
primarily and exert their influence on the further steps.
The first challenge any scientific study faces is the clear use of terms to transmit the
content as explicit as possible. Already between scientists of one discipline, different un-
derstandings and descriptions are applied, and in a multi-hazard context this difficulty
is even more pronounced due to the combination of multiple disciplines (Huttenlau &
Sto¨tter, 2011). Therefore, definitions and explanations for the most important terms
are introduced before presenting the review (the definitions and descriptions presented in
the following are in large parts repeated from the article Kappes et al. (subm.a, A.4).
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Natural hazard describes a “[n]atural process or phenomenon that may cause loss
of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of
livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or envi-
ronmental damage” (UN-ISDR, 2009b, p. 9). However, in a tech-
nical context hazard refers usually to quantitative information on
the “likely frequency of occurrence of different intensities for differ-
ent areas, as determined from historical data or scientific analysis”
(UN-ISDR, 2009b, p. 7). In the field of multi-hazard both defini-
tions of hazard are useful: hazard according to a wider definition
is suitable when generally referring to one or several processes and
hazard according to the technical definition is required to describe
the level of information available for a certain process (in contrast
to susceptibility). To enable the distinction between the two mean-
ings, in the present study the term Full-Hazard will be used to
indicate the second (technical) definition. The term threat is syn-
onymously used to hazard according to the first definition.
Hazard
relations
Any kind of connection, mutual influence, or spatial or temporal
coincidence between hazards. The terms hazard relationships and
hazard interrelations are used synonymously.
Susceptibility offers in first place spatial information on a hazard, i.e. indications
on “[t]he propensity of an area to undergo” for instance landsliding
(Glade et al., 2005, p. 791) or “the probability that any given
region will be affected” (Guzzetti et al., 2005, p. 277). This
implies that susceptibility offers spatial information on a hazard
and lacks, in contrast to full-hazard, information on magnitude-
frequency relationships or intensity distributions.
Exposure refers to “[p]eople, property, systems, or other elements present in
hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses” (UN-
ISDR, 2009b, p. 6). In this study the definition includes not only
the presence of elements in hazard (i.e. full-hazard) but also in
susceptibility zones.
Vulnerability relates to the “” In this study, the emphasis is on physical vulner-
ability, in other words, in first place the characteristics describing
the resistance of the physical environment to the impact of natural
hazards are considered.
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Elements
at risk
“means the population, properties, economic activities, including
public services, etc., at risk in a given area” (Varnes, 1984, p. 10)
Risk is defined as the “[e]xpected losses (of lives, persons injured, prop-
erty damaged and economic activity disrupted) due to a particular
hazard for a given area and reference period” (WMO, 1999, p. 2).
2.1. Multi-Hazard Analyses
According to Delmonaco et al. (2006b, p. 15), the performance of multi-hazard analysis
refers to the “[i]mplementation of methodologies and approaches aimed at assessing and
mapping the potential occurrence of different types of natural hazards in a given area.
Analytical methods and mapping have to take into account the characteristics of the
single hazardous events [...] as well as their mutual interactions and interrelations”. This
description indicates two important issues giving rise to difficulties in multi-hazard analysis
procedures: (1) differing hazard characteristics and their effect on the comparability of
hazards, and (2) hazard relations and interactions. In the following sections these issues
are described in detail and the principal current approaches to solutions are presented
(refer also to Kappes et al., subm.b, A.1).
2.1.1. Comparability of Hazards
One of the major objectives of multi-hazard analysis is the comparison of hazards and
hazard intensities, respectively. However, comparability is difficult to achieve since hazards
differ widely “by their nature, intensity, return periods, and by the effects they may have
on exposed elements” (Carpignano et al., 2009, p. 515). The problems at the hazard
analysis stage, without proceeding to risk, emerge in the first place due to disparities
concerning the impact indicators and impact metrics used to study the effects of hazards
on humans and assets (Delmonaco et al., 2006b; Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al., 2011). For
instance in the case of floods, impact indicator and metric relate usually to the inundation
depth in [m], for rock falls to the impact pressure in [MPa] and for earthquakes to the
peak ground acceleration in [m/s2]. Since neither impact indicators nor impact measures
are directly comparable, an additional step to accomplish comparability is necessary.
According to Kappes et al. (subm.b, A.1) standardisation of hazards is a commonly
applied approach to solve this problem. Two standardisation methods are in wide-spread
use, (a) classification and (b) index schemes.
a) By means of intensity and frequency thresholds, the single hazards can be classified into
hazard categories (e.g. Heinimann et al., 1998; Chiesa et al., 2003; Moran et al., 2004;
Delmonaco et al., 2006a; El Morjani et al., 2007; Thierry et al., 2008). Thereby,
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thresholds are defined with reference to the objectives of the study. For example, the
Swiss guidelines were developed for the determination of hazard zones (high, moderate
and low) for spatial planning purposes (Loat, 2010). These zones are defined according
to the following descriptors and their implications for spatial planning. In zones of high
hazard persons out- and inside of buildings are endangered and sudden building destruc-
tion is possible, further building projects are prohibited (Verbotsbereich). In moderate
hazard areas persons are at risk outside of buildings and usually buildings are only dam-
aged but not destroyed, under the application of building codes further constructions are
possible (Gebotsbereich). In low hazard regions persons are hardly at risk, only slight
damage to buildings is to be expected and no prohibitions or conditions apply (Hinweis-
bereich). In accordance to the effect on humans and buildings, the numerical hazard
intensity thresholds are defined as presented in Table 2.1. The thresholds were defined
assuming an equivalence between, for example, a rock fall with a kinetic energy higher
than 300 kJ and a flood higher than 2 m with respect to the consequences on humans and
buildings. The frequency classification presented in the guidelines compounds the classes
1 - 30 years, 30 - 100 years, 100 - 300 years and more than 300 years. Finally the intensity
and the frequency classes are opposed in a matrix and the final hazard class is determined
from the combination of the intensity and the frequency class (Loat & Petrascheck,
1997). For instance the combination of high intensity and low frequency leads to high haz-
ard, and low intensity and high probability to moderate hazard (Loat & Petrascheck,
1997).
In summary, the central issue in a classification scheme is the definition of the objective
such as spatial planning and the determination of criteria, as for instance impact or hu-
mans an buildings. Subsequently, equivalent thresholds can be established for multiple
hazards. However, without such an overall scheme for the specification of thresholds,
classified hazards from different sources may share the same denomination but are most
probably not equivalent and therefore not comparable.
b) In contrast to classification schemes, standardisation by means of indices is a semiquan-
titative and not a qualitative approach (e.g. Odeh Engineers, Inc, 2001; Dilley et al.,
2005; Bartel & Muller, 2007). This means, while the classified output of the previous
approach is ordinal scaled, index schemes produce cardinal scaled results. Thus, it is not
only possible to rank hazard levels but also to quantify the difference between two hazard
levels and carry out simple mathematical operations, such as averaging calculations. For
the index computation, the methodology is not as evident as for classification approaches.
For instance, Odeh Engineers, Inc (2001) classify the single-hazard magnitudes, fre-
quencies and proportion of the area potentially affected by a hazard event (the analysis
is carried on a sub-region level). However, the second step consists of a multiplication of
the classified frequency score, area impact score and intensity score yielding the contin-
uous hazard scores. Bartel & Muller (2007) do not compare hazard in the sense of
combinations of frequencies and magnitudes, but by probabilities of one scenario for each
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Table 2.1.: Hazard intensity thresholds used in Switzerland for the standardised classi-
fication of avalanches (SLF, 1984), mass movements (Lateltin, 1997) and
floods (Loat & Petrascheck, 1997) with the velocity v, flow depth h,
kinetic energy E and depth of the mobilised mass M.
Intensity High Moderate Low
Avalanches pressure≥ 30 kN/m2
or return period up
to 300 a or less pres-
sure avalanches with
return periods of up
to 30 a.
pressure < 30 kN/m2
with a return pe-
riod of 30 - 300 a,
dust avalanches of
≤ 3 kN/m2 and re-
turn periods under
30 a
dust avalanches with
< 3kN/m2 or less fre-
quent then 30 a or
theoretically possible
events of > 300 a
return period or statisti-
cally unseizable flowing
avalanches
Landslides v > 0.1 m/day or
v > 1 m per event for
displacements
v > 2 cm/a v ≤ 2 cm/a
Rockfall E > 300 kJ 300 kJ > E > 30 kJ E < 30 kJ
Potential
slope de-
bris flows
M > 2 m 2 m > M > 0.5 m M < 0.5 m
Debris
flows
h > 1 m and
v > 1 m/s
h > 1 m or v > 1 m/s not defined
Floods h > 2 m or
h·v > 2 m2/s
h > 0.5 m or
h·v > 0.5 m2/s
h < 0.5 m or
h·v < 0.5 m2/s
hazard. This means, for each hazard type, the annual probability of an event above a cer-
tain magnitude threshold is computed. Subsequently, for each location the single-hazard
annual probabilities can easily be compared and the hazard with the highest probability
can be identified.
Standardisations offer not only the comparison between single-hazards but also their
combination to the overall hazard. Thereby, the central question is, how overlapping haz-
ards are handled. Usual options for classification approaches are to adopt the highest
class of all overlapping hazards (e.g. Heinimann et al., 1998) or an intermediate rating
between the coinciding hazards (e.g. Chiesa et al., 2003). In the case of indices the
single-hazard values can simply be summed or a weighted sum is calculated according to
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the importance of each hazard since they are cardinal-scaled. For instance, Bartel &
Muller (2007) compute for each single-hazard the annual probability that an event with
a magnitude above a certain level may take place. Subsequently they sum all probabilities
to obtain the probability that any of the hazards takes place within a given year. By
contrast, Greiving (2006) use the Delphi method, an approach to collect and synthesise
knowledge from a group of experts by means of questionnaires, to weight single-hazard
indices. The weighted single-hazards are then summed to form an integrated hazard map.
By contrast to this method, El Morjani et al. (2007) weight the hazards on the basis of
the human and economic impact reported in EM-DAT. In this way, the resulting overall
hazard considers the differing importance of various threats for humans and assets.
Apart from the difficulties involved in comparing impact indicators, differences in hazard
characteristics entail the development of specific analysis methods and models for each
process. In Table 2.2, an impression is given of some of the decisive properties that
influence not only the performance of multi-hazard analyses but also risk assessments, risk
prevention measures, event management and regeneration. In their specific combination,
Table 2.2.: Differences between hazards with respect to their characteristics using the
examples of river floods, rock falls and earthquakes (compare also to Hewitt
& Burton, 1971 and Delmonaco et al., 2006b). The appraisals shown in
this table are primarily comparative and qualitative. The qualitative scales
(low - high) applied here are spanned by the three presented hazards.
River floods Rock falls Earthquakes
Onset time slow-onset rapid-onset rapid-onset
Predictability (very) good very difficult (still)
impossible
Frequency rather medium to high rather medium
to high
rather low
Spatial extent medium low high
Impact indicator inundation depth,
flow velocity or
sediment/chemical transport
impact
pressure
peak ground
acceleration
these and many more properties and details give rise to very particular analysis models
based on certain assumptions and featuring diverging levels of uncertainty. The resulting
degree of difference between analysis approaches is illustrated very clearly in the report
of the WMO (1999, p. vii). In this document “existing technologies used to assess the
risks for natural disasters of different origins” for multiple meteorological, hydrological,
volcanic and seismic hazards are presented. Already a short glance at the table of content
and the brief descriptions of the assessment methods indicates many distinctions in the
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fundamental approaching of the respective process (WMO, 1999):
• Meteorological hazards assessment: operational and statistical methods
• Techniques for flood hazard assessment: extent of past flooding; probable maximum
flood and rainfall-run off modelling; estimation of flood discharge etc.
• Techniques for volcanic hazard assessment: mapping and modelling; human surveil-
lance and instrumental monitoring of the volcano.
• Techniques for earthquake hazard assessment: earthquake source models; occurrence
models; ground motion models etc.
Since no common terminology has been applied for the description of the methods, the
differences seem particularly pronounced. By contrast, Delmonaco et al. (2006b) provide
an overview of hazard methodologies based on a synthetic analysis of current approaches
indicating differences between analysis approaches as well (Table 2.3). Primarily, this
Table 2.3.: Methods applied for the analysis of different hazards at different scales ac-
cording to Delmonaco et al. (2006b)
Site specific Local Regional National
Volcanoes deterministic deterministic deterministic deterministic
Seismicity quantitative,
semi-
quantitative
or qualitative
damage
scenarios
deterministic-
quantitative
deterministic-
quantitative
Landslides deterministic deterministic statistical susceptibility
maps with simple
statistical de-
scriptive methods
Meteorological
extreme
events
no common
methodology
available
no common
methodology
available
no common
methodology
available
no common
methodology
available
Forest fires not available fire behaviour,
potential as-
sessment with
fire simulation
models
fire behaviour,
potential as-
sessment with
fire simulation
models
fire frequency
distribution, em-
pirical methods
derived from sta-
tistical analysis
Floods deterministic-
quantitative
deterministic-
quantitative
deterministic-
quantitative
deterministic-
quantitative
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comparison shows that the type of hazard model usually applied depends in a hazard-
specific way on the spatial scale. This implies, that, determined by the respective scale,
hazards are analysed by either rather similar or rather distinct methods. For example, at
a site specific scale volcanoes and landslides are both analysed with deterministic methods
while at a regional scale deterministic or statistical approaches are common. At certain
scales no models may be currently available such as site specific methods for the investi-
gation of fires (Delmonaco et al., 2006b). Moreover, despite apparent similarities large
differences may be inherent in the approaches. For instance, in this overview (Table 2.3)
landslides are addressed as components of one rather homogeneous group that are anal-
ysed by analogue modelling approaches. Indeed, they show many similarities, especially
in comparison to other hazards that are not primarily determined by gravitation such as
forest fires, or that are not related to moving material as is the case for hurricanes. A
closer examination, however, reveals important differences that have to be accounted for
in the analysis method, even between these rather similar process types. For example,
Ayala-Carcedo et al. (2003, p. 327) mention significant differences in the susceptibility
analysis of the run out of rock falls and other types of landslides because (a) the run
out differs in mass size, mobility etc., (b) traces of past rock falls are generally absent,
especially older ones and (c) at smaller scales “the blocks from rockfall cannot be carto-
graphically displayed”. Consequently, differing approaches have to be used to consider the
respective characteristics. Another example is the recurrence of debris flows in the same
torrent or river that allows an estimation of the return period. In contrast, shallow land-
slides and other landslide types do not recur since an event alters the slope conditions and
makes a repeat of a similar incidence very improbable (vanWesten et al., 2006). This
implies that frequency analyses for debris flows and shallow landslides have to be carried
out in different ways. A final example for the differences between landslide types relates
to their predictability. Rock falls are triggered by earthquakes, freezing-thawing leading
to the final destabilisation, heavy rainfall etc. (Dorren, 2003). However, these triggers
are not predictable as in the case of earthquakes, or the exact moment of detaching is
very difficult to forecast since the triggers are in first place promoters of rock falls leading
only after continuous destabilisation to the actual triggering of an event. Therefore, the
prediction of rock falls is very difficult. In contrast, in many studies rainfall thresholds are
established to link their occurrence to a possible triggering of debris flows or shallow land-
slides (Remaˆıtre et al., 2010). Since rainfalls are additionally mostly well predictable, it
is more likely possible to forecast debris flows than rock falls, although still huge difficul-
ties are related to factors such as material availability (Glade, 2005). These significant
differences between processes of apparent similarity give a good indication of the degree
of dissimilarity between obviously contrasting processes.
The difficulties arising with differing modelling approaches lie in the inherent assumptions,
scale, required input, quality of the output and other factors (Marzocchi et al., subm.).
All these properties influence the character and the uncertainties of the result. Statisti-
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cal methods for landslide modelling for example are based on the assumption, that those
factors which have led to landslide occurrence in the past will also lead to landslides in
the future (Dai et al., 2002). This may also include indirect parameters such as altitude
or exposition which actually represent temperature gradients or other meso-climatic con-
ditions. Consequently, the assumption of equal influence of indirect factors in past and
future holds only true if the relationship between the indirect factor and the parameter it
actually represents remains unchanged. By contrast, physically-based methods are based
on physical parameters such as gravitation, friction, viscosity etc. Although they attempt
to describe the process itself and involve much more detail, they are still based on certain
generalisations and assumptions. Expert assessments, again, are primarily based on the
experience of the respective person and criteria that are in most cases not explicitly de-
scribed (vanWesten et al., 2006). Due to these differences, Delmonaco et al. (2006b,
p. 60) call for “rigorous methodologies with rigorous data” and Marzocchi et al. (subm.,
p. n.a.) remark that the implicit assumptions and propagated uncertainties “should not
be ignored, but they have to be incorporated into the final assessment in a coherent way”.
However, so far no clear guidelines and few indications are available, as to by which criteria
this can be done.
In summary, the most obvious requirement for comparability is the sameness of the final
output metrics and the choice of a common scale. To which extent, beyond these aspects,
further criteria for the model choice can be effectively adopted to ensure comparability of
the results has so far not received much attention. Although differences and difficulties
have been mentioned by Delmonaco et al. (2006b) and Marzocchi et al. (2009) and
the need for a coherent approach is clearly stated, general advice is still lacking. Shedding
some light at this aspect is one of the aspirations of this study.
2.1.2. Hazard Relations
The existence of relations between natural hazards and the potentially resulting conse-
quences is an issue of increasing importance in multi-hazard studies (e.g. Egli, 1996;
Tarvainen et al., 2006; dePippo et al., 2008; Bovolo et al., 2009; Marzocchi et al.,
2009; Kappes et al., 2010). Thereby, hazard relations refers to many different types of
influence one hazard may exert on another. However, the multiple kinds of relations as
well as the associated terminology are still not clearly structured. Currently, the following
phenomena are primarily described and studied in the literature: the triggering of one
hazard by another such as river damming by a landslide (Carrasco et al., 2003; Mar-
zocchi et al., 2009); multiple effects of one hazard phenomenon, e.g. volcanic eruptions
causing lava flows, ash deposition, lapilli ejection, lahars etc. (Marzocchi, 2007; Zuc-
caro et al., 2008); the simultaneous impact of several hazards for instance due to the
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same triggering event as in the case of landsliding, debris flows and floods due to heavy
and prolonged rainfalls (Luino, 2005); and the alteration of the disposition of a hazard
after the occurrence of another hazard, for instance the impact of a fire on the disposition
to debris flows (Cannon & deGraff, 2009). To describe these phenomena a range of
terms is in use. Below, a list of commonly applied terms is given:
Cascades, cascading ef-
fects, cascading failures
or cascade events
Delmonaco et al. (2006a); Carpignano et al. (2009);
Zuccaro & Leone (2011); European Commission
(2011)
Chains Shi (2002); Erlingsson (2005), with the difference that at
least the cited studies do not only include the natural but
also e.g. technological hazards and refer to the resulting
disaster. Thus, they are also called disaster chains.
Coincidence of hazards
in space and time
Tarvainen et al. (2006, p. 84)
Coinciding hazards European Commission (2011)
Compound hazards Hewitt & Burton (1971); Alexander (2001)
Coupled events Marzocchi et al. (2009)
Cross-hazards effects Greiving (2006)
Domino effects Luino (2005); Delmonaco et al. (2006a); Per-
les Rosello´ & Cantarero prados (2010); vanWesten
(2010); European Commission (2011)
Follow-on events European Commission (2011)
Interactions Tarvainen et al. (2006); dePippo et al. (2008); Marzoc-
chi et al. (2009); Zuccaro & Leone (2011)
Interconnections Perles Rosello´ & Cantarero prados (2010)
Interrelations Delmonaco et al. (2006b); Greiving (2006)
Knock-on effects European Commission (2011)
Multiple hazard Hewitt & Burton (1971)
Synergic effects Tarvainen et al. (2006)
Triggering effects Marzocchi et al. (2009)
However, few clear definitions of and delimitations between terms exist. Delmonaco
et al. (2006a, p. 10) describe the domino effect or cascading failure as “a failure in a
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system of interconnected parts, where the service provided depends on the operation of a
preceeding part, and the failure of a preceeding part can trigger the failure of successive
parts”. To name this phenomenon, the European Commission (2011, p. 23) uses the
term coinciding hazards, “also referred to as follow-on events, knock-on effects, domino
effects or cascading events”. By contrast, the term hazard interactions suggests a mutual
relation between hazards although in many studies the authors refer not to reciprocal
processes. For instance, Tarvainen et al. (2006) establishes a division into vice versa in-
teractions and interactions between two hazards in which only one process influences the
other. Hewitt & Burton (1971) present a broader explanation distinguishing between
compound and multiple hazard. While they characterise compound hazard as “several el-
ements acting together above their respective damage threshold–for instance wind, hail,
and lightning damage in a severe storm”, multiple hazard to “elements of quite different
kinds coinciding accidentally, or more often, following one another with damaging force–
for instance floods in the midst of drought, of hurricane followed by landslides and floods”
(Hewitt & Burton, 1971, p. 30).
The specific methods to deal with related hazards are as diverse as the terms and the
phenomena falling into this category. However, according to Delmonaco et al. (2006a,
p. 10) two general approaches can be distinguished: (a) the identification where different
hazards overlap and might be coupled and (b) the investigation of all individual chains
of one hazard triggering the next. Although Delmonaco et al. (2006a) refer in the first
place to hazard cascades where one hazard triggers the next, method (a) is also applicable
for other kinds of hazard relations which occur in zones of hazard overlap. This includes
for example also the simultaneous impact of several hazards or the alteration of the dis-
position of a hazard after the occurrence of another hazard.
a) The simple identification of hazards’ overlap zones and possible interactions is usually
carried out by a separate modelling of the single-hazards and a subsequent overlay of the
hazards in a GIS software. For the overlapping areas, the potential effect of spatial haz-
ard coincidences has to be determined. For this step, Tarvainen et al. (2006) as well as
dePippo et al. (2008) propose the use of a matrix as depicted in Figure 2.1. Thereby,
dePippo et al. identify for instance for overlap of riverine flooding (Figure 2.1 cell 2.2)
and landslide hazard (cell 4.4.) the potential of flood-induced landslides with subsequent
breaching of the dam (cell 2.4). Additionally, these areas may be prone to a reverse in-
fluence of landslides on flooding as well, by means of cut off or flow deviation (cell 2.4).
At the identified locations, relations and interactions can then be analysed in more detail
and with more sophisticated methods at a local scale.
b) To analyse the potential consequences of cascading effects in more detail, the possi-
ble series of events have to be examined. Especially event trees proved useful, although
their elaboration is extremely demanding. First, a triggering event is defined and secondly,
known possible subsequent incidences are identified and arranged in a tree-structure (Egli,
1996; Marzocchi et al., 2009). Finally probabilities are assigned to the single branches, a
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Fig. 7. Descriptive matrix of the interaction of each hazard with one another. Six leading diagonal terms: shoreline erosion, storm waves, riverine flooding, landslides, seismicity and volcanism and
man-made structures are considered. Such a matrix, already tested in other environmental studies, indicates the influence of the morphological parameters on the system (the cause of the phenomena) or
show the influence of the system on each of the parameters (the effect of the phenomena).
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Figure 2.1.: Interaction matrix according to dePippo et al. (2008). The processes are
located in the diagonal and in the remaining cells the possible interactions
are presented. For each cell the hazard situated in this line indicates the
possibly influencing and the process of this column the influenced process.
very challenging step that is mostly based on serious assumptions and subjective appraisals
(Figure 2.2). However, this method is, due to the immense multitude of possibilities and
the lack of information to assess their probabilities, not applicable to examine all poten-
tial situations and incidences. Though, for the examination of specific scenarios at a local
scale, this approach offers an insight into the potential occurrence of event combinations.
Apart from these two major approaches, in many hazard-pair-specific studies, methods
are proposed to account for the specific relations between the two particular processes.
Examples are the definition of earthquake intensity thresholds for the triggering of land-
slides (Harp & Wilson, 1995; Keefer, 2002), the analysis of increased debris flow threat
following forest fires (deGraff et al., 2007; deGraff & Ochiai, 2009; Cannon & de-
Graff, 2009), the identification of torrents potentially blocked by landslides (Costa &
Schuster, 1988; Carrasco et al., 2003; Perucca & Esper Angillieri, 2009), the
examination of potential outburst of glacial lakes due to ice avalanches or debris flows
(Huggel et al., 2003, 2004) or the study of material propagation between soil erosion,
rock fall, debris flows, shallow landslides and full-depth avalanches (Wichmann & Becht,
2003; Wichmann et al., 2009).
In summary, a multitude of relations between different hazards exists that influence pri-
marily the manifestation of hazards e.g. due to hazard cascades and the hazard level in-
cluding frequency and magnitude. Although a multitude of terms and methods is applied
to consider these phenomena, clear definitions or general concepts are rarely presented.
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Landslide  Clogging Lake formation Dam break …
Triggering 1st secondary 2nd secondary 3rd secondary …
event event event event
PA = 0.01
q1 = 0.2
q2 = 0.1
1-q2 = 0.9
q3 = 0.4
1-q3 = 0.6
1-q1 = 0.8
P = 0.003
P = 0.001
P = 0.002
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
…
…
Figure 2.2.: Example of an event tree, translated and modified after Egli (1996) with
the probability of the triggering event PA, the conditional probability qi of
the non-occurrence of the event i and the total probability of the complete
path P .
The compilation of current methods for the consideration of multi-hazard relations indi-
cates a strong dependence on the scale as well as on the specific set of hazards involved.
Concluding, the comparability between hazards is a major challenge for the performance
of multi-hazard analyses, nevertheless, standardisation techniques already provide a viable
solution. Moreover, the consideration of hazard relations is an important issue for multi-
hazard analyses. The neglect of this aspect may otherwise lead to the occurrence of
unexpected and completely unforeseen effects due to a misjudgement of the actual hazard
situation. Multiple approaches exist to take these phenomena into account, but, still no
overall concept is available to coherently incorporate them into analysis procedures.
An alternative option to overcome the comparability problem is the performance of a
full risk analysis for each individual hazard, and the subsequent comparison of the results.
Risks are expressed in hazard-independent metrics such as number of fatalities, persons
affected or monetary losses and can therefore be directly compared. For the computation
of risks, hazards are related to the vulnerabilities of exposed elements at risk. Thus, after
having assessed the hazard, the next step towards a full analysis of multi-hazard risks is
the examination of vulnerability. The joint consideration of multiple hazards also leads
in the vulnerability context to additional issues and difficulties. In the following section,
details on the challenges and currently used solutions are provided, with emphasis on
physical vulnerability.
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2.2. Physical Vulnerability for Multiple Hazards
The revision of approaches for single-hazard physical vulnerability analyses presented in
Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. (2011, A.2) gives an overview of a range of methods in use.
However, in a multi-hazard context with the aim of generating comparable single-hazard
assessments, a common approach is important to assure the comparability of the single
risks. In addition to differing analysis methods, the effect of temporally and spatially
overlapping hazards on the vulnerability also poses a considerable challenge. These two
issues are presented in detail below.
2.2.1. Availability of Vulnerability Analysis Methods
Due to differences in hazard characteristics not only the methods to determine the hazard
level but also those to commonly appraise the vulnerability differ between processes. While
for example a variety of methods for earthquake vulnerability and damage assessments are
used (Calvi et al., 2006), vulnerability analyses for landslides, coastal erosion and volca-
noes emerged much later and are still applied less frequently and are less well-established
(Glade, 2003; vanWesten, 2004; Douglas, 2007; Foerster et al., 2009). Also the
“goal of assessments is different” since for instance for earthquakes the possible impact
of an event is estimated, as earthquakes cannot be predicted or prevented. In contrast,
for volcanic or landslide vulnerability assessments evacuation or prevention purposes have
priority (Foerster et al., 2009, p. 11). By implication, this affects the straightforward-
ness of the development and performance of multi-hazard vulnerability analyses and still
only a few, especially only a few generic, approaches exist (Kappes et al., subm.b, A.1).
The principal approaches to assess physical vulnerability are curves/functions, matri-
ces/coefficients and index-/indicator-based methods (Foerster et al., 2009). Although
all three approaches are already in use in multi-hazard vulnerability analyses, they are
not equally applicable for the whole range of hazards. For instance vulnerability curves,
also referred to as damage, risk or fragility curves, are based on a large amount of data on
damaged buildings collected after hazard events. Hereby, the event intensity is related to
the caused damage at a certain type of building and curves are adjusted to the observed
intensity-damage combinations (Menoni, 2006). Thus, this is a common approach for
extensive hazards such as storms, floods or earthquakes but for very local hazards such
as rock falls this method is less frequent used and curves are hardly available (one of the
few examples is Borter & Bart, 1999). Though, for analyses that are restricted to
extensive hazards, curves are well-applicable (e.g. Gru¨nthal et al., 2006). An example is
the software tool HAZUS that offers the analysis of hurricane, earthquake and flood based
on vulnerability curves (HAZards U.S., FEMA, 2003, 2007a,b).
In contrast to curves, damage matrices are discrete, or non-continuous, approaches (Fo-
erster et al., 2009). They “express in a matrix the combination of [classified] hazard
levels and [stepwise] vulnerability” and are either developed on the basis of observed dam-
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ages or, in the case of qualitative matrices, on rough appraisals (Menoni, 2006, p. 40).
Therefore, their development is simpler, less data-demanding and more expert appraisal
can be integrated (Menoni, 2006; Calvi et al., 2006). For multi-hazard studies they are
obviously more applicable since they are available or can be created with less required
damage data for many types of hazards (Menoni, 2006).
An important constraint most curves and matrices share is the limitation that they con-
sider only one building characteristic (Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al., 2011, A.2). This refers
in most cases to the building type, for instance wooden, masonry, concrete or reinforced
(e.g. Keylock & Barbolini, 2001; Bu¨chele et al., 2006). The study of Zezere et al.
(2008) is an exception with the combined consideration of building type and condition.
However, many more properties as for example design, shape or foundation of a struc-
ture influence the physical vulnerability of a building. Indicator approaches fill this gap
since they consider a range of properties (used as indicators) and combine them to de-
scribe or quantify the vulnerability of an element at risk. For instance for the analysis of
the building vulnerability, in the study of Puissant et al. (2006) the indicators building
type, height and function were used and Schneiderbauer & Ehrlich (2006) propose
parameters such as building material and age, size and height, location of dwelling, etc.
However, in contrast to curves and matrices they are mostly used in a rather qualitative
than quantitative way.
For the comparable analysis of vulnerability for multiple hazards, first, one approach
has to be chosen to be applied for all processes. Moreover, equivalent criteria have to be
used for the creation of curves, the definition of vulnerability matrices or the application of
indicator approaches to ensure the comparability between the vulnerabilities towards mul-
tiple hazards. Thus, a coherent vulnerability analysis scheme to assure the comparability
of the final single-risks is required. However, not only the coherent analysis of multi-hazard
vulnerabilities is a challenging issue but also the consideration of effects emerging due to
overlapping hazards. This aspect will be illustrated in the next section.
2.2.2. Effects of Related Hazards
The overlapping and relation of hazards does not only influence the threat natural hazards
pose, but has also an important impact on the vulnerability. By reviewing the literature,
different situations and settings turn out to lead to particular effects. Three types of
effects could be distinguished: (a) the exposure of buildings to various hazards, (b) the
simultaneous impact of hazards and (c) the sequential occurrence of hazard events in a
short period of time and the same area. In contrast, cascading effects only alter the haz-
ard level, but not the vulnerability characteristics. In the following, these three cases are
illustrated in detail:
a) The exposure of buildings to various hazards. The building properties contribute differ-
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ently to the hazard-specific vulnerabilities of a structure. For instance, large unprotected
windows increase the vulnerability for winds but have a less negative effect on earthquakes
(Table 2.4). By contrast, the number of storeys is of higher importance with respect to
Table 2.4.: Relative contribution of building characteristics to the hazard-specific vul-
nerability after Middelmann & Granger (2000). (Note: the higher the
number of ∗ the higher the contribution to the building vulnerability).
Characteristic Flood Wind Hail Fire Earthqu.
Building age ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Floor height or vert. regularity ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Wall material ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗
Roof material ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Roof pitch ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Large unprotected windows ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗
Unlined eaves ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Number of stories ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Plan regularity ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Topography ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
earthquakes and floods then to winds or hail. In zones where buildings are exposed to
multiple hazards, the hazard-specific vulnerability has to be considered.
b) The alteration of the building vulnerability due to the simultaneous impact of two or
more threats. This refers for example to an earthquake impact on a snow or volcanic ash
covered house (e.g. Lee & Rosowsky, 2006; Zuccaro et al., 2008). Due to the load on
the roof, the structural properties of the building are modified and the earthquake exerts a
modified effect. Thus, a separate consideration or a summing up of vulnerabilities cannot
account for these implications.
c) The sequential impact. This relates to the cumulative impact of multiple hazards, so-
called hazard sequences (Zuccaro et al., 2008). Shortly after an impact, for example of
an earthquake, the same structure is hit by a landslide triggered by the ground movement.
Since the structure is already affected by the earthquake, the consequence of the landslide
may differ from the effect it would have caused before the earthquake. Again, by summing
of vulnerabilities or potential damages this cannot be accounted for.
The first step to deal with the effect of overlapping hazards is the identification of all
processes that are known to pose a threat to a certain building. The second step is to
determine which measures can be taken in each of the three situations.
a) Due to the hazard-specific contribution of building characteristics to the vulnerability of
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a structure towards each of the processes, buildings located in zones of overlapping hazards
have to be carefully designed. This refers primarily to the identification of synergistic and
especially contradictory properties. For example, heavy structures better resist to wind
while light structures are favourable in the case of earthquakes (Gibbs, 2003; Holub &
Hu¨bl, 2008). Nevertheless, for both, winds and earthquakes, symmetrical compact shapes
proved more convenient. That implies, in zones of overlapping threats, multi-hazard de-
signs and suitable building codes have to be developed, avoiding contradictions and seeking
for synergies (e.g. Gibbs, 2003). This applies as well for the construction of protection
measures such as reinforcements. The vulnerability reduction towards one hazard should
not lead to an increase towards another hazard.
b) Since the consequences of simultaneous impacts depend on both hazards, Lee &
Rosowsky (2006) propose the development and use of fragility surfaces instead of curves.
Therefore, the loads of the two hazards at the x- and y-axis are plotted against the re-
sulting vulnerability on the z-axis as displayed in Figure 2.3. However, the development
Figure 2.3.: Fragility surface after Lee & Rosowsky (2006).
of fragility surfaces is demanding and damage information for the development of such
mathematical functions is difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, an alternative option is their
elaboration on the basis of physical calculations (Lee & Rosowsky, 2006).
c) For the case of the sequential impact of hazards, Zuccaro et al. (2008, p. 430) recom-
mend a dynamical updating of “the building inventory and the vulnerability functions”
during the event sequence. Hereby, the situation is treated as “progressive deterioration
of the building’s resistance characteristics that is essentially represented by the damage
level” (Zuccaro et al., 2008, p. 420).
In conclusion, the consideration of the consequences of hazard overlapping on multi-
hazard vulnerabilities is, in the framework of vulnerability analyses, in the early stages of
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development. Although, in the engineering field multi-hazard design is already an issue, in
general the presented approaches to deal with overlapping are pioneer works. Nevertheless,
while the exposure to multiple hazards is gaining increasing attention, hardly any study
is available that would cover the topic of consequences of sequential impacts.
2.3. Multi-Hazard Risk
Being a combination of the analysis of hazard and vulnerability of elements at risk, multi-
hazard risk studies face most of the previously identified challenges. This refers primarily
to the difficulty to assure the comparability of the analysis results, be it at hazard, vul-
nerability or finally at risk level. Thus, an overall scheme for hazard and vulnerability
analyses and their combination to risk is very important. However, in contrast to multi-
hazard analyses, multi-hazard risk analyses exhibit the major advantage that they are not
quantified in hazard-specific units but in damage- and loss-specific measures (except for
qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches). This facilitates the comparison and stan-
dardisation by means of classification or index-creation is not necessary. Thus, according
to Marzocchi et al. (subm.) and as coincided during the workshop “Multi-Hazard Risks
- status quo and future challenges”1 minimum prerequisite for comparability is the def-
inition of common output metrics and the scale at which the modelling is carried out.
Marzocchi et al. (subm.) refer to the scale term as the space-time window that has
to be defined for the performance of a multi-hazard risk analysis. Thereby, the spatial
scale refers to the size of the study area and the required degree of detail. The temporal
resolution relates to the considered time window such as several days for the planning and
performance of emergency activities, or weeks, years, decades or even centuries for land use
planning (Marzocchi et al., subm.). The risk metric corresponds to the type of risk to
be examined as for instance economic, social, ecological, direct or indirect risks. Thereby,
Marzocchi et al. (subm.) refer to quantitative metrics but, according to Kappes et al.
(subm.b, A.1) qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches are also in use. In the fol-
lowing, the three types of approaches (qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative) are
presented briefly and several examples are given.
In the case of qualitative multi-hazard risk analyses, usually the classified hazards and
vulnerabilities are combined to risk according to a predefined scheme as for example il-
lustrated in Figure 2.4 (e.g. Granger et al., 1999; Sperling et al., 2007; BBK, 2010).
A basic requirement for the comparability of the final risk classes is the equivalence of
all single-hazard classes and the compatibility with the vulnerability classes, which means
an overall analysis scheme is needed. This also applies for index-based semi-quantitative
methods. Here, risk is not the result of a classification step as in the case of the combina-
tion of hazards and vulnerabilities for qualitative analyses, but of a computation process.
1December 20-21, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
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Figure 2.4.: Matrix for the combination of hazard and vulnerability to risk (translated,
following Sperling et al., 2007)
Examples of index-based multi-hazard risk analysis schemes are provided by Greiving
et al. (2006) Greiving (2006) and Dilley et al. (2005). For instance, in the analysis
concept proposed by Greiving et al. (2006) the previously computed hazard and vulner-
ability indices are equally-weighted and summed to the integrated risk. For more detail
refer to Kappes et al. (subm.b, A.1).
In contrast to the previous two approaches, quantitative multi-hazard risk analyses pro-
vide information on potential damages or losses (e.g. vanWesten, 2002; Gru¨nthal et al.,
2006; Garcin et al., 2008; Bru¨ndl, 2008; Marzocchi et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2011;
Marzocchi et al., subm.). Thereby, a large multitude of different metrics and formula
based on differing parameters are in use. For instance, Bell & Glade (2004a,b) calculate
the annual risk of loss of life in buildings and the economic risk to buildings and infras-
tructure while Bru¨ndl (2008) analyse the collective and individual risks. Gru¨nthal
et al. (2006) and vanWesten et al. (2002) also calculate economic damages. However,
they are not restricted to single scenarios and the respective risk but assess the potential
damages related to the annual exceedance probabilities of the events by means of curves
(e.g. Figure 2.5). Therefore, the annual exceedance probability of multiple scenarios with
different return periods is calculated and plotted against the expected damages. This rep-
resentation form offers the possibility to better account for hazard differences concerning
their magnitude-frequency characteristics. For instance, while at higher annual exceedance
probabilities floods and storms pose a higher economic risk, earthquake events may lead to
much higher potential damages at lower exceedance probabilities due to this high magni-
tude (Figure 2.5). Furthermore, the area under the curve “represents the total [expected]
damage for the specific type of hazard” (vanWesten et al., 2002, p. 16). By combining all
single-hazard risk curves vanWesten et al. derive the total risk curve “which represents
the annual expected losses to buildings and contents of buildings for the various types of
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Figure 2.5.: Risk curves showing the “total direct monetary losses for buildings and
contents in the sectors private housing, commerce and industry in Cologne”
with respect to their annual exceedance probability (Gru¨nthal et al., 2006,
p. 38).
natural hazards” (vanWesten et al., 2002, p. 16).
All these distinct types of risks that are characterised or quantified and the differing ap-
proaches used therefor indicate that although no difficulties emerge in their comparison
due to hazard-specific metrics, an overall analysis scheme is still necessary to assure the
comparability of the results. This refers first to metric and scale, but also to the approach
applied and the parameters considered. Furthermore, all assumptions and uncertainties
that are propagated from the hazard and vulnerability analyses pose an important chal-
lenge for the design of multi-risk analysis schemes (Marzocchi et al., subm.). Due to
the contrast between modelling approaches the quality and uncertainties of the modelling
results differs between single-hazard risks. However, it is difficult to consider these con-
trasts rigorously as demanded by Delmonaco et al. (2006b). Therefore they are mostly
neglected so far although at least in the interpretation of the results the attempt should
be made to consider these aspects.
2.4. Practical Challenges
Apart from the previously explained aspects which are directly related to the three steps of
risk analyses, three additional challenges arise: the high data requirement in multi-hazard
risk procedures, the multitude of steps the whole process consists of, and the difficulty to
visualise the multi-dimensional output.
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2.4.1. High Data Requirement
The consideration of different hazard types and elements at risk leads to the requirement
of “a large amount of spatial and attribute data [...] to carry out a comprehensive multi-
hazard risk assessment” (vanWesten, 2010, p. 206, see also Reese et al., 2007b). The
availability of multi-hazard inventories containing spatio-temporal information on past
events poses the greatest problem. The multitude of challenges occurring in inventory-
based single-hazard studies gives a good indication of the difficulties multi-hazard inven-
tories face. For example, for landslides vanWesten et al. (2006, p. 174) mention that
“[t]here are few places in the world that have fairly complete historical [...] records for
the past 50-100 years”. Despite the fact that Italy is one of the few countries in which
landslide “inventory databases have been made in a consistent manner” these databases
suffer from several shortcomings (Blahut et al., 2010, p. 37). For multiple records the
exact date of occurrence is missing and events are depicted as points but no information
is attached whether this refers to the scarp, transport or deposition area. Another critical
aspect of landslide inventories containing different landslide types is the identification and
naming of the event types according to an agreed classification. In the context of rock fall
inventories, Chau et al. (2003) comment on the problem that many events are unreported
or even unnoticed and inventories are thus incomplete. Moreover, Maggioni (2004) made
the observation that the quality of the records depends on multiple circumstances. The
records of those snow avalanche events having occurred far from settlements, in stormy
periods or at night exhibit a lower quality and lack precise and complete information.
In contrast, for other hazard types the information on past events is much better. This
refers especially to processes that can be monitored continuously such as floods with dis-
charge or earthquakes with seismic measurements (Bautista & Bautista, 2004; Glade,
2006). This indicates already that the methods by which information on past events is
collected play an important role. For the compilation or completion of inventories several
approaches can be used: (multi-temporal) aerial-photo and satellite image interpretation,
field surveys, interviews, maps, reports and instrument monitoring (vanWesten, 2010).
The applicability of each method is strongly dependent on the hazard characteristics as
outlined in Table 2.5. For instance, Ayala-Carcedo et al. (2003, p. 327) state that in
contrast to other landslide types, “trace[s] of a block movement[s], specially the older ones
are generally absent”. Likewise, snow avalanches leave traces that vanish shortly after
the event, latest during the next snow melt. However, “sharp trim lines in treed areas,
new tree growth, and different species” give indirect indications on past events, visible in
the field or on aerial photos (Mc Clung et al., 1989, p. 122). In contrast, shallow and
deep-seated landslides can directly be mapped in the field and in aerial photos (Thiery
et al., 2003). Digital surface models from airborne laser-scanning allow the recognition of
landslide forms even below forest cover (Petschko et al., 2010). By contrast, in the case
of floods remote sensing is, if not during the flood itself, not always helpful (Table 2.5).
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Table 2.5.: Methods for the compilation and completion of inventories for several haz-
ards based on information from Thiery et al. (2003); Barriendos et al.
(2003); Chau et al. (2003); Bautista & Bautista (2004); vanWesten
et al. (2006); Thiery et al. (2007); Apel et al. (2009). ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates well
applicability and wide use of the method, ∗∗ medium and ∗ rather seldom/no
use and low/no usefulness. Documentary sources refer to documents from ad-
ministrative, religious, private or notaries’ archives.
River floods Rock falls Earthquakes Shallow /
deep-seated
landslides
Aerial
photos &
satellite
imagery
∗∗
During &
shortly after
events
∗∗
Source & accu-
mulation area
∗
Damages
directly after
an event
∗ ∗ ∗
Esp. photo
series or in
combination
with DEMs
Field survey ∗∗
Especially
artificial
marks e.g. at
buildings or
timely close to
events
∗∗
Direct
observation,
lichenometry,
etc.
∗
Only timely-
close to an
event, map-
ping on basis
of damages
∗ ∗ ∗
Mapping of the
phenomenon
itself
Documentary
sources
∗ ∗ ∗
Often effect
on settlements,
rather well
documented
∗
Less often
effect on
settlements,
not that well
documented
∗ ∗ ∗
Often effect
on settle-
ments, thus
rather well
documented
∗∗
Less frequently
effect on
settlements,
only small
proportion is
documented
Instrumental
monitoring
∗ ∗ ∗
Discharge
measurements
∗
Not
established
∗ ∗ ∗
Seismograph
∗∗
Extensiometers
etc. to measure
movement
rates
Based on the difficulties presented in this section it becomes clear that multi-hazard in-
ventories with comparable quality for all hazards are extremely difficult to obtain. Never-
theless, detailed inventories are a prerequisite for the performance of magnitude-frequency
calculations and serve as a basis for the calibration and validation of hazard models. Differ-
ent qualities of inventories may therefore lead to differing levels of quality and uncertainty
of single-hazard analysis results.
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2.4.2. Multi-Part Procedure
The performance of a multi-hazard risk analysis is composed of many single steps. This
implies the hazard, vulnerability and risk analysis of each process taken into account and
additionally all preparative and intermediate steps. Therefore, the modelling procedure
is time-consuming due to the multitude of single steps to be performed by the modeller,
error-prone because of potential mistakes in the conduct of all these steps, parameter entry
and file naming, and the updating or analysis of scenarios is an unwieldy operation.
An approach to facilitate the performance of multi-hazard risk analyses is the automation
of the whole sequence of single steps in software tools (Bell et al., 2007). Thereby, the
user is guided through the analysis process while standard steps such as format changes,
calculation of derivatives, classifications etc. are carried out automatically. Moreover,
such software tools enable not only fast analysis completion but also provide a better
comparability of hazard and risk levels in space and time. This means that the results of
different study areas as well as the outcome of repeated analyses, months or years later,
can be better compared since the same analysis approach is used, and enables prioriti-
sation of certain areas or identification of trends. The currently most known software
tools are HAZUS for the USA (FEMA, 2008), RiskScape in New Zealand (Reese et al.,
2007a) and CAPRA in Central America (Central American Probabilistic Risk Assessment
CEPREDENAC et al., 2011). HAZUS offers hurricane, earthquake and flood hazard
and risk modeling, RiskScape currently facilitates the analysis of volcanic ashfalls, floods,
tsunamis, landslides, storms and earthquakes and CAPRA provides the examination of
hurricanes, heavy rainfall, landslides, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic hazards.
2.4.3. Visualisation of the Multi-Dimensional Output
The final challenge presented here relates to the large information content of the outcome
of multi-hazard risk analyses. This affects the communication of the results and especially
the visualisation in maps, since only a certain amount of information can be shown at
once (Fuchs, 2009b; Kunz & Hurni, 2011a). Thus, the information content has to be
distributed to multiple maps presenting different aspects of the multi-hazard risk analysis
result. Several map types and approaches to communicate the information are currently
in use (Kappes et al., subm.b, see Appendix A.1):
Single variable visualisation: The depiction of each single-hazard, vulnerability or risk
separately. However, this is in many cases only the first step of the exposition of anal-
ysis results followed by further maps presenting combined information (as e.g. in Odeh
Engineers, Inc, 2001; Bell, 2002; Dilley et al., 2005). The major strength of this
presentation form is the clear and in depth visualisation of one parameter. Hereby, the
map reader can identify the patterns of each hazard separately and in detail.
Visualisation of a joint variable: Depiction of the sum, product, maximum value etc. of
hazards, vulnerabilities or risks in a so-called synoptic map (Kunz & Hurni, 2011a). This
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display form does not pose challenges concerning the visualisation since, as in the previ-
ous display format, only one parameter is shown although information on a multitude of
hazards or risks is visualised jointly. However, details on single hazards, vulnerabilities or
risks are lost in favour of the illustration of combined patterns. Examples are Bell (2002)
presenting the individual risk to life, object risk to life and the economic risk resulting
from multiple hazards by summing single risks up, or Dilley et al. (2005) showing the
number of overlapping hazards.
Simultaneous visualisation of several variables: The advantage of this approach is that
it allows to identify spatial relations between different parameters while also presenting
information on each single one. However, it is important to avoid an overload of the
maps with too much information since this leads to confusion and reduces the readability
(Kunz & Hurni, 2011a). Overlaps aggravate this challenge since either one parameter is
overlain by the other and thus not visible or with semi-transparency both are visible but
details are more difficult to recognise. If many processes are considered it is not possible
to visualise all of them in one map and they have to be separated into groups as for ex-
ample in the study of UN-ISDR (2009a) where weather-related hazards (floods, tropical
cyclones and droughts) and tectonic hazards (tsunamis, landslides and earthquakes) were
presented in two separate maps. The BGR & DESDM (2009) propose another option by
restricting the hazard information given for each single process to the high-hazard class.
Consequently, the map offers information on the zones which “deserve most attention for
mitigation efforts” (BGR & DESDM, 2009, p. 46) but which may miss the indication of
the overall area threatened by significant hazard.
Web-mapping applications: In the era of GIS and web-mapping applications, digital, flex-
ible and user-defined visualisations offer an interesting alternative to static analogue maps
(e.g. Mu¨ller et al., 2006; Salvati et al., 2009; Frigerio et al., 2010b; Frigerio &
vanWesten, 2010; Kunz & Hurni, 2011b). They offer an interactive exploration of the
information to the user by means of options such as zooming in/out, visibility of layers
on/off, queries etc. A central issue is an adequate interface to guide the user, provide
clear presentation and prevent misinterpretations (Kunz & Hurni, 2008, 2011b). If this
is assured, interactive tools facilitate the understanding of the complex information by
splitting it up and enabling the user to compose a map according to the specific needs.
Obviously, multiple types of map or visualisation techniques exist which can aid the
clearer communication of multi-hazard risk analysis results. Their suitability depends on
the precise objective and aspect to be communicated and who they are communicating to.
Consequently, either the single hazard patterns or the overall hazard or risk level have to
be transmitted, analogue maps in reports and articles or broad distribution of the results
with web-mapping tools prove suitable.
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2.5. In Conclusion: The Major Multi-Hazard Issues
Evidently, the performance of multi-hazard risk analyses is not a simple operation. Apart
from the data- and time-consuming conduction of many single-hazard risk studies that
requires know-how from different disciplines, many further aspects have to be considered.
One important source of difficulties is the contrast in hazard characteristics. Hazards differ
with respect to their properties such as time of onset, duration, physical properties, extent,
parameter of influence on the built environment and humans. As a result, also modelling
approaches adjusted to the hazard specifics contrast strongly. At the multi-hazard anal-
ysis level this leads to problems of comparing modelling results, not only due to differing
impact indicators but also due to differing inherent assumptions and uncertainties. More-
over, the relations between hazards lead to effects on the hazard manifestation and hazard
level. Although multiple methods and approaches exist to take this aspect into account,
still no overall concept is available to coherently consider and incorporate them into anal-
ysis procedures. An option to overcome the problem of single-hazard comparability due to
differing parameters of influence, i.e. differing metrics of the modelling result, is the perfor-
mance of full risk analyses. Since risks are expressed in hazard-independent metrics such
as monetary damages or number of fatalities, single-hazard risks are comparable without
standardisation. The next step towards risk calculation is the analysis of the vulnerability
of elements at risk. Thereby, the choice of a vulnerability analysis method applicable for
all hazards is difficult since the approaches are not equally applicable for different hazards.
Thus, an approach has to be selected that can be applied for all considered processes. In
the context of multi-hazard and vulnerability analyses, the relation between hazards poses
an additional difficulty. This refers not only to the triggering of one hazard by another
or other types of influences between hazards but also to the simultaneous or subsequent
impact on elements at risk. Approaches to consider these phenomena are still in the early
stages of development. The final step of a multi-hazard risk analysis is the combination
of hazards and vulnerabilities of elements at risk towards risk. To ensure a smooth pro-
cess, the previous steps have to be carried out according to a coherent analysis scheme.
However, this refers not only to the choice of methods producing compatible outputs with
respect to the metrics but also to their suitability to produce results with similar inherent
assumptions and uncertainties. Finally, the clear visualisation of the multi-dimensional
content of the output is challenging since many aspects may be of interest and have to be
communicated.
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The most important aspects are summarised in the following seven major multi-hazard
issues:
1. High data requirements give rise to difficulties in the practicability of multi-hazard
analyses.
2. Scale differences between hazards and hazard models lead to the necessity of the def-
inition of a common analysis scale that is moreover relevant to the output required.
3. Differing model principles, assumptions and uncertainties influence the character of
the modelling results.
4. Hazard relations alter the actual hazard level and lead to very particular phenomena
as hazard cascades or the like and exert influence on the vulnerability of elements
at risk.
5. Units for quantifying hazards differ and also at the risk level several different metrics
are at choice.
6. Multi-hazard risk analyses consist of many steps. Therefore, their performance is
time-consuming, error-prone and unwieldy.
7. The visualisation of the multi-dimensional multi-hazard risk information is a chal-
lenge.
These major multi-hazard issues give a context to the further course of the methodological,
technical and practical investigations presented in this study.
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3. Meeting the Challenges: Development of
a Conceptual Approach and Software
Implementation
The central objectives of this study are the elaboration of a coherent GIS-based multi-
hazard risk analysis and a visualisation scheme as well as their subsequent automation in
a modelling and a visualisation tool. Thereby, the knowledge about aspects and challenges
emerging in the multi-hazard context and the current approaches to solutions gained in
the review are to be taken into consideration. In this process, a focus is on addressing
and discussing of the previously identified multi-hazard issues and, where reasonable and
possible, the integration of adjusted solutions into the concepts and software implementa-
tions. In this chapter, the concept development is presented (section 3.1), followed by an
explanation of the elaboration of the software solutions named MultiRISK Modelling and
MultiRISK Visualisation Tool forming together the MultiRISK Platform (section 3.2).
3.1. Concept Development
In the previous chapter, the need for overall analysis schemes, be it for multi-hazard,
vulnerability or risk modelling, has been highlighted several times. Thereby, the deter-
mination of the spatial scale is a fundamental step in the development of a multi-hazard
risk analysis scheme (cf. Borter, 1999; Marzocchi et al., subm.). Moreover, the scale
is one of the seven multi-hazard issues determined previously. The choice of the scale
depends primarily on the objectives of the study (e.g. for the national prioritisation of
funds, municipal spatial planning or the construction of local structural mitigation mea-
sures) but is also related to the data availability. Since the data requirement is, especially
in a multi-hazard context, an important difficulty and another multi-hazard issue to be
explicitly considered, a preferably efficient approach is advisable. Castellanos Abella
(2008, p. 36) recommends for data-scarce cases a hierarchical, i.e. a top-down or from top
to bottom approach because it “seems to be more economic” since “only areas detected
at certain levels are studied in detail at lower levels”. The Top-down approach refers to a
multi-step method starting with rough and large scale analyses on the basis of which zones
of interest are identified. For these zones of interest more local, detailed and sophisticated
investigations are performed. For example, Castellanos Abella (2008) distinguished
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for his multi-scale landslide risk assessment in Cuba between the national (1:1,000,000),
regional (1:250,000), provincial (1:100,000), municipal (1:50,000), local (1:25,000) and site
investigation level (1:10,000-1:1,000). This classification is strongly related to the manage-
ment and political structure of Cuba and the information required for risk management
at each level. At the province and municipal level, for instance, assessments enable the
identification of “troublesome areas” for subsequent local or even geotechnical analyses
(Castellanos Abella, 2008, p. 38). In the Swiss guidelines a multi-scale approach
is proposed as well although they different levels are primarily defined according to the
degree of detail with which the analysis is carried out without defining a specific scale
(Borter, 1999): in a stage 1 analysis, areas with protection deficits are identified. This
refers to zones in which the “maximum permissible intensity of the hazardous process and
its recurrence interval” are exceeded (Borter, 1999, p. 8). In stage 2 studies, risks for
spatial spatial elements identified in the first step are analysed, however, risks can also be
directly examined in stage 2 level of detail. In stage 3, again, risks of individual objects
determined in stage 2 may be specified, even though directly stage 3 analyses can be car-
ried out as well.
This method of determining hotspots and analysing them in detail accommodates the
multi-hazard topic in particular because the hazard situation due to a single hazard might
be relatively clear from records and experience of past events, and focusing on empirical
hotspots may be possible. Thus, torrents prone to flash floods and debris flows are often
well-known, annually certain snow avalanche tracks reactivate and the zone potentially
threatened by river floods can be narrowed down to the valley bottom. However, in a
multi-hazard setting the distribution of all single- as well as the overall multi-hazard is
much less obvious and mostly more widely spread over the whole area under consider-
ation. In particular zones of overlapping hazards are difficult to locate without specific
analyses. A first, rather general study can close this gap and support the determination
of multi-hazard hotspots.
Based on the previous considerations, a top-down approach was adopted for this study.
For the beginning this shall refer to two levels: a regional scale which is, in contrast to the
terminology of Castellanos Abella (2008), between 1:10,000 and 1:50,000, and a local
scale of >1:10,000. Thereby, the regional analysis is designed to serve for the identification
of zones of potential risk and possible hazard relations to enable detailed local studies at
these sites. In the present work, the elaboration of such a multi-scale multi-hazard analysis
scheme is initiated with the development of the regional scale concept. The elaboration of
a local analysis concept goes beyond the scope of this thesis although the function of this
analysis level is already outlined here. In accordance with the thematic background of the
Mountain Risks project1 in the framework of which this work has been carried out, a set
of five typical mountain hazards was chosen (cf. Sto¨tter et al., 1999): debris flows, rock
1http://mountain-risks.eu, contract MCRTN03598
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falls, shallow landslides, snow avalanches and river floods. The five processes are shortly
defined below, for more detailed definitions refer to Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. (2011, A.2):
• Debris flows can be described as “masses of poorly sorted sediment, agitated and
saturated with water [that] surge down slopes in response to gravitational attraction”
and are triggered by water from rain fall and snow melt (Iverson, 1997, p. 245).
• Rock falls “start with the detachment of rocks from bedrock slopes” that are pro-
moted and/or triggered by processes such as weathering, rainfall, frost shattering
and seismic activity (Dorren, 2003, p. 70). After the detachment the rocks move
downhill in freefall, “bouncing on the slope surface or rolling” (Dorren, 2003, p. 70).
• Shallow landslides are “slope failure[s] within the soil mantle or at the contact
with the impermeable boundary below. The detached mass then slides downslope”
(Borga et al., 1997, p. 81). Principal triggers are rainfalls, snow melt and earth-
quakes (Borga et al., 1997; Chang et al., 2007; Remaˆıtre et al., 2010).
• Snow avalanches are fast-moving mass movements of snow that can contain rocks,
soil, vegetation or ice (Bru¨ndl et al., 2010). According to the release, two types of
avalanches can be distinguished: loose and slab avalanches (McClung & Schaerer,
1993). Natural triggers include the overload or internal weakening of the snowpack
as well as earthquakes, while also humans or explosives may initiate the movement
of avalanches (Bru¨ndl et al., 2010).
• River floods can be described as the inundation of areas outside of the normal confines
of the water course and are caused by high intensity and/or prolongued precipita-
tions, snow melt or blockage of the flow (Boukalova & Heller, 2005; Jonkman
& Kelman, 2005).
The integration of additional hazards and the implementation of further, smaller scales as
the provincial or national scale proposed by Castellanos Abella (2008) is to be done
in the future and in accordance with user needs. Thereby, this study can serve as a first
step towards discussing the specific requirements of stakeholders.
For a regional analysis with the objective of identifying hotspots it is not necessary to
carry out full-hazard and risk modelling. Instead susceptibility and exposure analyses
shall be sufficient for this purpose (Borter, 1999; Fuchs et al., 2001). This is accom-
panied by the advantage of far lower data requirements and thus much better applica-
bility. Especially in the multi-hazard context in which extensive inventories for reliable
assessments of magnitude-frequency relationships are rare, the practicalness of a regional
analysis depends strongly on this aspect. Consequently, at this scale the performance
of a vulnerability analysis is not necessary. However, vulnerability analyses also pose a
considerable challenge in the multi-hazard context and therefore this topic is conceptually
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approached as well, but separately from the multi-hazard exposure analysis. This implies
that the vulnerability analysis concept is not integrated into the exposure analysis and
not incorporated into the MultiRISK Modelling Tool, but is presented separately as a first
step towards a more local scale analysis.
The multi-hazard exposure analysis scheme to be elaborated here is composed of hazard
modelling (subsection 3.1.1) extended by consideration of the consequences of related haz-
ards (subsection 3.1.2). A validation step is performed on the hazard modelling to enable
the evaluation and comparison of hazard model qualities (subsection 3.1.3). Subsequently,
the approach to exposure analyses is introduced (subsection 3.1.4). The development
of hazard-specific multi-hazard vulnerability analyses is then outlined (subsection 3.1.5).
This represents a step towards a more local analysis and does therefore not form part of
the exposure analysis. Finally, the development of a visualisation scheme is presented in
order to display the multi-dimensional analysis results (subsection 3.1.6).
3.1.1. Hazard Modelling
Having defined the scale of the modelling, the next step in the development of a multi-
hazard modelling scheme is the choice of the model set. In first place, this choice has to
be adapted to the scale at which the analysis is carried out, in this case the regional scale.
Considering the challenges identified in the previous section, two additional aspects, (a)
the model principles and assumptions, and (b) the required data, are of high importance
for the model choice.
a) The model principles: The need for comparability of the modelling results is the central
issue in a multi-hazard analysis. However, as identified in the previous chapter, hazard
characteristics and consequently the methods and approaches used for their analysis and
computation differ. This includes the assumptions and principles behind the different
methods used in setting up the models. Assuming that models following the same or
similar principles and assumptions produce better comparable results, in this respect sim-
ilar methods are selected. In a regional context, empirical models proved useful (Kappes
et al., 2011, A.3). In contrast to statistical models empirical models are transferable,
“usable without the high data needs for calibration [that] deterministic models have” and
therefore meet the requirements of a regional scale analysis (Kappes et al., 2011, p. 628,
A.3). Consequently, empirical models are to be chosen in the present study wherever
possible.
b) The required input data: The data input for spatial models consists of two types, spatial
data and information required for the model calibration. Spatial data refers to area-wide
information on environmental parameters such as topography, land cover, geology or soils.
The calibration of models is usually based on hazard inventories providing information on
past events, laboratory analyses, field measurements etc. However, to apply an analysis
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scheme on a smaller scale, “it is important to use models which require only few input
data that are more or less easy to obtain” (Wichmann et al., 2009, p. 72). Therefore, the
required spatial input should focus on topography, land cover, geology and river courses,
since this information is of high importance in GIS-based models and is widely available.
Concerning the information needed for the model calibration or parameterisation, flexible
methods have to be chosen. Since comprehensive multi-hazard inventories are difficult to
obtain, models exclusively based on detailed inventories or field and laboratory studies are
not suitable. Instead, models should be chosen that are based on limited input data that
can be supplemented with expert knowledge or based on previous studies carried out in
comparable cases. In this way the applicability of the model set can be assured, even in
data-scarce settings.
The final choice of hazard models can, apart from the previously mentioned criteria,
basically be considered as coincidental and the models are exchangeable by others fulfilling
the required characteristics. However, the replacement of models obviously not suitable
for a certain study site has always to be contemplated.
3.1.2. Consideration of Related Hazards
In the previous chapter, two main branches of influences exerted by related hazards could
be distinguished: (a) effects on hazard manifestation and hazard level and (b) the implica-
tions for vulnerability. However, as became apparent in the review on current approaches,
the terminology is not clearly defined and only few concepts exist to account for phenom-
ena arising with related hazards. In this study the attempt is made to develop conceptual
approaches for both branches and provide an overarching approach for a classification,
characterisation and representation of the different aspects emerging from hazard rela-
tions. Thereby, the focus is on establishing a general overview of the emerging issues, and
indicating how hazard relations can be considered in multi-hazard studies. The develop-
ment approaches of these two concepts are outlined below.
a) For the characterisation and representation of modified hazard manifestations and haz-
ard levels, two well-known conceptual models are employed (cf. Kappes et al., 2010,
A.5): first, the systems theory as outlined by Chorley & Kennedy (1971, based on
von Bertalanffy, 1956) and secondly, the disposition and triggering model as outlined in
Zimmermann et al. (1997, dating back to Schumm, 1979) and Kienholz et al. (2004).
While the first concept is used to elucidate the provenance of hazard relations, the sec-
ond concept supports the classification and description of hazard relations and facilitates
their consideration in hazard analysis procedures. After a presentation of both conceptual
models, their connection is outlined below.
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The systems theory according to Chorley & Kennedy (1971, p. 1 et seq.)2 describes
a system as consisting of several parts which “exhibit discernible relationships with one
another and operate together as a complex whole, according to some observed pattern”.
From a hazard/risk perspective “[n]atural processes [form part] of systems (ecosystems,
geosystems, etc.) and only certain characteristics which possibly pose a threat to elements
at risk convert them into hazards” (p. 351 Kappes et al., 2010, A.5). For the investigation
and modelling of a certain hazard, a kind of subsystem is constructed, containing the set
of process and factors relevant to that particular hazard (refer also to Borter, 1999).
This means that only those factors rated as relevant for the hazard under consideration
are included in the modelling or, in other words, are extracted from the overall system
and integrated into the subsystem. In multi-hazard analyses the single subsystems which
are the single hazards with their respective influencing factors, are usually modelled in
parallel and the final results are then brought together and compared. However, some of
the factors may form part of multiple single-hazard subsystems or influence each other
but cannot be observed in a related way. By contrast, a joint consideration of the hazards
and their influencing factors may better consider their relationships and interactions.
To implement these rather theoretical considerations in a practical approach, the concep-
tual model of disposition and triggering is applied. This model assumes that the occur-
rence of a hazard event is the consequence of two factors, the disposition and the triggering
(Heinimann et al., 1998). The disposition describes the time dependent susceptibility of
an area to formation and initiation of a hazardous process (Zimmermann et al., 1997).
Generally, two components of the disposition are distinguished, the basic and the variable
disposition (Zimmermann et al., 1997; Heinimann et al., 1998, Figure 3.1). The basic
disposition refers to the general setting of an area with parameters such as geology, relief
or climate that are fixed or change only slowly over time. The variable disposition results
from the influence of time-varying parameters that are subject to modifications by season,
daytime, meteorological situation etc., for instance seasonal vegetation cover, temperature
or water balance. It influences the temporal occurrence of hazard events as well as hazard
magnitude. The triggering refers to the occurrence of episodic events with a short duration
of minutes to days that initiate a hazard process given a certain disposition. In Figure 3.1
the interplay between time dependent disposition level and potential trigger is illustrated.
Only where disposition level and trigger magnitude exceed a threshold is a hazard process
initiated (Zimmermann et al., 1997).
The distinction between basic and variable disposition as well as between variable dispo-
sition and trigger is mostly not clearly evident due to continuous transitions. However,
for hazard analysis purposes this separation is very helpful since it relates to the dif-
2In the present study only the conceptual model describing systems as interrelated parts is adopted from
Chorley & Kennedy (1971) while considerations with respect to system states and the differentiation
into fundamental and immediate causes leading to an incidence such as a mass movement are not
integrated. Instead, the disposition triggering model as presented in Kienholz et al. (2004) is employed
to describe the occurrence of a hazard event.
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Figure 3.1.: Disposition triggering concept, modified following Kienholz et al. (2004,
translated and modified after Zimmermann et al., 1997). (Note: arrows
indicate direction of increasing values).
ferentiation between susceptibility and full-hazard examinations (Zimmermann et al.,
1997). The basic disposition corresponds to the susceptibility and for primarily spatially
oriented objectives such as spatial planning this information is highly valuable (Heini-
mann et al., 1998). By contrast, the temporal disposition and the occurrence of triggering
events are more difficult to assess due to the time variability and the precise prediction
of hazard events is challenging. However, for emergency measures such as evacuations or
road closures, information on the variable disposition and the triggering are indispensable
(Heinimann et al., 1998).
Combination of the concepts: The description of hazards as related systems’ components
allows for the creation of a joint multi-hazard subsystem for multi-hazard risk analyses.
Therefore, the common set of influencing factors is related to the set of hazards under
consideration (Figure 3.2, solid arrows). Moreover, the influence of one hazard on another
(dashed arrows in Figure 3.2, e.g. hazard 2 on hazard 3) or on influencing factors (dotted
arrows in Figure 3.2, e.g. hazard 1 on factor 3 and thereby on hazard 2) can be identified
and subdivided into effects on disposition or effects on triggering. Concerning the disposi-
tion modification, this refers to phenomena such as an increase in the frequency of debris
flows and floods due to vegetation loss, increased run off and sediment washout following
forest fires etc. (deGraff et al., 2007; deGraff & Ochiai, 2009). This implies that
there exists a relation between the occurrence of a forest fire and the influencing factor
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Factor 1actor 1
Factor 2actor 2
Factor 3actor 3
Factor 4actor 4
Hazard 1azard 1
Hazard 2azard 2
Hazard 3azard 3
Figure 3.2.: Proposed structure of a multi-hazard sub-system. The solid arrows indicate
the relation between influencing factors and hazards, the dashed arrows the
impact of hazards on the factors and the dotted arrows the effects between
hazards.
vegetation cover that leads to a modification of the disposition of debris flows and floods.
Another example is the alteration of the density and locations of rainfall induced landslides
after an earthquake due to the extensive disturbance of surface strata (Lin et al., 2006).
That implies an influence of the earthquake on the soil structure that, again, alters the
disposition towards landslides. With respect to the triggering of one hazard by another,
so-called hazard cascades, examples have been given in the previous sections, such as the
triggering of landslides by earthquakes (Bommer & Rodr´ıguez, 2002; Lee et al., 2008;
Miles & Keefer, 2009) or damming with subsequent dam break and debris flow forma-
tion due to the accumulation of landslide material in a torrent or river (Carrasco et al.,
2003). Subsequently, the relations and influences are, according to the modelling scale,
approach, data input etc., integrated into the analysis procedure. In contrast to parallel
performed single-hazard subsystem analyses, this allows not only to consider hazard rela-
tions but is also more efficient since duplication of intermediate steps is avoided.
The conceptual approach is elaborated in detail for the regional scale multi-hazard anal-
ysis scheme developed in this study. This comprises the following steps:
1. First, the multi-hazard subsystem has to be determined. This includes the set of
hazards and all influencing factors considered relevant for any of the hazards. In
a modelling context, the influencing factors refer to the input data used for the
modelling such as land use, geology, soil type or rainfall.
2. Thereupon, possible relations between hazards (also via the influencing factors) have
to be identified. Tarvainen et al. (2006) and dePippo et al. (2008, refer also to
Figure 2.1) propose so-called interaction matrices in which the hazards are juxta-
posed in opposition in a table and the possible effects are entered in the interjacent
cells. Though they use this method for the determination of triggering effects, it
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can also be applied to detect potential modification of the disposition. This implies
that, for any combination of two hazards such as floods and landslides, the question
has to be answered, first, what influence floods may have on landslide disposition
and if floods can trigger landslides and, secondly, how landslides may alter the flood
disposition and whether landslides can trigger floods.
3. Subsequently, the effect of disposition modifications or triggering chains of hazards
is integrated into the modelling procedure itself. For the disposition issue this refers
firstly to the alteration of influencing factors by the occurrence of a hazard event
and, consequently, to the alteration of the disposition of all hazards related to this
factor. By means of the establishment of the relation between the hazard modelling
output of one hazard to the input for another hazard, this relation can be estab-
lished (Kappes et al., 2010, A.5). For instance, where the incidence of a hazard
event such as forest fires or avalanches alters one or several of the input factors such
as land cover, those models involving the altered input information have to be rerun
to account for the new situation. To integrate triggering effects into the modelling
procedure, the elaboration of event trees and the performance of consecutive haz-
ard modelling in sequence are proposed (e.g. in CAPRA the earthquake modelling
results are used as input into the landslide modelling tool, Phillips et al., 2010).
However, in susceptibility analyses the trigger is not directly incorporated as an in-
fluencing factor, and therefore such connection in series of the single-hazard models
is not possible. In consequence, the consideration of triggering effects at a regional
level does not go beyond the identification of zones potentially prone to specific haz-
ard combinations and therefore potentially prone to certain cascades.
The identification of those locations potentially prone to the previously identified
hazard relations is the principal task of regional analyses (Delmonaco et al., 2006a).
By means of overlay of potentially interacting hazards those areas possibly prone to
these effects are identified. For example, the analysis results of the flood and land-
slide modelling are superimposed, and in the overlapping zones a high potential for
the occurrence of the previously determined disposition modifications or triggering
relations has to be assumed.
b) The hazard relations described so far refer to the disposition modification or triggering
between hazards. This leads in the first place to an alteration of the hazard level and a
modification of the hazard manifestation. However, these phenomena are restricted to a
change in the hazard component and apparently have no influence on the vulnerability.
Instead, other types of hazard relations exert their influence on vulnerability. Examples
presented in chapter 2 are the simultaneous impact of two hazards on an element at risk
(Lee & Rosowsky, 2006), the sequential impact of multiple hazards (Zuccaro et al.,
2008) or the exposure to multiple hazards (Gibbs, 2003), indicating the importance of
spatial and temporal properties of multiple hazards on the vulnerability. Where hazards
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spatially and perhaps also temporally coincide, the vulnerability may be altered altered.
Therefore, these two aspects, the temporal and the spatial relation between multiple haz-
ards, are used as a basis for a conceptual approach to describe phenomena emerging in a
multi-hazard vulnerability context.
3.1.3. Hazard Model Validation
Model validation aims “to establish the degree of confidence of the model”(Beguer´ıa,
2006, p. 315) and thereby enables the sound interpretation of the modelling results (Chung
& Fabbri, 2003). Beyond that, validation also allows for comparison of models based on
various parameters or predictor sets as well as the comparison between different models
(Beguer´ıa, 2006). Finally, model validation can be compared against the confidence re-
quirements of the user (Beguer´ıa, 2006). These characteristics are particularly useful in
a multi-hazard context where hazards and model characteristics vary strongly.
With respect to different hazard modelling approaches, a variety of validation methods
is used. The basic principle validation procedures for predictive models share, is the
comparison of the modelling result with recorded past events (Chung & Fabbri, 2003;
Merz et al., 2008). Two validation approaches can be distinguished: methods for dis-
crete validation based on confusion matrices and calculating accuracy statistics such as
the model’s sensitivity or efficiency (Beguer´ıa, 2006), and methods for continuous valida-
tion, for instance ROC (receiver-operating characteristic) plots and prediction rate curves
(Beguer´ıa, 2006; Chung & Fabbri, 2003).
The selection of a validation technique is, like the model choice, strongly linked to the data
requirements of the respective methods. Since extensive multi-hazard inventories are ex-
tremely scarce but necessary for the validation procedure, a suitable validation approach
has to be flexible to also operate with little inventory information. Together with the
requirement to be compatible with all single-hazard models and the objective to compose
a well-applicable analysis scheme at a regional scale, this points towards a simple and not
continuous method.
3.1.4. Exposure Analysis
In comparison to full risk analyses, the performance of exposure analyses is much simpler
and easier to carry out. They consist of the identification of those elements at risk being
situated in the susceptibility or hazard zones while a vulnerability of 1 is assumed (cf.
vanWesten, 2004). In a GIS context the exposure is analysed by an overlay of the
hazard or susceptibility zones with the elements at risk to localise and quantify the exposed
elements at risk (vanWesten, 2004). According to Nadimpalli et al. (2007, p. 1674)
this may include the “number and type of buildings, infrastructure and people exposed
to the hazard of interest”. In the present study the emphasis is on the determination of
exposed buildings and infrastructure.
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3.1.5. Physical Vulnerability Assessment
The aim of a regional scale analysis is primarily the identification of areas potentially at
risk. Furthermore, the criteria according to which the models are chosen indicate that
regional modelling results are probably too inaccurate and imprecise to make reliable pre-
dictions of which buildings are actually exposed. Thus, an analysis of the vulnerability of
exposed elements at risk is unnecessary in a regional scale analysis and their localisation
and rough quantification is sufficient. Nevertheless, vulnerability analyses pose an impor-
tant challenge in a multi-hazard context, as discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore,
it is the objective of this study to also identify and propose ways to deal with these dif-
ficulties. The multi-hazard vulnerability approach developed here can be considered as a
step towards a more local analysis.
As presented in section 2.2 (refer also to Kappes et al., in press, A.7) the three major
vulnerability analysis approaches are curves, matrices and indicators (e.g. Glade, 2003;
Gru¨nthal et al., 2006; Birkmann, 2007; Felgentreff & Glade, 2008). Each method
has its disadvantages, starting with high requirement of information on past damages for
the elaboration of vulnerability curves, through to the restriction of curves and matri-
ces to only one vulnerability indicator, and the rather qualitative character of indicator
approaches. However, each approach has also advantages in comparison to the other meth-
ods: vulnerability curves are continuous approaches while matrices offer classified and thus
less detailed information. However, matrices are more applicable for less extensive pro-
cesses, since less information is needed for their creation. Finally, indicator approaches
consider multiple characteristics that influence the overall vulnerability of an element at
risk. This last aspect, the possibility of indicator approaches to involve multiple element
characteristics, appears to be highly promising in a multi-hazard context since element
properties contribute in varying degrees to hazard-specific vulnerabilities. In the present
study, the potential of vulnerability indicators in a multi-hazard context is explored by the
development of an indicator-based methodology to assess physical vulnerability for multi-
hazards (Kappes et al., in press, A.7).
Among the few approaches in this direction are the studies of Granger et al. (1999),
Papathoma & Dominey-Howes (2003) and Puissant et al. (2006). While Granger
et al. (1999) use multiple building characters as purely qualitative indicators to iden-
tify the suitability of edifices as shelters, Puissant et al. (2006) use indicators to assess
the potential losses of buildings. Papathoma & Dominey-Howes (2003) developed an
indicator-based approach to assess the physical vulnerability of buildings to tsunamis, the
PTVA method (Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment), that was later adapted
to a landslide hazard context (Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al., 2007). Although the analyses
for tsunamis and landslides were carried out separately and the method can thus still
not be called a multi-hazard vulnerability approach, it presents a high potential to be
applied to a setting of multiple threats. The PTVA method consists, in its original version
47
Meeting the Challenge
for tsunami vulnerability assessments, of four steps (Papathoma & Dominey-Howes,
2003): (1) the identification of the inundation zone and inundation depth zones, (2) the
identification of the factors that affect the vulnerability of buildings and people and col-
lection of data, (3) the calculation of the vulnerability of individual buildings within the
inundation zone using a multi-criteria evaluation method, and (4) the display of building
and human vulnerability. The core of the PTVA is the second step, the identification
of characteristics of buildings and their surroundings that affect their vulnerability and
can serve as vulnerability indicators. Table 3.1 shows the compilation of all indicators
used either for the tsunami and/or the landslide vulnerability application. While several
indicators such as building material or number of floors, may be relevant for both hazards,
other properties such as condition of the ground floor refer only to one of them. This
indicates that the set of indicators would have to be expanded in a multi-hazard context,
although a core of indicators will probably show relevance for most of the processes.
Table 3.1.: Building vulnerability indicators of the PTVA method according to (Pap-
athoma & Dominey-Howes, 2003; Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al., 2007, cf.
Kappes et al., in press). Row of the building describes the location of a
building with respect to structures between this edifice and the coastline.
Tsunamis Landslides
Material of the building x x
Number of floors of the building x x
Warning signs on buildings x
Characteristics of the slope side wall
(windows or only wall)
x
Condition of the ground floor x
Building surroundings (e.g. walls) x x
Row of the building x
Presence of sea-defence x
Width of intertidal zone x x
The PTVA method shows a high potential to be adopted to a multi-hazard context and
was therefore chosen as the basis for the development of a hazard-specific multi-hazard
physical vulnerability approach (Kappes et al., in press, A.7).
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3.1.6. Visualisation
As outlined in subsection 2.4.3, the visualisation of multi-hazards and risks is a challenging
task. Not only the single hazard patterns but also the zones of overlapping threats and the
overall hazard and risk are of potential interest. However, it is not possible to transmit all
this information in one single map without overloading it (Fuchs et al., 2009; Kunz &
Hurni, 2011a). Thus, several maps are necessary to depict the information content that
multi-hazard risk analysis results offer. Taking account of the review in chapter 2, three
options seem to be of specific interest:
1. The presentation of single-hazard information. The objective is the display of single-
hazard patterns for the identification of areas of higher and lower susceptibility,
full-hazard, risk and the like. For that purpose, susceptibilities, full-hazards, vulner-
abilities, exposures or risks are presented in detail, which means that the distribution
of spatial probabilities, hazard intensities, risk quantities and other parameters are
shown.
2. The presentation of hazard overlays. The purpose of this representation form is
the identification of areas of hazard overlaps while details on the single hazards
are usually of less importance. The major challenge of this type of mapping is the
potential overload with too much information. This can be avoided by a restriction
of the amount of visualised information either by limiting the number of included
hazards or by a reduction of the level of detail shown for each hazard. The most
critical areas are the actual overlaps. By means of transparency, patterns, colour
hue, value and saturation, shape, size and orientation, their clear representation can
be achieved (Kunz & Hurni, 2011a).
3. The presentation of the overall susceptibility, full-hazard or risk resulting from merg-
ing of the single-hazard components. Without confusing details only the zones with
highest susceptibility, full-hazard or risk are given. However, these maps do not offer
information on the contributions of each single-hazard component. To get informa-
tion on these details, single-hazard or overlay maps have to be consulted.
These three visualisation forms are used as core for the development of the visualisation
scheme consisting of multiple maps.
3.2. Technical Implementation: The MultiRISK Platform
To facilitate rapid, time-saving and easily repeatable multi-hazard exposure modelling,
the analysis scheme has been automated in the MultiRISK Modelling Tool. To enable
a fast, clear and interactive display of the modelling results, the visualisation has been
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implemented in a web-mapping application called the MultiRISK Visualisation Tool. To-
gether, the two Tools form the MultiRISK Platform and their development is outlined
below.
3.2.1. The MultiRISK Modelling Tool
The analysis concept is GIS-based and thus a GIS software was chosen as foundation for
the development of the modelling tool. Various purchasable programs such as ArcGIS3,
ERDAS4 or MapInfo5 as well as a wide range of free GIS software tools as for example
SAGA GIS6, GRASS GIS7, or QGIS8 are on the market. Among them, ESRI is with the
ArcGIS software market leader in GIS solutions and “more than 300,000 organisations
worldwide including each of the 200 largest cities in the United States, most national gov-
ernments,” companies, colleges and universities use their products (ESRI, 2010). Due to
the use of ArcGIS by most national governments and practitioners, this GIS program was
chosen as the basis upon which the modelling software tool MultiRISK was implemented.
ArcGIS is compatible with several programming languages, among others Python, Visual
Basic (VB), Visual Basic for Applications (VBA), VBScript and JavaScript (University
of Delaware, 2005). Python offers, in contrast to the other languages, several advan-
tages since it is easy-to-use, no compiling is needed, it is easy to integrate with other
languages (e.g. C, C++, Java and Fortran), it is adjusted to the use with ArcGIS, offers a
wide range of possibilities and it is automatically installed with ArcGIS (Butler, 2005).
Therefore, Python was chosen for the programming of the modelling procedures.
In the modelling tool the following steps have been incorporated:
1. the hazard modelling (subsection 3.1.1)
2. the hazard model validation (subsection 3.1.3)
3. the exposure analysis (subsection 3.1.4)
4. in addition, the preparation of the data for display in the Visualisation Tool is
associated as last step
Two aspects, the vulnerability assessment based on an indicator approach and the con-
sideration of related hazards are still not included in this first version of the MultiRISK
Modelling Tool. Concerning the vulnerability approach, the reason is the non-fit of scale,
however, with the integration of a local scale analysis the vulnerability assessment will be
included as well. With respect to the hazard relations, a manual performance by the user
is still possible although this feature is not automated.
3http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/index.html
4http://www.erdas.com/Homepage.aspx
5http://www.pbinsight.com/welcome/mapinfo/
6http://www.saga-gis.org/
7http://grass.fbk.eu/
8http://www.qgis.org/
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3.2.2. The MultiRISK Visualisation Tool
After each modelling procedure, the results have to be visualised and checked. For mod-
ellers without extensive GIS and cartographic experience, this can be a labourious activity
due to the large amount of output information. However, also for experienced users the
display of various hazard susceptibilities, validation results, exposure results and addition-
ally the overlays with the assignation of colour, pattern etc. takes time. Web-mapping
tools have been identified as a very promising alternative in the multi-hazard context
(subsection 2.4.3). In such a digital approach the visualisation is automated, cartographic
principles can be directly implemented and thus the user does not need profound GIS and
cartographic knowledge, information can be explored interactively, e.g. after the mod-
elling, and the final analysis results can even be published via the internet to be accessible
to all stakeholders.
Due to these advantages, a web-mapping approach is chosen for the display of the multi-
hazard exposure analysis results, combined with the three previously presented visualisa-
tion approaches as central to the visualisation concept. By these means, the outcome can
be directly and automatically presented after the modelling and the final results can be
transmitted to the stakeholders.
For the design of the web-mapping application, CartoWeb9 based on a MapServer10 engine
was chosen. Both software programmes are open source, free of charge and released under
the GNU General Public License11. With this combination of freely available components,
several applications have already been developed, for example WebRiskCity (Frigerio
& vanWesten, 2010), Barcelonn@ (Frigerio et al., 2010c) and Historic@ (Frigerio
et al., 2010a). Such a web-mapping application can be run on a local server to visualise
preliminary modelling outcome or can publish the final results on a web server to be ac-
cessible via the internet by stakeholders and other interested persons. The users get access
by means of a standard internet browser and this implies that no specific software has to
be installed for visualisation.
3.3. Summary
In this chapter, the methodological background for the development of a multi-hazard risk
analysis scheme, under consideration of the major multi-hazard issues, has been outlined.
This includes the challenges of high data requirement of multi-hazard risk analyses, scale
differences between hazards and between modelling approaches, contrasts in model princi-
ples and assumptions, relations between hazards, units to quantify them and difficulties to
present the results in a clear way. In this regard, a top-down design of the analysis scheme
to use resources efficiently has been identified as promising approach and a first structure
9http://www.cartoweb.org/
10http://www.mapserver.org/
11http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html, accessed 25 June 2011
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with two levels, a regional and a local level, has been proposed. For the detailed elabora-
tion of the regional scale analysis, criteria for the susceptibility modelling step, validation
of the modelling results, consideration of related hazards, computation of exposure and
visualisation of the analysis outcome have been outlined. In addition, the elaboration of
an indicator-based vulnerability approach has been presented, as step towards a more local
analysis since in a regional exposure analysis vulnerability assessments are not necessary.
Subsequently, the implementation of the developed concepts in the MultiRISK Modelling
Tool, a GIS-based application, and the MultiRISK Visualisation Tool, a web-mapping
application, has been outlined.
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4. MultiRISK: Completed Concepts and
Software Platform
This chapter first comprises the presentation of the completed modelling and visualisation
scheme. Subsequently, the software tools created for the modelling and visualisation and
based on the developed concepts are introduced. Together these tools form the MultiRISK
Platform and their principal aim is to facilitate the multi-hazard exposure analysis and
to clearly present the analysis results. In this chapter, only a compilation of the most
important results is presented, while the detailed results and discussion are given in the
the papers Kappes et al. (2010, in press); Kappes & Glade (acc.); Kappes (2011);
Kappes et al. (subm.b,s) in the appendix.
4.1. Completed Concepts
The regional modelling scheme developed in the present study forms part of a top-down
multi-hazard risk analysis approach. As an initial step in the top-down context, a regional
overview is undertaken, which is designed to give an approximation of threatened zones,
hazard overlaps and potential risk zones. This comprises the hazard analysis including the
examination of possible hazard relations, followed by a hazard model validation to assess
the models’ qualities and an exposure analysis associated with a visualisation scheme to
display the analysis results. Moreover, in a step towards a more local scale of analysis,
the indicator-based vulnerability assessment approach is presented, including the effect of
related hazards.
4.1.1. Hazard Modelling
Additionally to the analysis scale, two further criteria have directed the hazard model
selection: the model principles and the required input data (subsection 3.1.1). Apart
from these criteria, the choice of model can be considered coincidental, i.e. the selected
models are exchangeable by others matching the requisites as well. The final model set is
introduced in Table 4.1.
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Details on the models are given in Kappes et al. (subm.a, A.4) and will not be repeated
in depth here. However, the model characteristics will be shortly outlined with respect to
the selection criteria:
The analysis of landslides and snow avalanches at a regional scale is usually carried out
in a two step approach: the identification of source areas and the computation of the run
out. For debris flows, rock falls and snow avalanches simple empirical models could be
identified for the determination of potential source areas at a regional scale (Table 4.1).
Thereby, empirical models are approaches in which a combination of empirical criteria such
as specific geological units, land cover types or slope angles, is used to identify potential
source areas. For instance, according to the methodology after Maggioni & Gruber
(2003) and Barbolini et al. (2011), the area susceptible to snow avalanche formation
refers to zones fulfilling the following conditions. Based on the assumption that snow will
not start moving below a certain slope angle as e.g. 30o, and above a second slope angle at
about 60o not enough snow accumulates, potential snow initiation zones can be confined
to the range between 30o and 60o. Likewise, at ridge positions snow is usually blown
off and therefore ridges are excluded as potential snow avalanche sources. Finally, dense
forest stabilises the snow cover and thereby inhibits the movement of snow. By means of
classification procedures and intersection of all these criteria, source areas are determined.
In contrast to these three hazards, empirical methods are not an equally common ap-
proach for the analysis of shallow landslides. Here, statistical and physically based meth-
ods are more common (e.g. Carrara et al., 1991; Iida, 1999; Thiery et al., 2007; Cervi
et al., 2010). However, a variety of simple physically-based models were transfered to the
GIS context to be used with topographic input derived from DEMs, among them Shal-
stab (SHAllow Landsliding STABility, Montgomery & Dietrich, 1994; Montgomery
et al., 1998; Dietrich & Montgomery, 1998). This method couples a “hydrological
model to a limit-equilibrium slope stability model to calculate the critical steady-state
rainfall necessary to trigger slope instability at any point in a landscape” (Montgomery
et al., 1998, p. 944). Shalstab also provides the option for the model to be used without
calibration to field data (soil properties) and offers the identification of “areas with equal
topographic control on shallow landslide initiation” (Montgomery et al., 1998, p. 945).
In this mode the model corresponds more to an empirical than to a physically-based ap-
proach and is applicable to use with topographic input data. These are important reasons
to choose Shalstab for the analysis of shallow landslides in this conceptual framework.
The run out of these four processes is analysed based on the approach proposed by Horton
et al. (2008). This method consists of a combination of a flow direction with a flow inertia
algorithm. By the relation of the two algorithms the spreading of the flow is modelled,
while the stopping point of the flow is determined by the Fahrbo¨schung (Heim, 1932), or
angle of reach (Corominas, 1996). The Fahrbo¨schung or angle of reach describes the
angle of incidence of a line connecting the highest point of the source area to the point of
the furthest run out. This line is not straight between the highest and the lowest point
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but follows the flow and is unbended for the determination of the angle (Heim, 1932).
For modelled or mapped source areas this angle enables the identification of the stopping
point of the propagation and spreading of a moving mass.
In contrast to the four processes described so far, river floods are not modelled in two
steps, and also the general modelling strategy differs strongly. The simplest method to
model floods is the linear interpolation of the water level at a gauging station and its
intersection with a DEM (Apel et al., 2009). The area situated below this level is indi-
cated as inundated, and the inundation depth is calculated by subtraction of flood level
from terrain elevation (Apel et al., 2009). However, this method does not control the
water volume. This means, the defined water level is interpolated in channelised river
sections as well as on floodplains where this gives rise to unrealistically big flooded areas
and water volumes. By contrast, 1D/2D and 2D models consider the flow characteristics
and hydrodynamics and account for the water volume, but need more input information
such as river cross sections or roughness parameters. Although, the extrapolation of a
certain water level corresponds to a simple empirical approach rather than hydrodynamic
approaches, the problem it poses in flood plains is a serious limitation. For this analysis
scheme the model FloodArea (Geomer, 2008) has been chosen since it offers both op-
tions. Thus those situations not facing the problem of ample flood plains can be analysed
with the water level method, and in the other cases the simple discharge-based approach
FloodArea offers can be chosen.
By combination of the hazard model set with all input parameters required for any of
the models and the indication of intermediate steps, an overall analysis scheme has been
constructed (Figure 4.1). This flow chart is illustrates the links between the input data,
derivatives and model criteria to calculate the source areas and in a second step the run
out as well as the one-step analysis of floods.
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For the consideration of related hazards in a multi-hazard context, three steps have been
identified. (1) The establishment of a multi-hazard subsystem containing the set of haz-
ards and influencing factors, (2) the identification of potential disposition modifications
and triggering factors between components of the multi-hazard subsystem, and (3) the
integration into the modelling procedure of those relations determined to be relevant at
the scale under consideration and the spatial identification of areas of hazard overlap.
1) Each hazard model chosen so far is based on a set of input parameters. The restriction
of all factors influencing this process to this set of parameters is done on the basis of
their assumed importance and their availability at the respective scale of analysis. For
the analysis of hazard relations the establishment of a multi-hazard subsystem has been
proposed. This subsystem consists of the set of all five hazards as well as all influencing
factors included into any of the analysis processes as model input (Figure 4.2). Those
factors exerting an influence that is considered relevant at the respective scale of analysis
and form input for the modelling of each of the five processes were linked to the respective
hazards (coloured arrows in Figure 4.2).
2) In the previous chapter a subdivision of related hazards into the alteration of the
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Figure 4.2.: Multi-hazard subsystem of the five hazards involved in the current study
(right hand boxes) and with respect to the modelling approaches chosen for
their analysis. The coloured lines indicate the first run of the model, the
black dashed lines the potential feedback to the input data and the effect on
the hazards illustrated by the coloured dashed lines (Kappes et al., 2010;
Kappes & Glade, acc.).
disposition and the triggering of one hazard by another has been proposed. For the iden-
tification of relations in a hazard set under consideration, a juxtaposition of all involved
processes in an interaction matrix has been suggested (see the example of dePippo et al.
(2008) in Figure 2.1). With respect to the five hazards forming part of this study, identi-
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fied relations are presented in Table 4.2, divided into disposition modifications and direct
triggering. The matrix indicates three major groups of disposition influences: effects on
Table 4.2.: Matrix indicating the alteration of disposition and the triggering (in italic
letters) between the five considered hazards modified after Kappes et al.
(2010). The process indicated in each line defines the influencing, the process
in the column the influenced component(note: “-” indicates combinations for
which no potential relations have been identified so far).
Avalanches
Influence on
vegetation cover
(removal of
forest)
Influence on
vegetation cover
(removal of
forest)
Influence on
vegetation cover
River damming
leading to flood-
ing
- Debris flows - -
Change of river
bed morphology
(accumulation
& erosion)
River damming
leading to
flooding
Increased slope
roughness
Supply of mate-
rial
Rock falls Increase of load
Material ac-
cumulation in
river bed
River damming
leading to
flooding
Alteration of
surface rough-
ness
Supply of mate-
rial
-
Shallow
landslides
Change of river
course
River damming
leading to flood-
ing
-
Remobilisation
of material
-
Erosion/ satura-
tion of landslide
deposits
Slope undercut-
ting leading to
failure
River floods
the land cover, modifications of the material distribution and availability, and alterations
of the surface characteristics and morphology. For the triggering of one hazard by another,
principally the interaction between floods and landslides was identified. Shallow landslides
accumulating their material in river channels may result in river damming, upslope inun-
dation and, after a dam break, a flash flood or debris flow downstream. Although this
effect can also result from damming by snow, rocks (mostly rock avalanches and not from
single rock falls) or debris flows, it is mostly the result of shallow landslides. Flooding
may lead to saturation of the slope toe and destabilisation or undercutting of the slope.
This may result in slope failure and, in narrow river channels, to river damming with the
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potential consequences previously outlined. Studies to analyse potential consequences in
detail have to be carried out at a local scale by means of methods such as event tree
analyses.
3) The implementation of the identified relations depends on the scale at which the study
is carried out and the specific model characteristics. At the regional scale for which this
analysis scheme is designed, only a few of the identified disposition alterations can be
included into the model. Parameters such as the slope or surface roughness cannot be
represented by the DEMs used for regional analyses, and information on material avail-
ability or displacement cannot be included in any of the input parameters. By contrast,
the influence on the vegetation cover can be considered, since information on land use
forms part of the input set. This relation can be incorporated and visualised in the multi-
hazard subsystem as feedback loop as depicted in Figure 4.2. Consequently, the effect of
an avalanche on forest cover can be analysed and based on the avalanche analysis result,
an updated version of the land use is created. By input of this new land use file into the
analysis process, the modified rock fall, debris flow and avalanche hazards can be calcu-
lated.
With respect to the cascading effects between hazards, the principal task of regional
analyses is in the identification of locations potentially giving rise to this type of phe-
nomenon (Delmonaco et al., 2006b; Tarvainen et al., 2006). By means of overlap of
the modelling results, such as between from floods and shallow landslides, these zones
can be determined for detailed analysis of potentially sequential occurrence of events with
their respective probabilities for instance by means event trees (Egli, 1996; Delmonaco
et al., 2006b; Marzocchi et al., 2009; Kappes et al., 2010).
4.1.2. Hazard Model Validation
Due to its flexibility, simplicity and suitability at a regional level, the confusion matrix ap-
proach as outlined in Beguer´ıa (2006) was chosen for the validation of the susceptibility
analysis outcomes. Confusion matrices are the result of a spatial overlay of modelling re-
sult with recorded past events. According to the four possible constellations of the output,
a classification is performed into the four groups depicted in Table 4.3. Thereby, the true
positives (a) indicate the area correctly identified as hazardous since past events confirm
the threat while the false negatives (c) indicate errors of the model, i.e. zones which are
obviously at threat but the model was not able to identify them. The false positives (b)
“have to be thought of as cases highly propense to develop the dangerous characteristic
in the future, and not merely as classification errors” (Beguer´ıa, 2006, p. 322). Since
the objective of models is the identification of the areas potentially affected by future
events, these zones are of high importance, although an overestimation of the susceptible
area has to be avoided. The true negatives (d) are very difficult to interpret since hazard
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Table 4.3.: Confusion matrix after Beguer´ıa (2006).
Observed Not observed
Predicted True positives False positives
(a) (b)
Not predicted False negatives True negatives
(c) (d)
inventories usually do not contain records of safe zones. Thus, the assumption that all
areas are safe for which no past events are recorded is not valid and thus no true negatives
can be determined. Therefore, conclusions based on this measure have to be drawn very
carefully.
On basis of these four categories, several quality indicators can be identified (Beguer´ıa,
2006). Among them, in particular the sensitivity and the positive prediction power seem
suitable in a multi-hazard context:
Sensitivity : a/(a + c) (4.1)
Positive prediction power : a/(a + b) (4.2)
The sensitivity quantifies the proportion of recorded events that have been modelled cor-
rectly, and by association the fraction that could not be accounted for. The positive
prediction power serves as measure for the effectiveness of the model. The combination of
both measures facilitates the appraisal of the model’s effectiveness, i.e. an indication on
its ability to predict future events without overestimating the area prone to hazards.
4.1.3. Exposure Analysis
In GIS environments this procedure is usually carried out by an overlay of the elements
at risk with the susceptibility or hazard information (vanWesten, 2004). This overlay is
either based on raster or on shape files. In the present study a shape file based approach
is used, offering the possibility to upload the elements at risk either as points, lines or
polygons. Furthermore, in the case of line or polygon upload, elements at risk can be
treated either as entire units, this means an element at risk located partly in a suscepti-
bility zones is either marked exposed, or the part actually situated in the zone is cut and
marked. According to the three shape file types and the handling as entire units or the
cutting of the exposed partition, the following three upload options are offered:
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1. The upload of points, lines or polygons to be treated as entire units. Thereby, the
number of exposed elements at risk is quantified. This is most suitable for buildings
or pylons represented by points or polygons etc.
2. The upload of linear elements at risk to be cut according to the overlap with the
susceptibility zones for the measurement of the exposed section. This option is
especially applicable for the exposure analysis of roads, water supply lines and the
like (e.g. Borter, 1999; Budetta, 2004; Zischg et al., 2005; Wastl et al., 2008).
3. The upload of polygons to be cut according to the overlap with the susceptibility
zones. The exposed area is measured. This is especially suitable for the examination
of built-up areas or other land use units if information on single buildings is not
available.
Two exposure options are given for the hazard processes: the exposure to source and the
exposure to the complete hazard, since for example for shallow landslides it is important to
differentiate between buildings situated on the moving mass or those hit by it (vanWesten
et al., 2006).
4.1.4. Physical Vulnerability Assessment
Based on the PTVA method that has already been used in the tsunami and landslide
context (Papathoma & Dominey-Howes, 2003; Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al., 2007), a
multi-hazard indicator-based vulnerability approach has been developed (for more detail
see Kappes et al., in press, A.7). The first step of the assessment of the hazard-specific
physical vulnerability of structures in a multi-hazard context is the identification of vul-
nerability indicators. These indicators have to be available with reasonable effort and have
to include those characteristics primarily influencing the vulnerability of a structure with
respect to the considered hazards. While some indicators influence the vulnerability for
several hazards, others may be rather specific and related to the vulnerability for just one
process. Moreover, the level of importance of a certain indicator for the assessment of the
hazard-specific vulnerability varies from processes to process. For instance in the case of
buildings, for floods Granger et al. (1999) indicate the relevance of the floor height and
number of floors while in the rock fall context Holub & Hu¨bl (2008) refer primarily to
the strength of the outer wall and the existence, height above ground and size of windows.
By contrast, in the case of avalanches Bertrand et al. (2010) suggest the significance
of building shape, mechanical properties of its material and anchorage of the foundation.
These examples indicate not only the variation of potential indicators but also the neces-
sity to weight the indicators for each single hazard according to its level of importance for
the hazard-specific vulnerability. For each indicator, again, scores have to be defined that
indicate to which degree a certain characteristic (e.g. one-, two- or three-storey edifice
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with respect to the vulnerability indicator number of floors) contributes to the vulnera-
bility of a building (Kappes et al., in press, A.7). Based on the scores and weights the
Relative Vulnerability Index (RVI) is calculated, a measure of the vulnerability of a struc-
ture (Figure 4.3). Thereby relative refers to the missing relation to the hazard intensity.
Relative Vulnerability
Index (RVI)
elative Vulnerability
Index ( VI)
Indicator I2Indicator I2Indicator I1Indicator I1 Indicator ImIndicator Im
W1 Wm
Score 1Score 1
Score 2Score 2
Score 3Score 3
Score 4Score 4
s1
s2
s3
s4
Score 1Score 1
Score 2Score 2
Score 3Score 3
Score 4Score 4
s1
s2
s3
s4
Score 5Score 5 s5
Score 1Score 1
Score 2Score 2
Score 3Score 3
s1
s…
sn
>0
No importance
Very low importance
Very high importance
0
>0
1
Not relevant
Low vulnerability
High vulnerability
0
1
Indicator I..Indicator I..
Score 1Score 1
Score 2Score 2
Score 3Score 3
Score 4Score 4
s1
s2
s3
s4
W2 W…
Indicator weight Score      
Figure 4.3.: Structure of the calculation of the relative vulnerability index on basis of
indicator weights and scores according to Kappes et al. (in press, A.7).
That implies, within one susceptibility or hazard zone, buildings can be compared and
prioritised. However, a comparison across several hazard zones is difficult since hazard
and vulnerability cannot be combined to form some kind of qualitative risk. The scores
are assigned according to the hazard type while the weights are chosen under considera-
tion of the user-specific objective and the hazard-specific characteristics. For instance, the
number of floors is an important influencing factor on the flood vulnerability of a building.
However, it may be of higher importance in an emergency management context than in a
spatial planning context since emergency services need to locate potential victims as soon
as possible and especially in buildings without the possibility of vertical evacuation. The
RVI is calculated according to the following formula (Kappes et al., in press, A.7):
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RV I =
m∑
1
wm · Imsn (4.3)
with the weights w1 − wm (with
∑m
1 wm = 1) for the different indicators (I1 − Im) and
the influence to vulnerability (I1s1 − Imsn, with values between 0 and 1).
Finally, the effect of hazard relations on the overall vulnerability has to be assessed. As
described in the previous chapter, the combination of spatial and temporal coincidence
have been identified as those types of hazard relations that exert influence on the vul-
nerability. By opposing these two components, four possible combinations are identified
(Table 4.4), giving rise to the following implications (Kappes et al., in press, A.7):
Table 4.4.: Matrix of the influence of spatially and/or temporally related hazards on the
vulnerability, modified after Kappes et al. (in press). (a)-(d) is described in
the text.
Spatially overlapping Spatially not overlapping
Separated in
time
a) An element is affected
(threatened) by different haz-
ards over time
b) Different elements within
the area under consideration
are affected by different haz-
ards over time
Simultaneous
or closely timed
c) An element is affected by
two hazards at the same time
or an element already affected
by one hazard is hit by a sec-
ond one afterwards
d) Different elements are af-
fected at the same time by dif-
ferent hazards
a) A building situated in a zone threatened by multiple hazards is potentially exposed
to differing types of impacts and loads over time. While certain building characteristics
or reinforcement measures reduce the vulnerability for one process, they may lead to an
increase towards another. UNEP (1992, Paragraph 7.61) make the example that “an
earthquake-resistant house made of wood will be more vulnerable to wind storms”. Con-
sequently, building codes and design of mitigation measures have to consider the synergies
and contradictions arising from certain building properties with regard to multiple hazards
(Gibbs, 2003; Holub & Hu¨bl, 2008; Holub, 2008). However, the inclusion of this aspect
into the presented methodology is restricted to the identification of buildings confronted
with this situation and the determination of contradicting characteristics. More detailed
engineering knowledge is necessary to account for the possible effects and to develop more
effective building codes.
b) The spatially and timely separate occurrence of multiple hazards within an area under
consideration has no implications for the physical vulnerability.
c) The simultaneous or closely timed impact of various hazards an area can result either
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from the triggering of multiple hazards by one event, one hazard triggering another, or the
coincidentally simultaneous or closely timed occurrence of two or more hazards. The erup-
tion of a volcano with the different processes arising from this event including earthquakes,
ash falls and pyroclastic flows is for instance one occasion in which near-simultaneous im-
pact of two or more hazards is relatively probable (Zuccaro et al., 2008). Therefore,
the simultaneous impact of several hazards on an element at risk results in an overall
vulnerability which may differ from the sum of their vulnerabilities. For instance Lee &
Rosowsky (2006, p. 302) mention a “significant increase in effective seismic weight [due
to snow load] when the structure is subjected to seismic loading”. Zuccaro et al. (2008)
made a similar observation for masonry buildings and reinforced/concrete structures un-
der ash load during an earthquake. By contrast, Zuccaro et al. (2008, p. 429) observed a
“positive effect of the vertical ash load on the roof that, when it does not reach the value
of the roof collapse, produces on the structure a considerable stabilizing effect due to the
total weight increment” when being hit by a pyroclastic flow. With the development of
fragility surfaces (Figure 2.3) instead of a vulnerability curves, Lee & Rosowsky (2006)
give an example of how this effect of related hazards can be considered. However, this is a
rather engineering or technical problem that can only be considered at very small scales.
Therefore, the presented methodology supports the identification of such situations, while
further analyses and measures have to be based on engineering experience and technical
knowledge.
The closely timed occurrence of two or more hazards is described by Zuccaro et al. (2008,
p. 417) as a “sequence of events”. An example is the impact of an earthquake triggered
landslide on a building that is already damaged by the earthquake and will therefore be-
have differently. Zuccaro et al. (2008, p. 417) propose to consider such settings as “a
progressive diminution of the resistance characteristics of the buildings”. This enables the
calculation of the vulnerability alteration within the hazard sequence and for instance may
facilitate the inclusion of the vulnerability into event trees assessing the effect of potential
hazards cascades.
d) The simultaneous impact of hazards on different zones within an area under consider-
ation has no implications for the physical vulnerability.
4.1.5. Visualisation
The visualisation scheme elaborated for the presentation of the results of multi-hazard
exposure analysis consists of a set of maps. Each map is designed to communicate a
certain aspect of the modelling outcome with the three representation forms described in
subsection 3.1.6 as core: single hazard information including all detail, overlays of mul-
tiple hazards, and joint variables as the overall hazard, susceptibility or risk. They are
supplemented by several additional maps to provide background information for the in-
terpretation of the results. The following is the final result of this combination of core
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representations and supplementary background:
1. General setting: In the first map, an overview of the general situation in the study
site is given, including information on land use, geology, slope angle and planar cur-
vature. These parameters are included in the modelling procedure and their patterns
may provide the basis for a better understanding of the analysis results presented
in later maps. The objective of this map is to offer introductory information and
orientation in the respective area for the user.
2. Single hazards: After a general introduction into the area, the first analysis results
are presented. According to the three core representation forms this refers initially
to the display of single hazards separately and in detail, for instance presenting the
inundation depth of floods. For the colour definition of each hazard the symbol kit
of Kienholz & Krummenacher (1995) is proposed. It assigns red to rock falls,
orange to shallow landslides, purple to debris flows, light blue to avalanches and
darker blue to floods.
3. Overlapping hazards: The presentation of an overlay of hazards is important to
facilitate the identification of zones of overlap. However, the display of all combina-
tions of five superimposed processes would lead to 31 different combinations in total
and for four processes to 15 possibilities. The clear representation of all different
classes would be extremely difficult, even with colours and patterns etc. Therefore,
the overlay is restricted to three hazards resulting in seven combinations, while each
hazard is not only represented by its specific colour but also by a pattern.
4. Number of hazards: The presentation of the number of overlapping hazards offers
information on the whole set of processes taken into account without disturbing
details of the single threats. However, this gives no information on the overall
susceptibility level, i.e. areas in which multiple hazards are superimposed are not at
a higher threat than those prone to less hazards.
5. Past events: This map again provides background information to the user as prepa-
ration for the analysis results. In this case the uploaded past events used for the
validation are shown before presenting the validation results to first draw the atten-
tion to the distribution of the records, the quantity of information available for each
process, and the area covered by the inventory information.
6. Validation: The hazard model validation results are presented to transmit a spatial
impression of the models’ qualities and the predictions made. Thereby, the true
positives, false negatives and false positives are depicted to transmit the information
on modelling results confirmed by past events, past events that were not covered by
the model and the area potentially prone to future incidents.
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7. Exposure: Finally, elements at risk located in susceptibility zones are presented
indicating potential risk areas.
4.2. The MultiRISK Platform
Although the developed concepts already give clear indications for the performance of
multi-hazard exposure analyses at a regional level, the modelling is still time-consuming.
Steps such as the data preparation, calculation of derivatives or reclassifications can easily
be automated and facilitate the repetition of the investigation of scenarios, updating of
the susceptibility and exposure analyses etc. The same applies for the visualisation of all
output files resulting from the modelling process. Their upload in a GIS software, the
definition of colours, transparency or the composition of multiple files is time-consuming.
Whilst the examination of the result files in a GIS software is always possible, the pro-
gramming of a visualisation tool also offers a fast inspection of the information after the
modelling procedure and can be used for communication of the final results. In the fol-
lowing sections the two tools forming the MultiRISK Platform are presented in detail.
4.2.1. The MultiRISK Modelling Tool
The MultiRISK Modelling tool represents a first attempt at the automation of the previ-
ously developed analysis concept. In order to keep the software simple and transferable,
hazard relations are still not included. However, only few steps have to be carried out by
the user to link for example the output of a hazard model to the input files to consider
the impact of one process on the disposition of another one.
The Modelling Tool consists of four major steps, the hazard modelling, the validation of
the output by means of overlay with past events, the exposure analysis, and the prepa-
ration of the output files for subsequent presentation in the Visualisation Tool (Figure
4.4). The fundamental step in MultiRISK is the upload of data for the modelling proce-
dure (DEM and, optionally, land use and lithology) or the upload of a previously created
project (Figure 4.5). On this basis, either the susceptibility of hazards is modelled or
further activities such as model validation or exposure analyses are performed or the visu-
alisation of the results is prepared. For the hazard modelling stage the set of hazards to be
considered has to be selected and the model parameters have to be entered (refer to Table
4.1 for the required model parameters). After a confirmation of the chosen parameters,
the modelling procedure is performed. Thereby, meta-data is automatically assigned to
each of the output files that contains information on the input data and the modelling
parameters used for its creation.
In the next step, the validation of the analysis results is offered. Two options are provided,
the validation of the modelled sources and the validation of the complete susceptible area
including source instabilities and run out. After the upload of event records the calculation
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Figure 4.4.: Flow chart of the susceptibility step of MultiRISK Modelling Tool (Kappes
et al., subm.a, A.4).
can be started.
Based on uploaded elements at risk (buildings, infrastructure etc.) the exposure analysis
is carried out for the source areas as well as for the complete area affected by each of
the hazards. This is primarily important for the occurrence of shallow landslides, since
a building located on moving ground is differently affected than a building being hit by
moving mass.
The final step initiates the preparation of the data for display in the MultiRISK Visu-
alisation Tool. At first, the result files are automatically saved in the folder defined as
workspace in the initial software interface (Figure 4.5). Thereby, the Name of the project
determines the first part of all file names while associated abbreviations indicate the con-
tent of the files. Primarily, this includes the hazard set with the abbreviations av for
avalanches, rf for rock falls, sl for shallow landslides, df for debris flows and fl for
floods. Furthermore the consideration of either sources s, run out r or the complete
area c is indicated and the performed activities are signalled such as the validation vl
or the overlay of all hazards resulting in the number of hazards nr. For instance, the file
Barcelo rf s contains the modelled rock fall source instabilities for the project Barcelo and
the file Barcelo av c vl is the result of the validation of the complete area susceptible to
avalanches. However, for the visualisation, predefined file names are necessary and the
files have to be located in a predefined folder. This implies that the changing project
names and the project folder pose a problem for the web-mapping application. Therefore,
all produced files are copied in the predefined folder with predefined names from which
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Figure 4.5.: Screenshot of the initial interface of the MultiRISK Modelling Tool.
the visualisation tool obtains the information. For details on the single steps, file naming
and screenshots of the interfaces please refer to the MultiRISK manual (Kappes, 2011,
A.8).
So far, hazard relations are not automated in the MultiRISK Modelling Tool. Never-
theless, only few steps are necessary to integrate for instance the disposition alteration
snow avalanches may cause due to forest destruction. Based on the avalanche modelling
output a new land cover file can be created outside of MultiRISK, and this land cover file
forms input of a second MultiRISK analysis cycle that is run for all processes depending
on land cover information.
4.2.2. The MultiRISK Visualisation Tool
The set of seven maps presented in section 4.1.5 was implemented as seven single shifts
in the web-mapping based Visualisation Tool (see Figure 4.6) and offer the interactive
exploration of the different topics. The default background of each map is the hillshaded
DEM since it facilitates the orientation in an area, especially in mountain environments
and directly provides an impression of the topographic setting (Figure 4.6, 1a). Besides,
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Figure 4.6.: Screenshot of the interface of the MultiRISK Visualisation Tool. The fol-
lowing descriptions refer to the red numbers in the graphic: 1) Layers tree,
managed by the user. According to predefined options layers can be switched
on, off, overlaid etc. 2) Tabs for query, printing and online guide. 3) Map
area and key map visualisation. 4) Tools for cartographic interaction as
zoom in/out, spatial query etc. 5) Scale and map size customization. 6)
Tabs to access the different interactive maps.
in contrast to topographic maps, aerial or satellite images it is unobtrusive and enhances
the information presented in each map. Further information available for visualisation in
each map are the elements at risk and the rivers (Figure 4.6, 1c).
Certain rules ensure the clear visualisation of the files that are included in each map:
1. General setting: Either the land use, lithology, slope or planar curvature layer can
be visualised (Figure 4.6). Land use and lithology are semi-transparent to facilitate
the orientation in the area based on the translucent hillshaded DEM.
2. Single hazards: The visualisation of the five hazards under consideration is offered
as a combination of the source areas and the run out. However, only one process
can be displayed at a time (Figure 4.7a).
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3. Overlapping hazards: The overlay of three processes is offered. For the represen-
tation of the seven combinations, each hazard is not only represented by a certain
colour but additionally by a specific pattern (Figure 4.7b).
4. Number of hazards: This map provides information on the number of overlapping
hazards. By means of a spatial query the information which hazards are overlapping
is available (Figure 4.7c). With the hyperlink related to the question mark located
in the layer tree, further information on the query can be accessed in a separate tab.
5. Past events: The files uploaded for the validation procedure are visualised. Thereby,
information is displayed on one process at a time and either referring to the source
or the complete area.
6. Validation: The validation result is presented separately for each hazard and ei-
ther the source or of the complete validation is depicted. Additionally, a hyperlink
situated in the layer tree offers the display of the confusion matrices in a separate
tab.
7. Exposure: The hazard information forms the background for the display of the
yellow highlighted exposed elements at risk. Either those elements at risk exposed
to source instabilities or to the whole process can be visualised. Additionally, a
hyperlink offers the numerical results of the exposure analysis in a separate tab.
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a)
b)
c)
Figure 4.7.: Screenshots of the MultiRISK Visualisation Tool (Kappes et al., subm.a,
A.4). (a) The single hazards are shown separately, (b) the overlay of three
processes is offered and (c) the number of overlapping hazards is presented.
The results shown here stem from the case study in the Barcelonnette Basin.
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4.3. Summary
In this chapter, a multi-hazard risk analysis concept based on a top-down approach has
been presented. At its current stage, this concept includes two levels, (a) a regional
analysis for the identification of zones prone to multiple hazards and potential risk areas
followed by (b) a local detailed investigation of the identified areas. The complete regional
multi-hazard exposure analysis scheme under consideration of related hazards has been
outlined and indications for the connection and function of the local level analysis have
been given, although the local analysis scheme was not developed in this study. Associated
to the modelling scheme, the visualisation concept has been described through which
a clear exploration of the analysis results is offered. As a step towards a more local
analysis level, an indicator-based vulnerability assessment approach for user- and hazard-
specific analyses has been proposed. Subsequently, the implementation of the modelling
and the visualisation scheme into MultiRISK Tools has been outlined and both software
applications have been presented.
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5. Application of the Developed Concepts
and the MultiRISK Platform
To test the usefulness and coherence of the analysis and visualisation scheme as well as
the applicability and user-friendliness of the MultiRISK Platform, a case study has been
carried out. For that purpose, one of the research sites of the Mountain Risks project
has been chosen, the Barcelonnette basin. Due to its situation in the Alps it is prone
to multiple hazards, among them the five processes included in the MultiRISK Platform
(debris flows, rock falls, shallow landslides, river floods and avalanches).
5.1. Characterisation of the Barcelonnette Basin
5.1.1. General Setting
The study site is located in the Barcelonnette basin which lies in the Southern French
Alps in the De´partement Alpes des Haute Provence. The considered zone encompasses
almost the complete area of the municipalities Jausiers, Faucon de Barcelonnette, Saint-
Pons, Uvernet-Fours, Enchastrayes and Barcelonnette. Only few marginal zones had to be
excluded due to unavailability of aerial photos for the derivation of land use information.
The population of these six municipalities amounts to nearly 6,000 inhabitants (INSEE,
2011). However, due to summer and winter tourism the number of people residing in the
area is temporarily much higher as the large number of beds available in hotels and capac-
ities in camping places indicate (INSEE, 2011). The valley extends between an altitude
of 1,100 and 3,100 m a.s.l. and is drained by the Ubaye river in which a large number of
torrents flow (Figure 5.1). It is characterised by (a) a mountain climate with pronounced
interannual rainfall variability (735 ± 400 mm) and 130 freezing days per year, (b) a conti-
nental influence with large intra-day thermal amplitudes (>20o) and multiple freeze-thaw
cycles and (c) a Mediterranean influence with summer rainstorms providing occasionally
more than 50 mm/h (Flageollet et al., 1999; Maquaire et al., 2003). These sum-
mer rainstorms, as well as heavy rains on melting snow accumulations in spring, lead
to high discharges (Flageollet et al., 1999). Meso-climatic differences emerge due to
the orientation of the valley in an east-west direction, especially between the north- and
south-facing slopes (Remaˆıtre et al., 2010). Geologically, the valley presents a structural
window with autochtonous Callovo-Oxfordian black marls (the Terres Noires) below the
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Figure 5.1.: Overview of the study area with indication of the principal settlements in
white letters and catchments in blue letters (modified after Kappes et al.,
2011, A.3).
allochtonous Autapie and Parpaillon flysch (E´vin, 1997; Maquaire et al., 2003). As re-
sult of this geological setting, the upper slopes (1,900 - 3,000 m a.s.l.) consist of thrust
sheets of cataclastic calcareous sandstones and are mostly steeper than 45o (Kappes et al.,
2011, A.3). A layer of non-consolidated weathered debris between 0.5 and 5 m thickness
covers large parts of these slopes leading to debris tracks. The lower slopes (1,100 - 1,900 m
a.s.l.) are much gentler with angles of 10o to 30o and consist of the Callovo-Oxfordian
black marls, fragile plates and flakes in a clayey matrix. These zones are mostly covered
by Quaternary deposits such as poorly sorted debris at taluses, moraine deposits or land-
slide material (Kappes et al., 2011, A.3). A multitude of debris cones from the torrents
characterise the valley. Due to their fertility and shallow slopes several of the cones are
populated such as Sanie`res, Bourget, Faucon or Saint-Pons (Weber, 1994). Weathering
and disintegration of sand- and limestones give rise to the formation of sandy and loamy
regolith. On flysch, sandy or loamy regolith may further develop to silty or clayey regolith
(Blijenberg, 1998). The vegetation mainly consists of forests and alpine pastures with a
dominance of alpine pastures and bare rock outcrops above the tree line which is located
at about 2400 m at south-facing and 2200 m at north-facing shadowy slopes (Blijenberg,
1998). The forest cover had diminished in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries drastically
due to the use of wood and the extension of arable land (Remaˆıtre, 2006; Remaˆıtre
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& Malet, 2010). This had led to a huge increase in torrential activity for which reason
reforestation and check-dam construction has been initiated in 1864, and is still ongoing
(Remaˆıtre, 2006).1
5.1.2. Natural Hazards
The location and the specific characteristics of the Barcelonnette basin give rise to the
occurrence of a multitude of natural hazards:
• In the past, several severe river floods of the Ubaye River led to considerable damages.
Among them primarily the events in 1856 which hit in first place Jausiers and in
1957 which concentrated on Barcelonnette and several neighbouring villages (Sivan,
2000). Further cases of considerable high water or flooding are recorded for the
years 1951, 1960, 1963, 1970, 2003 and 2008 (LeCarpentier, 1963; Sivan, 2000;
Bhattacharya, 2010). Corrective measures to reduce the river flood risk comprise
the construction of dykes and river channelisation, especially of the river sections in
the cities of Jausiers and Barcelonnette.
• Between 1850 and 2004 alone, information on about 100 debris flow and 461 flash
floods has been collected (Remaˆıtre, 2006). Most notably, the Riou Bourdoux was
famous as the alpine monster or the first torrent in France (“le premier torrent de
France”, Delsigne et al., 2001, p. 527), due to the devastation it caused. Check-
dam construction and reforestation led to a decrease in torrent activity, however,
occasionally debris flow events still cause damage. The most recent example in the
study area is the incidence of 2003 in the Faucon catchment that affected nine houses
and involved the closure of the main road that crosses the valley (the R.D. 900) for
several hours (Remaˆıtre, 2006; Remaˆıtre & Malet, 2010).
• The valley exhibits a great variety of slope movements in moraine deposits, due to
slope undercutting and even in the hummocky and less steep slopes (Thiery et al.,
2007). Thiery et al. (2004) mapped about 250 active rotational and translational
landslides in the year 2000. Furthermore, three big earth flows have developed in the
black marls of the Barcelonnette basin (Guillon, 2001; Malet et al., 2004; van
Asch et al., 2007; Maquaire et al., 2003): Super Sauze (∼750,000 m3), La Valette
(∼3,600,000 m3) and Poche (∼1,000,000 m3). Despite their usually slow movement,
they pose a notable threat due to their sediment volume and high mobility, including
for the release of debris flows (Malet et al., 2004).
• Areas prone to rock fall mostly lie far off from the built-up zones or other infrastruc-
ture, in the higher parts of the valley and therefore receive rather low attention in
1This subsection is in large parts repeated from the article Kappes et al. (subm.a, A.4).
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the Barcelonnette basin. Exceptions are several spots in the municipality of Jausiers
that are considered in the municipal risk prevention plan (RTM, 2000a).
• The avalanche inventories of the “Enqueˆte Permanente sur les Avalanches” (EPA)
and “Les Donnees de la Carte de Localization des Phonome`nes d’Avalanche” (CLPA)
indicate a rather high historic avalanche activity (MEDD, 2007). However, the
threatened areas are mostly situated in uninhabited catchments as the Abries or in
the upper zone of e.g. the Riou Bourdoux and the Sanie`res catchment.
• Moreover, the Barcelonnette basin is threatened by earthquakes. In a global compar-
ison France exhibits only a medium seismicity, but, within France the department
of Alpes de Haute Provence is among the most seismic ones (CETE, 1987). Two
major events were recorded, one in 1887 with an intensity of VII - VIII on the MSK
scale (Medvedev-Sponheuer-Karnik scale) and the other in 1959 with an intensity
of VI - VII on the MSK scale. The centennial seismic intensity of Barcelonnette
was assessed to 6.5 and the bicentennial seismic intensity to 7.0 on the MSK scale
(CETE, 1987).
5.1.3. Risk Prevention Plans in the Barcelonnette Basin
Since 1982 the elaboration of risk exposure plans (Plans d’exposition aux risques, PER)
that were succeeded in 1995 by the natural risk prevention plans (Plans de pre´vention des
risques naturels, PPR), is obligatory for those municipalities in France that are exposed
to natural hazards (MEDD, 1999; Delattre et al., 2002; Fleischhauer et al., 2006).
These plans “aim at regulatory risk zoning, also with important legal significance for
compensation rules” (Fleischhauer et al., 2006, p. 43). The prefect of each De´partement
is instructed to determine the municipalities at risk and demand the preparation of a PER
or now PPR. Due to the hazard situation in the Barcelonnette basin, all municipalities
are obliged to elaborate such a plan and the zoning is already taken into consideration
for spatial planning. The PERs and PPRs indicate areas of high risk in which no further
construction works are allowed (red zones), medium risk where new building projects can
only be carried out under the consideration of specific requirements (blue zones), and no
significant risk (white zones). In the Barcelonnette basin, the zoning is the result of a
combination of modelling, information on past events and expert judgement and covers,
as prescribed for PERs and PPRs, only the settled areas (Michel Peyron, RTM, personal
communication).
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5.2. Available Data
5.2.1. Area-Wide Spatial Data
A digital elevation model is available from the interpolation of digitised contour lines and
breaklines of channels of the 1:10,000 topographic maps from IGN (Institut Ge´ographique
National). Scanning and georeferencing of the maps had been carried out by Thiery
et al. (2007) and the interpolation was realised with the software program SURFER2
using kriging on basis of a semivariogram elaborated by Thiery (2007). The resulting
DEM was smoothened by 9-nodes averaging. A second DEM, or to be more precise a
digital terrain model (DTM), is available from airborne interferometric synthetic aperture
radar (IFSAR) with a resolution of 5 m. A visual comparison clearly indicates quality
differences between the DEM and the DTM depending on the location in the valley. On
tree-covered slopes the level of detail of the DEM is higher, attributable to the creation of
the DTM by filtering out the forest from the digital surface model. This leads to a very
strong smoothing of the respective zone. By contrast, in the nonforested flood plain and
in particular in the river channel itself, the quality of the DTM is much higher than the
quality of the DEM. This difference in quality between the DTM and the DEM in the
flood plains is increased due to the long distances between elevation lines in areas of only
slight elevation differences as flood plains. Thus, at the forested slopes the DEM, and in
the nonforested flat flood plains the DTM show a higher level of represented detail.
Using aerial photographs of 2000 the land use was digitised and classified into dense
coniferous forest, coniferous forest of average to low density, deciduous forest, natural
grassland, arable land/permanent crops, pastures, bare rock, bare soil, urban areas, mining
sites, water courses and marshes and water bodies by Bordonne´ (2008). The information
on the lithology was digitised from the geological map (1:50,000) constituting the following
ten classes (Bordonne´, 2008): marls, torrential alluvium, limestone, boulder fields, talus
slopes, flysch, gypsum, lacustrine deposits, calcareous marls and moraines.3
5.2.2. Inventory Data
With respect to the five processes considered in the MultiRISK Platform the following
information on past events is available3:
• Debris flows: the envelopes (polygons) of the deposition of the debris-flow events
observed in 1996, 2002 and 2003 at the Faucon, Sanie`res and Bourget torrent based
on post-event field observations (Remaˆıtre, 2006).
• Shallow landslides: Information was extracted from the landslide inventory of
Thiery (2007). This inventory was compiled at a scale of 1:10,000 by means of the
2http://www.goldensoftware.com/products/surfer/surfer.shtml
3This paragraph is in large parts repeated from the article Kappes et al. (subm.a, A.4).
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interpretation of aerial photos, field surveys and literature analyses (Thiery et al.,
2007). A limitation is that this inventory does not cover the whole basin but only
the eastern half of the study area.
• Rock fall: Several indications concerning potential rock fall sources were derived
from the landslide inventory of Thiery (2007). These records were complemented by
information derived from the PPR of Jausiers indicating complete rock fall process
areas including the run out zone (RTM, 2000a).
• Avalanches: The CLPA inventory - “Les Donnees de la Carte de Localisation des
Phe´onome`nes d’Avalanche” (MEDD, 2007) - provides information on terrain obser-
vations and photo-interpretation results for the southeastern part of the study area.
This includes primarily the north-facing slopes (parts of the Bachelard catchment,
Galamonds, Bramafan Riou Versant and Abries nearly complete).
• Floods: Since no spatial records providing information on the extent of past events
are available, recourse was made to the risk zones of the PPRs available for Jausiers,
Enchastrayes, Faucon and Barcelonnette (RTM, 2000a,b, 2002, 2008). Especially
for the river flooding, this information is highly valuable, since the river lies entirely
in the settled area and no other data could be acquired. Non-spatial information,
i.e. assessments about the 100 year discharge of the Ubaye at five points between
Jausiers and Barcelonnette, are available from hydrological reports (IDEALP &
Hydroetudes, 2008, 2010).
5.2.3. Data on Elements at Risk
A database with the footprints of all buildings, and that contains information on the type of
building, use, building condition, material and number of floors, is available from the LIVE
institute (Laboratoire Image, Ville, Environment) of CNRS, University of Strasbourg (for
more detail on the database refer to Kappes et al., in press, A.7 and to Puissant et al.,
2006). Moreover, digital information on infrastructure (roads and paths) and the outline
of the settled areas is available from the LIVE institute. This data has been compiled in
the framework of several projects, among them ALARM (Assessment of Landslide Risk
and Mitigation in Mountain Areas, contract EVGI-2001-00018, 2002-2004).
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5.3. Approach for the Performance of the Multi-Hazard
Exposure Analysis
Based on the information compiled for the Barcelonnette basin, a case study is carried
out. This comprises the performance of a multi-hazard exposure analysis with the Multi-
RISK Modelling Tool and the subsequent visualisation of the results with the MultiRISK
Visualisation Tool. Moreover, potential hazard relations are investigated and finally a
vulnerability analysis is carried out in the municipality Faucon de Barcelonnette. In this
section, the application of the concepts and tools is explained.
5.3.1. Parameterisation of the MultiRISK Modelling Tool
The first step offered in the Modelling Tool is the susceptibility analysis. To perform this
step, model parameters have to be chosen in accordance with the objectives of the study
as well as the available information. However, in a multi-hazard context this is a chal-
lenging task because inventory information used for model calibrations is mostly difficult
to obtain for multiple hazards. Moreover, the single-hazard models have to produce com-
parable results, which means with reference to a common basis or a common scenario. In
full-hazard cases, this relates to certain scenarios such as 20, 50 or 100 year events or the
annual probability of events above certain magnitudes. However, susceptibility analyses
are not usually based on magnitude-frequency relations since susceptibility indicates only
the propensity of an area to a certain process. Nevertheless, the model parameterisation
can follow a conservative or a rather liberal expert estimate, or can be based on a set
of event records. This implies that in a multi-hazard context a common qualitative sce-
nario has to be defined according to which parameters are chosen. Since in the proposed
top-down scheme the regional analysis is supposed to indicate as far as possible all zones
potentially prone to hazards, hazard overlaps and risk, the adoption of a worst-case sce-
nario is chosen.
Although many authors use the term worst-case, they refer to different definitions. For
instance, Bartels & van Beurden (1998, p. 118) apply this approach with the objec-
tive to “know any risk spot, regardless of areal unit size or shape”. Baxter et al. (2008,
p. 455) describe the worst-case context as “domain of low probability - high consequence
incidents and uncertainty” and Bommer & Scherbaum (2008) relate conservative deci-
sions in a hazard analysis to the identification of the worst-case scenario. Huggel et al.
(2002, p. 322) explain, that “a worst-case philosophy is followed to delineating the area
which could be affected”. In this study, worst-case is defined as the choice of very con-
servative modelling parameters to identify as far as possible all potential hazard and risk
spots.
However, between hazards, approaches to assess the worst-case scenario vary. For example
with respect to landslide and avalanche modelling, expert appraisal related to observed
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events or information from comparable studies is often used. For instance, for the source
identification of landslides and avalanches based on empirical rules, the conservative choice
of the parameters offers a reasonable possibility to identify the overall area potentially
susceptible. For instance, Horton et al. (2008) decide to not exclude forested areas as
potential source since “some debris flows can be observed in forests, and as the protective
effect of trees can be removed by a fire or a cut down”. For the definition of slope angle
thresholds for the initiation of avalanches and landslides, frequently based on expert ap-
praisal values are chosen that lead to a conservative estimate of the hazard situation (e.g.
Moran et al., 2004). For the determination of the angle of reach for the run out mod-
elling, large data sets of observed events and statistics carried out with these records give
indications of potential maximum run out lengths (refer to Corominas, 1996; Huggel
et al., 2002; Corominas et al., 2003; Moran et al., 2004).
While approaches to assess the worst-case scenario for landslides and avalanches are often
expert- and experience-based, river flood worst-case methods follow different principles
and contrast strongly to the strategies used for avalanches and landslides. In the river
flood context, further terms referring to a meaning equivalent to worst-case are extreme
flood or maximum flood. Thereby, Ruiz Rodriguez + Zeisler et al. (2001) define ex-
treme flood as a very rare event with a recurrence probability that is too low to specify
its return period and France´s & Botero (2003, p. 223) refer to the probable maximum
flood as “the biggest flood physically possible in a specific catchment”. For the calculation
of the maximum or extreme floods very diverse methods are available. The presented
approaches refer to simple methods, while sophisticated approaches such as the analy-
sis of the probable maximum precipitation as input for a rainfall-run off model are not
mentioned:
1. Estimation of the maximum discharge for the catchment area and potentially fur-
ther influencing factors such as land cover (Schick, 1988; Pegram & Parak, 2004;
Abrahamson & Pentland, 2010). Examples are the formulae proposed by Fran-
cou & Rodier (1969) and Kovac (1988, in Pegram & Parak, 2004). For in-
stance, Abrahamson & Pentland (2010) propose the equation Q = 17.795A0.8156
for the computation of the discharge Q based on the catchment area A for Vancouver
Island, and Q = 23.753A0.7808 for the British Columbia Coastal Region.
2. One option is the definition of the maximum or extreme flood on basis of a scenario
with a defined return period (Huttenlau et al., 2010). Huttenlau et al. (2010)
cite several authors which describe the extreme flood with the 200 to 500 year event.
Ruiz Rodriguez + Zeisler et al. (2001) use return periods between 1,250 and
10,000 years to assess the extreme flood for different sections of the Rhine delta.
Bru¨ndl (2008) applies the 1,000 year event to the modelling of the extreme flood of
the river Lonza in a case study for the communities Gampel and Steg in the Canton
Wallis.
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3. Another approach is the increment of the water level of a certain flood scenario by
a defined water depth. For instance UVM (2005) propose an increase of the 100
or 200 year flood by x m. For a section of the Oder the 200 year flood + 1 m has
been applied (OderRegio, 2006) and at the Rhine, the 200 year flood + 0.5 m was
chosen (Ruiz Rodriguez + Zeisler et al., 2001).
4. Alternatively to the previous method, the discharge of a predefined scenario can
be multiplied by a certain factor. Klumpp & Ho¨rmann (2010) propose the mul-
tiplication of the 100 year flood by 1.6 and Hydrotec (2009) applied a factor of
1.3.
These methods show differences in their suitability to be used in a regional context. For
the first approach the whole river catchment has to be considered. At a regional scale of
about 1:10,000 and 1:50,000 the entire catchment is included in the area under consider-
ation in only a few cases. This implies that for many cases, additional information for
surrounding regions would have to be gathered, which complicates the procedure. For the
second approach, statistical analyses of discharge time series have to be performed and
extrapolated for very long periods, which has many uncertainties and assumptions. The
third approach, the assumption of a certain additional water depth, is associated with
specific characteristics of the river such as river size and morphology. Therefore, this mea-
sure is difficult to transfer to other rivers with different characteristics. By contrast, the
multiplication of a certain commonly used scenarios such as the 100 or 200 year flood, with
a defined factor, is more widely applicable and transferable to other rivers. Nevertheless,
it also requires information of the scenario to use.
To perform the case study in the Barcelonnette basin, for landslides and avalanches the
empirical models were parameterised by means of a literature review of comparable studies.
Since not enough information is available in the basin to assess minimum angles of slopes
prone to landslides or extrapolate worst-case angles of reach, those parameters found in
the literature that lead to the most conservative assessment of the susceptible area have
been chosen. For the river flood worst-case appraisal, the fourth method, multiplying the
value of the 100 year flood by the factor 1.6 was chosen since it is applicable at a regional
scale, does not require the definition and statistical calculation of a very low frequency
event, and is better transferable to different river basins. The process of parameter choice
is described in detail in Kappes et al. (subm.a, A.4) and is therefore not be repeated here
in depth. Table 5.1 presents the final set of parameters chosen for the hazard analysis in
MultiRISK.
For the validation step the inventory information previously presented is used and the
exposure analysis is performed for single buildings, built-up areas and roads.
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Table 5.1.: Parameters applied in the MultiRISK Modelling Tool for the Barcelonnette
basin case study. The Holmgren exponent refers to the spreading algorithm
for multiple flow directions (Holmgren, 1994). An exponent of 1 results in
a wide spreading. As the value increases, the width of the flow spreading
decreases.
Sources Run out
Parameters Values chosen Parameters Values
chosen
DF Planar curvature threshold
Slope angle - upslope area
threshold
Land use/cover & litholog-
ical units to be excluded
< -2/100 m−1
Extreme fitting
.
Outcropping
limestone
Holmgren exponent
Angle of reach
1
7o
RF Slope threshold
Land use/cover & litholog-
ical units to be excluded
37o
Outcropping
marls & clays
Holmgren exponent
Angle of reach
1
29o
SL Soil bulk density
Slope threshold (friction
angle)
Critical rainfall threshold
Lithological units to be ex-
cluded
1,700 kgm3
28o
.
33 mm
Outcropping
limestone
Holmgren exponent
Angle of reach
1
20o
AV Slope threshold
Land use/cover units to be
excluded
30o-60o
Dense forest
Holmgren exponent
Angle of reach
1
14o
FL Hydrograph, 100-year flood∗1.6 with 48 hours duration
5.3.2. Analysis of Hazard Relations
The proposed concept for the consideration of hazard relations consists of three steps,
(1) the creation of a multi-hazard subsystem, (2) the identification of potential relations
within and between the set of hazards and the set of influencing factors, and (3) the inte-
gration of hazard relations into the analysis scheme and the determination of those zones
potentially prone to the effects. A multi-hazard subsystem with identified regional scale
relations was presented in subsection 4.1.1. Based on this framework, the third step, the
analysis of zones prone to hazard relations is carried out in the Barcelonnette basin. This
comprises (a) the triggering of one hazard by another and (b) the disposition alteration.
The detailed performance of this analysis is presented in Kappes & Glade (acc., A.6)
and therefore only a resume is given here.
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a) With respect to the triggering of one hazard by another, two possible combinations have
been identified in the matrix presented in Table 4.2, the undercutting of slopes by floods
and the damming of rivers or torrents by landslides. For the identification of potential
slope undercutting during flood events, the shallow landslide source areas modelled with
MultiRISK are overlain with the flood analysis result. However, an influence of the water
beyond the overlapping area has to be expected due to water saturation and erosion of the
toe. In order to consider this additional influence, the flooded area has been buffered. To
test the method, in this first case study a buffer of 20 m has been assumed, correspond-
ing to two pixels with respect to the resolution of the DEM of 10 m. The second type
of relations between the two processes, the river damming by accumulation of landslide
material in a river or torrent channel is performed by the overlay of the zones susceptible
to shallow landslides with the water courses. However, only in narrow valleys or gorges, a
damming can be expected since otherwise the water may deviate and remove the material
slowly (Carrasco et al., 2003). Therefore, Carrasco et al. (2003) propose to identify
gorge-type valleys and to restrict the areas potentially prone to damming to those narrow
river sections (for details refer to Kappes et al., subm.a, A.4). Using the MultiRISK
modelling results, an analysis of zones potentially prone to damming is performed.
b) An analysis of the disposition modification has not been carried out for the Barcelon-
nette basin. Since the multi-hazard susceptibility analysis performed with MultiRISK
describes the worst-case scenario, the result would refer to the effect that all potential
avalanches in the area may have on the forest stand and subsequently on the hazard situa-
tion. Since this is a highly improbable possibility and the usefulness of such an assessment
is questionable, this step has not been performed. Nevertheless, such an analysis may be
valid for a less extensive scenarios than the one used in this study.
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5.3.3. Vulnerability Analysis
Based on the multi-hazard version of the PTVA a vulnerability analysis has been carried
out for the municipality Faucon-de-Barcelonnette (Kappes et al., in press, A.7)4. Since
the multi-hazard susceptibility areas resulting from the MultiRISK Modelling Tool do
not exhibit the scale and level of detail required for the vulnerability analysis, the risk
zones of the risk prevention plans (PPRs) are used instead, to determine the exposure
of the buildings (Figure 5.2). Although called risk zones, the differing vulnerabilities of
$
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Figure 5.2.: Overview of the municipality of Faucon de Barcelonnette, situated between
Jausiers, Enchastrayes and Barcelonnette (Kappes et al., in press, A.7).
diverse structures is not considered, but a standard vulnerability of buildings and humans
is assumed. Thereby, red zones indicate high and blue zones medium risk while in white
zones no significant risk has to be expected (for details on the risk zones please refer
to 5.1.3). By means of the multi-hazard version of the PTVA the buildings situated in
4The vulnerability assessment approach is not included in the MultiRISK Platform but forms a step
towards a more local scale analysis.
85
Application of the Developed Concepts and the MultiRISK Platform
these zones will be differentiated according to their hazard-specific vulnerabilities. This
is done for the hazard zones of three of the five threats considered in the PPR, namely
debris flows (torrent processes), river floods and landsliding while badland erosion and
deposition of eroded material is not considered in this study. The PTVA offers not only
hazard-specific vulnerability assessments but also customisation to user priorities. Two
scenarios are developed to test this option, the general and the emergency scenario for
three different hazards (Figure 5.3). The weighting of indicators for the general scenario
is performed with the objective to support local authorities, insurance companies or house
owners in the identification of buildings requiring vulnerability reduction measures. For the
emergency scenario, weights are determined in order to identify those buildings in which
inhabitants have the highest need for support during an event. Especially for emergency
services and rescue teams this information is highly valuable. From a set of vulnerability
indicators including building characteristics and information on the building surrounding,
those relevant for each hazard were chosen (refer to Kappes et al., in press, A.7). Scores
and weights forming the basis for the calculation of the relative vulnerability indices were
assigned according to expert appraisal (Figure 5.3).
86
Application of the Developed Concepts and the MultiRISK Platform
Figure 5.3.: Weights and scores assigned for the calculation of the relative vulnerability
index for debris flows, river floods and shallow landslides, for the general
and the emergency scenario (vulnerability reduction & reinforcement (blue)
and evacuation & rescue (red), Kappes et al., in press, A.7).
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5.4. Results and Discussion
In this section the results of the application of MultiRISK in the Barcelonnette Basin are
presented. On basis, but outside of MultiRISK, hazard relations have been examined and
the vulnerability of buildings and infrastructure of one municipality has been analysed in
detail. The results and short discussions of these three analysis steps are presented below.
For further detail refer to the articles in the appendix (Kappes et al., 2010, subm.a;
Kappes & Glade, acc.; Kappes et al., in press).
5.4.1. Results from the MultiRISK Platform
The parameters presented in Table 5.1 were entered into the MultiRISK Modelling Plat-
form and the analyses performed. Since the software tool is primarily developed for practi-
cal applications, issues such as comfort, functionality and time consumption are important
parameters to assess its usefulness. Therefore, several technical aspects are outlined here.
Having already prepared the input files and determined modelling parameters, the setup
of the model including defining the project folder and project name, upload of the input
files and entering the model parameters takes only several minutes. Altogether, the data
preparation, derivative production and source identification of all processes took about
20 minutes5. The validation for all five processes took about 5 minutes and the exposure
analysis around 5 minutes as well. The preparation of the data for the visualization ac-
counted for around 10 minutes. The processes requiring much more time were the flood
modelling with about 24 hours and the run out computations. With respect to the run
out analyses, Flow-R offers two modes, the complete and the quick mode. In the com-
plete mode, each single source pixel is propagated forwards. In the quick mode first the
propagation of superior sources is calculated and, if lower ones follow the same path with
a similar or lower kinetic energy, they are neglected. This reduction of single calculation
steps provides a significant time saving (Kappes et al., subm.a). With the choice of the
quick mode for the run out calculations the modelling lasted in total for about 50 hours.
The complete modelling took much longer as the values in brackets behind the duration
of the quick analysis indicate (Table 5.2). Thus with the present computer specifications,
it is not a really flexible method for scenario calculations or testing. By contrast, the
quick run is much faster and leads to almost identical identification of susceptibility areas.
Hence, the final modelling has been carried out in the quick mode and this is also the
suggestion for further applications of the MultiRISK Modelling Tool on computers with
similar specifications6.
5Computer specifications: Intel(R) Core(TM)2 CPU 6400 @ 2.13GHz, 2.13 GHz, 3.25 GB RAM, Windows
XP.
6This paragraph is in large parts repeated from the article Kappes et al. (subm.a, A.4).
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The largest susceptible area has been determined for avalanches with over 200 km2,
followed by shallow landslides with almost 200 km2. As a result, twice the number of
buildings is exposed to avalanches with more than 1,600 buildings, while only about 900
buildings are situated in the area susceptible to shallow landslides. Much smaller areas
have been identified for rock falls (∼ 87 km2) and debris flows (∼ 63 km2). Considering its
smaller size, debris flows pose a comparatively high threat to buildings with about 1,143
buildings exposed while for rock falls a lowest number of buildings (∼50) is identified to
be exposed. The area prone to floods is by far the lowest (∼ 10 km2) but has the second
highest number of buildings is exposed (∼ 1,300). This very differing sizes of the suscep-
tible areas are in a great measure attributable to the proportioning between slopes, that
form the largest part of the area and that are prone to debris flows, avalanches, rock falls
and shallow landslides, and the much smaller flood plain that is prone to river floods. At
the same time, the villages and cities are located on the valley floor close to the river and
on the torrent fans. This explains the comparatively high exposure to debris flows and
floods despite the rather small areas prone to these hazards.
The validation of the susceptibility models (Figure 5.4) resulted in high sensitivity values
of over 83% for any of the processes indicating low false negative proportions. However,
the prediction power is low, especially for debris flows and rock falls with <1% and slightly
higher for shallow landslides with ∼7%. Only for the snow avalanche and the river flood
model higher values were identified with ∼23% and ∼32%. At first, this result indicates a
considerable overestimation of the modelled susceptible areas, nevertheless these numbers
have to be interpreted in the light of two aspects, (a) the process characteristics and (b)
the size of the inventory used for the validation. (a) For instance, the occurrence of river
floods and channel debris flows is clearly restricted to the area of the flood plain and the
torrent channel, and the recurrence of these events is possible and probable. By contrast,
the area prone to shallow landslides is less limited to a certain comparatively small zone
but is in most mountain areas much larger. Moreover, the incidence of a shallow land-
slide event does not indicate the location of further events, since only a reactivation but
not a recurrence is possible as in the case of river floods. These two aspects entail that
already few recorded flood events may cover a comparatively large proportion of the area
potentially affected in the future. On the contrary, in the case of shallow landslides the
area potentially prone to failure is only in a very small fraction covered by past events
which, moreover, can only reactivate. This indicates that the positive prediction power
of floods may naturally be higher than of shallow landslides. (b) Furthermore, the size of
the inventory plays an important role, the larger the inventory the higher can the positive
prediction power be. This reflects in the validation results of the Barcelonnette basin:
the inventories largest in area are available for floods and avalanches (see Figure 5.4) and
the positive prediction powers for these two processes are the highest as well. However,
in addition both processes, river floods and avalanches, are recurring hazards, an aspect
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Figure 5.4.: Maps of the validation results (Kappes et al., subm.a, A.4).
also influencing this result. This combination of effects hinders a direct comparison and
ranking of model qualities and a careful interpretation is necessary. An approch to over-
come this restriction could be the implementation of an uncertainty assessment to enable
an evaluation of, and comparison between the quality of the modelling results of differ-
ent hazard models. Moreover, uncertainty appraisals are important for decision-making
and risk management as Granger et al. (1999, p. 3) illustrate with the statement that
“the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies is inversly proportional to the level of un-
certainty that exists. Bell & Glade (2004b) present a qualitative method to estimate
uncertainties in a multi-hazard context, nevertheless, uncertainty approaches are still rare
in this field although several authors mention the importance to integrate this aspect (e.g.
Granger, 1998; vanWesten et al., 2010; Schmidt et al., 2011).
In summary, the quality assessment of the modelling results, referring to their ability to
correctly predict susceptible areas and the degree of overestimation of this prediction is
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the principal objective of a validation step. However, in a multi-hazard context it is rather
difficult to rank the quality of modelling results of different hazards due to the differing
characteristics of these hazards and inventory sizes. Thus a careful interpretation is rec-
ommended. Especially in the case of this study area, the shallow landslide susceptibility
of 53% of the total area, seems extremely high, the small inventory size does not allow for
a clear interpretation of this result. For a more detailed description and interpretation of
the results described here, please refer to (Kappes et al., subm.a, A.4).
The visualisation tool offers, in addition to the purely numerical results, the spatial
depiction of the modelling outcome. From a practical point of view, this proved a very
fast option to get an overview of the modelling output and provided the expected advantage
of rapid and interactive exploration of the results without time-consuming upload in a GIS
software and the assignment of colours and patterns. Especially with respect to the spatial
distribution of hazards towards each other, the Visualisation Tool facilitates a structured
depiction. The map presenting the overlay of three hazards and the depiction of the
number of overlapping hazards offer the interpretation of the distribution of single, three
and all five hazards (Figure 4.7). For instance, in the Barcelonnette basin, the overlap
of the susceptible areas of all three landslide types and the avalanche in the upper slopes
becomes apparent (Figure 4.7 c). The midslopes are less prone to the overlap of these
four processes and the superimposition of even all five hazards is very rare since rock falls
and river floods hardly overlap. The information on which processes contribute to the
respective number of overlapping hazards can be queried by clicking on the location of
interest. Also with respect to the distribution of exposed elements at risk, the combined
visualisation with the susceptibility zones offers a clear identification of the spatial patterns
(Figure 5.5). Moreover, the comparison with the numerical results is enabled by means
of a hyperlink that opens an additional tab in the internet browser with this information
(Figure 5.5). This option is also available for the validation results where a hyperlink
offers the confusion matrices.
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Figure 5.5.: Screenshot of the Visualisation Platform depicting the map that presents
the exposed elements at risk. A hyperlink in the layer tree opens an addi-
tional tab in the internet browser showing numerical results of the exposure
analysis.
5.4.2. Potential Hazard Relations in the Barcelonnette Basin
On the basis of the modelling results obtained from the analysis performed in MultiRISK,
the zones potentially prone to hazard cascades have been examined outside of the mod-
elling platform (for more detail refer to Kappes & Glade, acc., A.6). With respect to
the potential slope undercutting during flood events, a multitude of zones has been iden-
tified in the basin. Figure 5.6 b indicates an area of undercutting of the River Ubaye.
However, an overlay with elements at risk did not indicate any buildings potentially af-
fected by landsliding due to undercutting. Only several smaller roads may be affected by
this phenomenon. At these spots a more detailed analysis may be of interest if the roads
are sufficiently important for the transport in the valley. The potential damming of the
river due to the sliding mass is not to be expected since the Ubaye is mainly braided river
and so does not block easily.
With respect to river damming by the accumulation of landslide material in a river or tor-
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b)
a)
Figure 5.6.: Potential slope undercutting by the Ubaye river at the confluence of Sanie`res.
The area in the red ellipse in the map (a) is illustrated by a photograph of
the specific site indicating the destabilitsation of the respective slope (b)
(Kappes & Glade, acc., A.6).
rent channel, many areas of the basin are apparently prone to this phenomenon. In Figure
5.7 an example of the Riou Bourdoux catchment is given, indicating a delimitation of the
zones in which shallow landslides and river courses overlap, nevertheless, many spots may
be prone to damming in a narrow channel. In other catchments of the basin show similarly
high quantities of spots were identified as potentially prone to damming. Actually, the
slopes of the torrents are very steep and in large parts unstable. However, not all unstable
zones provide enough material to lead to a serious damming of the torrent. Probably a
more detailed analysis of the shallow landslide potential has to be performed to identify
sections potentially dammed by a sliding mass big enough to lead to water accumulation.
Moreover, in local analyses the potential effect of a debris flow following the dam break has
to be examined in detail to provide the necessary information to determine the potential
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Figure 5.7.: Areas potentially affected by slope undercutting, example of the Riou Bour-
doux catchment (modified after Kappes & Glade, acc., A.6). In green the
overlap of the area susceptible to shallow landslides (SL) and river courses is
presented. In purple those overlapping zones situated in gorge-type valleys
are depicted.
consequences for exposed elements at risk.
The disposition modification is not considered for the Barcelonnette basin, since the
assumption of forest destruction for the complete worst-case avalanche susceptibility area
is highly unrealistic. Even for more rare scenarios it is still some kind of worst-case
assumption that all possible avalanches will happen and completely destroy the forest
situated in their run out zone. However, this assumption may be valid for a less extensive
scenarios than the one used in this study. Therefore, no analyses with respect to the
disposition modification have been carried out in this context.
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5.4.3. Physical Vulnerability in the Faucon Municipality
The relative vulnerability index values for each building were calculated on basis of the
assigned scores and weights, and classified into high, medium and low vulnerability classes
according to the quantile classification method. That implies, the same number of build-
ings situated in the area at risk by one hazard is classified as high, medium or low vul-
nerability to provide a clear prioritisation in that area. The resulting vulnerability maps
presented in Figure 5.8 offer indications for general risk reduction purposes as well as for
emergency situations for debris flows, river floods and shallow landslides. However, the
results for the two scenarios, the general and the emergency scenario elaborated for debris
flows and floods, indicate only small differences, a situation that has to be ascribed to the
lack of information. For instance for emergency managers, information on the distribu-
tion of the population would be of high importance. At this first stage only the physical
environment has been considered, leading to a low degree of difference between scenarios.
Nevertheless, the analysis results give first indications for the prioritisation of buildings
to be reinforced or attended to in emergency situations. However, these indications offer
in first place orientation for the prioritisation of buildings situated in either the blue or
in the red area. By contrast, a prioritisation between hazard zones is much more difficult
since hazard and vulnerability levels cannot be combined to rank the risks they face. For
the detailed presentation and discussion of the results please refer to Kappes et al. (in
press, A.7).
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Figure 5.8.: Physical vulnerability maps of the Faucon municipality (Kappes et al., in
press, A.7).
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5.5. Insights gained from the Concept and Platform Application
in the Barcelonnette Basin
In the presented case study, the MultiRISK Modelling tool proved to be useful in multi-
hazard exposure analyses when considering the very short time required from the user for
the initialisation of the software. However, the modelling itself is still time consuming,
especially in the complete run out modelling mode and for a worst-case scenario in which
a large number of potential sources is identified and has to be propagated. The quick
run out modelling mode is much faster and makes the tool applicable and more flexible
with the current computer specifications. However, the most challenging aspect of the
procedure is the definition of the parameters. In this case study a worst-case scenario
has been chosen and seems to be generally suitable in a top-down approach, especially
in a areas with low data availability and without previously performed hazard analyses.
Nevertheless, the literature-based approach for model parameterisation used in this study
led to an apparent overestimation of the susceptible areas. This effect has to be considered
in the interpretation of the results or a more adjusted worst-case parameterisation of the
respective area has to be performed.
The MultRISK Modelling results provided a good basis for the investigation of potential
hazard relations even though they are still not implemented in MultiRISK. Although the
usefulness of an examination of disposition alterations had to be questioned for a worst-
case scenario, the identification of zones potentially prone to hazard cascades appears to
be a promising approach. The next challenging step is to perform local detailed studies
of potential cascades for the identified zones.
The MultiRISK Visualisation Tool proved supportive for the fast examination of the mod-
elling results to check the modelling output. However, its applicability and user-friendliness
has to be tested with external users. This applies even more for the necessity to test its
usefulness for publishing the final modelling results on the internet and to be used by a
range of stakeholders.
The vulnerability approach has only been presented in brief, details are presented in
Appendix A.2. Nevertheless, it became apparent that this method to evaluate different
element characteristics with respect to the hazard properties offers interesting possibili-
ties for the prioritisation of the most vulnerable buildings. Thereby, the information on
multiple building characteristics enables the calculation of relative vulnerability indices
for multiple processes as well as for different stakeholders and objectives. The more infor-
mation on buildings and inhabitants is available, the more supportive can the indications
given by the final RVI be. However, the data requirements are a major limitation.
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At the beginning of this study two hypotheses have been outlined:
Hypothesis I Multi-hazard (risk) analyses are not just the sum of single-hazard
(risk) analyses.
Hypothesis II A software platform provides practical advantages for coherent
and reproducible multi-hazard risk modelling and visualisation.
Based on the two hypotheses in total five objectives have been formulated. These objec-
tives directed the course of this study and are linked to each other: the first step has been
the identification of challenges arising in the multi-hazard context, compiled in the major
multi-hazard issues, and the current approaches to solution (hypothesis I, objectives 1
and 2). Secondly, under consideration of the identified issues and the knowledge gained
from this review, an analysis and visualisation scheme has been developed (hypothesis I,
objective 3). Thirdly, the conceptual approach has been implemented into the software
platform MultiRISK (hypothesis II, objectives 1 & 2). Finally, to test the conceptual
approaches and the technical realisations of the model, a case study has been carried out.
In this chapter, the challenges and difficulties while fulfilling the objectives are discussed
and on this basis the hypotheses are examined.
6.1. Is Multi- just the Sum of Single-Hazard Risks?
Hypothesis I Multi-hazard (risk) analyses are not just the sum of
single-hazard (risk) studies
In the framework of the first hypothesis, three objectives have been formulated: (1) to
investigate aspects and challenges emerging in the multi-hazard risk environment, (2) to
review the recent approaches used to cope with the identified challenges, and (3) to develop
an analysis scheme considering the knowledge gained in the previous two steps. To fulfill
the first two objectives, a detailed literature review has been performed (refer to chapter 2
and Kappes et al. (subm.b, A.1)). Thereby, not only studies dealing with multi-hazards
in the sense of all relevant hazards in a defined area but in general those considering more-
than-one-hazard have been examined. The literature review resulted in the compilation
of seven major multi-hazard issues that provoke difficulties in the multi-hazard context.
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These issues have guided the elaboration of an analysis and visualisation scheme, the third
objective, and the knowledge gained about possible solutions provided the base for the
development of solutions. The performance of a case study in the Barcelonnette basin
provided the possibility to examine the usefulness and the coherence of the concepts as
well as the practicalness of the software implementations. In the following, the experiences
gained on the seven multi-hazard issues in the course of concept development, software
implementations and the case study are outlined and subsequently the implications with
respect to the first hypothesis are discussed:
1) High data requirements of multi-hazard analyses: For the performance of multi-hazard
risk analyses, a large amount of information is necessary and this prerequisite reduces its
practicality. In the first place this refers to the data necessary when summing up the
required input for all considered hazards. Particularly challenging is the acquisition of
inventories for all processes of comparative quality and extent but also the collection of
detailed laboratory and field survey data. In the present study, a top-down design has been
identified as a promising approach to create an effective and applicable analysis scheme.
This concept consists of two levels, a regional and a local level, has been proposed. At the
regional scale, susceptibility and exposure are modelled to identify zones of hazard over-
lap and potential risk for which subsequently detailed local analyses can be performed.
This implies that the regional analysis can follow a simple approach and extensive in-
ventory data for the establishment of magnitude-frequency relationships, laboratory or
field survey information are not necessary. Subsequently, resources can be directed to the
determined zones of hazard overlap and risk and detailed analyses are only carried out
for these areas. Applying this approach in the Barcelonnette basin, it proved suitable
to identify zones to be analysed in local studies, but during the regional multi-hazard
susceptibility analysis challenges became apparent. Even though susceptibility analyses
usually follow rather simple approaches, in a multi-hazard context the need to consider
the comparability between hazards gives rise to challenges. Hazard susceptibility refers to
the area possibly affected by a process and is usually not based on magnitude-frequency
estimates. However, in a multi-hazard context, some kind of qualitative susceptibility
scenario has to be defined according to which the parameters are chosen for each hazard.
To give an example, in the landslide context, the calibration of susceptibility analysis
models is frequently based on expert appraisal in combination with information on past
events. For instance Corominas et al. (2003) define on the basis of expert knowledge
and information on past events those combinations of geological material and threshold
slope angle that lead to either to rock fall, debris flow, shallow landslide and rotational
slide susceptibility. Since all four processes are analysed according to the same principle,
it is possible to choose the parameters in a way that leads to an equivalence of the results.
However, for example floods are analysed by models based on differing parameters and
therefore independent criteria have to be defined to guide the parameterisation. In the
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Barcelonnette case study, the worst-case scenario has been chosen as orientation, requiring
more information and resources for parameterisation than an expert-based determination
as presented in Corominas et al. (2003). This indicates that the performance of multi-
hazard analyses may even lead to higher data-requirements since the comparability of the
analysis results has to be considered.
Although the performance of multi-hazard analyses according to an overarching scheme
to consider the comparability issue is demanding and may result in the requirement of
additional information, the joint analysis of multiple hazards also offers advantages. With
the joint data gathering, preparation and processing, time and effort can be saved. For the
regional study carried out in the Barcelonnette basin, topographic, land use and lithology
information had to be obtained, quality and format checked etc. In a multi-hazard con-
text this has not to be done for each process separately but is done once and leads to an
efficient procedure with less redundancies.
In summary, a top-down strategy as proposed by Castellanos Abella (2008) in the
landslide context has also been identified as a promising approach to multi-hazard risk
since it offers the most efficient use of resources, although the full effectiveness has still to
be evaluated since only the first step, the regional analysis scheme, has been developed in
detail. Nevertheless, multi-hazard analyses are datademanding since many processes, each
with specific data needs, are analysed and moreover the comparability between hazards
has to be considered. This leads to the requirement of an equivalent level of information
for all hazards, the choice of a method providing comparable results and may thereby lead
to the need of additional data. Nevertheless, the joint acquisition and preparation of input
data offers time-saving and a more efficient procedure.
2) Scale differences: The analysis scale of multi-hazard risk examinations for risk man-
agement and reduction purposes is usually determined by the requirements of the stake-
holders. Thereby, scale refers to the spatial extent of the area under consideration and
the level of detail at which the results have to be provided and therefore the analysis is
carried out. However, a scale determined according to practical needs matches the char-
acteristics of each process of a set of considered hazards better or worse. For instance,
in the present study a regional analysis has been performed. The hazard set under con-
sideration includes rather local hazards with debris flows, rock falls, shallow landslides
and snow avalanches with the result that the complete process areas are situated within
the studied zone. However, since the modelling scale is rather small for the local pro-
cesses, detailed analyses have to be performed on a local scale while at a regional scale an
approximation is given. An exception are the river floods because usually at a regional
level only part of the catchment of a river is located within the studied area, and implies
that the process cannot be examined as a whole. As a consequence, certain approaches
or methods for flood modelling are not usable since information is missing. This applies
for instance to process-based rainfall-run off models or empirical estimates of the regional
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maximum flood as outlined in Pegram & Parak (2004) since the required information
concerning catchment characteristics, size etc. is not available. Other hazards as storms,
hail or earthquakes exhibit a still much more diverging spatial scale and their modelling
at a regional level is even more challenging. To only take earthquakes as an example,
the process modelling solely within the Barcelonnette basin would not be possible since it
is likely that earthquake sources lie outside of the basin and exert an effect. A possible
solution to this problem is the inclusion of supraregional information and downscaling to
a regional resolution under consideration of regionally relevant parameters. For instance
in the case of earthquakes two very important factors differentiating the hazard intensity
at a regional level are the topography (Boore, 1972; Bouckovalas & Papadimitrou,
2005; Shafique et al., 2008; Anggraeni, 2010) and the soil & geology (Bour et al.,
2000; Wald & Allen, 2007; Anggraeni, 2010; USGS, 2009). Shaking is increased at
mountain tops and ridges while valleys face usually reduced ground motion (Lee et al.,
2009). With respect to soil characteristics, soft soils and regolith lead to an amplification
of the ground motion whereas unweathered rock outcrops contribute to a lesser extent
to shaking amplification (Wald & Allen, 2007; USGS, 2009). This example illustrates
the need for information at a smaller scale as input at a more local, in this case at the
regional, scale and raises the question, how this aspect can be included in a coherent way
in a multi-hazard analysis scheme.
In the present study, the development of a multi-scale top-down approach has been pro-
posed, focusing on the regional scale to provide information for local detailed analyses.
This accommodates the local hazards since it offers the possibility to first identify hotspots
and then focus in local analyses on these zones. An amplification of the considered levels
towards smaller scales may offer a promising possibility to also take the hazard charac-
teristics of extensive processes better into account. That implies that in an extended
multi-scale approach one level does not only offer indications how to direct resources very
efficiently at another level but may also form input in a downscaling approach. However,
as pointed out before, primarily the user-specific needs determine in the required output
and thereby the scale at which the analyses have to be carried out. Nevertheless, mostly
this does not refer to precise and fixed levels but rather to a description of needs. Thus,
a merging of the administrative levels and user-specific needs with the necessities in the
multi-hazard context due to process-specific characteristics indicates a promising approach
to the creation of a comprehensive multi-scale analysis scheme.
Apart from the spatial, also the temporal scale poses challenges in the multi-hazard con-
text. Although few problems arose within the set of processes chosen for this study, the
inclusion of hazards with very differing return periods such as earthquakes, may lead to
difficulties. While for damaging landslides or floods, return periods of several decades
to centuries are to be expected, damaging earthquakes rather exhibit return periods of
centuries up to millennia. Consequently, the creation of high-frequency scenarios below
the 100 year event are rather unusual for earthquakes and low-frequency scenarios roughly
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above the 500 year event may be in use for earthquakes but less for floods. These contrasts
also have an influence on the worst-case scenario modelling. In the context of river floods,
extreme or worst-case may refer to a return periods of about 1,000 years as proposed by
Bru¨ndl (2008) or to 1,250-10,000 years as in the study of Ruiz Rodriguez + Zeisler
et al. (2001). By contrast, in the case of earthquakes scenario modelling reaches still longer
return periods as the curves proposed by Gru¨nthal et al. (2006, Figure 2.5) indicate.
The inclusion of a process of such low frequencies but extremely high magnitudes with
high spatial extent could lead to a distortion of the result. Due to the very high magni-
tudes earthquakes exhibit, although at very low frequencies, this process would dominate
and worst-case damage assessment. Thus, for a set of temporally very distinct hazards,
the objectives of a study and the suitability of an approach as the worst-case analysis
have to be revised, especially with respect to the requirements of involved stakeholders
and decision-makers. Gru¨nthal et al. (2006) indicate a possible solution with damage
curves opposing for each return period the damages to be expected (Figure 2.5). Thereby,
these very differing relations between return period and damage can be clearly visualised,
compared between hazards and considered in the decision-making process although high
data-requirements are a disadvantage of such an approach.
In summary, spatial as well as temporal scales differ between hazards and towards stake-
holders’ needs. With respect to the spatial scale, the experiences made in the present
study point towards the elaboration of a multi-scale analysis approach adjusted to stake-
holder needs and process characteristics. With respect to the temporal scale the difficulty
of including very high magnitude and low frequency processes into a worst-case approach
has been identified and raises the question to what extent temporally very differing pro-
cesses can be included in worst-case and in general in susceptibility analyses.
3) Differing model principles, assumptions and uncertainties: Assuming that models based
on similar principles and assumptions may produce more comparable results, in this re-
spect similar models have been selected. In the present study, a group of empirical models
was chosen to build up the analysis scheme, although several challenges arose during the
selection process. While snow avalanches, debris flows and rock falls are frequently anal-
ysed by empirical methods in a very similar manner, this approach is much less used for
the analysis of shallow landslides. By contrast, for shallow landslide modelling, statistical
and physically-based are more commonly applied to consider the process-specific charac-
teristics. With respect to flood modelling the empirical approach is based on a very strong
simplification and its application is restricted to certain settings, while physically-based
approaches meet the qualitative requirements of a regional study possibly better. Thus,
the question arises if models following similar principles will lead to comparable results,
although they may be not equally well-fitting to the different processes. In this context,
the results of the validation procedure provide interesting insights. With the creation of
confusion matrices for the validation of the hazard modelling results, one approach was
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chosen for all processes. The method proved applicable for each of the processes and with
the very variable inventory sizes. Nevertheless, as outlined in the previous chapter it is
not possible to compare the quality measures of sensitivity and positive prediction power
without considering the hazard characteristics and the inventory size. This indicates that
the same method, in this case confusion matrices for model validation, may lead to qual-
itatively different results for distinct processes and therefore outcomes that have to be
compared carefully. Transfered to the hazard modelling context, the same model does not
offer necessarily results of similar quality for various hazards since the fit between hazard
and model differs. Nevertheless, equivalently fitting models based on very contrasting
principles will not provide comparable results either. Thus both aspects have to be con-
sidered in the model choice to find the best fitting and most similar modelling approaches.
In summary, the use of similar models for similar processes is reasonable as long as these
models are similarly well-fitting. Where this is not the case the differences in fit have to be
included into the interpretation of the analysis results or alternative methods that match
better have to be chosen. Thus, the model choice is not a very significant parameter to
compare model qualities, and therefore the validation of modelling results takes an im-
portant role. However, as became apparent, the validation faces difficulties with differing
process characteristics as well. This suggests to include the analysis of uncertainties into
the modelling procedure to independently compare model qualities.
4) Hazard relations and their consequences: In the present study, two types of hazard
relations have been examined: (a) those altering the hazard level and modifying the man-
ifestation form and (b) those leading to a shift in the vulnerability of elements at risk
(subsection 3.1.2).
a) For this type of hazard relations, a systemic approach proved viable by offering a de-
scription of the phenomena and considering them as processes pertaining to systems that
are related and interact. Thus effects emerge that differ from the simple sum of processes
and system components. For the detailed investigation of these relations a subdivision into
disposition modifications and hazard cascades in which one process triggers the next has
been applied and proved useful in the case study performed in the Barcelonnette basin.
b) With respect to effects on vulnerability, the spatial and temporal coincidence of hazards
may lead to alterations of the vulnerability of physical structures.
Nevertheless it became apparent that not all identified relations can be considered at the
regional, and perhaps not on any other scale. For instance, disposition modifications refer
in parts to parameters that cannot be considered at a regional scale such as the surface
roughness or the material availability. Also with respect to hazard cascades only those
zones potentially prone to this effect can be identified while the consequences have to be
investigated at a local scale. Likewise, the consequences arising with the simultaneous or
sequential impact of multiple hazards on a structure cannot be analysed and considered
in detail, but those buildings potentially prone to such effects can be identified and engi-
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neering approaches are necessary to propose possible solutions. However, it is important
to make the informed decision to consider certain relations and neglect others at a specific
scale and using a specific modelling set.
In summary, the most important step is the consideration of the existence of hazard rela-
tions, their identification and finally the informed decision to include or neglect them for
scale, objective or other reasons. Thereby, each level of a multi-scale approach may take
over specific tasks.
5) Differing units for quantifying hazards: A worst-case approach was used as basis for the
creation of comparable and equivalent modelling results. Thus the results of the suscepti-
bility analysis provide information on susceptible or not susceptible and can be compared
and jointly visualised easily. Although this is a strong generalisation, at the regional scale
and with the previously defined aim to identify zones potentially prone to hazards, hazard
overlaps and risk, this approach meets the objectives. At the exposure level, number of
buildings, length of roads and proportion of the built-area exposed to any of the hazards
have been quantified.
In summary, the definition of a common basis, the worst-case scenario, is the basic require-
ment for any comparison. Beyond that, at the regional scale at which the present study
has been carried out and with the defined objectives, the comparability of units has not
been a major difficulty due to the simplicity of the approach. Therefore, no classification
schemes or indices had to be calculated but only the differentiation between susceptible
and not susceptible.
6) Multi-step procedure of multi-hazard risk analyses: The manual performance of all steps
including preparative and intermediate operations is extremely time-consuming, error-
prone and confounding, and the confusion of intermediate products, results and scenarios
is very difficult to avoid. The MultiRISK Modelling Tool proved helpful although the
modelling procedure is still rather lengthy since the software needs several hours to days
and weeks for the calculation of the results. Nevertheless, much time and effort of the
user is saved since preparative and intermediate steps are automated and confusion is
avoided due to automatic meta-data saving and file naming. A clear disadvantage of such
a software tool is the restriction to the offered models, options and choices. Therefore, it
is very important to adjust the modelling tool to the needs of the user by adding further
parameters and the exchange of inappropriate models. RiskScape is an excellent example
of a very flexible and extensible software tool in which additional modules can be plugged
in (Schmidt et al., 2011). This flexibility is facilitated by means of clear specifications of
the modules with respect to formats and required in- and outputs.
In summary, the application of a software tool proved very helpful, nevertheless adequate
models, the adjustment to user needs and a flexible structure are important for its appli-
cation.
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7) Visualisation of the multi-dimensional result: The visualisation of the different aspects
of information that the multi-hazard exposure analysis output offers is challenging. Es-
pecially the spatial distribution of the single-hazards relative to one another and their
overlaps are difficult to display. In the present study a set of maps has been composed to
in a stepwise fashion provide different facets of the information contained in the analysis
results. Moreover, the implementation of these maps in a web-mapping application has
been identified as very promising, since it offers the direct visualisation of the results after
the completed analysis and enables the interactive exploration of the outcome. For the
communication of the results to a wider range of stakeholders, web-mapping approaches
provide not only the advantage of a very good availability for any interested person with
internet access but also displays those aspects of specific interest. Nevertheless, the Multi-
RISK Visualisation Tool is only a first version of an application to communicate the final
analysis results. An adjustment to the specific objectives and requirements of stakeholders
and users is indispensable.
In summary, a set of maps is necessary to transmit the multi-dimensional content of
the analysis results. A web-mapping application has been identified as very promising
approach to present these maps, and thereby enable the fast visualisation of the analy-
sis results after the modelling as well as communication of the final results via the internet.
With respect to the hypothesis that multi-hazard (risk) analyses are not just the sum
of single-hazard (risk) analyses, the seven multi-hazard issues can be subdivided into (a)
practical and (b) systemic issues. High data requirements, differing metrics, the multi-
step procedure and problems to visualise the results are first of all of practical nature.
By contrast, differences in spatial and temporal scale between hazards, contrasts between
model principles and assumptions of various processes and especially hazard relations are
systemic issues.
a) Considering the hypothesis from a practical point of view, a multi-hazard risk analysis
can in the fewest cases just be summed by separately created single-hazard risk analyses
since scale, level of detail and metrics will most probably not match. Moreover, the process
of harmonisation between modelling approaches to ensure the comparability of the results
may lead to additional data requirement and thus information needs may exceed the simple
sum of requirements for single-hazard analyses. Furthermore, the visualisation of multiple
hazards is not supposed to be just the presentation of many single-hazard results since
additional aspects such as the overlapping areas are of high interest. On the other hand,
the high data requirements and the multi-step procedure suggest a contrary tendency.
Here, rather an indication is given that a multi-hazard risk analysis can be less than the
sum of separate single-hazard examinations since redundancies can be avoided such as
data gathering, preparative and intermediate steps. By identifying duplicate operations
and designing an overall analysis scheme as proposed in the present study, multi-hazard
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analyses can be performed even more efficiently than the sum of single-hazard modelling.
b) From a systemic point of view, the clearest support of the hypothesis is the existence
of relations and interactions between hazards. With a separate analysis of single hazards
it is very difficult, if at all possible, to consider the potential interactions and establish
relationships between them. By contrast, the joint consideration of all included hazards
and their influencing factors facilitates the integration of as relevant identified relations in
accordance with the analysis scale and objectives. Moreover, differing spatial and tempo-
ral scales of hazards and contrasting model assumptions and principles are an important
challenge. They arise with the contrasting hazard characteristics. Especially with respect
to the model assumptions and principles, the present study shows that it is very difficult
to regard this aspect. However, it becomes also apparent that certain measures such as
model choice, the joint validation and an assessment of uncertainties are possible and
necessary to regard for this challenge. Furthermore, the importance of spatial scale of
hazards with respect to their extent was outlined and a proposal was made how to take
the process-specific into account by means of a multi-scale approach. To establish such an
analysis scheme, the joint consideration of all hazards with their specific characteristics,
the user-specific scales and requirements is needed.
In summary, with respect to some aspects a multi-hazard risk analysis may be more
than just the sum of single-hazard risk analyses and regarding other issues it may be less
than the sum. Nevertheless, in the fewest cases it is just the sum.
6.2. How Necessary are Software Tools?
Hypothesis II A software platform provides practical advantages for re-
producible multi-hazard (risk) modelling and visualisa-
tion
In the framework of the second hypothesis, two objectives have been formulated: (1) to
implement the developed analysis scheme into a modelling tool, and (2) to develop a vi-
sualisation tool to present the modelling results. In fulfillment of these two objectives,
the software platform MultiRISK consisting of the Modelling and the Visualisation Tool
has been created, based on the previsouly developed modelling and visualisation scheme.
During the elaboration of the software and especially during the performance of a case
study in the Barcelonnette basin, its practical advantages have been examined. On the
basis of these experiences the hypothesis is discussed:
From a purely practical point of view, a software platform facilitates the modelling and
visualisation procedure by taking over the majority of preparative and intermediate rou-
tine steps. The flow chart provided in Figure 4.1 indicates the multitude of single steps
required in a rather simple regional scale multi-hazard analysis without considering the
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validation and exposure analysis. Thereby, many technically necessary steps as format
changes, reclassifications and selections are still not mentioned and contribute to an even
more complicated procedure. Further time-consuming and recommendably coherent op-
erations are the naming of the output files and the assignment of meta-data. To avoid
future confusion the clear name definition including all indispensable information to recog-
nise the file is necessary. Complete details shall then be given in the meta-data to make
sure the data used and the parameters chosen for the modelling are known. In MultiRISK
both procedures are automated and considering the large quantity of single files (easily
more than 30) produced in one full exposure analysis of all five hazards, the case study
confirmed that much time can be saved and confusion avoided. The visualisation faces
directly related challenges, especially concerning the multitude of files to be visualised.
The simple upload of 30 files and the assignment of colours and patterns is time consum-
ing. Moreover, especially the joint visualisation of multiple processes has been a challenge
that was met by a splitting into the combination of three and five hazards. However, the
manual performance of each single step is time-consuming, especially for users without
cartographic and GIS experience.
Moreover, it became apparent that a multi-hazard risk analysis has to be repeatable, not
only due to scenario modelling (e.g. climate or land use change scenarios) and to enable
the periodic update of the analysis but also to consider hazard relations. Even if the mech-
anism itself is not included into the analysis software, the possibility to rapidly repeat the
core modelling is an important support for a practical and applicable consideration of
hazard relations. In this study, especially the influence of hazard events on the disposition
of the other processes requires a preferably fast and rapid performance of the analysis to
facilitate the analysis of the current hazard level. On a local scale, this also applies for the
hazard cascades where the output of one model can directly feed into the next, as already
proposed in CAPRA (Phillips et al., 2010). In this software, for instance the earthquake
module is directly linked to the landslide module. This indicates that the more hazard
relations to be considered and the stronger single hazard analyses can be linked, especially
at a local scale, the more complicated the analysis scheme gets. Thereby, a software tool
that considers the relations between single hazards and establishes links between models is
increasingly helpful to incorporate these aspects in a multi-hazard risk analysis. This also
applies to the visualisation of the analysis results. The more hazards and hazard relations
are considered, the more challenging will be the visualisation of the results. In a first
step this refers to the fast visualisation of the results, for instance during the calibration
phase, and later to the communication of the results to further stakeholders and the public.
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In summary, software applications for the modelling as well as the visualisation proce-
dure are very practical to automate preparative and intermediate steps. However, with
increasing complexity due to higher numbers of involved hazards with very differing char-
acteristics and a multitude of relations and interactions between them, such tools gain
importance.
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The field of multi-hazard risk analyses is a still rather young research subject and only
recently attracting increasing attention. In this context, the present study contributed
three major aspects:
1. the provision of an overview of challenges and difficulties in the multi-hazard envi-
ronment subsumed in the seven major multi-hazard issues and current approaches
to solutions
2. the development of an analysis and visualisation scheme and the implementation
into software tools
3. the discussion of the identified multi-hazard issues in the light of the experience
gained during the steps of this study and the elucidation that multi-hazard risk
analyses are not just the sum of single hazard risks
From a scientific point of view still many aspects of multi-hazard risk analyses would
need more detailed investigation. With respect to the analysis scheme, this refers to the
inclusion of further and more contrasting hazards, and the development of an approach
to consider these differences. Moreover, the full elaboration of the multi-scale analysis
scheme including the local as well as a smaller scale is a future challenge. An important
aspect is the integration of an uncertainty assessment to enable external evaluation of
the quality of the modelling results and facilitating comparison between different hazard
models. Nevertheless, this study has been done with regard to the practical utility in a
risk management or governance framework. For the initiation of a dialog with decision-
makers and stakeholders, a first version of such a concept and software tool is very helpful
if not even required as starting point. However, many more practical, administrative and
legislative problems and difficulties will have to be solved when attempting to integrate
such an approach into a risk governance framework and thus further scientific work is most
effectively done under consideration of these issues. At first this refers to the separation
of responsibilities and tasks with respect to risk analysis and management of multiple
hazards. Here, the question will arise, if such a tool is desired and in the case of divided
responsibilities it is necessary to determine if and how it can be used. The next step
is the legislative framework with respect to single natural hazards or even multi-hazard.
Which information is required at which level for making which decisions and what kind of
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data and resources is available to develop the required output? Or are there no statutory
provisions for the multi-hazard context and the need for such a tool is still not perceived?
Thus, the development of a first conceptual approach to the multi-hazard topic was
necessary to investigate challenges from a scientific perspective and identify approaches to
solution as well as the development of a first software proposal to detect the possibilities
and create a basis for discussions. Nevertheless, at this point, the next step should be the
contacting of stakeholders to jointly identify ways for its application.
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Abstract 
Risk analyses are an important component of risk management and thus risk reduction since they 
provide the basis for decision making. However, to reduce the overall risk proactively and 
effectively all hazards threatening the area of concern have to be studied. Such so-called Multi-
Hazard Risk Analyses (MHRA) are rather multipartite procedures consisting, as single-hazard risk 
analyses, of the three parts hazard, vulnerability and risk investigation. Though, they pose a range 
of additional challenges due to the multitude of processes involved as the need for comparability 
of the single-hazard results, an equivalent vulnerability assessment towards multiple hazards, an 
overall analysis scheme for the multi-hazard risk or the visualization of the multi-dimensional 
results. The aim of this contribution is to give an outline of the steps of a Multi-Hazard (Risk) 
Analysis (MH(R)A), to present a review how multi-hazard (risk) analyses are addressed in various 
studies and to indicate the inherent challenges. 
KEY WORDS: Multi-hazard risk, hazard, vulnerability, risk, hazard cascades, 
hazard chains 
 
Introduction  
The term “multi-hazard” emerged in the international political environment with 
one of the first references in the Agenda 21 for sustainable development (UNEP 
1992). In this document “complete multi-hazard research” was called for as a part 
of human settlement planning and management in disaster-prone areas (UNEP 
1992, paragraph 7.61). The term appears again in the Johannesburg Plan 
concerning “protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and 
social development” (UN 2002, p. 14), aiming for an “integrated, multi-hazard, 
inclusive approach” as “essential element of a safer world” (UN 2002, p. 20). The 
aspect to implement an “integrated, multi-hazard approach for disaster risk 
reduction [...] into policies, planning and programming related to sustainable 
development, relief, rehabilitation, and recovery activities in post-disaster and 
post-conflict situations in disaster-prone countries” was taken over by the Hyogo 
Framework of Action (UN-ISDR 2005, p. 4).  
The term multi-hazard is thus used by the UN in the context of risk management 
and with the focus on overall risk reduction. This indicates that the need is seen to 
conflate and jointly investigate the whole range of threatening hazards, resulting 
in an integrated multi-hazard risk output. Consequently, the term multi-hazard risk 
can be interpreted as the consideration of multiple (if possible all relevant) 
hazards posing risk to a certain area under observation. In contrast to many 
scientific studies no significant emphasis is put on the hazardous processes 
themselves, as their investigation is only one component of the overall risk 
assessment.  
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Hazard and risk analysis methods are already well-established for many (if not 
most) single processes (e.g. Hutter et al. 1996, Aleotti and Chowdhury 1999, 
Dorren 2003, Ancey et al. 2004, Jonkman et al. 2008). However, a multi-hazard 
risk output is not just the sum of single-hazard risk results as major differences 
exist between: 
1) hazard characteristics, 
2) methods to describe vulnerability, 
3) assessment of exposed elements at risk including direct and indirect 
consequences, 
4) modeling methods to compute hazards and risks, 
5) hazards and risks classification schemes, and 
6) visualization of results. 
These process-specific differences are a major challenge for the analysis of multi-
hazard risks. In order to compute the overall risk, (1) comparable single-hazard 
risk components have to be calculated which (2) can be combined to a 
comprehensive risk. In countries such as Switzerland, France or Liechtenstein, 
multi-hazard (risk) maps and reports are already elaborated for some time, 
although the term “multi-hazard (risk)” is still rarely used. In these reports the risk 
for the communities posed by natural processes is analyzed.  
The aim of this contribution is to give an outline of the steps of a Multi-Hazard 
(Risk) Analysis (MH(R)A), to present a review how multi-hazard (risk) analyses 
are addressed in various studies and to indicate the inherent challenges. 
Although this review focuses on the methodology of multi-hazard (risk) analyses, 
it also includes studies which are not explicitly working on multi-hazard but 
consider “more-than-one-hazard” and multiple hazards, respectively. These 
descriptions refer to studies not aiming at a whole multi-hazard (risk) analysis or 
not intending to include all relevant processes for a certain area and work only on 
a distinct part of the whole procedure. These studies were included since they 
often provide profound insight in a certain aspect which might be neglected in 
studies doing the overall procedures due to the high difficulty and complexity.  
To meet the objective of this paper, the three main steps of a multi-hazard risk 
analysis are presented, namely the hazard, vulnerability and risk assessment, and 
the challenges of each step are discussed. Additionally, in a final section, methods 
for multi-hazard (risk) visualization are outlined. This transfer of the results to the 
users is important to contribute for a successful risk management and ultimately 
risk reduction. However, due to the multi-dimensionality of the output, it is indeed 
a challenging task.  
The authors do not claim completeness of the presented review but aim to give a 
comprehensive introduction into the field of multi-hazard risk analyses and its 
specificities. 
The terms hazard, vulnerability and risk exhibit multiple definitions and are 
described by various authors and institutions (e.g. Varnes 1984, UNDHA 1992). 
To avoid confusion, the definition of the main terms used in this paper are 
highlighted at the beginning of each chapter. Furthermore, we classify the 
described concepts in qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative approaches 
using the definition of Borter (1999) and Altenbach (1995) as follows: 
Qualitative: Description in words (e.g. high, medium and low) which relate to, or 
involve quality or kind. Qualitative judgments rank in higher and lower without 
the information how much higher or lower. Such classifications are highly 
dependent on the experience of the involved personnel. 
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Semi-quantitative: Description by means of a scale which consists of words or 
numbers. This scale allows a relative ranking and provides a measure how much 
more one scenario contributes over the next. This scale is a combination of expert 
opinion and objective calculations. 
Quantitative: Relates to or can be expressed in terms of quantities or amounts. It 
allows the determination of absolute information on whatever scale of units is 
chosen. 
Multi-hazard risk analysis 
According to Varnes (1984, p. 10) hazard is defined as the “probability of 
occurrence within a specified period of time and within a given area of a 
potentially damaging phenomenon”. Risk includes, apart from the hazard aspect, 
also the vulnerability of the elements at risk and is established as the “expected 
degree of loss due to a particular natural phenomenon”, the product of 
vulnerability and hazard (Varnes 1984, p.10). In this section we focus on the three 
steps of a multi-hazard risk analysis, namely the analysis of (1) multi-hazard, (2) 
vulnerability towards multiple processes and (3) multi-hazard risk. Examples of 
existing methods to cope with difficulties due to the joint investigation of multiple 
hazards are presented.  
 
Multi-Hazard Analyses 
Hazards “differ by their nature, intensity, return period and by the effects they 
may have on exposed elements. […] Their magnitudes are also measured in 
different ways, using different units of reference, for example, discharge or 
inundation depth for floods, ground motion or macro-seismic intensity for seism” 
(Carpignano et al. 2009, p. 515). This statement summarizes the main reasons 
why different types of hazards are not directly comparable and why 
standardization of a common measure is most important to enable a comparison.   
Comparability of hazards types 
Reviewing numerous studies (e.g. Heinimann et al. 1998, Delmonaco et al. 2006b, 
Thierry et al. 2008, Odeh Engineers, Inc 2001, El Abidine El Morjani et al. 2007, 
Bartel and Muller 2007) regarding the used standardization of hazard types two 
major methods could be determined: (1) the classification of hazards (qualitative 
approach), and (2) the development of indices as continuous technique (semi-
quantitative approach). Both main approaches are exemplified and discussed in 
the following. 
(1) Standardization by means of classification is the most often used approach to 
allow the comparison of different hazards. A framework of common objectives or 
criteria has to be established, according to which a coherent classification scheme 
adjusted to each hazard can be defined. According to Delmonaco et al. (2006a) 
this is the only way to assure an equivalence and comparability of ‘high’ 
earthquake and ‘high’ flood hazard. Therefore the comparison of data received 
from different sources without any collaboration is very difficult or even 
impossible since most probably different criteria were applied. In the following 
we present a number of studies employing diverse classification schemes. 
Moran et al. (2004) (based on Heinimann et al. 1998; Fuchs et al. 2001) used a 
worst-case scenario for the modeling of avalanches and rock fall in order to 
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estimate the risk potential at regional scale. Due to the common basis (worst-case 
scenario), the modeling results can be compared and visualized in a single map. 
By overlay with elements at risk, the number of endangered buildings or affected 
road kilometers could be determined and results directly compared between the 
two processes.  
Within the ARMONIA project a classification scheme was proposed for hazard 
intensities at a regional scale (Delmonaco et al. 2006b). This matrix with regard to 
spatial planning classifies the process intensities using hazard-specific thresholds 
for low, medium and high intensities (Table 1). Subsequently the importance of 
hazards can be compared and consequences for the spatial planning process can 
be defined. 
 
Table 1 ARMONIA hazard intensity classification matrix for a regional scale (Menoni 2006) 
Intensity Scales Natural 
Hazard Low Medium High Parameters 
Flood < 0.25 0.2 - 1.25 > 1.25 Flood depth (m) 
Forest Fire < 350 350 - 1750 > 1750 - 3500 
Predicted Fire-line Intensity 
(*)(kW/m) 
Forest Fire < 1.2 1.2 - 2.5 > 2.5 - 3.5 Approximate Flame length (m) 
Volcanoes < 5 5 - 10 > 10 
Intensity = Volcanic 
Explosive Index  
log10(mass eruption rate, 
kg/s) + 3 
Landslide 
(fast and slow 
movements) 
< 5 5 - 15 > 15 
Percentage of landslide 
surface (m2, km2, …) vs. 
stable surface (%) 
Seismic < 10 10 - 30 > 30 Peak Ground Horizontal Acceleration (%g) 
 
In Switzerland, the classification for the production of hazard maps used in land 
use planning is also defined by hazard-specific thresholds determining high, 
medium and low hazard classes (Heinimann et al. 1998). The thresholds were 
established according to the possible effect on buildings and humans: 
 High hazard (red zone): persons in- and outside of buildings are at risk and the 
destruction of buildings is possible, or events with a lower intensity occur but 
with higher frequency and persons outside of buildings are at risk. Further 
construction of buildings is prohibited.  
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 Medium hazard (blue zone): people inside of buildings are slightly endangered, 
damages of buildings are possible, but destruction is seldom. Further 
construction of buildings is allowed with constraints. 
 Low hazard (yellow zone): people are slightly endangered, small damages and 
interferences are possible. 
 Residual hazard (yellow white striped): hazards of very low frequency and 
high intensity are possible. 
The hazard classes are technically defined by their constellation of intensity and 
probability (Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1 Swiss intensity-probability matrix after Kunz and Hurni (2008) 
 
Frequency thresholds are the same for all processes divided in 1-30 years for the 
high, 30-100 years for the medium and 100-300 years for the low class, 
respectively. The intensity classification is primarily based on the effects on 
humans and buildings as described in the characterization of the hazard zones and 
is translated to certain intensity thresholds for each process (for avalanches in SLF 
(1984), for landslides in Lateltin (1997), for floods in Loat and Petrascheck (1997) 
and all summarized in Loat (2010, Table 2).  
Table 2 Swiss hazard intensity classification matrix according to Loat (2010) 
Process Low intensity Average intensity High intensity 
Rock fall E < 30kJ 20kJ < E < 300kJ E > 300kJ 
Landslide Vs < 2cm/year Vs: dm/year Vs > dm/day; 
displacement  
> 1m per event 
Debris flow -- D < 1m and  
V < 1m/s 
D > 1m and  
v > 1m/s 
Static flooding h < 0.5m 0.5 < h < 2m h > 2m 
Dynamic flooding q < 0.5 m2/s 0.5 < q < 2m2/s q > 2m2/s 
Bank erosion t < 0.5m 0.5 < t < 2m t > 2m 
Snow avalanche P < 3 kN/m2 3 kN/m2 < P < 30 
kN/m2 
P > 30 kN/m2 
E = kinetic energy; Vs = mean annual velocity of landslide; D = thickness of 
debris front; v = flow velocity (flood or debris flow); h = flow depth; q = specific 
discharge (m3/s/m) = h x v; t = extent of lateral erosion; P = avalanche pressure 
exerted on an obstacle 
 -5- 
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An overall hazard map is derived by overlay of all classified hazards. For the 
overlapping of different hazard scenarios of the same process the highest hazard 
class is adopted. In case of overlapping of different hazards also the highest 
hazard class is assumed but hazards of an equal or lower hazard class can be 
indicated by an additional index letter (Heinimann et al. 1998). 
A very similar approach was used by Thierry et al. (2008) for the active volcano 
Mount Cameroon: six volcanic hazards, two slope instability incidents, and one 
tectonic phenomenon were included and for each of them a separate intensity 
classification scheme was developed. The five intensity classes were determined 
for each process according to the expected damage level (≤5% very low, 5-10% 
low, 10-50% moderate, 50-80% high and ≥80% very high) by means of expert 
knowledge following the proposal of Stiltje (1997), cited in Thierry et al. (2008). 
Seven frequency classes were established from 1-10 years quasi-permanent, 10-50 
years very frequent, 50-100 years high, 100-500 years moderate, 500-1000 years 
low, 1000-5000 years very low and 5000-10000 years very low to negligible. 
Opposing frequencies and intensities five hazard classes ranging from negligible 
to very high hazard were computed. The classified hazards were finally 
superimposed and the locally determined maximum hazard class was retained.  
Chiesa et al. (2003) use in their study on earthquakes and tropical storms in the 
Asia Pacific region a classification scheme as well. However, the overall multi-
hazard is not the maximum of overlapping hazards but defined by means of a 
matrix (Table 3). In comparison with the previous two studies where the 
maximum class was adopted, this leads to dissent results for very different classes 
of earthquake and storm threat. E.g. high and low/none hazard results in moderate, 
and extremely high and low/no hazard results in high overall hazard. 
Table 3 Matrix for the determination of the multi-hazard (Chiesa et al. 2003) 
Tropical storm hazard  
Low/none Mod. High Ext. high 
Low/none Low/none Mod. Mod. High 
Mod. Mod. Mod. High High 
High Mod. High High Ext. high 
Eq
. 
ha
za
rd
 
Ext. high High High Ext. high Ext. high 
 
In France, the elaboration of risk prevention plans (Plan de Prévention des 
Risques naturels prévisibles, PPR), likewise focusing on spatial planning, is 
obligatory in endangered areas (Delattre et al. 2002). A range of guides is 
available to support a harmonized preparation of PPRs (e.g. Cariam 2006 or Garry 
et al. 1997). Hazard modeling is supported and a general instruction how to 
establish thresholds for the hazard classification is given, but no immovable 
thresholds are provided - each municipality can determine them according to their 
specific needs and has to present them in its PPR (Liévois 2003; Besson et al. 
1999; MEDD 2002; MEDD 1999). 
 
Although all methods presented in this paragraph use classification schemes, the 
significant variations between each approach become already obvious. These 
variations are based on the constellation of hazards taken into account, but also 
regarding hazard indicators used to quantify intensities. The classification 
schemes of ARMONIA and Switzerland are not even comparable concerning 
landslides due to the differing measures used to quantify the processes – annual 
displacement of the landslide per time versus percentage of landslide surface 
compared to stable surface. Likewise, large differences become obvious for the 
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frequency classification in the Swiss approach ranging between 1 year and above 
300 years versus the scheme of Thierry et al. (2008) ranging between 1 year and 
5000-10000 years. Finally, also the methods to assess the overall hazard from 
overlapping threats vary from the adoption of the maximum hazard class (e.g. 
Heinimann et al. 1998) to an intermediate rating (e.g. Chiesa et al. 2003). 
Although classification schemes offer a simple way to compare hazards directly 
and well understandably, they are specifically developed for a certain situation, 
application or study and are thus restricted to the use in these frameworks. Since 
relative assessments were made in order to categorize, the result is a) subjectively 
influenced, b) adjusted to the purpose it was elaborated for, and c) all additional 
information between the defined threshold values is lost.    
 
(2) In contrast to classification, indices offer a continuous standardization of very 
different and not directly comparable parameters and the possibility to relatively 
rank the results (semi-quantitative method). Some studies using indices for 
standardization are highlighted in the following. 
Odeh Engineers, Inc (2001) compute the continuous “Hazard Scores” (HS) for 
communities as a whole (instead of modeling hazards in a distributed way, pixel 
by pixel):  
HS = FS · AIS · IS 
With: 
FS  Frequency Scores: measuring how often a given hazard occurs [events 
per year, classified in five levels], 
AIS  Area Impact Score: measuring how much geographical area will be 
affected by a hazard event [gross or relative area, classified in five levels] 
and 
IS  Intensity Score: measuring the intensity level of a hazard [hazard specific 
units, classified in five levels]. 
Due to multiplication of the classified input scores (FS, AIS and IS) the resulting 
HS is a continuous measure. The specificity of an analysis at community level is 
that it enables the comparison of different hazard indices in one community 
indicating the importance of each hazard and the comparison between 
communities. However, due to the choice of the study unit (community) no 
information is given on the location of the hazards. 
The World Bank initiated a global risk analysis to identify natural disaster 
hotspots and especially areas affected by several hazards, and in a further step to 
estimate the mortality and economic loss risk (Dilley et al. 2005). The hazard 
processes were investigated by combining information on past events from 
inventories and modeling. For the definition of the classification thresholds, the 
total number of pixels affected by a certain hazard was divided into ten 
approximately equally sized groups, the so-called deciles. In a next step, based on 
a histogram the corresponding threshold intensity values were determined. The 
first to fourth deciles indicate low, the fifth to seventh a medium and the eighth to 
tenth deciles high hazard. For an overall hazard indication the “Simple 
Multihazard Index” was calculated, only taking the high hazard class (eighth to 
tenth deciles) into account and adding up the values of all hazards overlapping in 
a pixel. The result is given as number of hazards affecting each pixel. 
El Abidine El Morjani et al. (2007, p. 20) pursue the goal to “identify potential 
hotspots where the population might be exposed to several hazards at the same 
time”. Separately modeled and classified hazards are weighted with the impact on 
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humans and economics (numbers of people killed, injured, homeless or affected 
and total damage expressed in US) caused in the past by these hazards (reported in 
the EM-DAT1). These weights (Table 4) are based on regional averages and are 
used as a measure of the importance of each process.  
 
Table 4: “Normalised weights applied to the different hazards when calculating multihazard” (El 
Abidine El Morjani et al. 2007, p. 22) 
Hazard Normalized weight 
Seismic 0.41 
Flood 0.36 
Wind speed 0.09 
Heat 0.08 
Landslide 0.06 
Sum 1 
 
The weighted indices are added up and are presented in the “multi hazard index 
distribution map” and are subsequently classified in five “intensity level[s] of 
multihazard” (El Abidine El Morjani et al. 2007, p. 20, p.23). 
Another semi-quantitative approach which is not based on an index scheme was 
elaborated by Bartel and Muller (2007, p.1). They calculated the probability that 
“a given natural disaster will develop in a given area of the HOA in within a given 
year” (HOA - Horn of Africa). Bartel and Muller took into account moderate to 
severe drought and floods above a certain threshold, and locust infestations 
defined as “outbreaks of gregarious swarms of hoppers and adults” (Bartel and 
Muller 2007, p.4). The analyses resulted in an estimation of the annual probability 
of each process, the probability that any of these hazards would occur, the so-
called joint probability, and the most probable hazard for each pixel. The 
earthquake hazard was not taken into account since it is “due to the relative 
infrequency of large damaging earthquakes in the HOA [...] not an annual concern 
like the other hazard types” (Bartel and Muller 2007, p. 1 et seq.). 
Most of the studies presented so far remain with a completely separate analysis of 
single hazards within a joint analysis scheme which are combined in a last step to 
the overall hazard. However, “[n]atural processes are components of systems 
(ecosystems, geosystems etc.) and only certain characteristics possibly pose a 
threat to elements at risk convert them into hazards. As components of complex 
systems these processes are not independent and separated from each other but are 
linked and connected” (Kappes et al. subm.). Thus, these components influence 
each other, interact also nonlinearly which can result in changes of the system 
state and hazard patterns may emerge which differ from the sum of all single 
hazards. The negligence of these relations between processes might thus lead to 
under- or misestimation of the actual hazard. 
                                                 
1 EM-DAT is the Emergency Disaster Data Base maintained by CRED, the Centre for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Disasters. It contains essential core data on the occurrence and effects of over 
18,000 mass disasters in the world from 1900 to present (CRED). 
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Dealing with relations between hazard types 
Interacting or coupled processes are a main challenge in multi-hazard analysis. 
Reviewing the described studies from this perspective we were able to identify 
two types of relations between processes: 
(1) The “domino effect or cascading failure” (Delmonaco et al. 2006a), i.e. direct 
triggering of one process by another. Delmonaco et al. (2006a) define this process 
relation as “failure in a system of interconnected parts, where the service provided 
depends on the operation of a preceding part, and the failure of a preceding part 
can trigger the failure of successive parts”. These cascading failures cause effects 
and pose risks which are not captured by means of separate single-hazard analyses 
which are merged together. Thus, their negligence is problematic. 
(2) Processes modify the disposition of each other which results in frequency 
and/or magnitude. An example is the removal of protective forest by avalanches 
in winter and the higher frequency and magnitude of rock falls in this area in the 
following spring.  
Although the inclusion of the interaction of several processes within one 
eco/geosystem (or region) might be the ultimate aim of multi-hazard risk research 
our understanding of process interactions and cascades is still very limited, and so 
is the number of respective research studies.  
1) According to Delmonaco et al. (2006a, p. 10) “basically two ways of how to 
assess the coupled hazards” exist: “[w]e can investigate the individual possible 
chains of hazardous events – one triggering another – and try to assess probability 
values in order to transfer these phenomena into risk maps [… or we] assess the 
risk for coincidences of different hazards, even without supposing any direct 
linkage among them.” While the first is extremely data-demanding and the 
complexity of the hazard chains can be overwhelming, the second method is more 
robust and less data-intensive. 
The studies of Tarvainen et al. (2006) and de Pippo et al. (2008) are very good 
examples for the “second way” to investigate the hazard coincidences. In both 
studies a matrix was used for the identification of possible hazard cascades and 
interactions by opposing all processes taken into account towards each other (Fig. 
2). The possibility of an influence of one hazard on another is identified; the 
relation is either simply marked as in the case of Tarvainen et al. (2006) or the 
possible effect is shortly described (Fig. 2) as done by de Pippo et al. (2008). An 
example is given in the following: Surges (Fig. 2, cell 3.3) may influence the 
occurrence of landslides (cell 4.4) as surges “affect a high cliff, both eroding the 
base (wave-cut notch) and scattering the marine spray along the slope” (cell 3.4 - 
the intersecting cell between 3.3 and 4.4 in Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 2 “Descriptive matrix of the interaction of each hazard with one another” after de Pippo et al. 
(2008, p. 459). In the dialog are the four leading processes located and in the cells between them 
their possible interaction. The process situated in the same line as the cell describing the relation 
indicates the causing, the process in the same column the affected process. 
 
The general identification of possible relations between hazards under 
investigation by means of the matrix is followed by the determination of the 
spatial position of these interactions in the studied area. Tarvainen et al. (2006) 
determine the locations of possible interactions by identification of areas (NUTS 3 
units) in Europe where the interacting hazard pairs occur in a significant 
magnitude. De Pippo et al. (2008) work with geomorphic units of a coastal area 
and detect on basis of the matrix those units which exhibit certain hazard 
combinations possibly leading to interactions.  
While with an interaction matrix general interactions and cascades within a set of 
considered processes can be identified and by overlay determined in the field, Egli 
(1996) and Marzocchi et al. (2009) propose a methodology on local level (type 
one approach investigating the individual possible chains of hazardous events 
according to Delmonaco et al. (2006a) constructing complete cascade scenarios. 
By means of an event tree all possible scenarios following one initial event are 
identified and their probabilities quantified (Marzocchi et al. 2009). The event 
trees are constructed in four steps (Egli 1996): the triggering event is determined, 
the possible following effects are identified, probabilities are assigned to each step 
and the probabilities of the possible final states of the complete system are 
computed. Furthermore, Egli (1996) proposes the use of fault trees. The fault trees 
enable the logical relation of possible partial scenarios which might lead to an 
unwanted ‘top-event’ (Fig. 3).  
 -10- 
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Fig. 3 The example of a fault tree after Egli (1996) 
 
 
Apart from general methods applicable to a variety of processes, a range of 
studies focuses on cascades between two specific hazards and develop respective 
procedures. For example, Carrasco et al. (2003) developed a GIS-based 
methodology to identify areas of cascades including floods and landslides. Herein, 
the results of an undercutting of slopes or a damming of torrents by displaced 
material resulting in a channeled debris flow or a torrential flood are considered. 
In a first step, the general landslide susceptibility is calculated and displayed. In a 
second step, gorges (narrow streams and torrents) are identified and by overlying 
with the susceptibility map slopes connected to narrow streams and torrents are 
determined. The delineated areas do not only show “intrinsic” susceptibility, but 
furthermore “the possibility of external contribution by undercutting has been 
added” (Carrasco et al. 2003, p. 377). Finally, the possibility that displaced 
material converts into a debris flow or torrential flood and continues its movement 
along the stream has been considered. 
Huggel et al. (2004) investigated the triggering of lake-outbursts by ice 
avalanches and periglacial debris flows. The target was to indicate those areas 
where critical situations may emerge; however, detailed scenarios were not 
elaborated. Only those ice avalanches and debris flows were considered which are 
large enough to cause an overtopping or even a complete emptying of the lake. 
Using a simple model based on the angle of reach concept the run out was 
estimated (Huggel et al. 2002).  
One of the most prominent cascades is the triggering of landslides by earthquakes.  
Meyenfeld (2008) worked on the determination of a minimum earthquake 
magnitude for landslide initiation and for the general stability of slopes under 
earthquake influence. ARMAGEDOM, a French tool developed for earthquake 
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modeling, is able to integrate possible slope instabilities after having computed 
the earthquake hazard (Sedan and Mirgon 2003). 
2) Besides the direct triggering of secondary hazards we already mentioned the 
modification of conditioning factors. Regarding this type or relation, this means 
that an effect is not immediately caused by a specific event but that this event 
changes boundary conditions. Hence, a triggering event is still needed to initiate 
the process (the matrices after Marzocchi et al. 2009 and de Pippo et al. 2008 
enable in fact the consideration of both, cascades and alteration of disposition). 
Cannon and DeGraff (2009) give a good example on changed preparatory factors 
with their research on increased flood and debris flow frequency due to forest 
fires. They investigated recurrence intervals and rainfall threshold intensities for 
the initiation of debris flows and floods shortly after fires and in time steps during 
the recovery phase and compared them with thresholds of unburned settings. The 
thresholds of recently burned catchments were significantly lower than most 
identified for unburned settings. Already after one year of vegetation recovery and 
sediment removal the threshold increased again. The authors emphasize the need 
of fast post-fire identification of the most critical locations to avoid damages and 
losses. 
Bovolo et al. (2009) investigated a similar case, firstly modeling possible forest 
fire scenarios resulting from four different ignition points, and secondly 
estimating the effect on hydrology, sediment yield and erosion with the 
SHETRAN approach (Ewen et al. 2000). 
Wichmann et al. (2009) present the SEDAG project (SEDiment cascades in 
Alpine Geosystems) which touches the geomorphic aspects of several natural 
hazards. Within SEDAG, the sediment pathways in high mountain areas were 
investigated, including the processes hill slope and channel fluvial processes, 
debris flows, full-depth snow avalanches, rock fall, landslides and slow mass 
movements (Wichmann and Becht 2003; Wichmann et al. 2009). The processes 
were modeled independently, and respective geomorphic process units (erosion, 
transport and deposition) were subsequently delineated. Linkages between two or 
more process such as the deposition by rock fall in debris flow erosion area units 
were identified by overlaying. Thus, the chain of sediment transport can be 
determined qualitatively. 
Garcin et al. (2008) developed a forecast of future (around the year 2100) marine 
submersion of coastal areas due to storm surges and tsunamis. They superimposed 
the effect of tsunamis and storm surges on the risen sea level due to climate 
change. 
Evidently, the consideration of interactions and linkages between hazardous 
processes is a challenging task. Although two main approaches, the investigation 
of hazard coincidence and thus risk of interactions and the development of 
detailed hazard chains exist, their rigorous implementation is still seldom done 
and, especially in case of the chains, very difficult. 
To summarize the section of multi-hazard analyses, the comparison of hazards is 
difficult due to their very different characteristics. Although classification and 
index schemes help to overcome this problem, they are specifically elaborated for 
one purpose/stakeholder and only in this framework they can be used. Menoni 
(2006, p.10) expresses this circumstance as follows: “[i]t is hard to find common 
units of measures” which would serve for emergency managers and urban and 
regional planners since they “face specific problems provoked by hazards in a 
given context.” Furthermore, no actually quantitative approach for multi-hazard 
investigation could be identified which restricts the comparison of multiple 
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hazards to relative rankings. An option to evade this problem is to move from 
multi-hazard to multi-hazard risk.  
Risks, although emerging from different hazards, are directly comparable since 
they quantify the possible consequences as numbers or probabilities of loss of life, 
injury, damages etc. For the analysis of risks, the possible impact of hazards has 
to be related to the vulnerability of e.g. people, buildings and infrastructure. Risk 
is, as highlighted in the definition by Varnes (1984), a function of hazard and 
vulnerability. Therefore, vulnerability is one key element in risk analysis and we 
will review vulnerability in the context of a multi-hazard framework in the next 
section. 
Analyses of the Vulnerability towards Multiple Hazards 
Vulnerability is a multi-dimensional term with very different definitions in social 
and natural sciences, respectively (e.g. Birkmann 2006; Bohle and Glade 2008; 
Fuchs 2009; Papathoma-Köhle et al. subm.). 
In social sciences, vulnerability mostly represents “the characteristics of a person 
or a group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, 
resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard” (Wisner et al. 2004 p. 11). 
Social vulnerability analyses often merely estimate special characteristics of the 
society, while the hazard-specific nature of vulnerability is not taken into account 
(Kumpulainen 2006, also cf. e.g. Ferrier and Haque 2003; Kumpulainen 2006). 
Hence, these studies have not to be adapted to multi-hazard approaches as they are 
already dealing with hazards in general. However, “factors that make people 
vulnerable to earthquakes are not necessarily the same as those that make people 
vulnerable to floods or cyclones” (UNDP 2004 p. 32). Therefore, from a multi-
hazard point of view, social vulnerability should also include the influence of 
hazard characteristics. 
Natural sciences choose a completely different approach to vulnerability. Here, it 
is mostly expressed as “[d]egree of loss (from 0% to 100% [or dimensionless 0 to 
1]) resulting from a potentially damaging phenomenon” (UNDHA 1992, p. 77). 
As opposed to social vulnerability studies, physical vulnerability investigated by 
engineers and natural scientists is in most cases hazard-dependent. However, the 
approaches used for the various hazard types differ strongly (Douglas 2007). 
Thus, it is not only very difficult to use results from social sciences in natural 
sciences approaches and vice versa, but even within the engineering and natural 
sciences. 
In the following, we will present some hazard-specific approaches from the social 
and the natural sciences, respectively.  
Approaches dealing with the vulnerability towards multiple hazards in 
social sciences 
An example for a hazard-specific concept considering social vulnerability is the 
global study of Dilley et al. (2005). They present ‘vulnerability coefficients’ 
which are derived from historical data on mortality and economic losses due to a 
specific hazard type as recorded in the EM-DAT database. These hazard specific 
coefficients represent an “aggregate index of relative losses within each region 
and country wealth class for each hazard” (Dilley et al. 2005, p. 55). The mortality 
coefficient is applied as weight to the population exposure resulting in mortality 
risk, and the economic loss coefficient weights the gross domestic product leading 
to economic loss risk towards each hazard. Furthermore, the coefficients can be 
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compared for different hazards and/or regions and thus show the relative 
significance of every single hazard in a given region. 
A similar approach was presented by UNDP (2004) introducing the disaster risk 
index (DRI). The index is also based on data of the EM-DAT database, but is 
restricted to the estimation of risk of loss of life. In a first step, the “relative 
vulnerability of a country to a given hazard by dividing the number of people 
killed by the number exposed” is calculated (UNDP 2004, p. 32). In a second step, 
the relative vulnerability is linked as dependent parameters in a statistical analysis 
to a set of 26 socio-economic and environmental parameters to identify possible 
indicators of vulnerability. Thus, those parameters which are most associated are 
determined for each hazard type and are used as indicators for risk.  
The two hazard-dependent social vulnerability approaches are both based on the 
consequences of past events. We could not find analyses in which hazard 
characteristics of multiple processes were investigated with respect to the effects 
they cause in society or the like. Whilst there are more approaches in the natural 
sciences which are hazard-dependent the major challenge of physical vulnerability 
analyses is the development of a common methodology. This problem will be 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
Approaches dealing with the vulnerability towards multiple hazards in 
natural sciences 
A variety of approaches dealing with the vulnerability towards multiple hazards in 
natural sciences exists which can be broadly distinguished in qualitative and 
quantitative methods. 
A qualitative approach was proposed by Granger et al. (1999) for the 
identification of shelters. Granger and colleagues investigated in their study the 
question to what extent buildings are suitable to serve as shelters including their 
response characteristics towards natural threats in this region. A simple matrix 
depicts the building characteristics and reveals the relative contribution of these 
characteristics to the building's vulnerability towards a set of hazards (Table 5).  
 
Table 5 Relative contribution of building characteristics to vulnerability (Granger et al. 1999). The 
number of stars reflects the significance of the contribution. 
Characteristic Flood Wind Hail Fire Quake
Building age *** ***** ** ***** *****
Floor height or vertical regularity ***** *  **** *****
Wall material *** *** ***** **** **** 
Roof material  **** ***** **** *** 
Roof pitch  **** *** *  
Large unprotected windows ** ***** **** ***** ** 
Unlined eaves  ***  *****  
Number of stories **** **  * *****
Plan regularity ** **  *** *****
Topography ***** ****  **** *** 
 
 
Another example for a qualitative approach are the risk matrices of the 
ARMONIA project. Originally in the proposed ARMONIA project a general 
quantitative concept for multi-hazard risk analyses using vulnerability curves (Fig. 
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4) for all hazards and building types was planned (Delmonaco et al. 2006b). Quite 
soon it became obvious that this approach was not feasible as only for floods and 
earthquakes vulnerability curves and methodologies were available while they 
were missing for other processes (Walker and Deeming 2006). The qualitative 
approach adopted instead consists of four vulnerability classes for different 
elements at risk (e.g. buildings or people). To obtain finally a joint vulnerability 
index (including e.g. vulnerability of buildings or people), each type of 
vulnerability is weighted in the framework of a Multi-Criteria Evaluation by the 
distribution of 20 points. While the weighting with one point assigns the lowest 
importance to a certain type of vulnerability, 19 points show the highest 
significance (Walker and Deeming 2006).  
 
Fig. 4 Vulnerability function for different hazard types (hazard intensities on the x-axis) indicating 
the probability of damage for different categories of exposed elements (y-axis) according to 
Delmonaco et al. (2006b) 
 
The tool HAZUS (HAZard United States) developed by the Federal Agency 
Management Agency utilizes a quantitative approach and is entirely based on 
vulnerability curves: depth-damage curves and velocity-depth damage functions 
indicating the collapse potential for floods (FEMA 2007a), fragility 
(displacement) and building capacity (force) curves for earthquakes (FEMA 2003) 
and building damage, building loss, building loss of use and building debris 
functions for hurricanes (FEMA 2007b). However, for the processes floods, 
earthquakes and hurricanes vulnerability curves are a commonly used method 
wherefore the problems ARMONIA faced do not occur. 
Hollenstein (2005) proposes a completely new, generic framework for the 
analysis of the vulnerability to any process. On the one hand, elements at risk are 
described in a hazard-independent, general way, i.e. the “Performance”, by a set 
of components representing its characteristics (e.g. maximum safe speed, 
maximum admissible load or market value). On the other hand, the hazards are 
characterized by the impact, a set of general components of each hazard and due 
to which the method is adjustable to any process (e.g. acceleration, pressure, shear 
stress or toxicity). So called “wrapper functions” have to be developed for the 
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conversion from established measures in which hazards are quantified usually to 
the needed impact parameters. Finally, the impact parameters are linked to the 
performance parameters with vulnerability curves (Hollenstein et al. 2002). 
Another aspect is brought up in the study of Gibbs (2003), the issue of spatially 
overlapping hazards. Within this concept, the consequences on the design and 
construction of buildings in case of exposure towards storms and earthquake are 
investigated. However, while specific building characteristics may proof favorable 
for the protection against one hazard, they may proof unfavorable against the 
other. Thus, an optimization for both hazard types has yet to be achieved. 
Ho Lee and Rosowsky (2006) even go a step further. Instead of merely 
investigating the vulnerability of wood frame buildings towards earthquake or 
snow loading, they also investigated the vulnerability towards the simultaneous 
occurrence of both processes. Therefore, they developed a fragility surface in the 
three dimensional space of snow loading, earthquake loading, and fragility (Fig. 
5).  
 
 
Fig. 5 Fragility surface as function of the combined load of the hazards x and y (snow cover and 
earthquake impact) after Ho Lee and Rosowsky (2006). 
 
For this section it can be summarized that the available vulnerability assessments 
are as diverse as the different and specific hazard assessments. The first major 
challenge for multi-hazard and risk approaches is that most social vulnerability 
approaches are hazard-independent while natural hazard approaches are “society-
independent”. However, the factors which make people/regions/societies 
vulnerable differ depending on the social context and the kind of hazard with its 
physical impact. It is exactly these two factors which have to be considered in a 
multi-hazard risk perspective. Secondly, vulnerability approaches within social 
and natural sciences cannot be transferred from one to the other. This is especially 
problematic as multi-hazard risk analyses mostly are (or should be) 
interdisciplinary in focus. And thirdly, even within the natural sciences no single 
method applicable for all hazards exists but several approaches which are more or 
less (or not) transferable to other processes. Although classification schemes 
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might be a solution, they are the lowest common denominator simplifying the 
result significantly.  
To complete the three steps which have to be considered in risk analyses – i.e. 
hazard, vulnerability, and risk analysis – the following section reviews existing 
approaches dealing with the computation of multi-hazard risk. 
 
Multi-Hazard Risk Analyses 
Risk is a qualitative or quantitative depiction of expected damages or losses and is 
thus expressed in units which are independent of respective hazard characteristics, 
e.g. “expected number of lives lost, persons injured, damage to property, or 
disruption of economic activity” (Varnes 1984, p. 10). This means that the risk 
posed by several hazards is easier to compare than in the case of a multi-hazard 
comparison. However, the framework to be computed (e.g. annual loss of life) has 
to be defined to assure the comparability of the single result and the combination 
to the overall multi-hazard risk. In this section, we present several approaches 
which estimate the risk either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
Qualitative approaches - classification and indices 
Within the Cities Project (National Geohazards Vulnerability of Urban 
Communities Project), Geoscience Australia developed a semi-quantitative 
method which ranks suburbs pertaining to one city environment according to their 
contribution to the city's risk (e.g. Granger et al. 1999, or Middelmann and 
Granger 2000). The hazard exposure is separately calculated for multiple hazards, 
and the suburbs are ranked according to their contribution to the city’s exposure. 
The vulnerability is then assessed based on the ‘five esses’ (shelter, sustenance, 
security, society and setting), and the suburbs are ranked according to their 
contribution to the city’s vulnerability. Finally, both lists of ranks are classified in 
either high (top 50% of ranks) or low (bottom 50% of ranks) exposure or 
vulnerability, and with the matrix shown in Table 6 the total risk posed by each 
single-hazard risk for each suburb is calculated. 
 
Table 6: Total risk (TR) classes concerning a specific hazard type resulting from contribution of 
vulnerability (CtV) and exposure (E) 
 Low exposure High exposure 
Low Contribution of  
Vulnerability Low Total Risk 
Significant Total 
Risk 
High Contribution of 
Vulnerability Moderate Total Risk High Total Risk 
 
This final result can be used for several evaluations: For each suburb the hazard 
posing the highest risk can be identified, the level of risk can be compared 
between suburbs and the process performing the highest risk for the whole 
community can be identified. 
In the province of Bolzano, Sperling et al. (2007) apply a qualitative method as 
well. Hazard zone plans are derived according to the Swiss method (Heinimann et 
al. 1998) and vulnerabilities are assigned depending on the land use type (e.g. 
built-up area, roads, recreation area). The classified hazard (three classes) and the 
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classified vulnerability (four classes) are combined in a matrix leading to four 
levels of classified specific risk. The result is not only, as in the case of the Cities 
Project, a comparison of single risks but the derivation of the overall risk shown 
in a map. Although it is not explicitly mentioned, it seems likely that in case of 
overlapping risks as well as in the case of overlapping hazards the highest class is 
adopted. 
Dilley et al. (2005) computed hazard and vulnerability as described in the two 
previous sections and weight the hazard with the vulnerability index to calculate 
risk. For the derivation of the multi-hazard risk, the risks posed by the single 
hazards were added up.  
Greiving (2006) presents the qualitative Integrated Risk Index (IRI) as basis for 
spatial planning decisions which also results in the overall risk posed by several 
processes: all hazards relevant for spatial planning are analyzed, classified in five 
intensity classes, and the resulting maps are added up to the integrated hazard map 
(Fig. 6).  
 
 
Fig. 6 Calculation scheme of the Integrated Risk Index (Greiving 2006) 
 
In contrast to the previously characterized method, weights can be assigned to the 
single processes according to their importance in the particular area. Greiving 
(2006) proposes the elaboration of the weights with the main stakeholders by 
means of a Delphi process (Helmer 1966). The vulnerability map originates from 
two indicators, i.e. hazard exposure and coping capacity, which are weighted, 
added and subdivided in five classes. The integrated risk matrix then opposes the 
overall hazard intensity (1-5) to the degree of vulnerability (1-5). Finally, the 
values are added leading to the resulting integrated risk (2-10). 
In comparison to the qualitative and semi-quantitative multi-hazard approaches 
multi-hazard risk analyses already take the vulnerability component of elements at 
risk into consideration. However, the classification and index schemes exhibit still 
the disadvantage of being subjective (e.g. the definition of the class thresholds) 
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and limited to the application they were developed for. Quantitative methods 
present a less subjective alternative and thus a broader applicability since class 
thresholds and index ranges do not have to be defined. 
Quantitative approaches - risk as potential monetary loss 
Quantitative approaches to calculate multi-hazard risk, as e.g. a potential 
monetary loss, meet the objectives of different stakeholders, especially in the    
(re-)insurance sector regarding their global distributed business or mostly 
scientific case studies on regional and local levels. Regarding the different main 
objectives and proposes of the stakeholders these quantitative approaches differ.  
Due to the development of various cat-models (catastrophe models), the             
(re-)insurance business probably is most experienced in risk quantification 
methods. The MRCatPMLService is a tool for accumulation loss potential 
analyses (of probable maximum losses) based on the models MRQuake, 
MRStorm and MRFlood (Munich Re 2000). Furthermore, scenarios of historical 
or hypothetical events can be simulated; the effect on individual portfolios derived 
by deterministic analyses and probabilistic evaluations carried out calculating loss 
occurrence probabilities (Munich Re 1998). 
Risk Management Solutions (RMS) is a company providing products, services 
and expertise for the quantification and management of catastrophe risk to (re-
)insurers and catastrophe management professionals (RMS). They offer several 
products as the Simulation Platform, the RiskLink-ALM (Aggregate Loss 
Module) and the RiskLink-DLM (Detailed Loss Mode) and provide for their 
smooth integration of RMS products in (re-)insurers’ applications RiskTools. 
The Australian Risk Frontiers developed the models FloodAUS (river floods), 
FireAUS (bushfires), HailAUS (hail), QuakeAUS (earthquakes) and CyclAUS 
(tropical cyclone winds) for risk analyses (partly probabilistic) and relative risk 
ratings for (re-)insurers (Risk Frontiers). The risk is rated by classification of each 
hazard in a five-point scale, and multi-criteria can be purchased at a range of 
spatial scales: urban areas, postcodes/CRESTA zones, census collection districts, 
and company specific portfolios.  
However, the knowledge and experience of (re-)insurers is difficult to access: The 
development of cat-models is very costly and due to their value as intellectual 
property the source codes are mostly unavailable and model licenses are 
expensive (Porter and Scawthorn 2007). On the one hand, this results in 
insufficient transparency, result-dependency of the clients to a model, and changes 
of the analyses with new releases. On the other hand, the input of (re-)insurance 
companies to the multi-hazard risk modeling community is just as limited as the 
knowledge transfer. Hence, the models and tools of the (re-) insurance groups 
cannot be explained in detail. 
Beside re-insurance solutions, on a global business perspective three big platforms 
exist for the automated computation of multi-hazard risks for the governmental 
risk management on a national level: HAZUS, RiskScape and CAPRA. The 
software packages offer guided step-by-step analyses. 
HAZUS (HAZard United States) is a software tool developed by FEMA (US 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, (FEMA) for the standardized 
estimation of losses resulting from several hazards (Baker et al. 1997). HAZUS 
provides different modeling options for the processes earthquakes, floods and 
hurricanes: scenario and probabilistic investigations as well as models to calculate 
the annualized losses of all three processes (Schneider and Schauer 2006). 
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In New Zealand, the tool Regional RiskScape has been developed for the 
modeling of potential multi-hazard losses (Reese et al. 2007a). Direct and indirect 
losses can be quantified, and the impact on people’s lives from river floods, 
earthquakes, volcanic activity (ash), tsunamis and wind storms can also be 
considered (Reese et al. 2007b, GNS & NIWA). 
CAPRA (CEPREDENAC et al.), the Central American Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment, is a methodology for probabilistic analyses as basis for risk 
management. The processes considered are earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanic 
activity, floods, tsunamis and landslides. Products derived by CAPRA are reports 
on the risk situation (annual expected losses, pure risk premium, loss exceedance 
curve and probable maximum loss) for spatial planning, cost-benefit analyses and 
studies on insurance premiums. CAPRA is planned as platform for 
communication, understanding and cooperation, focusing on the interactive aspect 
between stakeholders. This becomes clear by the integration of Web 2.0 
technologies which allow mass collaboration on the tool and analyses. 
Implementation of innovations is favored by its modular, extensible and open 
structure to enable an ever-evolving and sustainable “living tool” (GFDRR). 
Focusing the regional/locally level Marzocchi et al. (2009) present a method for 
the quantification and comparison of risks to identify the most dangerous hazard 
for a certain area. First, a common definition of the boundary conditions for the 
single hazard risk analyses (the timeframe and the specific kind of damage) has to 
be established. In this presented case study they investigate the risk of human life 
loss in the timeframe of one year in the Casalnova municipality (Italy). Thereupon 
the single risks are quantified for each process. For example, the formula for the 
seismic risk for human life is: 
Rseis = P · N · K   
With 
P probability of occurrence of an event above a certain magnitude threshold, 
N proportion of buildings with an expected damage above a certain threshold 
and 
K proportion of people killed inside a building with damages above the specific 
threshold. 
 
The resulting annual risks for human life can be compared to identify the most 
threatening ones and by adding up the single risks, the overall risk to die caused 
by one of the investigated processes is quantified.  
Bell (2002) calculated the individual risk to life [probability of loss of life per 
year], object risk to life [probability of loss of life per year] and the economic risk 
[Icelandic Krona/m2/a, EUR/m2/a] emerging from multiple hazards. In contrast to 
Marzocchi et al. (2009), he used a distributed raster-based approach with the 
underlying formula for the raster calculation of e.g. individual risk to people in 
buildings:  
Ripe = (H · Ps · Pt · Vp · Vpe · Pso) · Eipe 
with  
Ripe  Individual risk to people in buildings (annual probability of loss of life to an 
individual) 
H Annual probability of the hazardous event 
Ps  Probability of spatial impact (i.e. of the hazardous event impacting a 
building) 
Pt   Probability of temporal impact (i.e. of the building being occupied)  
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Vp  Vulnerability of the building 
Vpe Vulnerability of the people 
Pso Probability of seasonal occurrence (i.e. snow avalanches only in winter) 
Eipe Individual person 
 
For the derivation of the overall risk emerging from the multiple hazards, the 
single risks are summed up in a distributed way. This means, technically the raster 
of the single individual risks to life are overlaid and added up to the overall 
individual risk to life. Thus, it is possible to compare the results of multiple 
hazards, to identify the processes posing the most serious threats with their 
distribution and to get an overview on the overall risk (Bell and Glade 2004).  
Grünthal et al. (2006) propose the use of risk curves in addition to maps showing 
hazards, vulnerability and risks in a distributed way. This approach shall enable 
the user to better capture the characteristics of different processes, understand 
their significance and prevent from ignorance of the potential damage of extreme 
events with low probability. For the risk curves the total direct monetary losses for 
buildings and their contents in the city of Cologne were plotted against their 
exceedance probability (Fig. 7).  
 
 
Fig. 7 Risk curve after Grünthal et al. (2006) 
 
Within the framework of RiskCity, a training course developed by ITC, risk 
curves were created for the case study of Turialba (van Westen et al. 2002). The 
authors assume that the area under the curve represents the total expected annual 
damage for the specific type of hazard (Fig. 8).   
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Fig. 8 Specific risk curve for seismic risk. Annual exceedance probability (x-axis) is opposed to 
the estimated damage in Costa Rican currency (y-axis) (van Westen et al. 2002) 
 
The comparison of the total expected annual losses of different hazards supports a 
ranking of the risks they pose. Combining the curves of various hazards the total 
risk curve was derived, representing the annual expected losses to buildings and 
contents in general.  
On the one hand, multi-hazard risk is, in comparison to multi-hazard, easier to 
compute since the single risks can be easily combined due to matching units. On 
the other hand, the data needs, especially for quantitative analyses, are very high 
and the procedure poses not only the challenge of interacting hazards but depends 
also on a coherent overall vulnerability analysis.  
After the calculation of the required hazard or risk product the final and important 
step is the communication of the results. In most cases, the principal way is a 
graphical visualization since descriptions and explanations are usually not 
sufficient to transfer the information. 
 
Visualization 
One of the principal products of multi-hazard risk studies are maps since they 
enable the communication of the spatial aspect of this multi-dimensional problem 
very well. However, a key question is how to display simultaneously each of the 
other dimensions (namely the multiple hazards) ensuring that not only the single-
hazard patterns are clearly distinguishable, but also their overlapping and 
coincidences are graspable. Three mapping approaches could be identified within 
the multi-hazard risk framework: First, the visualization of each single hazard/risk 
separately, second, the reduction of the multi-dimensionality to only one 
hazard/risk variable being visualized, and third, the presentation of more than one 
process displayed in one map as e.g. the overall hazard or risk. An alternative 
visualization approach are web-mapping applications which offer an interactive 
definition of the visible layers and gain more and more importance. 
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Single-hazard visualization 
Maps of this category show each hazard or risk separately and are often only the 
first part of the result, giving the reader the possibility to interpret the patterns 
separately and in detail. They are mostly followed by the visualization of merged 
or joined hazards or risks (e.g. Dilley et al. 2005; Bell 2002; Odeh Engineers, Inc 
2001). To overcome at least partly the separation of information the method of 
small multiples introduced by Tufte (2001) can be applied. Small images are 
arranged side by side which enables the observer the comparison of attributes 
although not shown in one map. Bartel and Muller (2007) applied this method, 
juxtaposing the annual occurrence probability of any of the investigated hazards 
and the most probable hazard type. This provides the information for the reader on 
the hazard presumably most responsible for e.g. threat hotspots.  
Visualization of a joint variable 
Maps of this category show summed, multiplied, counted or maximum hazards or 
risks, and thus the multi-dimensionality is reduced to one parameter. Examples 
are maps showing the number of relevant processes per pixel (Dilley et al. 2005) 
or the joint vulnerability, i.e. the annual probability that any of the hazards would 
occur (Bartel and Muller 2007). Odeh Engineers, Inc (2001) depict a combined 
hazard map, resulting from the sum of all single hazard scores and according to 
Heinimann et al. (1998) the highest hazard class is adopted for a hazard zone map. 
For multi-hazard risk, examples include the global distribution of multiple 
hazards’ mortality risk classified from low to high (UN-ISDR 2009), and Bell 
(2002) visualizes the individual risk to life, object risk to life and the economic 
risk emerging from multiple hazards calculated by summing the single risks.  
 
Simultaneous visualization of several variables 
Maps visualizing multiple hazards or risks provide on the one hand the possibility 
to get simultaneously information on their individual patterns and on the spatial 
coincidence but raise on the other hand the questions of readability and clearness 
of the maps. The rule of thumb is herein: The more components are included, the 
more difficult it is to find enough different colors, patterns or sizes still allowing a 
differentiation. Hazard and risk overlaps aggravate the situation. A number of 
approaches exist to reduce the problem of readability and benefit from the joint 
view. One option is to subdivide the whole range of processes considered into 
hazard type classes. This approach has been followed by the UN-ISDR (2009) 
where weather-related hazards (floods, tropical cyclones and droughts) and 
tectonic hazards (tsunamis, landslides and earthquakes) were distinguished. One 
could argue on the assignment of different processes to the respective class, 
however, such a procedure reduces the dimensionality from six hazards per map 
directly to three hazards. Instead of separating hazards, the amount of information 
per hazard can be reduced alternatively to focus on the most important 
information to be transmitted. BGR and DESDM (2009, p. 46) show only the high 
(and eventually moderate) hazard zones in their multi-hazard map to provide “a 
clearer message” concerning those areas which “deserve most attention for 
mitigation efforts”. 
Bell and Glade (2004) depict the outlines of the hazard zones (as lines) within a 
map showing the total economic risk as areas in raster format (Fig. 9). Thus, apart 
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from the possibility to identify economic risk hotspots, it is possible to determine 
the contributing processes. 
 
 
Fig. 9 Multi-hazard risk map after Bell and Glade (2004) showing the outlines of hazard zones and 
as areas the emerging risks 
 
Within the ARMONIA project a new two-dimensional color scheme was 
proposed to combine two aspects and thus offer the possibility to show by means 
of one color in the map simultaneously two aspects. Fig. 10 shows an example 
opposing risk based on monetary values and risk based on non-monetary values 
(Klein et al. 2006). 
 
Fig. 10 Color scheme for simultaneous visualization of two aspects (Klein et al. 2006) 
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Garcin et al. (2007) use a similar approach for the joint visualization of two 
parameters by applying a color scheme where each color is defined by two 
characteristics: high, medium, low or no hazard by the first and the second hazard. 
In their study, they present the combined sea level rise and tsunami hazard in the 
so-called ‘composite hazard map’.  
Kienholz and Krummenacher (1995) proposed a symbol kit (the 
“Symbolbaukasten”) for the mapping of phenomena. Basic principles are the 
general assignation of colors to each hazard and the definition of how to use color 
nuances: the more intensive, active, deep-seated, younger or more evident the 
process, the more intense the color.   
As already indicated each of the three approaches exhibits different advantages 
and disadvantages. While single hazard/risk maps allow the interpretation of each 
hazard/risk pattern, it is very difficult to grasp the relationships. Maps reducing 
the dimensionality offer exactly this joint view, but consequently lack at the same 
time the information on the single factors. Finally, multi-dimensional maps 
composed by several hazards/risks might be able to bridge the gap between the 
two afore mentioned approaches, however the higher the dimensionality the less 
readable is the map. Thus, only a limited number of different aspects can be 
visualized in a cognizable way and the challenge has to be faced, how to arrange 
and depict them. 
Web-mapping applications 
In the era of GIS and web-mapping, an alternative to static analog maps are digital 
interactive and flexible visualizations (e.g. the CEDIM Risk Explorer, Munich 
Re’s NATHAN or CalEMA’s MyHazards). According to Kunz and Hurni (2008) 
they provide a solution to the difficulty to deal with large sets of data in one multi-
hazard or multi-risk map.  
Due to the possibility to provide the whole range of single layer information , no 
content is lost and the user chooses the to him/her relevant hazard or risk 
combination, defines a specific area, zooms in and out, and is able to explore 
stepwise the complex information. However, the advantage of free interactive 
choice should not lead to the creation of maps not following cartographic 
standards which might in the consequence result in misinterpretation, confusion 
and missing readability (Kunz and Hurni 2008). An appropriate graphic user 
interface can prevent from this effect and especially the supply of further 
information and suggestions might enhance the comprehensibility. 
 
In the previous sections the topics different components of multi-hazard risk 
analyses (1) multi-hazard, (2) vulnerability towards multiple processes and (3) 
multi-hazard risk were reviewed and discussed. Additionally, different approaches 
for (4) the visualization of the results were presented. A number of challenges 
became apparent within each of the steps and will be recapitulated in the 
following section. 
 
Facing the challenges 
Multi-hazard risk analyses as important part and basis of risk management consist 
of a number of steps and pose a variety of challenges. The different 
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methodologies and approaches available to cope with these difficulties have 
advantages and disadvantages. Thus, the adjustment of the whole framework 
towards the required result considering the inherent issues is a fundamental 
necessity. From the beginning several principal choices have to be made: 
The first major choice is the definition of the expected outcome: multi-hazard 
(MH) or multi-hazard risk (MHR). This is not only a question of the objective but 
also of the data availability and the question if either qualitative or quantitative 
outcome is needed. While multi-hazard analyses are commonly restricted to 
qualitative and semi-quantitative approaches, the whole range from qualitative to 
quantitative methods is available for multi-hazard risk research.  
Based on the previous review of different methods and concepts, the following 
paragraphs summarize the identified difficulties and the related solution 
approaches: 
1) Multi-hazard: a) The computation of the overall hazard due to multiple natural 
processes is difficult since the single processes are mostly quantified in different 
units and measures. The approach typically used to overcome this difficulty is the 
development of a common standardization scheme (classification or indices, 
qualitative or semi-quantitative). The approach of standardization can mostly be 
used easily; it is an adaptive method also in case of few input data but only 
applicable for the aim it was developed for due to the specificity of the scheme.  
b) Hazards are parts of geosystems, and thus are not independent from each other 
and their interactions might lead to hazard patterns not captured by the sum of 
separate single-hazard analyses. Multi-hazards can be assessed either by 
identification of coincidences (overlay) or by detailed scenario development. 
The next step towards risk is the examination of the vulnerability of elements at 
risk with its inherent challenges and available solutions: 
2) Vulnerability towards multiple hazards: a) Vulnerabilities of elements at risk 
towards multiple hazards vary just as hazard characteristics vary. Thus, the 
methods to assess them are likewise differing widely, not only between 
approaches for social and physical vulnerability, but also towards the single 
threats. Typical approaches in the natural sciences are vulnerability curves or 
matrices. The few methods identified for the social sciences refer to the effect of 
past impacts and assess thereby the hazard-specific vulnerability. 
b) In case of simultaneously occurring hazard events, the overall vulnerability 
might be different from the single vulnerabilities. A possibility to describe this 
combined vulnerability is the extension of e.g. two dimensional vulnerability 
curves into three dimensional vulnerability surfaces. 
And finally the connection of hazard and vulnerability to risk: 
3) Multi-hazard risk: The comparison of risks is much easier than the comparison 
of hazards since the procedure is carried on from hazard to risk and the single 
risks can be expressed in hazard-independent and element at risk/ damage / loss 
specific units. However, still a general analysis framework defining which 
parameter to compare is needed. This framework can either be qualitative 
(classification), semi-quantitative (indices) or quantitative (monetary values, 
probabilities, etc.). And finally, the issue of hazard interactions resulting in 
amplified risk or differing patterns has to be considered. 
4) Visualization: The communication of the multi-dimensional results poses a 
final major challenge. One single map for all kinds of stakeholders and showing 
all types of hazards in the area will surely not match the needs of the involved 
parties. Several options could be identified, each highlighting another aspect: a) 
separate visualization of single hazards/risks, b) visualization of the overall 
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hazard, risk, probability etc., c) joint visualization of a number of hazards and 
risks according to a certain criteria and d) the use of web-mapping tools to let the 
user choose the combination. 
 
In summary, multi-hazard risk analyses are multipartite and pose a lot of 
challenges. The choice to compute multi-hazard or multi-hazard risk, to use a 
qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative approach, and the selection of the 
method depend primarily on the objective. However, also practical issues as 
method availability for the specific set of hazards and the scale as well as data 
availability complicate the selection. And finally, the decision has to be taken 
aware of all strengths, weaknesses and inherent generalizations of the method and 
possible alternatives. A conscious choice is also necessary for the consideration or 
negligence of hazard interactions and cascading effects, respectively, since their 
implementation is surely difficult but they obviously pose an additional threat. 
This article presented a range of possible approaches to deal with the challenges, 
hopefully serving as basis for the development of further (more) coherent multi-
hazard (risk) analysis methods. 
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Abstract Mountain hazards such as landslides, floods and avalanches pose a serious
threat to human lives and development and can cause considerable damage to lifelines,
critical infrastructure, agricultural lands, housing, public and private infrastructure and
assets. The assessment of the vulnerability of the built environment to these hazards is a
topic that is growing in importance due to climate change impacts. A proper understanding
of vulnerability will lead to more effective risk assessment, emergency management and to
the development of mitigation and preparedness activities all of which are designed to
reduce the loss of life and economic costs. In this study, we are reviewing existing methods
for vulnerability assessment related to mountain hazards. By analysing the existing
approaches, we identify difficulties in their implementation (data availability, time con-
sumption) and differences between them regarding their scale, the consideration of the
hazardous phenomenon and its properties, the consideration of important vulnerability
indicators and the use of technology such as GIS and remote sensing. Finally, based on
these observations, we identify the future needs in the field of vulnerability assessment that
include the user-friendliness of the method, the selection of all the relevant indicators,
the transferability of the method, the inclusion of information concerning the hazard itself,
the use of technology (GIS) and the provision of products such as vulnerability maps and
the consideration of the temporal pattern of vulnerability.
Keywords Vulnerability  Landslides  Avalanches  Debris flows  Rock falls  Floods
1 Introduction
The alpine communities have long suffered from natural hazards that have often caused
loss of life, agricultural land, infrastructure and buildings in the past. Although alpine
communities are threatened by a significant number of hazards, in this study, the focus is
on avalanches, floods and landslides including debris flows and rock falls.
M. Papathoma-Ko¨hle (&)  M. Kappes  M. Keiler  T. Glade
Institute of Geography and Regional Research, University of Vienna, Austria,
Universita¨tsstrasse 7, 1010 Vienna, Austria
e-mail: maria.papathoma@univie.ac.at
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The vast majority of the studies concerning alpine hazards focus on hazard assessment
(zoning), hazard modelling, hazard monitoring and risk management. Vulnerability
assessment of alpine hazards is a relative new field of research which eventually brings
together scientists from different disciplines (Fuchs 2009). As there is no universal defi-
nition for vulnerability, all these scientists from different background give their own
definition, showing clearly that there is a lack of common language that hinders vulner-
ability research to move forward (Brooks 2003). In social science, vulnerability is related
only to the social context whereas, engineers and natural scientists try to define thresholds
in order to determine the acceptable risk and the point from which a society should take
measures against a hazard (Bohle and Glade 2007).
In this paper, the physical vulnerability is investigated without taking into consideration
the social, legal or cultural setting. The focus is on the physical environment and, par-
ticularly, on the impact of natural hazards on the built environment.
In most studies concerning physical vulnerability, assessment vulnerability is perceived
as ‘‘The degree of loss to a given element, or set of elements, within the area affected by a
hazard. It is expressed on a scale of 0 (no loss) to 1 (total loss)’’ (UNDRO 1984). In this
study, vulnerability is considered a pre-existing condition that is related to those charac-
teristics and properties of the elements at risk that increase their susceptibility to the impact
of hazards. In a wider sense, ‘‘vulnerability is a characteristic of human behaviour, social
and physical environments, describing the degree of susceptibility (or resistance) to the
impact of e.g. natural hazards’’ (CENAT 2004). Proper understanding of vulnerability and
its assessment is very important since it can lead to more effective emergency management
and to the development of mitigation and preparedness activities all of which are designed
to reduce the loss of life and economic costs.
The objective of the present study is to identify the gaps and difficulties of existing
methodologies and to point out the future needs for vulnerability assessment to alpine
hazards, which can serve as a tool for effective emergency and disaster management.
2 The impact of alpine hazards on the built environment
The impacts of natural hazards on elements at risk vary according to their characteristics
and properties. In the following section, the natural phenomena and their properties that
make them hazardous to the alpine communities are described.
2.1 Landslides, including debris flows and rock falls
Landslides can be defined as the downslope movement of soil, rock, or debris due to
gravitational forces that can be triggered by heavy rainfall, rapid snow melting, slope
undercutting, etc. (Crozier 1999; Glade and Crozier 2005). In this paper, we categorise
the methodologies in three groups according to the type of phenomenon: landslides in a
general meaning, debris flow and rock falls. The impact of landslides on the built
environment ranges from null or minimum (landslides in remote regions away from
inhabited areas or infrastructure) to maximum (collapse or burial of buildings and
infrastructure, loss of life and loss of agricultural land). Although large magnitude
landslides have a low probability to result in significant loss of human life in Europe, the
concentration of property on steep slopes, high standard of living and high population
density makes society vulnerable to even small magnitude landslide events (Blo¨chl and
Braun 2005).
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Debris flows are rapid gravity-induced mass movements that consist of sediment sat-
urated with water that owe their destructive power to the interaction of solid and fluid
forces (Iverson 1997). They can cause extensive damage to buildings, infrastructure,
lifelines and critical infrastructure. As far as buildings are concerned, debris flows do not
only influence their stability, as most of the mass movements do, but they also enter the
building through doors or windows and damage its interior (Holub and Fuchs 2009).
Rock falls pose a continuous threat to the inhabitants of alpine areas. The rolling,
bouncing, or falling from rocks put in danger not only the stability of the building but also
its interior (Holub and Hu¨bl 2008). Potential hazardous zones can be identified by mapping
the presence of detached rock blocks or the presence of unstable rock masses resting on the
cliff face (Corominas et al. 2005).
2.2 Avalanches
Avalanches are fast moving mass movements that can contain, apart from snow, rocks, soil and
vegetation, or ice (Bru¨ndl et al. 2010). Avalanches occur due to topographical (inclination,
aspect and roughness of ground surface), meteorological (temperature, precipitation, wind
speed and direction) and snowpack factors (snowpack structure, depth and water content)
(McClung and Schaerer 1993). The impact on the objects that are located in the disposition area
can be very high. Only in Austria, since 1950 avalanches have claimed more than 1,600 lives,
which are 30 fatalities on an annual basis (Ho¨ller 2007). The elements at risk are influenced by
two major processes: the air pressure plume in front of the avalanche and the high impact
pressure of the snow in motion. The debris or vegetation that can be transported within an
avalanche increases its impact on buildings, infrastructure and individuals (Bru¨ndl et al. 2010).
2.3 Floods
River and flash floods pose a serious threat to Alpine communities. They are caused by heavy
or prolonged rainfall and rapid snowmelt, ice jams or ice break-up, damming of river valleys
by landslides or avalanches, and failure of natural or man-made dams (WMO 1999).
BWW et al. (1997) suggest two categories of river flooding: static and dynamic. Static
flooding occurs in areas with relatively plane topography. Water level is rising slowly and
flow velocity is very slow if the water is moving at all. The damage they cause is attributed to
the influence of the water on the building structure. In dynamic floods the water movement is
higher and affects the elements at risk due to erosion or direct impact (Hollenstein et al. 2002).
On the other hand, flash floods originate in steep basins and show an extremely sudden onset
(Barredo 2007). They are not always connected with bodies of water since also ditches can
turn into torrents where water may reach high flow velocities. UNDHA (1992) defines this
phenomenon as floods ‘‘of short duration with a relatively high peak discharge’’.
The frequent occurrence of natural hazards in Alpine regions leads to a high impact
potential to the exposed societies. Therefore, the role of vulnerability assessment needs to
be addressed. A working report from PLANAT (Swiss National Platform for Natural
Hazards) provides a thorough list of national and international efforts from scientists or
projects to assess vulnerability to alpine hazards having a focus on vulnerability functions
(Spichtig and Bru¨ndl 2008). Moreover, vulnerability studies regarding landslides are
reviewed by Glade (2003). Various methods to assess vulnerability are compared and some
examples of applications are given (Glade 2003). The present review expands the analysis
to more recent studies concerning not only landslides but also snow avalanches and floods
focusing on Alpine regions.
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3 Literature review of existing vulnerability assessment methods
for alpine natural hazards
After conducting a review of existing vulnerability assessment methods regarding various
disaster types, Hollenstein (2005) suggests that vulnerability assessment studies concerning
mass-movements related disasters are limited. The difference to other types of disaster is
striking: Hollenstein (2005) recorded more than 100 studies about earthquake vulnerability
models, more than 100 studies regarding wind-related vulnerability models and less than
20 vulnerability models involving gravitational hazards (landslides, debris flows, snow
avalanches) and floods. He assumes that a potential reason for this is that gravitational
processes are usually accurately delimited and the most common strategy of the authorities
and other stakeholders is to simply avoid the potentially affected areas. Another potential
reason is that the institutions that are responsible for the management of these risks have
enough empirical knowledge and they do not need theoretical models.
Each study addresses vulnerability in a different way and the result is a wide range of
different vulnerability assessment methods. Engineers focus on the reaction of individual
buildings to the impact of a natural process (e.g. landslide, snow avalanche). Some scientists
design vulnerability curves showing the relationship of the vulnerability and the phenomenon
intensity as well as others, having a disaster management or emergency planning background,
provide vulnerability maps in order to support the local authorities with a decision-making
tool. Some studies focus exclusively on vulnerability assessment, whereas others deal with
vulnerability as part of a risk assessment. A review of some vulnerability assessment methods
regarding alpine hazards is given in the following paragraphs without claiming completeness.
3.1 Landslides
One of the first studies dealing with the vulnerability assessment of geological hazards was
the one of Mejia-Navarro et al. (1994), which assessed the vulnerability and risk of
geological hazards (subsidence, rock falls, debris flows and floods) in the Glenwood
Springs area, Colorado. In this vulnerability analysis, the following aspects were consid-
ered: ecosystem, economic and social structure vulnerability. The result was a map with 14
land use suitability classes, which incorporated hazards, vulnerability and risk parameters.
The first seven classes are, or may become, suitable for urban infrastructure while the last
seven classes are reserved for environmental protection, contingency occasions, or avoided
because of a high hazard level (Mejia-Navarro et al. 1994). According to the same study,
vulnerability is a function of population density, land use and lifelines. This function is
expressed by the following equation.
Vuln ¼ Density  10 þ Lusevuln  7 þ Lifelines  2ð Þ=19:
with:
Vuln Vulnerability
Density Population density (higher weight to higher human concentration per hectare)
Lusevuln Land use vulnerability (schools have the highest score (10) and farms the
lowest)
Lifelines Highways, city roads, service lines such as phone and electricity
Leone et al. (1996) also worked on the vulnerability assessment of elements exposed to
mass movements, by investigating the interaction between landslides and exposed
648 Nat Hazards (2011) 58:645–680
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elements. They produced damage matrices for elements exposed to mass movements that
provide a correlation, in terms of loss rate, between the landslides and the exposed ele-
ments. Finally, they developed a classification of the types and levels of damage of
the main elements exposed to mass movements, without linking them to the intensity of the
phenomenon based on historic data. Zezere et al. (2008), on the other hand, connect the
vulnerability values of the elements at risk to the types of landslide that the element is
exposed to (shallow translational landslides, translational landslides and rotational slides).
Through a case study in Portugal, they assessed the vulnerability of buildings and roads,
based on the age and material of buildings, their use and the number of floors. As far as
roads were concerned, they used data concerning the type of road (motorway, national
road, county road, rural road).
A number of vulnerability indicators, as far as the buildings were concerned, were also
used by Bell and Glade (2004). They recognised the gap in vulnerability assessment of
elements at risk subject to landslides and made an attempt to assess vulnerability to
landslides in Iceland using a heuristic approach within the framework of a quantitative risk
analysis. In this effort, they used general information on houses within the endangered
areas, based on expert judgement, noting that some of the houses were made of timber and
had large windows built towards the mountain slope. The vulnerability of the people in
buildings is expressed as the product of the vulnerability of buildings and the vulnerability
of people. The vulnerability of buildings and people is determined depending on the
process and its magnitude. As final product, they provided an ‘‘elements at risk map’’ based
on number of residents and employees and a ‘‘risk map’’ as a function of hazard and
consequences including elements at risk, damage potential and vulnerability.
Some studies aim at the production of a final map that demonstrates the spatial pattern
of vulnerability. For example, Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. (2007) introduce a framework to
undertake an assessment of the vulnerability of buildings to landslide, based on the
development of an ‘‘elements at risk database’’ that takes into consideration the charac-
teristics and use of the buildings, their importance for the local economy and the char-
acteristics of the inhabitants (population density, age, etc.). The established GIS database
contains attributes that affect vulnerability, and it is used for the visualisation of physical,
human and economic vulnerability (Fig. 1). The vulnerability assessment is based on a
landslide susceptibility map demonstrating the probability of landslide occurrence; how-
ever, it does not take into consideration the frequency, magnitude and run out of potential
landslides. The result of the study can contribute to effective disaster management and
emergency planning and the database produced may be used by various end-users and
stakeholders, such as insurance companies, emergency planners, local authorities.
Apart from Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. (2007), GIS and remote sensing data were also used
in a study of Macquarie et al. (2004). The main idea of the approach of Macquarie et al.
(2004) is to identify vulnerable zones for landslide risk assessment at large scales (1:5,000
to 1:10,000) through the aggregation of elements at risk sharing identical attributes. Based
on aerial photography, statistical analysis and GIS technology, the urban fabric is divided
in three vulnerability categories (low, medium and high) according to criteria such as
number of inhabitants, type of buildings, type of activities, land use and lifelines.
Vulnerability maps were also produced by Uzielli et al. (2008) and Kaynia et al. (2008).
Uzielli et al. (2008) used a method for scenario-based, quantitative estimation of physical
vulnerability of the built environment to landslides and introduced a methodology of
probabilistic estimation for vulnerability to landslides. Based on a first-order second-
moment approach, they estimate the vulnerability for susceptible categories of structures
and people for prescribed study areas, finally quantifying the uncertainties.
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Some studies investigated also the impact of landslides on people and not only on
buildings. For example, Bell and Glade (2004) and Glade and Crozier (2005) determine the
vulnerability of a person affected by a landslide according to his location (open spaces,
Fig. 1 Map showing the landslide susceptible areas of Lichtenstein (Germany) and the vulnerability of the
buildings that are found within them (Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. 2007)
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vehicles, buildings). Santos (2003) has included a vulnerability assessment study for
landslides within a QRA (quantitative risk analysis), which is based on a weighting of
elements at risk giving the highest priority to the human life. In this study, the criteria used
included presence, frequency and absolute number of human lives, infrastructures (public,
residential, etc.) and productive function and activities (industry, agriculture, etc.). How-
ever, the construction type or the condition of the buildings in the study area are not taken
into consideration. The vulnerability assessment was used for the production of a risk map.
There was no map demonstrating the vulnerability pattern (Santos 2003).
Another study has been carried out by the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology
for Nepal for the Advance Institute on Vulnerability to Global Environmental Change
(Shrestha 2005). This study includes physical and social vulnerability for both landslides
and floods. Total vulnerability is also assessed based on hazard, physical exposure and
adaptive capacity. In parts of the study area, although the hazard has decreased, the total
vulnerability has risen due to higher physical exposure and the lower adaptive capabilities
of the community (Shrestha 2005). Similar findings have been reported in New Zealand
(Hufschmidt et al. 2005).
Galli and Guzzetti (2007) map vulnerability of buildings and roads to landslides, in
Umbria (Italy) by using the existing landslide inventory and established vulnerability
curves. Based on information on the damage caused by 103 landslides, they establish
dependencies between the area of the landslide and the vulnerability of buildings and roads.
Finally, a vulnerability assessment method for landslides was introduced by Alexander
(2005) based on the vulnerability of buildings and structures, human lives and socio-
economic activities. The methodology can be used in three scales: single asset method
(vulnerability is assessed for each element at risk of the area), summed asset method
(vulnerability is assessed as an average vulnerability of assets in a hazard area) and
generalised asset method (a general level of vulnerability for all assets in the hazard area is
estimated). The vulnerability classes of the assets are assigned on the basis of the likely
degree of loss. Vulnerability estimated in this way can be mapped, and, in combination
with a hazard map, can lead to the production of a risk map.
3.2 Debris flow
In the study of debris flow vulnerability, there are significantly more efforts in the pro-
duction of vulnerability curves. BUWAL (1999a), focusing on gravitational mass move-
ments in Switzerland, presents vulnerability curves that are integrated in a 3-step
methodology for the vulnerability of communities at risk.
1. Step 1: By combining a hazard and a land use map and comparing with the protection
objectives potential ‘protection deficits’ are deducted.
2. Step 2: The vulnerability of object categories is quantified by taking into consideration
the loss of life, assets and agricultural land, and rebuilding and clean-up costs.
3. Step 3: The vulnerability of each object is assessed using vulnerability curves and
detailed information on elements at risk to estimate the death risk in buildings, on the
street and in the train, as well as the monetary loss as far as buildings, business
interruption and loss of farm animals are concerned.
The methodology is illustrated by case studies from Switzerland for debris flow, rock
falls, landslides and avalanches. It is based on vulnerability curves related to the intensity
of the phenomenon and its impact (degree of loss) on the buildings (green line in Fig. 2 for
debris flow).
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Moreover, Romang (2004) in a study related to the effectiveness of protection measures
for flooding and debris flow events in Switzerland recognised that the vulnerability of
buildings is a critical parameter not only within risk analysis but also for the planning of
protection measures. There, the vulnerability of buildings was expressed as the ratio
of effective damage and the value of the object, by using data provided by insurance
companies. The vulnerability of buildings was calculated according to different water
depth (0.5–1, 1–2, [2 m). According to Fuchs et al. (2007), the resulting curves were in
accordance with BUWAL (1999a) as far as medium debris flow intensities are concerned.
However, for high intensities, the values provided by Romang (2004) were considerably
higher than the ones provided by BUWAL (1999a).
Fuchs et al. (2007) using a well-documented event, which occurred in the Austrian Alps
(August 1997), obtained a vulnerability curve for buildings of the dominant type (brick
masonry and concrete) located on the fan of the torrent, based on the damage ratio and the
intensity of the phenomenon. The relationship between debris flow intensity and vulner-
ability is expressed by a second polynomial function (Fig. 2). The intensity is expressed by
deposit height and the curve concerns intensities lower than 2.5-m deposit height. In Fig. 2,
the curve produced by Fuchs et al. (2007) is shown together with existing curves for
comparison.
Akbas et al. (2009) use data from the 2008 debris flow event in Selvetta (Italian Alps) in
order to develop an empirical vulnerability function based on the relationship between
vulnerability of buildings and deposition height. The authors suggest that there is a dif-
ference in the results between the developed vulnerability function and other vulnerability
functions that can be found in the literature. In more detail, although the obtained vul-
nerability values are similar to the ones resulting from some studies (Fell and Hartford
1997; Bell and Glade 2004), they appear to be higher when compared with those of Fuchs
et al. (2007). To obtain results of high confidence level, future studies should include both
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Fig. 2 The generalised relationship between debris flow intensity and vulnerability is represented by the
black curve (refer to Fuchs et al. 2007). Mean vulnerability values published by BUWAL (1999b) and Fell
and Hartford (1997) (refer to green line and blue dots, respectively)
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characteristics related to the intensity of the event (velocity, deposition height) and
description of outcoming damage.
Cardinali et al. (2002) have also discussed the issue of vulnerability through a risk
assessment. In order to conduct a landslide risk assessment, they provided a table with the
vulnerability of the elements at risk, expressed as expected damage (superficial, functional
and structural) caused by different types of landslides having different intensities, but they
never went any further by mapping this vulnerability. Michael-Leiba et al. (2003) assessed
the vulnerability of elements as risk (people, buildings and roads), as part of a landslide
risk assessment for the community of Cairns, Australia. They consider vulnerability as the
probability of an element at risk to be destroyed by a landslide and produced a table
showing how the vulnerability of the elements at risk can change according to the type of
slide.
Other studies show a wider focus, not being limited to the assessment of the vulnera-
bility of buildings. Liu and Lei (2003) presented a vulnerability assessment model through
the assessment of debris flow risk in China, based on a more holistic approach taking into
consideration all the factors that influence vulnerability. According to the authors, vul-
nerability depends on physical, economic, environmental and social factors. In order to
assess vulnerability on a regional scale, the following characteristics were taking into
consideration:
• Physical vulnerability, defined by fixed asset values;
• Economic vulnerability, assessed through Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
• Environmental vulnerability, including baseline prices of different types of land;
• Social vulnerability, based on size, density, age, education and wealth of people.
Sterlacchini et al. (2007) include a vulnerability assessment of an Italian community
susceptible to debris flow within a multi-disciplinary landslide risk analysis. The vulner-
ability assessment of the elements at risk is based on the physical effects that the elements
could suffer because of the disastrous event, assessed basing on damage scenarios of
similar past events. Finally, the authors estimate the social and economic consequences by
producing a vulnerability scenario for built-up areas and infrastructure (buildings, road
network and waterlines and penstocks) described in terms of aesthetical, functional and
structural damage.
3.3 Rock falls
As far as rock falls are concerned, attempts for vulnerability assessment of elements at risk
of rock falls are limited, perhaps due to the limited impact of the phenomenon (it can affect
individual buildings rather than settlements, and rarely it causes casualties). BUWAL
(1999b) proposed vulnerability curves for rock falls as far as five building categories are
concerned. The curves express the relationship between the vulnerability of the buildings
and the intensity of the rock fall (kJ). Corominas et al. (2005) worked within the frame-
work of a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) in Andorra. Although they suggest that the
intensity of the event and the nature of the element are the two factors controlling the
amount of damage that can be produced by the rock fall in order to assign vulnerability
values to elements at risk, they only take into account the intensity of the event. Mavrouli
and Corominas (2008) make a step further, by analysing the vulnerability of buildings to
rock falls for three representative structural typologies: (1) reinforced concrete structure
with column and beam frames, (2) reinforced concrete structure with additional reinforced
concrete walls on the exposed facade and (3) bearing brick masonry. Finally, other
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landslide vulnerability studies included vulnerability to rock falls as part of a wider vul-
nerability assessment focused on landslides (Bell and Glade 2004).
3.4 Avalanches
Studies focusing on the vulnerability assessment of communities and buildings to avalanches
are significantly less than similar studies regarding other disaster types, probably due to lack
of sufficient data on avalanche damages to exposed elements (Cappabianca et al. 2008).
Wilhelm (1997) determines the vulnerability functions for different construction types
of buildings related to avalanche impact pressure (kPa) based on different avalanche events
beginning with the avalanche event in Voralberg in 1954. He introduces four vulnerability
thresholds, as shown in Fig. 3, in which:
• pu is the general damage level: mentionable damage (e.g. destroyed windows and
doors)
• pui is he specific damage level: damage on the building structure (according to
construction type)
• poi is the destruction level: maximum loss within each building category.
• pai is the detached limit: demolition and reconstruction is necessary.
Keiler (2004) investigates the damage potential of avalanche events in Austria. Within
this study, the value of buildings and number of exposed people that are located within
every hazard zone and the changes through the time for the period 1950–2000 are cal-
culated. In a later study (Keiler et al. 2006), which includes the vulnerability curves
introduced by Wilhelm (1997), she assesses potential building damage based on the
building value, the construction type and the existence of avalanche deflectors and rein-
forced structures at the exposed side of buildings. The results showed that the potential
building damage has decreased during the last 50 years, due to changes in the type of
building construction, which influence highly the vulnerability of buildings.
For the three stage-methodology of BUWAL (1999b), the main input is represented by
hazard maps for three scenarios (30, 100 and 300-year return period) and a related intensity
map for each obtained scenario according to the Swiss guidelines (BFF and SLF 1984;
Fig. 3 The relationship between the avalanche impact pressure and the vulnerability of the buildings
(expressed here as the susceptibility of loss) is determined for 5 building types: (1): lightweight construction,
(2): mixed construction, (3): massive construction, (4): concrete reinforced construction, (5): reinforced
construction (Keiler et al. 2006 after Wilhelm 1997)
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BWW et al. 1997; BUWAL et al. 1997). The intensity classification is derived as an
example for avalanches from impact pressure on large obstacles, and divided into low
(\3 kPa), medium (3 kPa \ 30 kPa) and high ([30 kPa). For the first two stages, the
vulnerability of elements at risk is neglected or included as general assumptions with
regard to the probability of lethality according to the intensity class and the land use
category (e.g. settlement area, industrial area, dense developed area). In the third stage, the
potential damage for buildings and infrastructure is calculated depending on the value of
the element at risk and the degree (or susceptibility) of loss related to the impact pressure
and intensity classes, respectively (BUWAL 1999b). The latter includes the construction
type of the buildings and the related resistance, the building height and the presence of
local structural protection. Furthermore, a degree of loss is estimated for traffic lines,
infrastructure and different agricultural uses. Also the vulnerability curve of BUWAL
(1999b) is strongly related to the approach of Wilhelm (1997) but differs because the
degree of loss is only given for three aggregated intensity classes and the related impact
pressure and no general damage level (pu) is included.
Keylock and Barbolini (2001) studied the impact of snow avalanches on buildings,
introducing a methodology for deriving vulnerability values as a function of position
downslope for a range of avalanche sizes. The same concept was used later by Barbolini
et al. (2004) in order to assess the vulnerability of buildings and people. Barbolini et al.
(2004) suggest that for buildings this loss is the value of the property and for people the
loss can be expressed as the probability that a particular life will be lost. Based on data
from two well-documented events in Tyrol (Austria) for different impact pressure they
produced three vulnerability curves for: buildings, people inside buildings and people
outside buildings. The vulnerability is expressed as a function of avalanche dynamical
parameters (impact pressure and flow depth). The vulnerability of buildings is defined in
this study by Barbolini et al. (2004) as the ratio between the cost of repair and the building
value. On the other hand, the vulnerability of people inside buildings is defined as the
probability of being killed by an avalanche if one stays inside a building when the ava-
lanche occurs. Moreover, the vulnerability of people outside buildings is defined as the
degree of burial, which depends on the flow depth of the avalanche.
Bertrand et al. (2010) presented a methodology for vulnerability assessment
of unreinforced masonry buildings exposed to snow avalanches. They accept that vulnerabil-
ity is the degree of loss of a given element at risk within the threatened area. Therefore,
the vulnerability of the structures is expressed as damage level. In more detail, they use a
numerical approach in order to simulate the displacements of blocks that constitute the struc-
ture under threat. The damage of the structure is estimated by the number of broken joints.
Finally, one of the most recent studies on vulnerability for snow avalanches is the one of
Cappabianca et al. (2008) who are proposing a vulnerability curve for people inside buildings
affected by dense avalanches based on Wilhelm (1997) making possible the inclusion of
these vulnerable elements in the calculation of the total risk at the valley bottom. In a similar
way, Jonasson et al. (1999) related the probability of people surviving an avalanche to the
avalanche velocity based on data from Iceland. The results concern Icelandic type of
housing, thus, the method is not transferable to other parts of the world without adaptation.
3.5 Floods
Most of the current state-of-the-art flood loss analyses focus on the estimation of direct,
tangible damages (Messner and Meyer 2005). The most frequently applied approach con-
cerns the linkage of inundation depth to estimated damages. Hooijer et al. (2001) developed
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classes of severity of flood and for each class (serious (\1.5 m), disastrous (1.5–4 m) and
catastrophic ([4 m)) the percentage of total potential damage for households, industrial
assets, infrastructure, etc. and number of inhabitants, respectively, is determined.
The stage-damage curves are widely used, tracing back to White (1945), who linked
inundation depth to expected losses expressed as percentage or total damage (monetary
value). The use of stage-damage curves is restricted to gently flowing water (\1 m/s) since
faster flows cause with increasing likelihood damages due to the dynamic load (Greenaway
and Smith 1983 in Middelmann-Fernandes 2010). NZIER (2004) limit their applicability
even further to slow-rising, low-silt and low-flow floods. Kang et al. (2005), for example,
developed curves for single and multiple family dwellings interrelating flow depth with
total damage, while Gru¨nthal et al. (2006) worked with relative stage-damage curves
estimating the damage ratio of buildings and contents for various economic sectors as
private housing, commerce, services, public infrastructure. The total economic value per
grid cell was assessed according to the economic sector to which it belonged based on unit
values per land area and after linkage to the stage-damage curves total losses were derived
for various flood scenarios. Meyer et al. (2009) used relative stage-damage curves for
potential damage assessment for various asset categories as residential, agriculture,
industry or service for the river Mulde in Saxony (Germany). Apart from the economic
assessment, Meyer et al. (2009) considered also ecological (erosion, accumulation and
inundation of oligotrophic biotopes) and social (spatial distribution of affected population,
location of social hot spots as hospitals, schools, etc. and inundation) consequences. By
means of multi-criteria analysis, the single sub-criteria and criteria were combined and the
spatial allocation of these monetary and non-monetary consequences was visualised in
separate maps or as final standardised multi-criteria risk.
Dutta et al. (2003) produced relative stage-damage curves for residential wooden
structures, residential concrete structures, residential content, non-residential property and
non-residential stocks. Additionally, they developed relative damage curves for crops
relating flood duration to relative damages for three inundation depth classes (Fig. 4).
Merz et al. (2010) include a review of damage functions for floods in a wider review of
assessment methods for economic flood damage. They distinguish the various functions in
relative (used in the HAZUS-MH model) and absolute (used in the UK and Australia), and
they summarise their advantages and disadvantages.
For static floods, the depth may indeed be the dominating factor and sufficient for an
analysis but Merz et al. (2004) criticise the limitation to this hazard indicator as too
simplistic since still a big variety of further parameters may influence the quantity of
losses. The Deutsche Ru¨ck (1999) found for the flood in May 1999 in Germany a tripli-
cation of damages for buildings with filled oil tanks due to oil spill and Thieken et al.
Fig. 4 Stage-damage curves for agriculture product damage estimation (Dutta et al. 2003)
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(2005) identified for the Elbe flood of 2002 contamination and flood duration as important
factors. Bu¨chele et al. (2006) identified contamination and the application of precautionary
measures as important variables in their study. They complemented the stage-damage
curve by these two parameters by means of so-called loading factors (Table 1), which are
multiplied with the damage predicted by the stage-damage curve.
Bu¨chele et al. (2006) collected a list of further influencing factors as ‘‘duration of
inundation, sediment concentration, availability and information content of flood warning
and the quality of external response in a flood situation’’, but very few studies consider
them quantitatively.
For dynamic floods flow velocity is an important parameter, but still only few studies
are available which include it into damage estimations. De Lotto and Testa (2000) analysed
the effect of dam-break at a test site in an alpine valley basing their analysis on water depth
and flow velocity. By that time no velocity-damage function could be found thus, they
adopted the pressure used as threshold of complete destruction of structures due to snow
avalanches (30 kN/m2). Since for the elements at risk (1 storey, 2 storey and 3 storey
houses and the content) two damage values were obtained—one for depth and one for
velocity, always the highest value was used and interactions were not taken into account. In
HAZUS-MH (FEMA 2007) a velocity–depth function is included indicating whether
building collapse has to be assumed. If the threshold for collapse is reached or exceeded,
the damage is set to 100% while below this threshold the damage is estimated based on
inundation levels only. Furthermore, the effect of warning and associated damage reduc-
tion can be considered and assessed by a so-called day curve. Based on the time of the
warning before the event a maximum percentage of 35% damage reduction can be
achieved if a public response rate of 100% can be assumed.
The Swiss risk concept from PLANAT (Nationale Plattform Naturgefahren) defines
three intensity classes for an effect analysis, based on flood depth and velocity (Table 2),
which are used as basis for spatial planning regulations (BWW et al. 1997; Bru¨ndl 2009).
The intensity classes are established according to their effect on human beings and
buildings (BWW et al. 1997):
• High: persons inside and outside of buildings are at risk and the destruction of buildings
is possible or events with a lower intensity occur but with higher frequency and persons
outside of buildings are at risk.
• Middle: persons outside of buildings are at risk and damage to buildings can occur while
persons in buildings are quite safe and sudden destruction of buildings is improbable.
Table 1 Loading factors for different levels of contamination and precautionary measures (Bu¨chele et al.
2006)
Consequence and measures Loading factors for damage ratios
Buildings Contents
No contamination and no precautionary measures 0.92 0.90
No contamination and medium precautionary measures 0.64 0.85
No contamination and very good precautionary measures 0.41 0.64
Medium contamination and no precautionary measures 1.20 1.11
Medium contamination and medium precautionary measures 0.86 0.99
Medium contamination and very good precautionary measures 0.71 0.73
High contamination and no precautionary measures 1.58 1.44
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• Low: persons are barely at risk and only low damages at buildings or disruptions have
to be expected.
Zhai et al. (2006) proposes an indirect method by assessing the probability of fatality or
injury as a function of the number of inundated buildings without considering any flood
characteristics (Fig. 5).
Obviously, a variety of empirical approaches is available, mostly focused on the pre-
dominant hazard characteristic (static or dynamic floods) of the particular event, linking
the corresponding hazard indicator (e.g. inundation depth) to the expected damage. On the
contrary, Kelman and Spence (2004) give a very detailed and more theoretical overview of
flood actions referring to them as ‘‘acts which a flood could do to a building, potentially
causing damage or failure’’ instead of flood indicators:
(a) hydrostatic actions (resulting from water’s presence) which are lateral pressure on the
building structure and capillary rise
(b) hydrodynamic actions (resulting from water’s motion) as e.g. velocity and turbulence
(irregular fluctuations in velocity in magnitude and direction)
(c) erosion actions (water moving soil)
(d) buoyancy action (tendency to float)
(e) debris actions (actions from solids in the water) are composed by static (e.g. sediment
accumulation in or outside of buildings creating forces), dynamic (impact of debris
moved by water on a building) and erosion actions
(f) non-physical actions which are chemical (e.g. rusting or contaminations, conducting
of electricity), nuclear and biological actions (e.g. micro organisms).
Although for most of the parameters they list no current techniques including them into
vulnerability assessments exist yet, this collection might serve as first step for a more
coherent approach.
Table 2 Intensity classes based
on flood depth and velocity from
PLANAT (Bru¨ndl et al. 2009)
Intensity class Criteria
Low h \ 0.5 m or v 9 h \ 0.5 m2/s
Middle 2 m [ h [ 0.5 m or 2 m2/s [ v 9 h [ 0.5 m2/s
High h [ 2 m or v 9 h [ 2 m2/s
Fig. 5 Probability of a flood
causing a certain number of
deaths versus the number of
inundated buildings (Zhai et al.
2006)
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In order to address the various concepts of vulnerability assessment and to determine the
similarities and the differences between them, a project funded by the European Com-
mission has been launched. In the MOVE project (Methodologies for Vulnerability
Assessment in Europe), existing vulnerability assessment methods were reviewed based on
a series of criteria. Information such as, the location of the study, the type of hazard and the
research domain of the scientific team that undertook the study are important for the
review. However, information regarding the way vulnerability is perceived by each author,
the gaps and difficulties of the methods and the potential end-users that can also demon-
strate the applicability of each method is considered as essential. Moreover, by scale we do
not mean the extend of the case study area but the units that have been used for the
vulnerability assessment that, for example, in the case of ‘‘local’’ are the individual houses.
The reviewed vulnerability assessment methods and their scores according to the MOVE
criteria are listed in the Appendix.
4 Discussion: Identifications of gaps
In this paper, 41 vulnerability assessment methods for alpine hazards are reviewed (some
of them referring to more than one type of hazard). As far as the landslide-related
hazards are concerned, the majority of vulnerability assessment methodologies have been
designed for earth flow and debris flow-related hazards, whereas for rock fall hazards we
have the smallest number of methodologies. Most of the reviewed methods consider
vulnerability to be ‘‘the degree of loss of a specific element at risk to a hazard of a given
magnitude’’. The vast majority of the vulnerability assessment methods are quantitative,
assigning vulnerability values from 0 to 1 to the elements at risk (e.g. Michael-Leiba
et al. 2003; Fuchs et al. 2007), whereas, only a small percentage of them are qualitative
describing vulnerability as low, medium and high (e.g. Cardinali et al. 2002; Santos
2003; Macquarie et al. 2004; Sterlacchini et al. 2007). This ‘‘degree of loss’’ is often
expressed as monetary loss (reconstruction costs, building value, etc.) (e.g. Barbolini
et al. 2004; Keylock and Barbolini 2001; Romang 2004; Fuchs et al. 2007; Cappabianca
et al. 2008), in other cases it is expressed as damages (aesthetic, functional, structural,
etc.) (e.g. Corominas et al. 2005; Sterlacchini et al. 2007; Mavrouli and Corominas
2008). Finally, in some studies (e.g. Mejia-Navarro et al. 1994; Liu and Lei 2003;
Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. 2007; Sterlacchini et al. 2007), vulnerability is a combination of
all these factors that contribute to the susceptibility of the building or the given element
at risk. Moreover, for studies with a focus on human life, vulnerability is the probability
of a life to be lost (e.g. Jonasson et al. 1999; Santos 2003; Barbolini et al. 2004; Keylock
and Barbolini 2001; Zhai et al. 2006).
From the 41 reviewed methods, 21 use existing (12) or introduce new vulnerability
curves (9). In the case of floods, almost all of the studies are based on vulnerability curves
which holds only for a few studies related to gravitational hazards. As Douglas (2007)
suggests, there are more vulnerability curves for other geohazards, such as earthquakes,
rather than for landslides and snow avalanches. Moreover, in the cases where vulnerability
curves are used the expected damages to the built environment are not always expressed in
relationship to the same characteristic of the hazardous phenomenon. For example, in the
case of debris flows, vulnerability is presented in relationship to the intensity of the debris
flow, which is expressed as deposit height. Other properties of the phenomenon (e.g. flow
velocity) are not taken into consideration (Fuchs et al. 2007). For snow avalanches, the
vulnerability curves that are available express the relationship between potential loss and
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the impact pressure of the snow avalanche, expressed as kPa, without taking into con-
sideration other avalanche characteristics such as flow density (Wilhelm 1997; Keiler et al.
2006). On the other hand, for floods there is a variety of vulnerability curves available in
the literature. The majority of the studies use vulnerability curves that demonstrate the
relationship between expected damage and inundation depth. The large number of vul-
nerability curves in flood studies can be explained by the fact that floods (just like
earthquakes and storms which are also hazards with very well developed vulnerability
curves) damage more buildings in a single event than other hazard types (Douglas 2007).
Additionally, these hazards occur frequently and are in society’s recent memory. Finally,
most of the methodologies have been applied in Europe or in countries with similar level of
development, such as America and Australia. However, the curves that are produced are
mostly for a specific construction type that is common in the study area. Therefore, they
cannot be used in another part of the world where the dominant construction type is
different or where there is diversity in the quality or types of buildings.
The focus of the methodologies varies significantly. The majority of the methodologies
focus on buildings, whereas, others include also potential victims, infrastructure and
lifelines such as the road network. Very few studies focus on the vulnerability of the
environment or the agricultural land, or the economic vulnerability of the affected com-
munity that can include the vulnerability of businesses, employment, tourism, etc. A very
limited number of the reviewed studies address the multi-dimensional nature of vulnera-
bility (Leone et al. 1996; Liu and Lei 2003; Sterlacchini et al. 2007). As far as the scale of
the study is concerned, the majority of the studies, especially the ones involving landslides,
concern methodologies designed to be applied only on a local level, whereas only a few
(Liu and Lei 2003; Galli and Guzzetti 2007) are applied on a regional scale. In the case of
studies concerning floods, the majority of them are carried out on a regional scale (Hooijer
et al. 2001; Gru¨nthal et al. 2006; Meyer et al. 2009; Zhai et al. 2006, etc.). The regional
vulnerability assessment is important for the central or the regional government in order to
make decisions regarding funding allocations. However, as far as on-site emergency
management and disaster planning is concerned in particular local vulnerability assessment
can provide the decision makers with useful information.
There are many difficulties in implementing the methodologies. The most common
setback is the data availability (Barbolini et al. 2004; Bu¨chele et al. 2006; Papathoma-
Ko¨hle et al. 2007; Kaynia et al. 2008; Uzielli et al. 2008; Akbas et al. 2009) and the fact
that some methods are time-consuming (Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. 2007; Kaynia et al. 2008;
Uzielli et al. 2008) due to extensive field work and the detailed data that are required.
Many studies focus only on the vulnerability of individual buildings (Corominas et al.
2005; Bertrand et al. 2010; Mavrouli and Corominas 2008). In the case of rock falls
(Corominas et al. 2005; Mavrouli and Corominas 2008), this is widely understood since the
specific type of disaster affects individual buildings rather than settlements. As far as other
alpine hazards are concerned, usually the studies focus on settlements rather than indi-
vidual buildings. Vulnerability maps, which could give an overview of the vulnerability
pattern, are often not provided (Leone et al. 1996; Sterlacchini et al. 2007; Zezere et al.
2008). Although due to the goal of the study vulnerability maps are not always necessary,
they may be a valuable tool for emergency planning and decision making in disaster
management. In many cases the authors provide an inventory of the elements at risk but
they do not provide information regarding their properties which is essential for a vul-
nerability assessment (Fuchs et al. 2007). In other cases, the indicators of vulnerability are
explicitly explained (Sterlacchini et al. 2007) and in many cases, only one vulnerability
indicator is taken into consideration, e.g. building type (Keylock and Barbolini 2001;
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Bu¨chele et al. 2006; Fuchs et al. 2007; Zezere et al. 2008). Moreover, vulnerability in most
cases is considered hazard dependant, in other words, characteristics of the hazardous
phenomenon, such as its intensity or magnitude, are also taken into consideration
(Mejia-Navarro et al. 1994; Macquarie et al. 2004; Keiler et al. 2006; Fuchs et al. 2007;
Bru¨ndl 2009; Kaynia et al. 2008; Bru¨ndl et al. 2009). However, some studies do not take
into consideration the hazardous phenomenon (Leone et al. 1996; Liu and Lei 2003;
Papathoma-Ko¨hle et al. 2007). In general, most of the vulnerability assessment methods
reviewed here are static: they refer to a state of vulnerability for given elements at risk
within a certain time period. However, vulnerability is a dynamic phenomenon which is
changing through time. Therefore, the temporal evolution of vulnerability should be taken
into consideration in future vulnerability assessment studies.
5 Conclusion: future needs
The diversity in the way physical vulnerability to alpine hazards is assessed by different
scientists is remarkable. It is understood that a common vulnerability assessment method
that satisfies all would be impossible. However, following this detailed review of the
existing vulnerability assessment methods for alpine hazards, a series of aspects regarding
future needs in the field of vulnerability assessment are outlined.
The absence of a common definition and conceptual framework of vulnerability can
obstruct efficient risk reduction. Sometimes, the different approaches confuse potential
end-users, leading to the exclusion of vulnerability assessment from the decision-making
process. For this reason, a common language not only between scientists of different
disciplines but also between scientists sharing a similar background is essential. Since
vulnerability can have many dimensions (physical, economic, social, etc.) a multi-
dimensional approach is necessary which would enable the collaboration between scien-
tists from various disciplines. Even if we focus on one dimension only in the respective
research, the other dimensions are still there and they might influence unintentionally the
results of the specific research. According to Fuchs (2009), integrating the contributions of
the different disciplines in a holistic way would not result in an individual integral method
which would be generally applicable; however, they could be combined in a concept
offering complementary results that can lead to a deeper understanding of hazard and risk.
In order to improve the physical vulnerability assessment, as a part of a future multi-
dimensional vulnerability assessment method, we would like to outline the following:
1. The aim of the vulnerability assessment and its end-users should be identified before
the development of the methodology. This holds not just for vulnerability assessment
but our analysis of existing methods shows that this is mostly missing. A vulnerability
assessment which will be used as a tool for decision making or emergency planning
will take into consideration different parameters than a vulnerability assessment that
will be used for funding allocation in national or international level. In case the
method is targeting a number of end-users then it should be user friendly and
comprehensible for a wide range of people and not only for specialists. The end-users
will also influence the scale of the assessment (local/regional/national).
2. All the relevant vulnerability indicators should be considered. Indicators can be
identified by looking at records of previous events, as far as every different type of
disaster is concerned. The construction type is a very important indicator of
vulnerability but there are other indicators that play a major role in the interaction
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between a building and a hazardous phenomenon such as the design and shape of the
building, its foundation, its surrounding, the existence of vegetation or protection
measures, and the static characteristics of the building. As far as floods and torrent
processes are concerned the opening of the buildings and the use of the ground floor
are also very important indicators. Birkmann (2006) suggests a number of steps for
such an indicator development, and a series of quality criteria.
3. It would be of great value if a vulnerability assessment method could be transferred to
other places of the world. However, due to the different housing materials and
architecture this is very difficult. Although the transferability of a method is hard to be
secured it should not be neglected where possible. For example, more than one
building type could be considered. These would eventually lead to more than one
vulnerability curve for the study area that could also enable the transferability of the
method to other parts of the world with a diversity of building and construction types.
Moreover, the uncertainties of the vulnerability functions should be also considered.
4. It can be of great use when vulnerability assessment is accompanied by a product (e.g.
a map or a GIS database) that shows its spatial pattern. Weichselgartner (2001) also
points out the importance of mapping vulnerability as a result of a series of hazard,
exposure, preparedness and prevention maps. Available technology such as remote
sensing and GIS should be used not only for the provision of quality maps but also in
order to reduce time-consuming fieldwork as much as possible. Although the necessity
of such technology (remote sensing and GIS) is highly dependent on the goal and scale
of the study, recent remote sensing data can provide the most up to date picture of the
study area and the inventory of the elements at risk together with their properties
avoiding time-consuming field work. Following, the up to date information can be
contained in a GIS database for fast data retrieval, easy weight allocation for the
various vulnerability indicators, better visualisation (understanding of the spatial
pattern of vulnerability) of the results and continuous updating.
5. The fact that vulnerability is hazard dependant should not be ignored. Information
regarding the properties of the hazardous phenomenon should be collected as well as
information regarding the impact of past events on the built environment. Moreover,
the vulnerability assessment method differs with the type of disaster as characteristics
regarding its frequency and extend should be taken into consideration.
6. A static vulnerability assessment method does not cover the needs of the end-users and
the development of risk management strategies under the consideration of complex
interaction between natural systems and social systems (global change) (Keiler et al.
2006, 2010). Vulnerability is a dynamic phenomenon that changes through time,
especially as much as people are concerned. A dynamic perspective of vulnerability
and the resulting consequents should be also taken into consideration in the
development of new methodologies.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their valuable
comments in the earlier version of this paper. Part of the research for this article was supported by EU-
projects of the 6th (Mountain Risks, MRTN-CT-2006-035798) and 7th framework programme (MOVE,
211590).
Appendix
See Table 3.
662 Nat Hazards (2011) 58:645–680
123
190
Articles
T
a
b
le
3
A
u
th
o
rs
(y
ea
r)
G
en
er
al
in
fo
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
u
se
d
G
ap
s
an
d
d
if
fi
cu
lt
ie
s
o
f
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
1
A
k
b
as
et
al
.
(2
0
0
9
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
D
eb
ri
s
fl
o
w
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
S
el
v
et
ta
(I
ta
li
an
A
lp
s)
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s,
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
,
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
L
o
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
p
la
n
n
in
g
ag
en
ci
es
,
en
g
in
ee
rs
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
co
n
si
d
er
ed
to
b
e
th
e
ex
p
ec
te
d
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
to
a
g
iv
en
el
em
en
t
at
ri
sk
re
su
lt
in
g
fr
o
m
th
e
o
cc
u
rr
en
ce
o
f
a
h
az
ar
d
o
f
a
g
iv
en
m
ag
n
it
u
d
e.
It
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
th
e
ra
ti
o
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
lo
ss
an
d
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
al
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
v
al
u
e
T
h
e
au
th
o
rs
su
g
g
es
t
th
at
,
in
o
rd
er
to
re
ac
h
a
h
ig
h
er
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
le
v
el
,
th
er
e
is
a
n
ee
d
fo
r
m
o
re
d
at
a
co
n
ce
rn
in
g
n
o
t
o
n
ly
th
e
re
su
lt
in
g
d
am
ag
e
to
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
b
u
t
al
so
in
te
n
si
ty
m
ea
su
re
s
if
th
e
ev
en
t
su
ch
as
d
ep
o
si
ti
o
n
h
ei
g
h
t
an
d
v
el
o
ci
ty
2
A
le
x
an
d
er
(2
0
0
5
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
L
an
d
sl
id
es
S
ca
le
:
lo
ca
l
(m
u
lt
i-
sc
al
e)
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
N
/A
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
d
is
as
te
r
m
an
ag
em
en
t
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s,
h
u
m
an
li
v
es
,
so
ci
o
-e
co
n
o
m
ic
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
q
u
al
it
at
iv
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
N
O
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
L
o
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
d
is
as
te
r
m
an
ag
er
s
‘‘
…
.w
it
h
re
sp
ec
t
to
th
e
el
em
en
ts
at
ri
sk
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
ca
n
b
e
co
n
si
d
er
ed
ei
th
er
as
su
sc
ep
ti
b
il
it
y
to
d
am
ag
e
in
m
as
s
m
o
v
em
en
ts
o
f
g
iv
en
ty
p
es
an
d
si
ze
s
o
r
in
te
rm
s
o
f
v
al
u
e…
’’
R
eq
u
ir
ed
d
at
a
sh
o
u
ld
b
e
m
ai
n
ly
co
ll
ec
te
d
b
y
ti
m
e-
co
n
su
m
in
g
fi
el
d
su
rv
ey
3
B
ar
b
o
li
n
i
et
al
.
(2
0
0
4
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
S
n
o
w
av
al
an
ch
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
It
al
y
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
C
iv
il
en
g
in
ee
rs
,
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
ci
ty
p
la
n
n
er
s
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
,
an
d
it
is
ex
p
re
ss
ed
o
n
a
sc
al
e
o
f
0
(n
o
lo
ss
)
to
1
(t
o
ta
l
lo
ss
).
F
o
r
b
u
il
d
in
g
s,
th
e
lo
ss
is
th
e
v
al
u
e
o
f
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
an
d
fo
r
p
eo
p
le
it
is
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
th
at
a
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r
li
fe
w
il
l
b
e
lo
st
.
In
m
o
re
d
et
ai
l,
th
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
th
e
ra
ti
o
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
co
st
o
f
re
p
ai
r
an
d
th
e
b
u
il
d
in
g
v
al
u
e
(S
L
:
sp
ec
ifi
c
lo
ss
)
M
o
re
d
at
a
ar
e
n
ec
es
sa
ry
in
o
rd
er
to
as
se
ss
th
e
v
al
id
it
y
o
f
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
.
M
o
re
o
v
er
,
th
e
cu
rv
es
ar
e
cr
ea
te
d
fo
r
o
n
e
ty
p
e
o
f
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
(a
lp
in
e
ty
p
es
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s)
,
w
h
ic
h
m
ak
es
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
d
if
fi
cu
lt
to
b
e
ap
p
li
ed
in
an
ar
ea
w
it
h
d
if
fe
re
n
t
ty
p
es
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s.
F
in
al
ly
,
th
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
o
f
p
eo
p
le
is
b
as
ed
to
a
li
m
it
ed
am
o
u
n
t
o
f
d
at
a
an
d
m
an
y
as
su
m
p
ti
o
n
s
Nat Hazards (2011) 58:645–680 663
123
191
Articles
T
a
b
le
3
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
A
u
th
o
rs
(y
ea
r)
G
en
er
al
in
fo
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
u
se
d
G
ap
s
an
d
d
if
fi
cu
lt
ie
s
o
f
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
4
B
el
l
an
d
G
la
d
e
(2
0
0
4
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
L
an
d
sl
id
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
Ic
el
an
d
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
p
eo
p
le
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
L
o
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
em
er
g
en
cy
an
d
ci
v
il
p
ro
te
ct
io
n
se
rv
ic
es
N
o
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
p
ro
v
id
ed
N
o
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
m
ap
is
p
ro
v
id
ed
an
d
n
o
d
et
ai
le
d
in
v
es
ti
g
at
io
n
s
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
is
ca
rr
ie
d
o
u
t
5
B
er
tr
an
d
et
al
.
(2
0
1
0
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
S
n
o
w
av
al
an
ch
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
-
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
E
n
g
in
ee
rs
,
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
sp
ec
ia
li
st
s
T
h
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
(f
ro
m
0
to
1
)
o
f
a
g
iv
en
el
em
en
t
w
it
h
in
th
e
th
re
at
en
ar
ea
T
h
e
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
is
d
ev
el
o
p
ed
o
n
ly
fo
r
o
n
e
ty
p
e
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
(u
n
re
in
fo
rc
ed
m
as
o
n
ry
st
ru
ct
u
re
s)
,
an
d
it
is
ti
m
e-
co
n
su
m
in
g
if
it
is
to
b
e
ap
p
li
ed
to
a
la
rg
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s.
T
h
er
ef
o
re
,
it
is
n
o
t
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e
fo
r
em
er
g
en
cy
p
la
n
n
in
g
an
d
d
is
as
te
r
m
an
ag
em
en
t
o
r
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
m
ap
p
in
g
6
B
ru¨
n
d
l
(2
0
0
9
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
F
lo
o
d
s,
av
al
an
ch
es
,
d
eb
ri
s
fl
o
w
s,
ro
ck
fa
ll
,
la
n
d
sl
id
es
,
ea
rt
h
q
u
ak
es
,
st
o
rm
s,
h
ai
l,
h
ea
t
w
av
es
S
ca
le
:
re
g
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
en
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s,
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
,
p
eo
p
le
,
ag
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
la
n
d
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
N
at
u
ra
l
h
az
ar
d
s
ex
p
er
ts
an
d
d
ec
is
io
n
m
ak
er
s
at
v
ar
io
u
s
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
le
v
el
s
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
sa
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
ex
te
n
t
o
f
d
is
tu
rb
an
ce
/
d
am
ag
e
an
o
b
je
ct
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
s
d
u
e
to
a
sp
ec
ifi
c
p
ro
ce
ss
ac
ti
o
n
N
o
n
-c
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
ap
p
ro
ac
h
,
w
el
l
ad
ap
te
d
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
th
re
sh
o
ld
s
to
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
si
tu
at
io
n
in
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
(e
sp
ec
ia
ll
y
to
sp
at
ia
l
p
la
n
n
in
g
)
b
u
t
tr
an
sf
er
ab
il
it
y
to
o
th
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
o
r
o
th
er
ap
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s
m
ay
b
e
d
if
fi
cu
lt
664 Nat Hazards (2011) 58:645–680
123
192
Articles
T
a
b
le
3
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
A
u
th
o
rs
(y
ea
r)
G
en
er
al
in
fo
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
u
se
d
G
ap
s
an
d
d
if
fi
cu
lt
ie
s
o
f
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
7
B
u¨
ch
el
e
et
al
.
(2
0
0
6
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
F
lo
o
d
s
S
ca
le
:
lo
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
B
ad
en
-W
u¨
rt
te
m
b
er
g
,
G
er
m
an
y
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
en
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
,
re
in
su
ra
n
ce
se
ct
o
r
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
co
n
te
n
ts
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
P
u
b
li
c
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
(c
o
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s)
,
sp
at
ia
l
p
la
n
n
er
s,
h
o
u
se
o
w
n
er
s
an
d
in
su
ra
n
ce
ag
en
ci
es
‘‘
S
ta
g
e-
d
am
ag
e
fu
n
ct
io
n
s
fo
r
in
d
iv
id
u
al
o
b
je
ct
s’
’
V
er
y
si
te
-s
p
ec
ifi
c
ap
p
ro
ac
h
w
it
h
h
ig
h
am
o
u
n
t
o
f
d
at
a
n
ee
d
ed
8
B
U
W
A
L
(1
9
9
9
b
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
D
eb
ri
s
fl
o
w
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
en
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
In
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
,
p
eo
p
le
,
ag
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
la
n
d
,
fa
rm
an
im
al
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
R
eg
io
n
al
an
d
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
ci
v
il
en
g
in
ee
rs
,
in
su
ra
n
ce
co
m
p
an
ie
s
T
h
e
au
th
o
rs
d
o
n
o
t
g
iv
e
an
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
.
T
h
e
d
eg
re
e
(o
r
su
sc
ep
ti
b
il
it
y
)
o
f
lo
ss
(f
ro
m
0
to
1
)
is
p
ar
t
o
f
th
e
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
fo
r
th
e
d
am
ag
e
p
o
te
n
ti
al
T
h
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
is
m
o
re
an
es
ti
m
at
io
n
d
u
e
to
o
n
ly
fe
w
d
et
ai
le
d
ev
en
t
an
al
y
se
s.
T
h
e
d
am
ag
e
fu
n
ct
io
n
is
o
n
ly
g
iv
en
fo
r
th
re
e
in
te
n
si
ty
cl
as
se
s
th
at
le
ad
to
o
v
er
-
an
d
u
n
d
er
es
ti
m
at
io
n
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
9
B
U
W
A
L
(1
9
9
9
b
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
S
n
o
w
av
al
an
ch
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
en
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s,
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
,
p
eo
p
le
,
ag
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
la
n
d
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
R
eg
io
n
al
an
d
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
ci
v
il
en
g
in
ee
rs
,
in
su
ra
n
ce
co
m
p
an
ie
s
T
h
e
au
th
o
rs
d
o
n
o
t
g
iv
e
an
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
.
T
h
e
d
eg
re
e
(o
r
su
sc
ep
ti
b
il
it
y
)
o
f
lo
ss
(f
ro
m
0
to
1
)
is
p
ar
t
o
f
th
e
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
fo
r
th
e
d
am
ag
e
p
o
te
n
ti
al
T
h
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
is
m
o
re
an
es
ti
m
at
io
n
d
u
e
to
o
n
ly
fe
w
d
et
ai
le
d
ev
en
t
an
al
y
si
s.
T
h
e
d
am
ag
e
fu
n
ct
io
n
is
o
n
ly
g
iv
en
fo
r
th
re
e
in
te
n
si
ty
cl
as
se
s
th
at
le
ad
to
o
v
er
-
an
d
u
n
d
er
es
ti
m
at
io
n
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
Nat Hazards (2011) 58:645–680 665
123
193
Articles
T
a
b
le
3
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
A
u
th
o
rs
(y
ea
r)
G
en
er
al
in
fo
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
u
se
d
G
ap
s
an
d
d
if
fi
cu
lt
ie
s
o
f
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
1
0
B
U
W
A
L
(1
9
9
9
b
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
R
o
ck
fa
ll
s
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
en
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s,
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
,
p
eo
p
le
,
ag
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
la
n
d
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
R
eg
io
n
al
an
d
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
ci
v
il
en
g
in
ee
rs
,
in
su
ra
n
ce
co
m
p
an
ie
s
T
h
e
au
th
o
rs
d
o
n
o
t
g
iv
e
an
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
.
T
h
e
d
eg
re
e
(o
r
su
sc
ep
ti
b
il
it
y
)
o
f
lo
ss
(f
ro
m
0
to
1
)
is
p
ar
t
o
f
th
e
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
fo
r
th
e
d
am
ag
e
p
o
te
n
ti
al
T
h
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
is
m
o
re
an
es
ti
m
at
io
n
d
u
e
to
o
n
ly
fe
w
d
et
ai
le
d
ev
en
t
an
al
y
si
s.
T
h
e
d
am
ag
e
fu
n
ct
io
n
is
o
n
ly
g
iv
en
fo
r
th
re
e
in
te
n
si
ty
cl
as
se
s
th
at
le
ad
to
o
v
er
-
an
d
u
n
d
er
es
ti
m
at
io
n
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
1
1
C
ap
p
ab
ia
n
ca
et
al
.
(2
0
0
8
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
S
n
o
w
av
al
an
ch
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
It
al
ia
n
A
lp
s
(T
re
n
to
)
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
p
eo
p
le
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
D
ec
is
io
n
m
ak
er
s
N
o
d
efi
n
it
io
n
is
g
iv
en
.
It
is
st
at
ed
th
at
fo
r
b
u
il
d
in
g
s,
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
ra
ti
o
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
co
st
o
f
re
p
ai
r
an
d
th
e
b
u
il
d
in
g
v
al
u
e
an
d
fo
r
p
eo
p
le
,
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
o
f
b
ei
n
g
k
il
le
d
in
si
d
e
a
b
u
il
d
in
g
F
o
r
b
u
il
d
in
g
s,
th
e
au
th
o
rs
u
se
th
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
e
fr
o
m
W
il
h
el
m
(1
9
9
7
)
o
n
ly
fo
r
o
n
e
ty
p
e
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
(c
o
n
cr
et
e)
.
O
th
er
b
u
il
d
in
g
ty
p
es
an
d
o
th
er
b
u
il
d
in
g
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
ar
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
as
se
ss
m
en
t
1
2
C
ar
d
in
al
i
et
al
.
(2
0
0
2
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
L
an
d
sl
id
es
,
d
eb
ri
s
fl
o
w
,
ro
ck
fa
ll
s
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
U
m
b
ri
a,
It
al
y
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
p
eo
p
le
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
al
it
at
iv
e
(A
,S
,F
)
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
T
o
w
n
o
ffi
ci
al
s,
p
ri
v
at
e
co
n
su
lt
an
ts
in
v
o
lv
ed
in
la
n
d
u
se
an
d
ci
ty
p
la
n
n
in
g
N
o
d
efi
n
it
io
n
is
g
iv
en
.
T
h
ey
su
g
g
es
t
th
at
a
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
as
se
ss
m
en
t
sh
o
u
ld
in
cl
u
d
e
co
n
si
d
er
at
io
n
s
o
f
th
e
ty
p
e
o
f
fa
il
u
re
,
th
e
el
em
en
ts
at
ri
sk
an
d
th
e
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
ab
il
it
y
to
su
rv
iv
e
th
e
ex
p
ec
te
d
la
n
d
sl
id
e
T
h
e
au
th
o
rs
p
ro
p
o
se
d
th
re
e
d
if
fe
re
n
t
ty
p
es
o
f
d
am
ag
e
fo
r
d
if
fe
re
n
t
ty
p
es
o
f
la
n
d
sl
id
es
an
d
m
ag
n
it
u
d
e
b
u
t
th
ey
n
ev
er
q
u
an
ti
fi
ed
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
fo
r
th
e
el
em
en
ts
at
ri
sk
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fo
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
u
se
d
G
ap
s
an
d
d
if
fi
cu
lt
ie
s
o
f
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
1
3
C
o
ro
m
in
as
et
al
.
(2
0
0
5
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
R
o
ck
fa
ll
s
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
A
n
d
o
rr
a
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
p
eo
p
le
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
E
n
g
in
ee
rs
,
o
w
n
er
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s,
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
o
f
an
el
em
en
t
at
ri
sk
A
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
sc
o
re
is
as
si
g
n
ed
to
th
e
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
th
e
v
o
lu
m
e
o
f
th
e
im
p
ac
t
b
lo
ck
.
T
h
e
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
o
f
th
e
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
ar
e
n
o
t
ta
k
en
in
to
co
n
si
d
er
at
io
n
1
4
D
e
L
o
tt
o
an
d
T
es
ta
(2
0
0
0
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
F
lo
o
d
s
S
ca
le
:
re
g
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
A
lp
in
e
v
al
le
y
in
It
al
y
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
P
la
n
n
er
s,
em
er
g
en
cy
m
an
ag
er
s
an
d
en
g
in
ee
rs
‘‘
A
fu
n
ct
io
n
th
at
re
la
te
s
th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
th
e
v
al
u
e
o
f
a
p
ro
p
er
ty
th
at
co
u
ld
b
e
lo
st
w
it
h
th
e
in
te
n
si
ty
o
f
th
e
ev
en
t’
’
O
n
ly
th
e
h
ig
h
es
t
ex
p
ec
te
d
d
am
ag
e
v
al
u
e
o
f
d
ep
th
an
d
v
el
o
ci
ty
w
as
u
se
d
an
d
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
w
er
e
n
eg
le
ct
ed
1
5
D
u
tt
a
et
al
.
(2
0
0
3
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
F
lo
o
d
s
S
ca
le
:
lo
ca
l
an
d
re
g
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
Ic
h
in
o
m
iy
a
ri
v
er
b
as
in
,
Ja
p
an
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s,
co
n
te
n
ts
,
cr
o
p
s
an
d
in
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
In
su
ra
n
ce
ag
en
ci
es
,
en
g
in
ee
rs
,
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
an
d
em
er
g
en
cy
m
an
ag
er
s
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
as
te
rm
n
o
t
m
en
ti
o
n
ed
O
n
ly
st
ag
e-
d
am
ag
e
cu
rv
es
ar
e
u
se
d
,
o
th
er
p
ar
am
et
er
s
n
eg
le
ct
ed
.
H
ig
h
er
ro
rs
in
u
rb
an
is
ed
ar
ea
s
h
in
d
er
th
e
ap
p
li
ca
b
il
it
y
fo
r
th
e
re
al
w
o
rl
d
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V
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it
y
d
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n
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n
u
se
d
G
ap
s
an
d
d
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cu
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ie
s
o
f
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
1
6
F
E
M
A
(2
0
0
7
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
F
lo
o
d
s
S
ca
le
:
lo
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
U
S
A
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
h
az
ar
d
s
ri
sk
m
an
ag
em
en
t
F
o
cu
s:
b
u
il
d
in
g
s,
co
n
te
n
ts
,
es
se
n
ti
al
/h
ig
h
lo
ss
fa
ci
li
ty
,
li
fe
li
n
es
,
v
eh
ic
le
s,
H
u
m
an
ca
su
al
ti
es
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
F
ed
er
al
,
st
at
e,
re
g
io
n
al
an
d
lo
ca
l
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
ts
,
p
ri
v
at
e
en
te
rp
ri
se
s,
em
er
g
en
cy
p
re
p
ar
ed
n
es
s,
re
sp
o
n
se
an
d
re
co
v
er
y
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
T
h
e
te
rm
is
n
o
t
ex
p
li
ci
tl
y
d
efi
n
ed
b
u
t
d
ea
lt
w
it
h
as
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
a
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r
el
em
en
t
at
ri
sk
w
il
l
su
ff
er
d
u
e
to
a
ce
rt
ai
n
im
p
ac
t
o
f
a
h
az
ar
d
o
u
s
p
ro
ce
ss
T
h
e
m
et
h
o
d
is
m
ai
n
ly
b
as
ed
o
n
fl
o
w
d
ep
th
,
fl
o
w
v
el
o
ci
ty
is
o
n
ly
ta
k
en
in
to
ac
co
u
n
t
w
it
h
a
th
re
sh
o
ld
fo
r
b
u
il
d
in
g
co
ll
ap
se
1
7
F
u
ch
s
et
al
.
(2
0
0
7
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
D
eb
ri
s
fl
o
w
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
A
u
st
ri
an
A
lp
s
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
L
o
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
em
er
g
en
cy
p
la
n
n
er
s,
b
u
il
d
in
g
o
w
n
er
s
T
h
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
w
as
m
ea
su
re
d
u
si
n
g
an
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
ap
p
ro
ac
h
.
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
w
as
d
er
iv
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
q
u
o
ti
en
t
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
lo
ss
an
d
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
al
re
in
st
at
em
en
t
v
al
u
e
fo
r
ea
ch
el
em
en
t
at
ri
sk
in
th
e
te
st
si
te
T
h
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
as
se
ss
m
en
t
m
et
h
o
d
is
d
es
ig
n
ed
o
n
ly
fo
r
o
n
e
k
in
d
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
w
h
ic
h
is
co
m
m
o
n
in
al
p
in
e
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
b
u
t
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
an
d
th
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
e
co
u
ld
n
o
t
b
e
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
to
ar
ea
s
w
it
h
d
if
fe
re
n
t
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
1
8
G
al
li
an
d
G
u
zz
et
ti
(2
0
0
7
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
L
an
d
sl
id
es
S
ca
le
:
R
eg
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
U
m
b
ri
a,
It
al
y
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
d
is
as
te
r
m
an
ag
em
en
t
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
ro
ad
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
L
o
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
em
er
g
en
cy
se
rv
ic
es
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
o
f
to
ta
l
lo
ss
to
a
sp
ec
ifi
c
el
em
en
t
g
iv
en
th
e
o
cc
u
rr
en
ce
o
f
th
e
la
n
d
sl
id
e
T
h
e
re
su
lt
in
g
m
ap
is
n
o
t
ea
sy
to
re
ad
an
d
to
u
se
fo
r
p
la
n
n
in
g
d
u
e
to
th
e
sc
al
e
(r
eg
io
n
al
)
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V
u
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il
it
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
u
se
d
G
ap
s
an
d
d
if
fi
cu
lt
ie
s
o
f
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
1
9
G
ru¨
n
th
al
et
al
.
(2
0
0
6
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
F
lo
o
d
s,
st
o
rm
s,
ea
rt
h
q
u
ak
es
S
ca
le
:
re
g
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
C
o
lo
g
n
e,
G
er
m
an
y
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
en
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
,
re
in
su
ra
n
ce
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
co
n
te
n
ts
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
D
is
as
te
r
m
an
ag
er
s,
u
rb
an
p
la
n
n
er
s,
in
su
re
rs
,
re
g
io
n
al
an
d
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
et
c.
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
‘‘
ev
al
u
at
io
n
h
o
w
ex
p
o
se
d
as
se
ts
w
il
l
su
ff
er
b
y
v
ar
io
u
s
h
az
ar
d
ev
en
ts
’’
O
n
ly
in
u
n
d
at
io
n
d
ep
th
is
ta
k
en
in
to
ac
co
u
n
t.
F
o
r
co
n
cr
et
e
p
la
n
n
in
g
d
ec
is
io
n
s
an
d
em
er
g
en
cy
st
ra
te
g
ie
s
st
il
l
m
o
re
d
et
ai
le
d
an
al
y
se
s
m
ig
h
t
b
e
n
ee
d
ed
2
0
H
o
o
ij
er
et
al
.
(2
0
0
1
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
F
lo
o
d
s
S
ca
le
:
re
g
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
H
ai
R
iv
er
B
as
in
,
C
h
in
a
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l/
in
d
u
st
ri
al
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
,
in
d
u
st
ri
al
fi
x
ed
as
se
ts
,
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
an
d
p
eo
p
le
.
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
D
ec
is
io
n
m
ak
er
s
fo
r
p
la
n
n
in
g
o
f
m
it
ig
at
io
n
m
ea
su
re
s
In
st
ea
d
o
f
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
th
e
te
rm
‘‘
lo
ss
ra
te
’’
is
u
se
d
w
h
ic
h
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
th
e
‘‘
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
to
ta
l
p
o
te
n
ti
al
d
am
ag
e
an
d
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
in
h
ab
it
an
ts
’’
N
o
n
-c
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
ap
p
ro
ac
h
,
o
n
ly
co
n
si
d
er
in
g
fl
o
o
d
d
ep
th
.
T
h
e
d
at
a
av
ai
la
b
il
it
y
w
as
to
o
lo
w
fo
r
th
e
p
ro
p
o
se
d
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
an
d
th
u
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
ar
e
n
o
t
su
ffi
ci
en
t
fo
r
fl
o
o
d
m
an
ag
em
en
t
co
st
-b
en
efi
t
an
al
y
se
s
2
1
Jo
n
as
so
n
et
al
.
(1
9
9
9
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
S
n
o
w
av
al
an
ch
es
S
ca
le
:
lo
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
Ic
el
an
d
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
F
o
cu
s:
p
eo
p
le
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
E
m
er
g
en
cy
se
rv
ic
es
T
h
e
te
rm
‘‘
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
’’
is
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
th
is
st
u
d
y
;
h
o
w
ev
er
,
th
e
su
rv
iv
al
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
(w
h
ic
h
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
in
th
is
st
u
d
y
)
co
u
ld
b
e
u
se
d
as
a
co
m
p
o
n
en
t
o
f
a
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
as
se
ss
m
en
t
to
sn
o
w
av
al
an
ch
es
T
h
e
m
et
h
o
d
co
n
ce
rn
s
o
n
ly
Ic
el
an
d
ic
ty
p
e
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
it
ca
n
n
o
t
b
e
tr
an
sf
er
re
d
el
se
w
h
er
e
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e
m
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h
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2
2
K
an
g
et
al
.
(2
0
0
5
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
F
lo
o
d
s
S
ca
le
:
lo
ca
l
an
d
re
g
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
T
ai
p
ei
,
T
ai
w
an
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
en
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
R
is
k
m
an
ag
er
s
an
d
en
g
in
ee
rs
T
h
e
te
rm
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
n
o
t
u
se
d
in
th
is
ar
ti
cl
e.
F
o
cu
s
is
p
u
t
o
n
th
e
d
am
ag
e.
S
ta
g
e-
d
am
ag
e
cu
rv
es
es
ta
b
li
sh
th
e
li
n
k
b
et
w
ee
n
fl
o
o
d
d
ep
th
an
d
to
ta
l
d
am
ag
e
O
n
ly
fl
o
w
d
ep
th
is
co
n
si
d
er
ed
.
A
b
so
lu
te
d
am
ag
e
w
as
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
,
h
in
d
er
in
g
tr
an
sf
er
ab
il
it
y
to
o
th
er
lo
ca
ti
o
n
s
an
d
u
sa
b
il
it
y
in
th
e
fu
tu
re
d
u
e
to
in
fl
at
io
n
,
et
c.
2
3
K
ay
n
ia
et
al
.
(2
0
0
8
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
L
an
d
sl
id
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
G
er
m
an
y
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
s,
en
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
p
eo
p
le
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
E
m
er
g
en
cy
p
la
n
n
er
s,
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
d
efi
n
ed
in
te
rm
s
o
f
b
o
th
th
e
la
n
d
sl
id
e
in
te
n
si
ty
an
d
o
f
th
e
su
sc
ep
ti
b
il
it
y
o
f
th
e
el
em
en
ts
at
ri
sk
.
V
=
I
9
S
T
h
e
m
et
h
o
d
is
to
o
so
p
h
is
ti
ca
te
d
an
d
th
e
d
at
a
d
if
fi
cu
lt
to
co
ll
ec
t
es
p
ec
ia
ll
y
fo
r
la
rg
er
ar
ea
s
2
4
K
ei
le
r
et
al
.
(2
0
0
6
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
S
n
o
w
av
al
an
ch
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
A
u
st
ri
a
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
A
st
u
d
y
ta
rg
et
au
d
ie
n
ce
is
n
o
t
id
en
ti
fi
ed
in
th
e
st
u
d
y
.
H
o
w
ev
er
,
th
e
re
su
lt
s
co
u
ld
b
e
u
se
d
b
y
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
p
la
n
n
er
s,
em
er
g
en
cy
se
rv
ic
es
an
d
in
su
ra
n
ce
co
m
p
an
ie
s
‘‘
T
h
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
o
f
th
e
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
is
u
n
d
er
st
o
o
d
as
a
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
to
a
g
iv
en
el
em
en
t
w
it
h
in
th
e
ar
ea
af
fe
ct
ed
b
y
n
at
u
ra
l
h
az
ar
d
s.
A
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
fu
n
ct
io
n
fo
r
d
if
fe
re
n
t
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
ty
p
es
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
th
at
d
ep
en
d
s
o
n
av
al
an
ch
e
p
re
ss
u
re
w
as
u
se
d
to
as
se
ss
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
’’
T
h
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
to
av
al
an
ch
e
im
p
ac
t
p
re
ss
u
re
h
as
to
b
e
fu
rt
h
er
in
v
es
ti
g
at
ed
si
n
ce
th
e
p
re
se
n
t
st
u
d
y
ta
k
es
in
to
co
n
si
d
er
at
io
n
a
m
et
h
o
d
(W
il
h
el
m
1
9
9
7
),
w
h
ic
h
co
u
ld
o
n
ly
se
rv
e
as
a
ro
u
g
h
es
ti
m
at
io
n
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V
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it
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
u
se
d
G
ap
s
an
d
d
if
fi
cu
lt
ie
s
o
f
th
e
m
et
h
o
d
2
5
K
ey
lo
ck
an
d
B
ar
b
o
li
n
i
(2
0
0
1
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
S
n
o
w
av
al
an
ch
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
Ic
el
an
d
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
A
v
al
an
ch
e
ex
p
er
ts
,
en
g
in
ee
rs
,
p
la
n
n
er
s,
d
ec
is
io
n
m
ak
er
s
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
lo
ss
,
an
d
it
is
ex
p
re
ss
ed
o
n
a
sc
al
e
o
f
0
(n
o
lo
ss
)
to
1
(t
o
ta
l
lo
ss
).
F
o
r
p
ro
p
er
ty
,
th
e
lo
ss
w
il
l
b
e
th
e
v
al
u
e
o
f
th
e
p
ro
p
er
ty
an
d
fo
r
p
er
so
n
s
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
th
at
a
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r
li
fe
co
u
ld
b
e
lo
st
V
er
y
si
m
p
le
re
la
ti
o
n
fo
r
th
e
es
ti
m
at
io
n
o
f
th
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
(d
er
iv
ed
fr
o
m
o
n
e
ev
en
t)
.
D
if
fe
re
n
t
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
ty
p
es
ar
e
n
o
t
re
g
ar
d
ed
2
6
L
eo
n
e
et
al
.
(1
9
9
6
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
L
an
d
sl
id
es
S
ca
le
:
R
eg
io
n
al
/l
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
-
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
s
F
o
cu
s:
M
u
lt
i-
d
im
en
si
o
n
al
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
E
n
d
-u
se
rs
ar
e
n
o
t
d
efi
n
ed
b
u
t
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
an
d
em
er
g
en
cy
p
la
n
n
er
s
co
u
ld
u
se
th
e
o
u
tc
o
m
es
o
f
th
is
st
u
d
y
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
th
e
le
v
el
o
f
p
o
te
n
ti
al
d
am
ag
e
(0
–
1
)
to
a
g
iv
en
ex
p
o
se
d
el
em
en
t
w
h
ic
h
is
su
b
je
ct
to
a
p
o
ss
ib
le
o
r
re
al
p
h
en
o
m
en
o
n
o
f
a
g
iv
en
in
te
n
si
ty
T
h
e
p
o
te
n
ti
al
d
am
ag
e
le
v
el
fo
r
d
if
fe
re
n
t
el
em
en
ts
at
ri
sk
is
g
iv
en
in
a
ta
b
le
w
it
h
o
u
t
b
ei
n
g
ex
p
la
in
ed
o
r
co
n
n
ec
te
d
w
it
h
d
if
fe
re
n
t
p
ro
ce
ss
in
te
n
si
ti
es
2
7
L
iu
an
d
L
ei
(2
0
0
3
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
D
eb
ri
s
fl
o
w
S
ca
le
:
R
eg
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
C
h
in
a
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
D
is
as
te
r
m
an
ag
em
en
t
F
o
cu
s:
M
u
lt
i-
d
im
en
si
o
n
al
p
h
y
si
ca
l,
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
,
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
N
O
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
R
eg
io
n
al
o
r
ce
n
tr
al
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
th
e
p
o
te
n
ti
al
to
ta
l
m
ax
im
u
m
lo
ss
d
u
e
to
a
p
o
te
n
ti
al
d
am
ag
in
g
p
h
en
o
m
en
o
n
fo
r
a
sp
ec
ifi
c
ar
ea
an
d
fo
r
a
re
fe
re
n
ce
p
er
io
d
T
h
e
ap
p
ro
ac
h
ca
n
b
e
u
se
d
fo
r
fu
n
d
in
g
al
lo
ca
ti
o
n
b
u
t
d
u
e
to
it
s
re
g
io
n
al
sc
al
e
an
d
th
e
d
if
fi
cu
lt
y
o
f
th
e
d
at
a
to
b
e
co
ll
ec
te
d
o
n
a
lo
ca
l
sc
al
e,
ca
n
n
o
t
b
e
u
se
d
in
a
lo
ca
l
sc
al
e
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G
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s
an
d
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o
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e
m
et
h
o
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2
8
M
ac
q
u
ar
ie
et
al
.
(2
0
0
4
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
L
an
d
sl
id
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
B
ar
ce
lo
n
et
te
,
S
o
u
th
ea
st
F
ra
n
ce
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
S
ci
en
ce
s
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
p
eo
p
le
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
al
it
at
iv
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
N
O
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
L
o
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
A
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
d
efi
n
it
io
n
is
n
o
t
g
iv
en
.
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
co
n
si
d
er
ed
to
b
e
re
la
te
d
w
it
h
th
e
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
ex
p
o
se
d
el
em
en
t
an
d
th
e
la
n
d
sl
id
e
p
h
en
o
m
en
o
n
T
h
e
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
h
as
n
o
t
b
ee
n
v
al
id
at
ed
,
an
d
it
h
as
b
ee
n
o
n
ly
b
ee
n
te
st
ed
o
n
a
sp
ec
ifi
c
b
u
il
t-
u
p
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t
(s
k
i
re
so
rt
)
2
9
M
av
ro
u
li
an
d
C
o
ro
m
in
as
(2
0
0
8
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
R
o
ck
fa
ll
s
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
A
n
d
o
rr
a
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
B
u
il
d
in
g
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
E
n
g
in
ee
rs
,
b
u
il
d
in
g
o
w
n
er
s
N
o
d
efi
n
it
io
n
fo
r
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
g
iv
en
,
it
is
h
o
w
ev
er
co
n
si
d
er
ed
to
b
e
th
e
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l
d
am
ag
e
o
f
th
e
b
u
il
d
in
g
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
a
ro
ck
fa
ll
T
h
e
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
is
d
es
ig
n
ed
fo
r
in
d
iv
id
u
al
b
u
il
d
in
g
s,
it
is
h
o
w
ev
er
d
if
fi
cu
lt
to
b
e
ap
p
li
ed
o
n
a
la
rg
er
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
3
0
M
ej
ia
-N
av
ar
ro
et
al
.
(1
9
9
4
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
S
u
b
si
d
en
ce
,
ro
ck
fa
ll
s,
d
eb
ri
s
fl
o
w
s
an
d
fl
o
o
d
s
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
C
o
lo
ra
d
o
,
U
S
A
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
E
ar
th
S
ci
en
ce
F
o
cu
s:
E
co
sy
st
em
,
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
an
d
so
ci
al
st
ru
ct
u
re
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
U
rb
an
p
la
n
n
er
s,
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
th
e
in
tr
in
si
c
p
re
d
is
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
an
y
el
em
en
t
to
b
e
at
ri
sk
o
f
a
m
en
ta
l
o
r
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
lo
ss
u
p
o
n
th
e
o
cc
u
rr
en
ce
o
f
a
h
az
ar
d
o
u
s
ev
en
t
o
f
in
te
n
si
ty
i
In
th
e
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
th
e
co
n
d
it
io
n
o
r
th
e
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
ty
p
e
o
f
b
u
il
d
in
g
is
n
o
t
ta
k
en
in
to
co
n
si
d
er
at
io
n
.
N
o
fi
n
al
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
m
ap
is
p
ro
v
id
ed
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3
1
M
ey
er
et
al
.
(2
0
0
9
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
F
lo
o
d
s
S
ca
le
:
re
g
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
R
iv
er
M
u
ld
e,
G
er
m
an
y
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
en
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
F
o
cu
s:
E
co
n
o
m
ic
al
,
ec
o
lo
g
ic
al
an
d
so
ci
al
ri
sk
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
al
it
at
iv
e
&
q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
Y
E
S
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
L
o
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
an
d
en
g
in
ee
rs
D
am
ag
ed
sh
ar
e
o
f
th
e
to
ta
l
v
al
u
e
o
f
th
e
as
se
ts
,
d
ep
en
d
in
g
o
n
in
u
n
d
at
io
n
d
ep
th
T
h
e
re
su
lt
s
ar
e
v
er
y
d
ep
en
d
an
t
o
n
th
e
cr
it
er
ia
ch
o
se
n
an
d
th
e
w
ei
g
h
ts
g
iv
en
to
th
e
d
if
fe
re
n
t
cr
it
er
ia
3
2
M
ic
h
ae
l-
L
ei
b
a
et
al
.
(2
0
0
3
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
D
eb
ri
s
fl
o
w
S
ca
le
:
R
eg
io
n
al
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
C
ai
rn
s,
A
u
st
ra
li
a
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
,
d
is
as
te
r
m
an
ag
em
en
t
F
o
cu
s:
P
eo
p
le
,
b
u
il
d
in
g
s
an
d
ro
ad
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
as
se
ss
m
en
t:
Q
u
an
ti
ta
ti
v
e
H
az
ar
d
d
ep
en
d
an
t:
Y
E
S
(t
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r)
V
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
E
m
er
g
en
cy
p
la
n
n
er
s,
lo
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
T
h
e
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
co
n
si
d
er
ed
th
e
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
o
f
d
ea
th
o
r
d
es
tr
u
ct
io
n
g
iv
en
th
at
a
la
n
d
sl
id
e
h
it
th
e
re
si
d
en
ce
o
r
ro
ad
T
h
e
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
as
su
m
es
th
at
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
is
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
o
f
la
n
d
sl
id
e
m
ag
n
it
u
d
e
3
3
P
ap
at
h
o
m
a-
K
o¨
h
le
et
al
.
(2
0
0
7
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
d
is
as
te
r:
L
an
d
sl
id
es
S
ca
le
:
L
o
ca
l
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
:
G
er
m
an
y
R
es
ea
rc
h
d
o
m
ai
n
:
N
at
u
ra
l
sc
ie
n
ce
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v
il
p
ro
te
ct
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F
o
cu
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B
u
il
d
in
g
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y
p
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f
as
se
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m
en
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Q
u
an
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v
e
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az
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en
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N
O
V
u
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er
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il
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y
cu
rv
es
:
N
O
P
o
ss
ib
le
en
d
-u
se
rs
:
L
o
ca
l
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
,
p
u
b
li
c,
ci
v
il
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Abstract. Debris flows are among the most dangerous
processes in mountainous areas due to their rapid rate
of movement and long runout zone. Sudden and rather
unexpected impacts produce not only damages to buildings
and infrastructure but also threaten human lives. Medium- to
regional-scale susceptibility analyses allow the identification
of the most endangered areas and suggest where further
detailed studies have to be carried out. Since data availability
for larger regions is mostly the key limiting factor, empirical
models with low data requirements are suitable for first
overviews. In this study a susceptibility analysis was carried
out for the Barcelonnette Basin, situated in the southern
French Alps. By means of a methodology based on empirical
rules for source identification and the empirical angle of
reach concept for the 2-D runout computation, a worst-case
scenario was first modelled. In a second step, scenarios for
high, medium and low frequency events were developed.
A comparison with the footprints of a few mapped events
indicates reasonable results but suggests a high dependency
on the quality of the digital elevation model. This fact
emphasises the need for a careful interpretation of the results
while remaining conscious of the inherent assumptions of the
model used and quality of the input data.
1 Introduction
“Debris flows are churning, water-saturated masses of fine
sediment, rocks and assorted detritus that originate on
mountain slopes and course down-stream channels when
they reach valley floors” (Iverson and Denlinger, 2001,
Correspondence to: M. S. Kappes
(melanie.kappes@univie.ac.at)
p. 1). They flow “as a single-phase system” and “look
like mudslides and landslides except that their velocity
and the distances they travel are much larger” (Ancey,
2001, p. 529). According to the origin of the material,
debris flows can be classified into slope and gully debris
flows (Glade, 2005). Their velocity, the frequently long
distances between the source area and the deposition zone
and the often apparent insignificance of the source volume,
which increases manifold during the runout, make them
one of the most dangerous natural hazards occurring in
the mountainous environment. They affect not only built-
up areas and infrastructure but also threat human lives
(Hofmeister et al., 2002). For the management and reduction
of risk posed by debris flows, analyses identifying the areas
at hazard by debris flows and describing the threat play an
important role. According to the purpose of the analyses,
the extent of the studied area and the data availability, the
analysis scale is chosen (Aleotti and Chowdhury, 1999):
regional, medium or local (single slope). Medium-scale
analyses, which include according to van Westen et al. (2006)
the range between 1:10 000 and 1:50 000, provide an initial
overview of a certain area identifying all potentially unstable
areas as far as possible and the down-slope regions probably
affected by the flow. Usually they are not used as the basis for
final decisions but rather serve, as in the case of Hofmeister
and Miller (2003), as initial screens for potential impacts and
they offer an indication where further local studies should
be carried out. Debris-flow analyses are often split into
two steps, (a) the identification of potential sources and
(b) the estimation of the runout. For both steps a variety of
methods is available:
(a) Heuristically potential sources can be identified as in
Benda and Cundy (1990) or Chau and Lo (2004)
in the field and on aerial photographs. Statistical
Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.
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methods linking a variety of environmental factors
contributing to possible instabilities to an inventory of
past events are very well-established for the source
identification at smaller scales (van Westen et al.,
2006). The models are either based on bivariate (Guinau
et al., 2007; Blahut et al., 2010; Melelli and Taramelli,
2004) or multivariate statistics (Carrara et al., 2008).
Horton et al. (2008) use a methodology for the source
identification based on empirical rules. By means of
a combination of environmental parameters chosen on
the basis of experience, primarily slope angle, upslope
area and planar curvature, the debris-flow susceptibility
is computed. For physically-based source identification
a common option is to couple hydraulic models with the
calculation of the safety factor (Delmonaco et al., 2003;
Carrara et al., 2008).
(b) While for the source identification statistical models
play a dominant role, empirical relationships and for-
mulae are well-established for the runout computation:
the Fahrbo¨schung (Heim, 1932) translated to angle of
reach (Corominas, 1996) describes the angle between
the horizontal and a line connecting the most distal point
of deposition with the upper limit of the source area,
along the path. This concept enables the estimation
of the maximum runout distance if the source area is
known. In many cases the angle of reach is expressed
as a function of the debris-flow volume (Hu¨rlimann
et al., 2008) as in the formulas proposed by Corominas
(1996) and Rickenmann (1999). Prochaska et al. (2008)
developed the average channel slope model predicting
the runout angle, which is the angle between the
horizontal and a line between the vertical midpoint
of the elevation difference between source area and
fan apex and the most distal deposition. Rickenmann
(1999) presents a formula predicting the runout distance
on the fan as a function of the debris-flow volume.
Several other studies associate the volume with the
deposition area of the flow as Iverson et al. (1998) or
Scheidl and Rickenmann (2010). So far, only a few
physically-based runout models have been applied on a
medium-scale due to calibration difficulties. Chau and
Lo (2004) adjusted a physically-based runout model to
one recorded event including friction and erosion and
computed the potential runout of several unstable areas
on the basis of this adjustment.
While deterministic approaches are very well transferable
to basically any site since they consider the physical
characteristics of the process, they are characterised by
rather high data requirements for the calibration. Statistical
models are based on extensive inventories of past events
and are, apart from the reliance on good records, only
transferable to a very limited extent. This is a consequence
of frequent inclusion of indirect parameters as elevation,
aspect etc. since these parameters cause very different effects
in distinct areas. Empirical models offer an alternative
in the case of general low data availability. Empirical
models in this study are understood as general rules and
relations which are established once on the basis of large
datasets and are afterwards usable without the high data
needs for calibration deterministic models have. An example
is the concept of Fahrbo¨schung according to (Heim, 1932),
for more detail refer to the description at the end of the
Sect. 3.1. In contrast to statistical models, empirical rules
and relations are not based on indirect parameters but
on parameters directly linked to physical characteristics.
Due to the degree of generalisation from the data on
which empirical models were created, they are rather well
transferable. If quite similar environmental conditions can be
assumed, even calibration parameters can be transferred to a
certain extent. A first overview over a relatively unknown
area can thus be conducted without many records of past
events and detailed environmental information for the model
calibration. The simplicity of empirical models is their major
advantage and disadvantage, since specific characteristics
in single cases cannot be accounted for (Hu¨rlimann et al.,
2008). For a debris-flow susceptibility analysis of the
Barcelonnette Basin, located in the southern French Alps,
an empirical methodology after Horton et al. (2008) was
used.
The Barcelonnette Basin is prone to debris-flows. One of
the recent damaging events was the debris flow in the Faucon
torrent in 2003 which affected six houses as well as the main
road crossing the valley (R.D. 900) and led to its closure
for several hours (Remaıˆtre, 2006; Remaıˆtre and Malet,
2010). Even though information on a number of events may
exist, records indicating source areas are missing and impede
the calibration of a statistical model. Likewise, in-depth
information on environmental parameters, indispensible for
the calibration of regional deterministic models, is missing
and leads to the selection of an empirical model. The
methodology applied in this study, consists of empirical
rules for source identification and empirical relations for
the modelling of the runout on a medium to regional scale.
Runout refers in this article to the complete 2-D pathway
of the debris flow from source to deposition area. An
analysis aiming at a preliminary worst-case1 debris-flow
susceptibility identification was carried out. In a further step
the applicability of the methodology for scenario analyses
was also investigated, estimating areas of high, medium
and low susceptibility. Both analysis-types, worst-case and
qualitative scenarios, were evaluated qualitatively on the
basis of a set of recorded events.
1Worst-case scenario refers to a very low-frequency and rather
high-magnitude event.
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Fig. 1. Hillshade of the Barcelonnette Basin (Southern French Alps) with the location of the most important human settlements and the
Ubaye River.
2 The Barcelonnette Basin
The Barcelonnette Basin is located in the dry intra-Alpine
zone and extends from 1100 to 3000 m a.s.l. (Fig. 1). It
is characterised by (1) a mountain climate with a marked
inter-annual rainfall variability (735 ± 400 mm over the
period 1928–2004) and 130 days of freezing per year,
(2) a continental influence with significant daily thermal
amplitudes (> 20◦) and numerous freeze-thaw cycles and
(3) a Mediterranean influence with summer rainstorms
yielding more than 50 mm h−1 on occasion (Maquaire et al.,
2003; Flageollet et al., 1999). Heavy spring rains on
melting thick snow layers also lead to high discharges
(Flageollet et al., 1999). Meso-climatic differences on a
small scale emerge due to the east-west orientation of the
valley (Remaıˆtre, 2006).
The valley is drained by the Ubaye River which is fed
by several torrents on the north- and south-facing slopes. It
constitutes a geological window, baring the autochthonous
Callovo-Oxfordian black marls, also called ’Terres Noires’,
under the allochthonous Autapie and Parpaillon flysch
(Maquaire et al., 2003). Local slopes are characterised by
a specific morphology due to the geological setting:
(a) In the upper part (1900–3000 m a.s.l.), slopes are
steeper than 45◦ and consist of thrust sheets of
cataclastic calcareous sandstones. These slopes are
often covered by non-consolidated debris varying in
thickness between 0.5 and 5 m. Several debris tracks
are affecting these slopes.
(b) The gentle slopes (10–30◦) of the lower part (1100–
1900 m a.s.l.) consist of Callovo-Oxfordian black marls,
mainly composed of fragile plates and flakes packed
in a clayey matrix. Slopes are covered by various
Quaternary deposits: thick talus slopes of poorly sorted
debris, moraine deposits and landslide debris. The
high erosion susceptibility of the black marls promotes
badland formation.
This geological, structural and climatological setting gives
rise to mass movements (Flageollet et al., 1999), active
torrential streams and debris tracks (Remaıˆtre et al., 2005,
2008; Remaıˆtre and Malet, 2010). Moreover, the region
suffered nearly complete deforestation during the 18th
and 19th centuries, which increased the torrent activity.
Reforestation and construction of check-dams was initiated
in 1864 and since then, forest cover has been rising
(Remaıˆtre and Malet, 2010). The collection of historical
data in catalogues, newspapers, monographs, technical
reports, bulletins and scientific papers for the period between
1850 and 2004 provides evidence of 561 torrential events.
The type and quality of information collected, and the
methodologies used to analyse the data are detailed in
Flageollet et al. (1999) and Remaıˆtre (2006). The analysis
indicates a dominance of flash floods with 461 recorded
events while only 100 debris-flows (slope and gully) have
been registered. The spatial distribution of historical debris-
flows shows that they have occurred mainly in the torrents
located on the south-facing slope of the Barcelonnette Basin.
Indeed, about 75% of the debris-flow events were recorded
in four torrents: Riou-Bourdoux, Sanie`res, Faucon and
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Bourget. This has to be ascribed (1) to the location of springs
in the transition between the permeable, coarse material of
the Autapie thrust sheet and the Callovo-Oxfordian black
marls below, (2) to the higher slope angle and (3) to the
thicker morainic coverage on the south-facing slopes which
gives rise to a higher material availability.
Further possible sources for debris flows are the three
big mudslides of La Valette, Super-Sauze and Poche which
have developed in the black marls. Having already produced
several mudflows and debris-flow events in recent years, they
pose a serious menace due to their high sediment volumes
and mobility (Malet et al., 2004).
3 Method
3.1 The debris-flow modelling
The debris-flow modelling was carried out in two steps:
(1) the identification of potential source areas and (2) the
calculation of the runout. According to Takahashi (1981)
and Rickenmann and Zimmermann (1993) the critical factors
for debris-flow occurrence are sediment availability, water
input and slope gradient. While sediment availability
and slope gradient refer to the general disposition, the
water input from precipitation and snow melt acts as a
triggering factor. To represent these factors by area-
wide available data the following inputs were chosen: the
sediment availability is linked to the lithology since the
debris production depends on the material characteristics
and furthermore the slope shape influences the accumulation
of material – the parameters lithology and planar curvature
were included. The water input is strongly related to the
upslope area in which precipitation and water from melting
snow accumulate and so the parameter flow accumulation
was implemented. The third factor, the slope gradient, is
critical due to its influence on the shear strength of the soil
and debris, respectively. Therefore, the parameter slope
angle was integrated. Furthermore the land use/cover was
considered since according to Ancey (2001) “[v]egetation
reduces the initiation potential to a certain extent”. Thus,
the parameter land use/cover was incorporated. Each input
parameter is entered as a raster into the modelling procedure.
User-defined thresholds classify the pixels of the continuous
data (e.g. slope, flow accumulation and planar curvature) as
favourable for mobilisation (the pixels are marked included
which indicates them as possible source) or inhibiting (the
pixels are excluded from being a possible source) debris flow
initiation. In the case of slope angle and upslope area a
combined approach is applied as for example proposed in
Rickenmann and Zimmermann (1993) or Heinimann et al.
(1998): below a certain upslope area size threshold the
slope angle is a function of the upslope area size and above
the threshold the angle is constant (Fig. 2). Horton et al.
(2008) propose two curves, the rare and the extreme fitting
(Fig. 2). For upslope areas bigger than 2.5 km2 both curves
Fig. 2. Extreme and rare slope thresholds for debris-flow
triggering with regard to the upslope area after Horton et al.
(2008), considering Heinimann et al. (1998) and Rickenmann and
Zimmermann (1993).
set the slope threshold at 15◦ (Takahashi, 1981) while smaller
catchments are only considered as possible sources if the
slope angle lies above the threshold function. The two
equations are the following (Horton et al., 2008):
Rare events{
tanβlim= 0.32 ·S−0.2UA if SUA < 2.5 km2
tanβlim= 0.26 if SUA≥ 2.5 km2 (1)
Extreme events{
tanβlim= 0.31 ·S−0.15UA if SUA < 2.5 km2
tanβlim= 0.26 if SUA≥ 2.5 km2 (2)
with the slope gradient βlim and the surface of the upslope
contributing area SUA. For the classified datasets land
use/cover and lithology those classes prone to debris flows
are designated as included as e.g. moranic deposits or
excluded as possible source, such as built-up areas. Finally
all classified spatial input parameters are combined and
pixels being at least once determined as possible debris-
flow source (included) and never excluded are assigned as
sources.
In a second step the probabilitistic runout is calculated,
starting from the previously determined sources and using
two types of functions: flow direction and runout distance
algorithms. It is a probabilistic propagation as it aims to
incorporate every possible path with a notion of probability.
Thus, it does not intend to process the spreading of a unique
event, but to include all possible events. The flow direction
algorithm defines the propagation of the flow from one cell
to the surrounding neighbours starting with a source cell
(Horton et al., 2008). A variety of algorithms is available:
the D8 and D∞ algorithm of O’Callaghan and Mark (1984)
and Tarboton (1997), respectively, which are restricted to
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 11, 627–641, 2011 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/11/627/2011/
214
Articles
M. S. Kappes et al.: Assessment of debris-flow susceptibility at medium-scale 631
one flow direction following the steepest downward slope.
The multiple flow direction method (Quinn et al., 1991)
and its modification (Holmgren, 1994) which spread the
flow on a percentage basis over several neighbouring down-
slope pixels are more realistic. The modified multiple flow
direction method after Holmgren (1994) is expressed by the
following formula:
fi = (tanβi)
x∑8
j=1
(
tanβj
)x for tanβ > 0 (3)
with i, j = flow direction (1...8), fi = flow proportion (1...0)
in direction i, tanβi = slope gradient between the central cell
and cell in direction i and x = variable exponent. For x = 1 the
formula turns into the basic multiple flow direction method
by Quinn et al. (1991) exhibiting a very wide spreading,
while for higher x values the flow converges more and
more and becomes a single direction flow for x −→∞
(O’Callaghan and Mark, 1984). In addition to the influence
of the slope on the flow direction, the effect of any directional
change is considered, in other words the inertia of the flow.
In the modeling context this parameter is called persistence
which is a weight defined as a function of the change in angle
from the last flow direction. Thus the final probabilities are
the combination of the spreading and the persistence (Horton
et al., 2008).
The distance reached by the flow is computed with
simple energy-based calculations not considering source
masses since they are mostly unknown in first medium-scale
analyses. The kinetic energy Ekin at the time step i is
obtained by the following formula:
Eikin=Ei−1kin +1Eipot−Eiloss (4)
with 1Eipot = the change in potential energy and Eiloss = the
constant loss. For the estimation of the energy loss, a
constant friction loss angle referring to the angle of reach
(Fahrbo¨schung) concept (Heim, 1932; Corominas, 1996) is
added. The angle of reach is defined as the angle between
the horizontal and an imaginary line connecting source area
and the end point of the flow along the flow path. This
angle of reach is applied as a constant friction loss during
the propagation from pixel to pixel. The flow stops as soon
as the kinetic energy drops below zero. The procedure of
runout calculation is performed for each source pixel and
results in two products (output grids), the kinetic energy and
the spatial probability. Where the flows originating from
different sources overlap, either the maximum value or the
sum of the spatial probabilities is computed. For the kinetic
energy always the maximum value of overlapping flows is
calculated.
Summarizing, this methodology enables a first assessment
of the overall area possibly giving rise to debris-flows (source
identification) and the area potentially affected by the debris-
flow runout. Not single events but the sum of all possible
incidences is estimated. This modelling approach was
implemented in the Flow-R model which has been developed
at the University of Lausanne (Horton et al., 2008) and is
available on request at www.flow-r.ch.
3.2 Data acquisition
3.2.1 Distributed data
A digital elevation model (DEM) with a resolution of 10 m
was calculated on basis of the digitised contour lines and
breaklines of channels of the 1:10 000 topographic maps
from IGN (Institut Ge´ographique National). Scanning and
georeferencing of the maps have been carried out by Thiery
et al. (2007) and the interpolation was realised with the
software program SURFER using a kriging method and the
semivariogram elaborated by Thiery (2006). The resulting
DEM was smoothened by 9-nodes averaging, the sinks were
filled and flow accumulations as well as planar curvature
were derived. On basis of the aerial photographs of 2004 the
land use was digitised and classified into dense coniferous
forest, coniferous forest of average to low density, deciduous
forest, natural grassland, arable land/permanent crops,
pastures, bare rock, bare soil, urban areas, mining sites, water
courses and marshes and water bodies (Bordonne´, 2008).
The information on the lithology was digitised from the
geological map (1:50 000) and converted into a raster file
with 10-m resolution as the DEM, constituting the following
ten classes: marls, torrential alluvium, limestone, boulder
fields, talus slopes, flysch, gypsum, lacustrine deposits,
calcareous marls and moraines (Bordonne´, 2008).
Although the resolution of the geological map is rather
low, this information was included due to the importance
within the modelling procedure. A possible option to cope
with small-scale input is according to Bell and Glade (2004)
the display of the final result in accordance to the scale of
the least detailed input. We complied with this principle by
preparing the resulting maps at a scale lower than 1:50 000.
3.2.2 Inventory data
A first inventory comprises the envelopes (polygons) of
the deposition of the debris-flow events observed in 1996,
2002 and 2003 at the Faucon, Sanie`res and Bourget torrents
based on post-event field observations (Remaıˆtre, 2006). The
inventory is later on included in Fig. 6. A second debris-
flow inventory using aerial photograph interpretation was
compiled by Stummer (2009). By means of comparison of
each two consecutive aerial photographs of the years 1956,
1974, 1982, 1995, 2000 and 2004, debris flows which had
happened in each of the periods were visually identified and
digitised. This collection comprises mostly small events on
steep slopes while bigger events flowing principally in the
torrents are in most cases not identifiable. Furthermore,
neither the source nor the deposition area could be identified
for all events, thus we extracted only the digitized linear flow
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paths (lines) to be used in this study. The inventory covers
only a part of the study area, and the Abrie`s catchment, for
example, was not mapped. A drawback of this method is
that very active torrents producing debris flows in each time
step can not be identified since no differences are visible
between the consecutive photographs (the inventory is later
on included in Fig. 4). A third inventory contains the number
of events per torrent/catchment between 1850 and 2004,
compiled from archive investigation by Sivan (2000) and
Remaıˆtre (2006). Geographically this information can only
be linked to the respective torrent/whole catchment since
no detailed information about source, runout and deposition
is available. The three inventories were not merged into
one overall inventory since they comprise very differing
information (regarding type of information, resolution, shape
etc.) but retained separately and used for distinct purposes as
detailed in the following sections.
3.3 Model parameter determination
3.3.1 Source identification
For the first modelling step, the source identification, the
three topographic parameters slope, flow accumulation and
planar curvature were complemented by lithology and land
use. Each parameter was implemented as 10-m raster into
the model and the following criteria were applied for the
classification of the single grid layers: the threshold for
the size of the upslope area was considered in relation with
the slope angle as explained in the model description and
the extreme fitting (Fig. 2) was chosen since it allows, in
contrast to the rare fitting, the identification of small and less
steep sources, too, and matches the objective of worst-case
scenario modelling well. The threshold for planar curvature
was set to –2/100 m−1 according to the experience of Horton
et al. (2008) in the Canton de Vaud, Switzerland.
All geological units but the limestone were included as
potential source areas. This includes torrential deposits,
moraines, boulder fields, marls and calcareous marls, talus
slopes, lacustrine deposits, gypsum and flysch. Concerning
land use, dense coniferous forest, deciduous forest, natural
grassland, arable land/permanent crops, pastures, urban
areas and mining sites were excluded and coniferous forest
(average to low density), marshes and water bodies, bare rock
and bare soil were included.
Finally, all pixels being at least once included and never
excluded as possible source were designated as susceptible
to debris flow initiation.
3.3.2 Runout
Worst-case scenario
To define the runout distance for the worst-case scenario the
literature was revised for minimum values of angles of reach
in debris-flow inventories and already existing estimates
of worst-case angles: Huggel et al. (2002) established a
worst-case angle of reach for debris flows resulting from
glacier lake outbursts. Reviewing a number of cases in the
European Alps and in Canada, they fitted a curve to the
angle of reach as function of the maximum discharge and
assessed a threshold angle of 11◦. Zimmermann et al. (1997)
studied a set of debris flows especially in the Swiss Alps
and found a minimum angle of reach of ∼ 11◦ (20%) for
coarse- and medium-grained and∼ 7◦ (12%) for fine-grained
debris flows. Prochaska et al. (2008) identified, reviewing a
large quantity of investigations, a minimum angle of reach of
6.5◦. Bathurst et al. (1997) mention a rule of thumb applied
in Japan using an angle of about 11◦ (20%) according to
T. Takahashi, personal communication, 1994. Rickenmann
and Zimmermann (1993) mapped about 800 debris-flow
events, triggered in the Swiss Alps during intense rainstorms
in the summer of 1987 and identified a minimum angle of
reach of nearly 11◦. We chose the lowest angle found in
the literature: ∼ 7◦ and added the angle of 11◦ since it was
mentioned several times, including as result of a statistical
analysis for the worst-case runout angle calculation (Huggel
et al., 2002).
For the spreading of debris flows Holmgren (1994)
proposes a range of x between 4 and 6 in the Eq. (3) and
Claessens et al. (2005) and Horton et al. (2008) chose x = 4
for their debris-flow modelling (the lower the exponent the
wider the spreading). However, since the objective is not to
model a certain event realistically but to compute a worst-
case scenario the widest spreading possible was applied
choosing x = 1. Thus, the spreading is not representing a
single event but covers the extent of all possible events.
Qualitative susceptibility scenarios
Apart from worst-case-runout-modelling the capability of
the methodology to assess certain hazard scenarios was
investigated, based on the following assumptions: according
to Corominas (1996, p. 270 and 260) “the relative mobility
increases with the volume of the landslide” and “[t]he
angle of reach is found to be a proper indicator of the
relative mobility of landslides” (the term landslide is used
by Corominas (1996) for a range of processes and among
them the debris flows). Corominas and Moya (2008,
p. 198) link the different magnitudes with frequency: “it
has been observed that large landslides are able to travel
for longer distances than smaller ones. Should small and
large landslides be produced in the source area, most of
them would reach points located close to the source but
only a small percentage – the largest landslides – would
reach points located far away. Consequently, the observed
temporal frequency of the landslide events will decrease
with the distance from the landslide source. Frequency is,
therefore, a spatially distributed parameter”. Thus it should
be possible to define several magnitude- and frequency-
scenarios, respectively, and to model them by means of
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Fig. 3. Geomorphological map of the Barcelonnette Basin depicting the extent of the torrential fans, after Remaıˆtre (2006).
different angles of reach. Smallwood et al. (1997) cite a
classification of Morgan et al. (1991) into small (<50 m3),
medium (50–500 m3), large (500–5000 m3) and very large
(> 5000 m3) debris flows with angles of reach of 13.5◦,
13.5◦, 11◦ and 8◦.
Since in the Barcelonnette Basin information on the
volume and the corresponding angle of reach is available
only for one event no analyses on volume – angle of reach
relationships and no computation of magnitude-frequency
scenarios could be carried out. However, a high potential
was seen in the two spatial inventories available: in the
aerial photograph interpretation (Stummer, 2009) a number
of small debris flows has been identified and the number
per time interval between two photographs indicates a
relatively high frequency of several events per year in
the study area, forming the basis for the high frequency
scenario. The second spatial inventory, compiled by
Remaıˆtre (2006), which consists of the debris-flow footprints
of 1996, 2002 and 2003 on the fans of Sanie`res, Faucon
or Bourget, indicates events of medium frequency which
occur every few years and show a higher magnitude than the
previous ones. These two constellations of high-frequency
low-magnitude and medium-frequency medium-magnitude
events were complemented by a third one for low-frequency
high-magnitude on basis of the following assumption: the
torrential fans (Fig. 3) are predominantly the result of debris-
flow events, this means they were affected in the past and
will possibly be affected in the future. Thus, the runout angle
was iteratively adjusted and set as low as necessary to cover
the length of the torrential fans (especially of those torrents
described in the literature as very dangerous as e.g. the Riou
Bourdoux) as far as the confluence with the Ubaye River.
Following the suggestion of Horton et al. (2008) to set the
exponent in the spreading algorithm of Holmgren between 4
and 6 for debris flows, a value of 5 was chosen for all three
scenarios. This is a less wide spreading than in the worst-case
model (with an exponent of 1) for which an especially wide
spreading was chosen. The fitting was done by modelling
with several angles of reach and adjusting recalculations to
adapt the model to the runout distance of the recorded events.
3.4 Assessment of the model performance
Beguerı´a (2006) presents two main approaches for the vali-
dation of predictive models: confusion matrices for classified
results and receiver-operating characteristics (ROC) for
continuous results. With confusion matrices the modelling
result is opposed to the recorded events resulting in four
groups (Carranza and Castro, 2006): true positives (event
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observed and model identified the threat), true negatives
(no event observed, no threat modelled), false positives
(no event observed but model identified threat) and false
negatives (event observed but no threat was modelled).
The ROC curves oppose the false positive to the true
positive rates by continuously changing the threshold used
for the classification (Carrara et al., 2008). Due to the
low availability of spatial information on past events only
two measures were implemented: the sensitivity which is
“the proportion of positive cases correctly predicted” and
its opposite, the false negative rate which is “the proportion
of false negatives in the total of positive observations”
(Beguerı´a, 2006, p. 321). The modelling results were
furthermore evaluated in a qualitative way.
3.4.1 Source identification
The identified sources were visually compared with the aerial
photograph inventory (Stummer, 2009) and the record of
the debris flow of the Faucon catchment of 2003 (Remaıˆtre,
2006), where the source area had been mapped in the field.
Furthermore, the percentage of source pixels per catchment
was compared with the percentage of events which had
happened between 1850 and 2004 in several catchments.
Based on the assumption that catchments exhibiting a higher
extension of unstable area produce more debris flows over
time, the percentage of modelled source area was compared
to the percentage of recorded events per catchment. An
attempt was made to use the assumed relation for the
validation of the modelling results.
3.4.2 Runout
The runout model performance was assessed by means of
a comparison of the potentially affected areas with the
footprints of the past events. Since the modelling of
the runout is based on two types of functions, the flow
direction (or spreading) and runout distance algorithms,
consequently the validation is also split into these two
categories. This means that the longitudinal profile and
the lateral characteristics of the flows are revised. For the
worst-case scenario an enclosure of all past events into the
modelled area is assumed and checked by an overlay of the
area susceptible according to the model and the footprints of
recorded debris flows.
The fitting of the susceptibility scenarios (high, middle
and low frequency) was also assessed in a qualitative way
comparing the modelling results with the spatial inventories
of Stummer (2009); Remaıˆtre (2006) and the longitudinal
coverage of the torrential fan of the Riou-Bourdoux. For
the event in the Faucon catchment in 2003 it was possible to
calculate the angle of reach since in this case the full debris-
flow path from the source to the endpoint is available. It
was compared to the angle of reach adjusted for the medium
frequency scenario.
4 Resulting susceptibility assessment
4.1 Source area identification
The model identified approximately 0.96 km2 of potentially
unstable area from a whole of 199.66 km2. About 65%
are located on the north-facing slopes including the Abrie´s
catchment and 35% on the south-facing slopes (Fig. 4a).
However, the highest percentage of potential sources (of over
45%) was identified in the Abrie´s catchment. Leaving this
catchment out of the calculation, 71% of the sources are
located on the south-facing and only 29% on the north-facing
slopes.
The ranking of the catchments according to the percentage
of recorded events shows especially for the four most active
torrents Riou-Bourdoux, Sanie`res, Faucon and Bourget a
very good relation with the ranking on basis of the percentage
of the area of modelled sources per catchment (diagram
in Fig. 5). For the four other south-facing catchments
possessing much lower percentages of recorded events as
well as modelled sources no clear trend is visible. However,
the order of magnitude of modelled and recorded percentages
is similar. The south-facing catchments show in general very
low numbers of recorded events and also the percentages
of modelled sources are very low, except for the Riou-
Versant and especially the Abrie`s catchment. No clear trends
are observable and the orders of magnitude differ as well,
especially for the Riou-Versant and the Abrie`s catchment
which exhibit much higher percentages of modelled sources
than recorded events although both catchments could not
be included completely into the analyses. For several
catchments such as Enchastrayes, Boure, Sauze or La Tour
no events were recorded but the model identified potential
sources. In only one case, the Claveaux catchment, events
were recorded but no susceptible areas were computed.
The threat posed by possible debris-flow formation on
the mudslides could be identified as well. Three possible
source pixels were identified on the lower part of the Poche
mudslide, 21 especially in the upper part of the La Valette
mudslide and 27 relatively equally distributed on the Super
Sauze mudslide.
The comparison with the 2003 debris flow in the Faucon
catchment shows a clear identification of the source area
(Fig. 4b). The comparison with the starting points of the
events mapped on the aerial photographs by Stummer (2009)
showed almost no exact matches, however many slope
segments, gullies and channels obviously prone to debris
flows could be identified by the source modelling (Fig. 4a).
4.2 Runout area modelling
4.2.1 Worst-case scenario
The results of the two models with angles of reach of 7◦
and 11◦, respectively, are matching nearly completely for
the slopes and the torrential fans. Minor differences are
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Fig. 4. Potential source areas identified by the model in comparison with the inventory by Stummer (2009) and the 2003 event observed in
the Faucon catchment (Remaıˆtre, 2006) (a) and an amplification of the upslope region of the Faucon catchment where the 2003 event had
been triggered (b).
Abriesri
Rioux-Versanti - r t
Bourer
Riou-Bourdouxi - r
Sau
ze
Sau
ze
Enchastrayestr
Faucon
Faucon
St-P
ons
St-P
ons
Sanières
anièresBourget
Bourget
Frache
Frache
Poche
Poche
Gaudeissart
Gaudeissart
Bera
rde
Bera
rde
La V
alett
e
La V
alett
e
Riou-Chanal
Riou-Chanal
Ribesi
La Tour r
Claveauxl
Esmenjaudj
Flouratsl r t
³
0 2 4 6 81 Kilometers
Legend
Ubaye River
Catchment basins
Elevation [m]
3030
1084
0
10
20
30
40
50
Riou
-Bou
rdou
x
Sani
èresFauc
on
Bour
get
La V
aletteSt-Po
ns
Esm
enjau
d
Bera
rde
Riou
-Cha
nal Poch
e
Riou
-Vers
ant
Gaud
eissa
rt
Clav
eaux Abrie
s
Bour
e
Sauz
e
Ench
astra
yes Frac
he Ribe
s
La T
our
Flour
ats
<< south-facing             north-facing >> slope            slope      
Percentage of debris flows recordedbetween 1850 and 2004
Percentage of modelled sources
14 M. S. Kappes et al.: Assessment of debris-flow susceptibility at medium-scale
Abriesri
Rioux-Versanti - r t
Bourer
Riou-Bourdouxi - r
Sau
ze
Sau
ze
Enchastrayestr
Faucon
Faucon
St-P
ons
St-P
ons
Sanières
anièresBourget
Bourget
Frache
Frache
Poche
Poche
Gaudeissart
Gaudeissart
Bera
rde
Bera
rde
La V
alett
e
La V
alett
e
Riou-Chanal
Riou-Chanal
Ribesi
La Tour r
Claveauxl
Esmenjaudj
Flouratsl r t
³
0 2 4 6 81 Kilometers
Legend
Ubaye River
Catchment basins
Elevation [m]
3030
1084
0
10
20
30
40
50
Riou
-Bou
rdou
x
Sani
èresFauc
on
Bour
get
La V
aletteSt-Po
ns
Esm
enjau
d
Bera
rde
Riou
-Cha
nal Poch
e
Riou
-Vers
ant
Gaud
eissa
rt
Clav
eaux Abrie
s
Bour
e
Sauz
e
Ench
astra
yes Frac
he Ribe
s
La T
our
Flour
ats
<< south-facing             north-facing >> slope sl pe      
Percentage of debris flows recordedbetween 1850 and 2004
Percentage of modelled sources
Fig. 5. Comparison of the source modelling result with the recorded events per catchment (diagram). The catchment locations are indicated
in the map below the diagram.
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³
Ubaye River
Max. spatial probability
Worst-case 11°
High : 1
Low : > 0
Worst case 7°
High : 1
Low : > 00 0.9 1.8 2.7 3.60.45 Kilometers
a)
Symbology
Inventory Stummer (2009)
Inventory Remaître (2006)
Faucon
Bourget
Sanières
Riou Bourdoux
Fig. 6. Worst-case debris-flow scenarios showing the south-facing slope of the Barcelonnette Basin, with angles of reach of 7◦ and 11◦ (the
7◦ scenario is underlying the 11◦ scenario and identical with it for the area where it is invisible) in comparison with the debris-flow inventory
according to Stummer (2009) and the inventory of Remaıˆtre (2006) which consists of the envelopes of the observed events in 1996, 2002 and
2003.
observable only for the further runout in the flood plain
of the Ubaye (Fig. 6). Longitudinally, the runouts are
covering most of the torrential fans (Fig. 3), especially of the
most active torrents Riou-Bourdoux, Faucon, Sanie`res and
Bourget, and reach the confluence with the Ubaye.
The comparison of the modelling result with the footprints
of the events of 1996, 2002 and 2003 shows a sensitivity
of 77% which expresses the coincidence of the affected
and modelled area. On the contrary the false negative
rate amounts to 33% which refers to the area of recorded
events but the modelling result does not indicate a threat.
A closer look reveals, that the areas affected on the Faucon
and Bourget torrential fan were modelled with only minor
differences and the main course of the flow was identified
(Fig. 8). In the case of the event in 2002 on the torrential
fan of the Sanie`res torrent the model identified a strongly
differing pathway, splitting shortly after having passed the
apex of the fan into two flows while the event in 2002 had
propagated straight ahead.
The comparison with the debris-flow courses mapped on
the aerial photographs (Stummer, 2009) exhibits a 60%
coverage by the model. A high number of the mapped
events is not or only partly covered since the respective
source areas had not been identified but where the source
areas were detected, the debris-flow courses identified on the
photographs lie completely within the modelled susceptible
area (see e.g. the Riou-Bourdoux catchment in Fig. 6).
4.2.2 Qualitative susceptibility scenarios
The adaptation of the model to the spatial inventories and
using an assumption on extreme runout for the development
of high (low), medium (medium) and low (high) frequency
Fig. 7. Profile of the 2003 debris-flow in the Faucon torrent. A line
for the identification of the angle of reach was positioned between
the source area and the furthest point of the runout.
(magnitude) scenarios resulted in the following angles of
reach: the adjustment to the inventory according to Stummer
(2009) gave an angle of 30◦ (Fig. 9). The modelling result
represents events of low magnitude with a high frequency
of several events per year distributed over the investigated
area. The short flows are in most cases only flowing down
the steep slopes and ending as soon as they get to the
torrential channels. The torrential fans in the valley are not
reached.
With an angle of reach of 14◦ the maximum runout
distance exhibited by the events in 1996, 2002 and 2003 of
the torrents Faucon, Sanie`res and Bourget can be represented
well. An investigation of the angle of reach of the debris-
flow event in the Faucon torrent in 2003 also reveals an angle
of reach of 14◦ (Fig. 7), matching exactly the empirically
(by model iteration) adjusted angle of reach for medium
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³
Ubaye River
Max. spatial probability
Worst-case 11°
High : 1
Low : > 0
Worst case 7°
High : 1
Low : > 00 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.60.2 Kilometers
a)
Symbology
Inventory Stummer (2009)
Inventory Remaître (2006)
Faucon
Bourget
Sanières
Fig. 8. Amplification of the three torrential fans showing the worst-case scenarios and the footprints of several observed events of the
inventory of Remaıˆtre (2006).
³
Symbology
Ubaye River
Inventory Remaître (2006)
Inventory Stummer (2009)
High frequency (30°)
Medium frequency (14°)
Low frequency (11°)0 1 2 3 40.5 Kilometers
a)
Faucon
Bourget
Sanières
Fig. 9. Modelling results for the qualitative scenarios of high, medium and low frequency in comparison with the inventory after Stummer
(2009) and the envelopes of events in 1996, 2002 and 2003 (Remaıˆtre, 2006), showing the south-facing slopes.
frequency events. The comparison of the modelled spreading
of the flow and the recorded events on the Faucon, Bourget
and Sanie`res torrential fans exhibits a very similar result
to the worst-case models. It shows the same pattern of
a good identification of the flow pathways on the Faucon
and Bourget fans but a strong deviation on the Sanie`res fan.
The higher value of the exponent in the spreading algorithm
resulted in only marginally narrower spreading.
In contrast to the worst-case scenarios for the medium
frequency scenario several other torrential fans are not
reached by the modelled flows such as the Riou-Bourdoux
and several north-facing torrents.
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The angle of reach identified to cover longitudinally the
torrential fans of the valley is consistent with the 11◦ worst-
case scenario. As main indicator of the success of the
modelling result on the torrential fan of the Riou-Bourdoux
was observed, since this torrent was described in Sivan
(2000) as one of the most active ones in the Barcelonnette
Basin. Any higher angle than 11◦ would not cover the whole
length of the Riou-Bourdoux torrential fan till the Ubaye. For
the other fans this angle exhibits good results as well and, as
observed by the comparison of the 11◦ with the 7◦ worst-
case model, virtually no differences could be identified for
the runout on the slopes, in the channels and on the torrential
fans.
5 Discussion
The source area identification could only be validated on the
basis of a small number of evidences: the event of 2003, the
aerial photograph interpretation inventory (Stummer, 2009)
and a comparison of the percentage of recorded events with
the percentage of modelled sources per catchment. A clear
identification of the source of the 2003 event contrasts with a
very low identification rate of the sources of smaller events of
the aerial photograph interpretation inventory. However, the
reasons for the difficulties in the identification are numerous,
starting with the inventory itself which includes the source
areas only in a few cases while for most events only segments
of debris-flow tracks could be determined and mapped.
Furthermore most of the events were obviously very small,
having occurred in small gullies and concavities which are
very difficult to identify with a 10-m resolution DEM. The
DEM creation on the basis of a topographic map with limited
detail as well as the interpolation and smoothing led probably
to further generalisation and loss of small scale forms. And
finally, the high altitudinal differences in the area posed a
challenge for the orthorectification of the aerial photographs
resulting in small mismatches between the photographs and
further spatial information. However, the very small sources
are presumably not the ones releasing the very dangerous
events and the larger channels and torrents to which they
contribute are indentified in any case. Thus, the non-
recognition of these sources is most probably of minor effect
on the runout on the torrential fans.
The assumption of a relation between the percentage
of modelled source area and the percentage of recorded
events seems at first sight viable and offers a possibility
for qualitative validation. The two percentages indicate a
good identification of the most important torrents on the
south-facing slope Riou-Bourdoux, Faucon, Bourget and
Sanie`res as well as a the same ranking of the four torrents
(Fig. 5). Though the ranking is matching well the values
are not directly comparable This fact is attributed to the
high percentage of more than 45◦ slopes of the modelled
sources identified in the Abrie`s catchment while very few
events were recorded. This leads to a distortion of the
percentages of modelled sources for other catchments and
especially in comparison with the percentages of recorded
events. The explanation for the wide difference in the
percentages of the Abrie`s catchment lies in its specific
setting: the Abrie`s itself cannot be considered a torrent
since it exhibits an only moderate slope of about 6.5◦
(Remaıˆtre, 2006). However, a large number of small very
steep torrents and gullies, tributaries to the main flow, were
identified as very active by the model. Nevertheless, they
are most probably not producing effects which would reach
the confluence with the Ubaye and since the catchment is
nearly unpopulated and no road is passing under the most
active slopes, these comparatively small events were not
recorded. A field check confirmed, that these small torrents
are indeed very active, not only concerning debris flows but
also rockfalls. For a number of catchments such as the Boure,
Sauze or Riou de Ribes, only possibly unstable areas, but
no events were recorded. Considering the minor morainic
cover of the north-facing slopes already mentioned, the non-
recording of events is not necessarily a non-existence of past
or future events but might indicate a lower frequency due to
lower material availability. In conclusion the dependence of
the comparability of the two percentages on the recording
activity becomes obvious. However, taking this aspect into
account the comparison served for discussion and validation
purposes very well.
Between the two worst-case scenario models with angles
of reach of 7◦ and 11◦ only minor differences were observed
for the runout in the river bed of the Ubaye. This indicates,
that an assumed worst-case angle of reach of 11◦ would be
sufficient to identify the areas threatened by debris flows
in the Barcelonnette Basin. The possible further runout
in the wide river bed is of less interest since the area is
not used and a possible damming of the Ubaye River does
not have to be expected due to the width of the bed. In
general, the runout distance of former debris flows was
captured very well in the worst-case scenario. However,
despite its designation as worst-case scenario, it does not
completely contain the area affected by the recorded past
events. Especially on the torrential fan of the Sanie`res torrent
the differences are very high since the model identified a
diverging course of the flow and did not cover the actual
event of 2002. The reason lies most probably in the quality of
the DEM. Especially in relatively flat areas the spreading of
the flow reacts very sensitively to elevation differences and
thus to errors in the digital elevation model. DEMs built
on digitised elevation lines which exhibit further runout
distances for flatter areas are rather prone to generalisations
of the actual topography as well as to errors. In contrast
to the strong reaction of the spreading to errors, the runout
distance seems to be much less sensitive. However to prove
these hypotheses further investigation has to be carried out.
The resulting errors are especially problematic for the worst-
case modelling. Understanding this term literally would
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 11, 627–641, 2011 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/11/627/2011/
222
Articles
M. S. Kappes et al.: Assessment of debris-flow susceptibility at medium-scale 639
assure the safety of the complete area outside the identified
regions. However, the interpretation of such modelling
results can only be done being aware of the assumptions
inherent in the model, its strong dependence on the quality
of the DEM and the accuracy and scale of the input data.
The qualitative scenarios computed on basis of the
empirically determined angles of reach match rather well
with the inventories and the assumption of full longitudinal
coverage of the largest torrential fans. Especially the fact
that the angle of reach calculated for the 2003 event in
the Faucon catchment matches exactly with the empirically
adjusted angle. The match of the angle of reach of high
magnitude events and the worst-case calibration indicate a
good adjustment of the scenarios. However, the data basis on
which the scenarios are defined and modelled is very small
and the estimation of the frequencies and magnitudes of the
three classes would have to be confirmed. The results have
to be interpreted being aware of these facts. Against this
background, the results indicate a ranking of susceptibility.
Priorities for more detailed studies can be determined by this
approach.
6 Conclusions
The aim of a medium-scale debris-flow susceptibility
analysis as a first overview for the Barcelonnette Basin
with limited spatial information on past events was
fulfilled. The source areas as well as the worst-case runout
modelling resulted in reasonable outcomes without site-
specific information linked to past events but by adoption of
empirical relations and parametrisation developed in other
regions. The comparison of the percentage of modelled
sources with the percentage of recorded events per catchment
proved very helpful, not only for the validation of the source
modelling results but also for shedding light on the model,
inventory and catchment characteristics. The development
of scenarios needs more input and particularly estimations
of the return periods of the events. However, detailed
inventories containing information on angles of reach and
volumes are not necessarily needed. With the model used
in this study, a direct calibration of the scenarios on the
basis of mapped deposition areas and frequency estimates
is possible. The quality of the DEM was identified as a
critical factor in the modelling process. Especially DEMs
interpolated on the basis of contour lines exhibit a variety of
errors and generalisations which have an important impact
on the reliability of the modelled susceptibility. However,
the application of the results lies in the identification of
the most threatened areas and not in the determination of
threatened areas for final decision making. E.g. effects such
as volume-specific friction, scouring and increase of the
volume during the movement cannot be taken into account
but play an important role. The angle identified as angle
of reach subsumes but does not describe the individual
effects. Due to these strong generalisations, not even for
the worst-case scenario can a guarantee be given that future
events will lie entirely within the identified limits. The
interpretation of the resulting maps is only possible with
the knowledge of the model assumptions and the accuracy
and scale of the input data. For future better adjustment
of the model to unknown areas with low data availability
it would be of great interest to fit the model to various
settings and compare the parameterisation in relation to the
environmental conditions. Information on the parameter
ranges and the resulting differences, especially in regions
with detailed information on angles of reach and volumes
of past events, would provide support for the calibration of
the model to unknown zones.
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Abstract 
World-wide many regions are threatened by multiple natural hazards with the potential to 
cause high damages and losses. However, their joint analysis is still in the early stages of 
development since a range of serious challenges emerges in the multi-hazard context such 
as differing modeling approaches in use for contrasting hazards, the time- and data-
demanding conduct of each single preparative, intermediate and analysis step, and the 
clear visualization of the modeling outcome. Under consideration of these difficulties a 
regional multi-hazard exposure analysis concept is developed for the five natural hazards 
debris flows, rock falls, shallow landslides, avalanches and river floods, complemented 
by a visualization scheme to present the modeling outcome. An automation of the two 
schemes resulted in the MultiRISK Modelling and the MultiRISK Visualization Tool 
forming together the MultiRISK Platform. To test MultiRISK a case study is performed 
in the Barcelonnette basin in France with a worst-case parameterization of the models on 
basis of extensive literature reviews. Although this analysis apparently leads to an 
overestimation of the susceptible areas and the number of exposed elements, it offers the 
determination of general hazard distributions, overlaps and areas of potential risk without 
data-demanding calibration. Thus, the proposed parameter set may also serve for the 
performance of an approximation in other, completely unknown, areas for a first 
identification of general hazard and risk patterns. Furthermore, the case study offered 
many insights into the multi-hazard topic and even more questions e.g. with respect to 
coherent multi-hazard model parameterization or the comparability and interpretation, 
respectively, of single-hazard modeling results. Although analysis schemes can be 
proposed and software tools can be provided to facilitate many steps, a well-conceived 
and reflective approach to multi-hazard settings is essential. 
 
Keywords: Multi-hazard risk, modeling software, web-mapping 
1. Introduction 
 
Many areas of this world as for example coastal zones, mountainous regions or volcano 
vicinities are threatened by multiple natural hazards. However, natural hazards are 
usually still examined and managed separately. Only in few studies multiple threats are 
analyzed jointly and the overall risk is assessed, e.g. by van Westen et al. (2002), Bausch 
(2003), Bell and Glade (2004), Glade and van Elverfeldt (2005), Reese et al. (2007), 
Bründl et al. (2009) or Marzocchi et al. (2009). With the joint analysis of hazards, 
numerous challenges and difficulties arise (Kappes et al., subm.): (a) hazards are not 
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directly comparable since their characteristics and their describing metrics differ, for 
instance inundation depth of floods versus impact pressure of rock falls. Furthermore, 
also the analysis methods and models diverge widely. These differences complicate the 
comparability of analysis results. (b) Hazards are related, interact and influence each 
other with the result of unexpected incidences and hazard chains (Kappes et al., 2010). (c) 
The estimation of the vulnerability of threatened elements is difficult since the 
vulnerability approaches vary between hazards (Papathoma-Köhle et al., 2011). (d) Risks 
are expressed in hazard-independent units as e.g. annual losses, lives lost etc. and hence 
easier to compare than hazards. However, a variety of risk measures exists (annual losses 
or losses for a specific scenario as a 100-year event, loss of lives, injuries or damage to 
buildings etc.). Therefore, at least a common metric at a predefined scale has to be 
specified to enable the comparison of single risk results (Marzocchi et al., subm.).  
Apart from the challenges concerning the comparability of hazards and risks, 
respectively, another major difficulty is the performance of such an analysis. Knowledge 
and experience from many different disciplines is required and the data acquisition, 
preparation and the hazard, vulnerability and risk modeling for single hazard procedures 
consist of a large number of different analysis steps which are complicated and thus time-
consuming and error prone. However, it would be desirable to be able to re-run the 
analysis repeatedly to evaluate e.g. the effect of management options or to consider 
changes in land use, in the climate, the general environmental setting or alterations of the 
elements at risk (Dai et al., 2002; Fuchs and Keiler, 2006; Slaymaker and Embleton-
Hamann, 2009). 
A possible solution is the automation of the single steps in a software tool offering the 
analysis of a set of hazards according to a coherent analysis scheme which results in 
comparable single-hazard (risk) results. Some developed approaches include HAZUS in 
the USA (Schneider and Schauer, 2006; FEMA, 2008) which offers hurricane, 
earthquake and flood hazard and risk modeling. RiskScape in New Zealand (Reese et al., 
2007) facilitates currently volcanic ashfalls, floods, tsunamis, landslides, storms and 
earthquakes. CAPRA in Central America provides the analysis of hurricanes, heavy 
rainfall, landslides, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic hazards (CEPREDENAC 
et al.). Such tools do not only provide user-friendly and straightforward performance of 
multi-hazard analyses and comparability between single hazards but their wide-spread 
and repeated use also guarantees comparability between e.g. municipalities or 
departments and between analyses over time. 
A final difficulty in the multi-hazard context is the huge data requirement. Extensive and 
qualitatively high standard inventories of past events including detailed spatio-temporal 
patterns, and particularly with equivalent standard for multiple hazards, are rare. In most 
regions huge differences in quality and dimension exist between the single-hazard 
inventories - if records of past events are available at all. Furthermore, the more detailed 
the models, the more detailed data on topography, geology, soils, land use, precipitation 
distribution etc. is required. A possibility to partly overcome this constraint is a top-down 
approach. A simple and fast analysis at small scale provides an approximation. In a next 
step, more detailed and sophisticated, and thus also more data requiring methods at a 
larger scale, is applied. By using the small-scale modeling results to define those areas for 
which detailed studies have to be carried out, resources can be utilized very effectively. 
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Under consideration of the previously mentioned challenges, the MultiRISK platform has 
been developed. This software consists of a multi-hazard risk analysis, projected 
according to a top-down approach, and a visualization tool to display the results. In the 
current version, the GIS-based regional to medium-scale overview analysis is completed 
(1:10.000-1:25.000) including the typical mountain hazards avalanches, debris flows, 
rock falls, shallow landslides and river floods. In this article the development of 
MultiRISK and the product will be presented together with the performance of a multi-
hazard exposure analysis in the test site of Barcelonnette in France. The analysis scheme 
for hazard modeling based on well-available input data, hazard model validation and 
exposure analyses is presented in section 2. A visualization scheme to display and 
communicate the results in a well-structured way is outlined in section 2.4. The analysis 
scheme is automated in a user-friendly software (section 3.1). The visualization outline is 
implemented into a visualization tool to present the results automatically in a web 
browser interface (section 3.2). In order to test the developed MultiRISK modeling and 
visualization tool, it is applied in the Barcelonnette basin (section 4). On basis of the 
findings of the analysis scheme development, the MultiRISK development and 
implementation in the case study, the challenges and specifics in a multi-hazard setting 
are discussed in section 5.   
 
The definition of key terms differs between scientists as well as between disciplines and 
processes. This has become evident when working in the field of multi-hazards and risks. 
Thus a short explanation is added in Table 1 to clarify the terminology used in this 
contribution.  
 
Table 1 Key terminology used in this contribution 
Hazard describes “[a] dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition 
that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, 
loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or 
environmental damage” (UN-ISDR, 2009b; p. 7). However, in a technical 
context hazard refers usually to quantitative information on the “likely 
frequency of occurrence of different intensities for different areas, as 
determined from historical data or scientific analysis” (UN-ISDR, 2009b; p. 7). 
In relation to multi-hazard both definitions of hazard are needed: hazard 
according to a wider definition is used when generally referring to one or 
several processes and hazard according to the technical definition is required to 
describe the level of information available for a certain process (in contrast to 
susceptibility). To be able to distinguish between the two meanings the second 
(technical) definition will relate in this article to Full-Hazard. 
 
Susceptibility offers in particular spatial information, i.e. “the probability that any given 
region will be affected” (Guzzetti et al., 2005; p. 277). In contrast to full-
hazard, susceptibility lacks information on the hazard intensity including 
frequency and magnitude. 
 
Risk refers to the “[e]xpected losses (of lives, persons injured, property damaged and 
economic activity disrupted) due to a particular hazard for a given area and 
reference period” (WMO, 1999; p. 2). The social dimension of risk (e.g. Wisner 
et al., 2004) is not addressed in this contribution. 
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Exposure is defined as “[p]eople, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard 
zones that are thereby subject to potential losses” (UN-ISDR, 2009b; p. 6). In 
this article the definition includes hazard (i.e. full-hazard) zones as well as 
susceptibility zones.  
Note: Additional terms such as coping capacity, adaptation and resilience, to name a few only, 
are not addressed in this contribution and are therefore not included in this table. 
2. Development of a regional-scale analysis and visualization 
scheme of multi-hazard exposure 
 
The multi-hazard risk analysis scheme proposed in the present follows a top-down 
approach in which a regional exposure analysis provides the identification of hazard 
distributions, hazard overlaps and zones potential risk. Subsequently, detailed, local risk 
analyses on basis of more sophisticate models are to be carried out at the previously 
defined points. In the present study, however, only the regional scale exposure analysis 
scheme is outlined and its implementation into a software tool is presented, while the 
local level analysis will be elaborated in future works and by now only its function is 
defined.  
The regional exposure analysis is composed of three components, the hazard modeling, 
the validation of the modeling results and the exposure analysis. These will be explored 
in the following. 
2.1. Hazard modeling 
The first step in a multi-hazard top-down approach shall offer a regional approximation 
by means of fast and simple methods. As explained before, the data need for multi-hazard 
risk analyses is in general a limiting factor. Consequently, the availability of input data is 
a major criterion for the model choice and determines significantly the tool’s 
applicability. For GIS-based models “input” refers to two types of information: (1) area-
wide information, i.e. information layers (e.g. elevation, land use or geology) and (2) 
information to calibrate or parameterize the model as e.g. inventory data, soil properties 
and precipitation or discharge time series. (1) Topographic characteristics, derived from 
digital elevation models (DEM), are for GIS-based modeling of natural hazards usually 
the most important area-wide input data. This information is already available in many 
regions in the world or can be produced with acceptable effort from topographic maps, 
satellite imagery and laser scanning. From the DEM, a variety of derivatives such as 
slope angle, curvature, aspect or distance to ridge/drainage line can be deduced. 
Especially the mountain hazards are strongly coupled with topographic characteristics 
and therefore, this data is highly valuable for any model. Consequently, the regional 
analysis is primarily based on the DEM including its derivatives and the required models 
to be chosen have to be operable with this topographic input.  
To optionally extent the topographic information additional data such as land use/cover 
was implemented. This data is rather easy to create, for example from remote sensing 
data or, in coarse resolution, as free image sharing from GoogleEarth. Furthermore, 
lithological information is included into the modeling approach since geological maps 
exist in many countries and regions and the lithology and tectonic lineaments influence 
and even determine many natural hazards significantly. In both additions, however, the 
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spatial resolution is of crucial importance and needs to be assessed carefully. (2) The 
second criterion for the model choice is the straightforwardness of the model 
calibration/parameterization. Models with indispensible need of data from field or 
laboratory analyses, time series or extensive inventories do not fit the objective of a 
simple and fast first approximation of an area. The models have to be straightforward and 
comprehensive to enable a flexible calibration on the basis of detailed information, if 
available. However, in cases of low data availability it has to be possible to complement 
with expert knowledge or even parameterize exclusively with expert experience or 
studies carried out in comparable settings.  
Furthermore, only models developed for a regional scale (1:10.000-1:50.000) were 
selected to ensure, as far as possible in a multi-hazard environment, the comparability of 
the results. Apart from these criteria, the model choice is open and the models selected 
here can be easily exchanged by other suitable ones (concerning scale, data input needs 
etc.). In the current version of MulitRISK, the processes snow avalanches, shallow 
landslides, debris flows, rock falls and river floods are considered. The different selected 
models and the methodology of their implementation is presented in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
Debris flows 
The source identification is carried out with Flow-R model (Horton et al., 2008; Horton 
et al., in prep.). Only those parameters and algorithms of Flow-R are presented which are 
included in the analysis scheme and later in MultiRISK. For more detail on Flow-R refer 
to Horton et al. (2008), Blahut et al. (2010), Kappes et al. (2011), and Horton et al. (in 
prep.). This model is based on the three topographic parameters slope angle, upslope area 
and planar curvature. They represent in directly (slope) or indirectly (upslope area and 
planar curvature) three major factors for debris flow disposition (Takahashi, 1981; 
Rickenmann and Zimmermann, 1993), slope gradient, sediment availability and water 
input. Flow accumulation and planar curvature serve as indicators for the convergence of 
sufficient water and material in gully structures. Flow accumulation is considered in 
combination with slope angle since in smaller catchments less material is accumulated 
and more water from steeper slopes is needed to enable the debris flow initiation. In 
contrast, larger catchments are supposed to accumulate higher volumes of sediment and 
water which starts moving at lower angles (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 Coupled consideration of slope angle and upslope area (Horton et al. 2008). Below an upslope 
area of 2.5km2 the slope angle to start the movement is rising with decreasing area while above 2.5km2 it is 
assumed to be constant at 15°. 
 
Additionally, certain land use/cover types and lithological units can optionally be 
excluded. For example dense forest influences surface runoff and buildup areas or 
outcropping rocks determine material availability. 
In a second step, Flow-R offers a 2D run out modeling option. The spreading of the flow 
is computed with the multiple flow direction algorithm according to Holmgren (1994), an 
expansion of the basic multiple flow direction algorithm developed by Quinn et al. 
(1991): 
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where i,j = flow direction (1..8) [-], fi = flow proportion (1..0) [%] in direction I [-], tan βi 
[-] = slope gradient between the central cell and cell in direction I and x an exponent 
introduced by Holmgren (1994). For x = 1 the algorithm converts into the basic multiple 
flow direction after Quinn et al. (1991) and for x →  into a single flow. The spreading is 
complemented by a persistence function. This function accounts for the inertia of the 
flow by a weighting of the change of angle from the last flow direction. For 0° a weight 
of 1 is assigned, for 45° 0.8, for 90° 0.4, for 135° and for 180° 0). The distance of the run 
out is computed with a constant friction loss angle, thus not considering the surface 
roughness. This angle corresponds to the Fahrböschung of Heim (1932), translated as 
angle of reach by Corominas (1996), which refers to the angle between a line from the 
highest point of the source area to the maximum run out and the horizontal. In Flow-R the 
angle is applied as constant loss variable in an energetic computation while the flow 
propagates from pixel to pixel (Horton et al., 2008): 
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with the time step i, the kinetic energy Ekin, the change in potential energy ∆Epot and the 
constant loss Eloss. The flow stops as soon as the kinetic energy drops below zero. At the 
overlap of the flows from different sources the maximum value of the spatial probability 
that this pixel might be hit and the maximum kinetic energy of all overlapping flows are 
calculated. 
Two run out calculation modes are offered: quick and complete. In the complete mode, 
each single source pixel is propagated. In the quick models first the superior sources are 
propagated. If lower ones follow the same path with a similar or lower kinetic energy 
they are neglected. This reduction of single calculations enables significant time saving. 
 
Rock falls 
A commonly used method for automatic rock fall source identification is the 
classification of the slope gradient map. Hereby, a threshold angle is defined above which 
the area is identified as potentially rock fall producing rock face (Wichmann and Becht, 
2006; Guzzetti et al., 2003; Ayala-Carcedo et al., 2003; Jaboyedoff and Labiouse, 2003; 
Frattini et al., 2008). As already described for the debris flow source modeling, specific 
land use/cover and lithological units as e.g. outcropping marls can also be excluded as 
potential rock fall source areas. As for debris flows, the run out is modeled by means of 
the Flow-R model according to Horton et al. (2008). 
 
Shallow landslides 
In comparison to the processes treated until now, areas susceptible to shallow landslides 
are rather analyzed with statistical and physically-based methods than with empirical 
models. However, statistical models are commonly not easy to transfer and physically-
based models require a high quantity of geotechnical input data and are thus also not 
suitable for a regional approach. Nevertheless, a variety of physical models was adjusted 
to the input of information derived from DEMs. Since topographic characteristics control 
water confluence, downslope forces etc. this effort proved to be successful as multiple 
models indicate, e.g. SLIDISP of Liener and Kienholz (2000), SHALSTAB of 
Montgomery and Dietrich (1994) and Dietrich and Montgomery (1998) or SMORPH of 
Shaw and Johnson (1995). Among these methods SHALSTAB (SHAllow Landsliding 
STABility; Montgomery and Greenberg, 2009) was selected because it offers the option 
to compute a first approximation of an area without the need of detailed calibration. The 
Slope Stability Package after Montgomery and Greenberg (2009) which refers to 
SHALSTAB was chosen since it can directly be included as toolbox in ArcGIS 9.x, while 
the original version of Dietrich and Montgomery (1998) is an ArcView 3.x application. 
SHALSTAB couples a “hydrological model to a limit-equilibrium slope stability model 
to calculate the critical steady-state rainfall (Qc) necessary to trigger slope instability at 
any point in a landscape” (Montgomery et al., 1998; p. 944). Under negligence of the soil 
cohesion the following equation emerges (Montgomery and Dietrich, 1994; Montgomery 
et al., 1998): 

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with the soil transmissivity T [m2/day], the hillslope angle θ  [°], the drainage area [m2] a, 
the outflow boundary length b [m], the soil bulk density ρs [kg/m3], the water bulk 
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density ρw [kg/m3], and the angle of internal friction   [°]. By using a “single set of 
parameter values” (ρs and , ρw are a constants) plus the area-wide DEM derivatives (a, b 
and θ) the “regional influence of topographic controls on shallow landsliding” can be 
assessed without any specific calibration (Montgomery et al., 1998; p. 943). Dietrich and 
Montgomery (1998) explain that SHALSTAB is not performing well in areas dominated 
by rocky outcrops or cliffs. Hence, an option is included to optionally exclude e.g. 
limestone outcrops and other lithological units as potential sources.   
Although much less used, the angle of reach principle can also be applied for the run out 
calculation of shallow landslides (e.g. Corominas et al., 2003) and thus the Flow-R model 
was applied in this case as well.  
 
Avalanches 
Maggioni and Gruber (2003) developed a methodology for the determination of potential 
release areas primarily based on topographic parameters which was simplified by 
Barbolini et al. (2011). For avalanche initiation a certain minimum slope angle is 
necessary to enable the movement, however, very steep slopes will not accumulate 
enough snow for avalanche formation. Thus, avalanches can be expected at slopes 
between a lower and an upper threshold angle. Specific land use types as especially dense 
forest that will stabilize the snow in the release area can be excluded as potential sources 
as well as ridges where too little snow accumulation can be assumed (identified by a 
curvature >1/100m and a change of aspect > 40°; see Maggioni (2004) for further detail).  
For the computation of the avalanche run out apart from the angle α which corresponds to 
the angle of reach further ones are in use. β is the angle of the avalanche track between 
source and the point of the slope with 10° (β point) and δ is the average angle of the run 
out zone between the β point and the stopping point of the avalanche (Bakkehøi et al., 
1983; Keylock, 2005). To keep the methodology simple the angle of reach and the α 
approach, respectively, was chosen and run out calculation is performed by means of 
Flow-R as well.  
 
Floods 
The simplest method to estimate floodplain inundations is the linear interpolation of a 
gauge water level in intersection with a DEM (Apel et al., 2009). Models representing 
hydrodynamic characteristics such as HEC-RAS, Sobek and others need more detailed 
information on channel geometry and roughness, hydrograph information etc. The 
ArcGIS extension FloodArea of Geomer (2008) offers both methods, the modeling on 
basis of a certain inundation depth or by means of a hydrograph and several more 
options. However, in the modeling scheme and the MultiRISK software only these two 
approaches were included and offer a choice based on data availability to 
calibrate/parameterize them. 
The combination of the previously described single-hazard models to one overall analysis 
scheme is challenging. However, it is evident that different natural hazard models require 
similar data, and therefore it is of major advantage to combine these models in a multi-
hazard analysis in order to gain synergies and consequently time-saving in a joint study. 
The flow chart of the resulting model set-up is presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Flow chart of the analysis scheme for rock fall, shallow landslides, debris flows, avalanches and 
floods. On basis of the DEM and optionally land use and lithology (in dark grey boxes on the left side) a 
multitude of derivatives such as slope, planar curvature or flow accumulation (medium grey boxes) are 
computed. They form the input for the models (light grey boxes with rounded edges) by means of which 
first the source areas are identified and second the run out is modeled (dashed lines). 
 
 
2.2. Validation 
Since comprehensive event inventories at a comparable quality and extent for a multitude 
of hazards are scarce, not only the calibration/parameterization of the models but also the 
validation has to be flexible concerning the input of information on past. Due to their 
simplicity, confusion matrices as described by Beguería (2006) and Carranza and Castro 
(2006) meet exactly this need. They are based on an overlay of the binary (yes/no) layer 
containing the modeling result with the layer of the recorded events. The models 
described in the previous section produce directly binary source maps while the run out 
computations yield spatial probability and kinetic energy, respectively, and the flood 
modeling outputs the inundation depth. Reclassifying the continuous results, binary maps 
were produced. Two options of validation of the modeled source and of validation of the 
complete area as a composite of the modeled sources and run out are given. However, 
especially in the case of shallow landslides, a clear differentiation between source area 
and run out is often very not possible. Therefore, a division in sources and complete area 
seems to be much more practical than to differentiate between sources and run out. 
Furthermore, river flooding cannot be subdivided into source and run out zone, however, 
the area susceptible to floods can be perfectly assigned to the complete category. 
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From the overlay of the modeling results and the recorded events four classes emerge. In 
these classes, the totality of pixels is classified and the numbers are depicted in a 
confusion matrix (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Confusion matrix according to Beguería (2006). Either the area [m2] or the area proportion [%] can 
be depicted in the cells. 
 
Observed  Yes No 
Yes  True positive (a) False positive (b) 
Predicted 
No False negative (c) True negative (d) 
 
The true positives refer to the recorded events which were correctly modeled as 
threatened while the false negatives draw attention to those zones which were missed by 
the model. The false positives, are de facto not errors but “cases highly propense to 
develop the dangerous characteristic in the future” (Beguería, 2006; p.322). The 
identification of these areas in which still no events took place but a high risk of future 
incidences exists, is the objective of hazard modeling. However, a too conservative 
modeling approach could lead to a strong overestimation of the actual threat, thus the 
proportion of false negatives should be compared to the proportion of true positives to 
better appraise the quality of the prediction. The true negatives are even more difficult to 
evaluate because in general inventories indicate only the recorded zones but not 
unsusceptible ones. Thus, the remaining area adjacent to the recorded events is not surely 
safe but events might simply not have been recorded or happened yet. However, this does 
not indicate a sure exclusion of the possibility that it could happen and consequently no 
true negatives exist in the strict sense of the term. 
On basis of the four classes of the confusion matrix (Table 2) Beguería (2006) proposes 
several quality indicators. Two of them were chosen for the multi-hazard context:  
 
Sensitivity:    a/(a+c )           Equation 4 
Positive Prediction Power: a/(a+b)    Equation 5 
 
While the sensitivity indicates, which proportion of the recorded events has been modeled 
correctly and which proportion not, respectively, the positive prediction power (PPP) 
serves as measure of the effectiveness of the susceptibility estimation. For instance a very 
high sensitivity might suggest a very good modeling result, however a coincident low 
PPP indicates an overestimation of the susceptible area. 
 
2.3. Exposure analysis  
The exposure is analyzed by overlaying the susceptibility footprints with the elements at 
risk and those elements situated within the susceptibility zones are marked. As for the 
validation two options are offered: the area susceptible to source instabilities and the 
complete susceptible area. Especially for the comparison with the elements exposed to 
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river flooding the complete options is very important, however, for shallow landsliding a 
significant difference exists between those houses situated on the slide and those possibly 
being hit by a slide. By offering both options (sources & complete) the specifics of 
landslides and floods are accounted for, as well as for the comparability between them. 
In accordance to overlay options and the feature classes available in ArcGIS three 
different exposure analyses are possible: 
1. Punctual, lineal or areal elements (points, lines or polygons) are uploaded and are 
treated as entire units: The element is identified as exposed if it intersects at least 
partly with the hazard area and the number of affected elements is counted. This is 
suitable for buildings uploaded as point or polygons, pylons etc. 
2. Linear elements (lines): The length of the line intersecting with the susceptible area is 
identified, marked and measured. This option is offered for the examination the 
exposure of lineal elements such as roads or water supply lines. 
3. Areal elements (polygons): The area intersecting with the hazard area is identified, 
marked measured. This option especially suits the analysis of built-up areas and land 
use units. 
 
2.4. Visualization scheme for the display of multi-hazard risk analysis 
results 
As identified in the review of Kappes et al. (subm.), the visualization of the multi-
dimensional result of a multi-hazard risk analyses poses an exceptional challenge. Several 
options to depict the different facets of the output have been identified in this contribution 
(refer to Kappes et al. (subm.) for details):  
 Visualization of susceptibility, full-hazard, exposure or risk of each single hazard 
separately and in detail (e.g. Dilley et al., 2005; Bell, 2002; Odeh Engineers, Inc, 
2001). This option allows discovering and recognizing single-hazard patterns without 
confusing the map reader with too much information. 
 Visualization of the overlay of several hazards (e.g. Bell, 2002; UN-ISDR, 2009a). 
This form of display has the special potential to indicate the areas where hazards 
overlap. However, the number of hazards which can be included is limited since an 
overloading with too much information may lead to confusion. 
 Visualization of the number of overlapping hazards (e.g. Odeh Engineers, Inc, 2001). 
This visualization form offers a clear focus on the identification of zones susceptible 
to several processes mentioning just the number of overlapping hazards without 
running the risk to get chaotic or unclear. 
The previously mentioned options were adopted and used as the core of a visualization 
scheme which communicates step by step the different aspects and results of the multi-
hazard exposure analysis: 
1. General setting: Display of basic information on the area as the input data of the 
hazard models (e.g. slope, curvature, lithology, land use/cover etc.) and others. The 
user gets the possibility to become acquainted with the area and its characteristics. 
2. Single hazards: Single-hazard susceptibility outputs are visualized separately (refer 
to explanation above).  
3. Overlapping hazards: Overlay of up to three hazards. No details are given on the 
single hazards, only the footprints are shown to not confuse the map reader.   
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4. Number of hazards: To give the full overlay information but not confuse the reader 
the number of overlapping hazards is shown without depicting the type of hazards 
summing up to this number. 
5. Past events: Visualization of the uploaded records of past events which were used for 
the validation. The user gets the opportunity to observe the distribution, coverage and 
patterns of recorded past events.  
6. Validation: Visualization of the overlay of records and modeling result for each 
single hazard separately. The distribution of true positives and false negatives may 
indicate situations the model can account for very well and others it cannot. 
Furthermore, the pattern of those zones which have not been affected until now (or at 
least no events have been recorded) but might in the future be hit, the false positive, 
manifests. 
7. Exposed elements: Depiction of the elements exposed to each of the single process 
separately, plotted together with the susceptibility information of the respective 
hazard.  
 
3. The MultiRISK Platform 
3.1. MultiRisk Modeling Tool 
Due to the large number of single steps (Figure 2) and the, therefore, time-consuming and 
error-prone performance of a multi-hazard analysis, the whole procedure was automated 
in the software called MultiRISK Modeling Tool. MultiRISK is programmed in Python 
accessing ArcGIS 9.x toolboxes and offers a graphical user interface for the 
straightforward operation. The single models are implemented either by activation of 
external software as in case of the Matlab-programmed stand-alone software Flow-R, 
direct inclusion as in case of the ArcGIS toolbox FloodArea or programming in Python 
on basis of ArcGIS tools of the ArcToolbox as in case of e.g. the source identification 
method after Maggioni (2004). The user is guided through the single steps of the three 
main components of the Modeling Tool, the hazard modeling (first column in Figure 3. 
For an overview over the parameters to be chosen refer to Table 3), the hazard model 
validation and the exposure analysis. If already a hazard analysis has been carried out, the 
tool offers the upload of this project and the subsequent performance of any of the three 
further steps (see bended arrows in Figure 3). After having finished the multi-hazard 
exposure analysis the preparation of the MultiRISK Visualization can directly be 
launched to view the results thereafter.  
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Figure 3 Flow chart of the MultiRISK Modeling Tool.  
 
The preparation primarily implies the copying of all result files in a previously defined 
folder from which the Visualization Tool obtains the information for display. The 
following files can be produced during the analysis procedure: 
 Hazard modeling: Source and run out files are written for avalanches, rock falls, 
debris flows, and shallow landslides while only one file for the complete area 
susceptible to floods is saved (rasters - max. 9 files). 
 Validation: The sources and/or the complete area (sources + run out) can be validated. 
Thus, for all hazards except flood two files can be produced (shape files - max. 9 
files). 
 Exposure: Exposure to source instability or to the complete process area can be 
computed, for floods only the complete option applies (shape files - max. 9 files). 
 Overlapping hazards, result of the intersection of all five complete hazard footprints 
(polygon shape file - one file). 
 Number of hazards resulting from the overlay of all five complete hazard footprints 
(raster - one files). 
In order to not burden the user with the naming of the many output files the names are 
generated automatically according to a modular terminology. Appended to the user-
defined project name (max. 7 letters), extensions referring to the process (_av for 
avalanches or _rf for rock fall), to the area (_s for sources, _r for run out and _c for 
complete) and to the analyses carried out (_val for validation) are added. Consequently, 
the VALidation result of the Complete area susceptible to AValanches for a project 
called Barcelo would be named Barcelo_av_val_c (for more detail refer to Kappes, 
2011). All files are saved in the project folder defined by the user in the very beginning of 
the analysis.  
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3.2. MultiRISK Visualization Tool 
The visualization has been automated to prevent the user from having to open each of the 
max. 29 result files in ArcGIS and define colors, patterns and symbols. Additionally, the 
contemplation of the outcome in such an application does not require GIS and 
cartography experience and enables in this way the presentation of the results to a broader 
audience. The Visualization Tool is designed with the comprehensive and free Web-GIS 
framework CartoWeb and is embedded in a MapServer engine. The final tool is 
accessible by the user with a standard internet browser. Currently it is applied in a local 
host environment but can be modified in the future to be published in the internet, 
potentially also considering different user groups and respective access to the various 
data sets. It is structured in different switches, i.e. interactive maps, according to the 
visualization scheme previously presented (Figure 4): 
1. General settings: land use/cover information, lithology, slope and planar curvature are 
presented and can be examined since they form the basis for the modeling. According 
to user needs further information of interest could be additionally included in the 
future. 
2. Single hazards: Only one hazard is shown at the time, but in detail, i.e. the source 
susceptibility (binary, yes/no) and the run out susceptibility (spatial probability with 
values between 0 and 1) of debris flows, rock fall, shallow landslides or avalanches or 
the susceptibility to river floods expressed as inundation depth. The color scheme is 
adopted from the Swiss “Symbolbaukasten” of Kienholz and Krummenacher (1995).  
3. Overlapping hazards: A maximum of three hazards can be shown simultaneously. 
The overlapping areas are displayed as combinations of the colors and patterns of the 
respective hazards. 
4. Number of hazards: The number of hazards is displayed with the option to enquire by 
means of a spatial query which hazards combine to the respective number. 
5. Past events: The records on past events which were uploaded for the validation are 
presented. 
6. Validation: The true positives, areas which were correctly identified as threatened; the 
false negatives, areas for which events were recorded but which could not be modeled 
as hazardous; and the false positive, zones which were modeled as potentially 
hazardous and might in the future be affected by events are visualized. By clicking on 
a hyperlink an additional tab opens showing the confusion matrix as table indicating 
the area in m2. 
7. Exposure: For one hazard at a time the susceptibility zones, either source or complete 
area, are depicted together with the highlighted exposed elements. By clicking on a 
hyperlink an additional tab opens with the number of e.g. buildings (entire elements), 
length of e.g. infrastructure and/or e.g. built-up area (proportion of polygons) 
exposed. 
Basic information is offered for display in each tab and includes hillshade, buildings, 
infrastructure, build up areas and water courses. 
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Figure 4 Screenshot of the Visualization Tool. The following descriptions refer to the red numbers in the 
graphic: 1) Layers tree, managed by the user. According to predefined options layers can be switched on, 
off, overlain etc. 2) Tabs for query, printing and online guide. 3) Map area and key map visualization. 4) 
Tools for cartographic interaction as zoom in/out, spatial query etc. 5) Scale and map size customization. 6) 
Tabs to access the different interactive maps. 
 
4. Case study: An Exposure Analysis in Barcelonnette, France, 
considering multi-hazards 
To test the practicalness and user-friendliness of the MultiRISK Platform a case study has 
been performed in the Barcelonnette basin. Moreover, the ability of the multi-hazard 
exposure analysis scheme to account for challenges arising in the multi-hazard context is 
examined.  
4.1. The Barcelonnette Basin 
The Barcelonnette basin is located in the southern French Alps in the Département Alpes 
des Haute Provence. It covers the major part of the community of Communes “Vallé de 
l’Ubaye”, an alliance of eight communities with a population of approximately 6500 
inhabitants. The valley varies between an altitude of 1,100 and 3,100 m and is drained by 
the Ubaye river. A large number of torrents flow in this river (see Figure 5). It exhibits 
(1) a mountain climate with pronounced inter-annual rainfall variability (735 ± 400 mm) 
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and 130 freezing days per year, (2) continental influence with large intra-day thermal 
amplitudes (>20°) and multitudinous freeze-thaw cycles and (3) Mediterranean influence 
with summer rainstorms providing occasionally more than 50mm/h (Flageollet et al., 
1999; Maquaire et al., 2003; Kappes et al., 2011). Apart from summer rainstorms, heavy 
precipitation onto melting snow accumulations in spring result in high discharge 
(Flageollet et al., 1999). Meso-climatic differences emerge due to the East-West 
orientation of the valley, especially between the north- and south-facing slopes. 
Geologically, the valley presents a structural window with autochtonous Callovo-
Oxfordian black marls (the ‘Terres Noires’) below allochtonous Autapie and Parpaillon 
flysch (Évin, 1997; Maquaire et al., 2003). 
The geological setting is reflected in the specific morphology. The upper slopes between 
1,900 and 3,000 m a.s.l. are composed by thrust sheets of cataclastic calcareous 
sandstones and exhibit slope angles steeper than 45°. These slopes are partly covered by 
layers of non-consolidated debris with thickness ranging between 0.5 and 5 m. The lower 
slopes from 1,100 to 1,900 m a.s.l. consist of Callovo-Oxfordian black marls, fragile 
plates and flakes in a clayey matrix are much gentler with slope angles between 10 and 
30°. These slopes are mostly covered by quaternary deposits as poorly sorted debris at 
taluses, moraine deposits or landslide material (Kappes et al., 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Presentation of the study area indicating the principal settlements and catchments (in blue letters). 
 
The situation and the specific characteristics of the basin give rise to the occurrence of 
several natural hazards. A large number of river floods produced by the Ubaye are 
recorded with major events in 1856 and 1957 (Le Carpentier, 1963; Sivan, 2000). 
Likewise the torrents are very active, Remaître (2006) collected information of 
approximately 100 debris flows and 461 flash floods in the period between 1850 and 
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2004. Three large earthflows (Super Sauze, La Vallette and Poche) pose a threat of 
possible unexpected mobilization and release of debris flows (Malet et al., 2004). In the 
year 2000 about 250 active rotational and translational landslides were mapped by Thiery 
et al. (2004). Although rock falls occur predominantly in the higher parts of the valley, 
also several low-lying regions, as for example in the municipality of Jausiers, are 
threatened (RTM, 2000). The avalanche inventories of the “Enquête Permanente sur les 
Avalanches” (EPA) and “Les Donnees de la Carte de Localisation des Phéonoènes 
d’Avalanche” (CLPA, MEDD) indicate a rather high avalanche activity. As in the case of 
rock falls,, however, their concentrated is in the upper zone of e.g. the Riou Bourdoux 
and the Sanières catchment or in uninhabited catchments as the Abries. 
In France the prefect of each “Département” is instructed to demand the elaboration of 
risk prevention plan (formerly a Plan d’Exposition aux Risques Naturels - PER, now a 
Plan de Prevention des Risques Previsibles - PPR) from all municipalities at risk from 
natural hazards. Due to the hazard situation in the Barcelonnette basin, all municipalities 
have to elaborate such a plan and the zoning is incorporated in the spatial planning. The 
plans indicate areas of high and medium risk in which no or only under the consideration 
of specific requirements new constructions can be built. The determination of the zones is 
the result of a combination of modeling, records of past events and expert judgement and 
covers only the settled areas. 
4.2. Input data 
A digital elevation model (DEM) with a resolution of 10 m was interpolated from the 
digitized contour lines and breaklines of channels of the 1:10.000 topographic maps from 
IGN (Institut Géographique National). Scanning and georeferencing of the maps have 
been carried out by Thiery et al. (2007). The interpolation was realized with the software 
program SURFER using a kriging method on the basis of the semivariogram elaborated 
by Thiery (2007). The resulting DEM was smoothened by 9-nodes averaging and sinks 
were filled. Furthermore, a second DEM, or to be more precise a digital terrain model 
(DTM), on basis of airborne interferometric synthetic aperture radar (IFSAR) with a 
resolution of 5 m derived form an initial digital surface model (DSM) is available. On the 
slopes the quality of the DGM is clearly better because the DTM was produced by 
filtering out the forest, a procedure that leads to strong smoothing of the respective areas. 
In the flood plain and especially in the river channel, itself the quality of the DTM is 
much higher since on the one hand the distance of the elevation lines which formed the 
basis of the DEM are very sparse while on the other hand no forest cover interfers the 
radar image. Thus, the DEM was used for the processes primarily happening on the 
slopes (debris flows, rock falls, shallow landslides and avalanches) while for the flood 
modeling the DTM was employed. 
On basis of the aerial photographs of the year 2000, the land use was digitized and 
classified into dense coniferous forest, coniferous forest of average to low density, 
deciduous forest, natural grassland, arable land/permanent crops, pastures, bare rock, bare 
soil, urban areas, mining sites, water courses and marshes and water bodies by Bordonné 
(2008). The information on the lithology was digitized from the geological map 
(1:50,000) constituting the following ten classes (Bordonné, 2008): marls, torrential 
alluvium, limestone, boulder fields, talus slopes, flysch, gypsum, lacustrine deposits, 
calcareous marls and moraines.  
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With respect to elements at risk, databases with the footprints of all buildings, outline of 
the settled areas and infrastructure (roads and paths) was at disposal from the LIVE 
institute (Laboratoire Image, Ville, Environment) of CNRS, University of Strasbourg. 
With respect to past events the following information is available: 
 Debris flows: Envelopes (polygons) of the deposition of the debris-flow events 
observed in 1996, 2002 and 2003 at the Faucon, Sanières and Bourget torrents based 
on post-event field observations (Remaître, 2006). For the 2003 event in the Faucon 
catchment the full process area is available (source, transport and deposition). 
 Shallow landslides: Out of the landslide inventory of Thiery (2007) and Thiery et al. 
(2007), compiled at a scale of 1:10,000 on basis of literature analyses, aerial photo 
interpretation and field surveys those records referring to translational (debris) slides 
were extracted. A limitation of this inventory is its restriction to the eastern part of the 
study area, from Faucon and Galamonds to the east. 
 Rock fall: As for shallow landslides also for rock fall records taken out from the 
landslide inventory of Thiery (2007). This information was merged with the rock fall 
zones indicated by the PPR of Jausiers (RTM, 2000). 
 Avalanches: The CLPA inventory (Les Donnees de la Carte de Localisation des 
Phéonomènes d’Avalanche, (MEDD) provides information on terrain observations 
and photo-interpretation results for the south-eastern part of the study area comprising 
primarily the north-facing slopes (parts of the Bachelard catchment, Galamonds, 
Bramafan Riou Versant and Abries nearly completely). 
 Flood: No spatial information on the extent of past events is available. Thus, the flood 
risk zones indicated in the different PPRs (RTM, 2000, 2002, 2008) were put together 
and used for the flood model validation. From the hydrological reports after IDEALP 
and Hydroetudes (2008), IDEALP and Hydroetudes (2010) information about the 
100a discharge values of the Ubaye at five points between Jausiers and Barcelonnette 
was derived.  
 
4.3. Hazard-modeling - parameter choice 
The calibration or parameterization of a model is a very difficult task, especially in a 
multi-hazard setting. To enable the comparison of the exposure to single-hazards the 
reference of the analyses has to be synchronized primarily. The reference relates to 
qualitative or quantitative scenarios as medium-frequency events, events with a 100-year 
return period, high-magnitude events, worst-case or the like. The selection of parameters 
or the model calibration for such scenarios can either be based on statistical inventory 
analyses, expert knowledge or on literature review of comparable studies and transfer of 
the parameter values. A challenge all options share in the multi-hazard environment is the 
unequal availability of information for the different hazards:  
 Inventories hold much more information on frequently occurring hazard types having 
affected settled areas and might completely underestimate very rare processes.  
 Experts have in very few cases a profound background concerning a wide range of 
different hazards.  
 Literature of studies with very similar conditions is not for any constellation and for 
any hazard equally available. 
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Although the Barcelonnette basin has been investigated for many years by many 
scientists, not enough inventory data is available to calibrate all five processes without 
further detailed literature examination, field surveys and photo interpretation. Thus in this 
study, in accordance with the objective to facilitate the computation of a fast and simple 
approximation without high data requirements the computation of worst-case scenarios1 
has been chosen. Based on the literature of comparable settings, parameter values are 
chosen which are related to the largest recorded events or methodologies selected to 
estimate these parameter values empirically. Consequently, no inventory data is needed 
for the calibration but can, if available, be fully used for the validation. Scientific journals 
and reports were searched for the necessary input parameters and always the value 
(rounded) leading to the largest area identified as threatened was chosen. In the 
following, the examined literature is presented shortly (see Table 4 for a listing of the, in 
MultiRISK required, parameters and the values finally selected on basis of the literature 
review): 
Debris flows:  
Sources: For the identification of gullies for debris flow initiation a planar curvature of < 
-2/100 m was adopted as proposed by Horton et al. (2008). Between rare and extreme 
fitting the second one was chosen because in case of small upslope areas it also assumes 
the existence of a source without very steep slope angles. Areas of outcropping limestone 
can, with high probability, be excluded as potential sources.  
Run out: Rickenmann and Zimmermann (1993) mapped about 800 debris flow events 
triggered in the Swiss Alps during intense rainstorms in the summer of 1987 and 
identified a minimum slope angle of nearly 11°. Bathurst et al. (1997) mention an angle 
of about 0.2 (~11°) for Japan according to personal communication with Takahashi in 
1995. Huggel et al. (2002) established a worst-case angle of reach for debris flows 
resulting from glacier lake outbursts. Reviewing a quantity of cases in the Alps and 
Canada, they fitted a curve to the angle of reach as function of the maximum discharge 
and assessed a threshold angle of 11°. Zimmermann et al. (1997) studied a set of debris 
flows especially in the Swiss Alps and found a minimum average slope angle of 0.2 
(~11°) for coarse and middle-granular debris flows and 0.12 (~7°) for fine-grained debris 
flows. Prochaska et al. (2008) identified, reviewing a large quantity of investigations, a 
minimum angle of reach of 6.5°. The lowest value detected, 7° rounded, was adopted for 
the worst-case modeling. 
Rock falls:  
Sources: Guzzetti et al. (2003) identified a slope angle threshold of 60° for Cretaceous 
granitic rocks, including granite, granodiorite and diorite for a 10 m DEM-resolution. 
Ayala-Carcedo et al. (2003) worked with 45° in a granitic paleozoic zone for 5 m 
distance elevation lines and Jaboyedoff and Labiouse (2003) determined an angle of 40° 
for local and 45° for regional analyses for a valley in Vaud, Switzerland, consisting of 
carbonates. Wichmann and Becht (2003) used an angle of 40° for two catchments in the 
Northern Limestone Alps, Germany, with a DEM resolution of 5 m and Frattini et al. 
(2008) applied an angle of 37° for an area composed by sandstones and carbonate rocks 
intermitted by intrusive and effusive rocks and a DEM resolution of 10 m. Since material 
and DEM resolution fit, the lowest identified angle of 37° was adopted for the rock fall 
source modeling under exclusion of outcropping black marls and clays. 
                                                 
1 Worst-case is in this study defined as an event of very high magnitude and rather low frequency. 
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Run out: Rickli et al. (1994) distinguish the angle of reach according to the resistance and 
the size of the blocks: 33° for small rocks if the resistance is low and the underground 
smooth or the blocks are larger, resistance is high and the underground is not smooth, 35° 
for middle to small blocks and 37° for small ones with high resistance and no smooth 
underground. For the Solà d’Andorra la Vella (granodiorite and hornfels), a statistical 
analysis of a set of past events resulted in the 90, 99 and 99.9 percentiles at 41.3°, 39.5° 
and 36.9°, respectively (Copons and Vilaplana, 2008; Copons et al., 2009). Jaboyedoff 
and Labiouse (2003) applied in their study an angle of reach of 33° (carbonates) and 
Domaas (1985, cited by Toppe, 1987), detected, that 95% of the rockfalls stop within an 
angle of 32°. Onofri and Candian (1979, cited in Jaboyedoff, 2003) assume 100% of rock 
fall events within the 28.5° run out. The lowest slope angle was 28.5° and thus the 
rounded value of 29° was applied in this study. 
Shallow landslides:  
Sources: Concerning the parameterization of SHALSTAB, Real de Asua et al. (2000) 
suggest for comparison purposes standard values of 1,700 kg/m3 for the bulk density and 
45° for the friction angle. With this high friction angle Real de Asua et al. (2000) attempt 
to compensate the negligence of factors as the root strength of forest and understory as 
well as for the elimination of cohesion (Real de Asua et al., 2000; Montgomery and 
Dietrich, 1994; Dietrich et al., 1998). However, for a worst-case scenario, the assumption 
of area-wide stabilization due to these effects is not meeting the objective of identifying 
all susceptible areas. Montgomery et al. (1998) applied a friction angle of 33° and 
Meisina and Scarabelli (2006) used an angle of 28° which was adopted for this study. For 
the determination of the critical steady state rainfall a study on rainfall thresholds for 
shallow landslides and debris flows in the Barcelonnette basin carried out by Remaître 
et al. (2010) has been consulted. Since the landslide threshold values are much more 
influenced by antecedent rainfall than the debris flow values, Alexandre Remaître 
(personal communication, 14.02.2011) recommends to use debris flow thresholds and 
advises daily rainfall values of 30-50 mm/day on basis of a database of past records 
(Remaître et al., 2010) The lower value of 30 mm/day was adopted for this study. For 
areas without comparable information the web page of the “Istituto di Ricerca per la 
Protezione Idrogeologica” (IRPI) gives an overview on general rainfall thresholds and 
can perfectly serve as first orientation in cases for which no statistical analyses have been 
carried out.  
Run out: The angle of reach is rarely used for the shallow landslide run out computation 
and only few studies were detected. Corominas (1996) mentions a tangent of the angle of 
reach of less than 0.8 (about 39°) for all recorded shallow landslides in his inventory. 
Corominas et al. (2003) assume in their study 26° (30°) for small <800m3, 22° (25°) for 
medium 800-2000m3 and 20° (23°) for large slides >2000m3 for unobstructed 
(obstructed) paths. On basis of the scarce literature detected, a constant friction loss angle 
of 20° was assumed.  
Avalanches:  
Sources: In accordance with Maggioni (2004) hillsides with a slope between 30° and 60° 
were chosen while densely forested regions were excluded. Ridges are automatically 
excluded in MultiRISK. 
Run out: According to McClung and Schaerer (1993) the run out angle of avalanches 
ranges between 15° and 50° while Liévois (2003) mentions a span between 55° and 28-
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30°, in exceptional cases even as low as 20° for slush-flows. Lied and Bakkehøi (1980) 
investigated 423 avalanches and observed values between 18° and 50° with a mean value 
of 33°. Hereby, 95% show a gradient greater than 23° and about 75% greater than 27°. 
Mc Clung et al. (1989) investigated four mountain ranges and found for the set of 100 
year avalanches a minimum angle of 14° (the Sierra Nevada) and a maximum of 42° 
(Western Norway). McClung and Lied (1987) investigated 212 avalanches and found a 
range of 18-49° with a mean of 30.3°. Barbolini et al. (2011) calculated an average slope 
angle of 27.3° with a standard deviation of 5.1° for an inventory of 2004 extreme 
avalanches in the Italian mountain range (Alps and Apennines). The lowest detected 
angle of 14° was adopted for this study.  
Flood:  
A parameter value choice, as for the previous processes, is not possible in the case of 
floods because the maximum possible discharge values or inundation depths depend 
stronger then in case of the previous processes on the specific setting. An equivalent of a 
worst-case run-out is presumably the probable maximum flood (PMF) which is defined 
by Francés and Botero (2003; p.223) as the “biggest flood physically possible in a 
specific catchment”. The PMF can be computed on basis of the probable maximum 
precipitation and a precipitation-runoff model as proposed in Ely and Peters (1984) or 
alternatively empirically by means of statistical analyses of discharge time series (Francés 
and Botero, 2003). An alternative concept to the PMF is the extreme flood, defined by the 
CEC (2006) and in the Flood Assessment and Management Directive (EP and EC, 2007) 
as an event of low probability and, as the term indicates, of very high magnitude. The 
ways to compute extreme floods differ widely but are in general more pragmatic and 
exhibit lower data requirements than the methods used for the PMF:  
 Assumption of a certain return period of the extreme flood: Ruiz Rodriguez + Zeisler 
et al. (2001) use the 1,250-10,000-year return period for the flood modeling of the 
Rhine-delta. Bründl (2008) applies for a case study of the river Lonza at the 
communities Gampel and Steg in the Canton Wallis the 1,000-year event as an 
extreme flood.  
 Increase of a certain flood scenario by a defined inundation depth as extreme value 
addition (Extremwertzuschlag; UVM, 2005): UVM (2005) propose the 100-year or 
200-year flood + x m, for one partition of the Oder the 200-year flood + 1 m is used 
(OderRegio, 2006) and for the extreme flood computation for several parts of the 
Rhine, Ruiz Rodriguez + Zeisler et al. (2001) applied the 200-year flood + 0.5 m.  
 Multiplication of a certain discharge scenario by a defined factor: the practitioners 
having participated in the workshop on risk management of alpine torrents and rivers 
Klumpp and Hörmann (2010) defined the threshold for acceptable residual risk which 
corresponds to the extreme event of the EU flood directive to 100-year flood × 1.6. 
This method is also frequently used for the designing of spillways as shown in the 
study of the TU Wien (2009) and in rivershed analyses (André Assmann, personal 
communication). Hydrotec (2009) used for identification of areas beyond the flood 
protection goal for the Solmsbach the 100-year flood × 1.3. 
The methods to assess the PMF are rather sophisticated and data-demanding and for the 
statistical computation of a very low frequency scenario as e.g. a 10,000-year event an 
extensive inventory is necessary, if such estimations are, on basis of rather short-period 
inventories, possible at all. The increase of a certain flood scenario by a defined 
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inundation depth depends strongly on the specific morphology and is not really 
transferable to other regions. Furthermore, this method is also very problematic if 
channeled and braided river sections alternate as it is the case in the Barcelonnette basin. 
Therefore, the multiplication of a comparably frequent and thus better assessable event 
(100-year event) with a certain factor was chosen to determine the discharge of the 
extreme flood which is assumed to be a suitable equivalent to the worst-case modeling of 
the other hazards. The modeling was run for 48 h at the constant discharge of the 100-
year flood × 1.6 to achieve a steady state flooding. 
In Table 3 an overview of the parameters to be defined in the MultiRISK Modeling Tool 
and the values assumed for the worst-case analysis in the Barcelonnette basin are 
compiled.  
 
Table 3 Summary of the parameters to be defined in the software for the modeling of the different hazards 
and the selection made for the case study 
 
 Source Run out 
 Parameters Values chosen Parameters Values chosen 
Debris flow Planar curvature threshold 
Slope angle - upslope area 
threshold 
Land use/cover & lithological 
units to be excluded 
< -2/100 m-1 
Extreme 
fitting 
Outcropping 
limestone 
Holmgren exponent 
 
Angle of reach (= constant 
friction loss angle) 
1 
 
7° 
 
Rock falls Slope threshold 
Land use/cover & lithological 
units to be excluded 
37° 
Outcropping 
marls & clays 
Holmgren exponent 
 
Angle of reach 
1 
 
29° 
Shallow 
landslides 
Soil bulk density 
Slope threshold (friction angle) 
Critical rainfall threshold 
Lithological units to be 
excluded 
1,700 kgm3 
28° 
30 mm 
Outcropping 
limestone 
Holmgren exponent 
 
Angle of reach 
1 
 
20° 
Avalanches  Slope threshold 
Land use/cover units to be 
excluded 
30-60° 
 
Dense forest 
Holmgren exponent 
 
Angle of reach 
1 
 
14° 
River flood Hydrograph, 100-year flood * 1.6, 48 h duration 
 
4.4. Validation and exposure analysis 
The validation has been carried out for the complete susceptible areas by means of the 
inventory information described in the input data section. No use has been made of the 
option to validate the sources susceptibilities separately since respective inventory 
information is lacking. 
The exposure analysis has been performed for the available building database while the 
buildings are treated as entire units. Likewise the exposure of infrastructure and settled 
areas was examined, however, in these cases the fractions exposed were quantified. 
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4.5. Results and Discussion 
 
If the input is prepared and the parameters are determined, the setup of the model takes 
about 5 minutes (definition of the project folder and name, upload of the input files and 
entering of the parameters). With the choice of the quick mode for the run out 
calculations the modeling ran in total about 50 hours2 whereof the hazard analysis, and 
more precisely the run out computation, took most of the time. The duration is dependent 
on the number of sources identified, e.g. the more source pixels are considered, the longer 
is the computation time. The complete modeling takes much longer as the values in 
brackets behind the duration of the quick analysis indicate (Table 4). Thus with the 
present computer specifications, it is not a really flexible method while the quick run 
serves, as comparisons indicated, very well. Hence, the modeling has been carried out in 
the quick mode. The data preparation, derivative production and source identification of 
all processes lasted for about 20 min in total. The validation for all five processes took 
about 5 minutes and the exposure analysis around 5 minutes as well. The preparation of 
the data for the visualization accounted for another max. 10 minutes. 
 
Hazard analysis 
The results indicate the largest susceptible area for snow avalanches with over 200 km2, 
directly followed by shallow landslides with almost 200 km2 (Table 4). Rock falls (~87 
km2) and debris flows (~63 km2) affect a much smaller region and river floods exhibit the 
smallest susceptibility zone with only about 11 km2, however, located in the most densely 
populated region. This area distribution is partly a result of the repartition between slopes, 
which occupy the largest proportion and are prone to debris flows, rock falls, shallow 
landslides and avalanches, and flood plains, prone to river floods, in the study site. 
However, also the process characteristics are of a major relevance, e.g. debris flows are 
spatially not as extensive as snow avalanches. Finally also the parameterizations exert a 
great influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Computer specifications: Intel® Core(TM)2 CPU 6400 @ 2.13GHz, 2.13 GHz, 3.25 GB RAM, Windows 
XP. 
250
Articles
 -24- 
Table 4 Overview over the analysis results for the processes debris flows (DF), rock fall (RF), shallow 
landslides (SL), avalanches (AV) and floods (FL). TP - true positives, FP - false negatives, FN - false 
negatives and TN - true negatives. 
 
Exposure to 
sources Exposure complete  
Quick 
(complete) 
[h] 
Complete area 
susceptible              
(% of the whole area) 
[m2] 
Validation of the 
complete susc. area: 
TP, FP, FN, (TN) [m2] Nr. of buildings [-] -Road length [m] - 
Settled area [m2] 
DF ~1 (36) → run out 
62,995,900 
(17%) 
210,936 0.06% 
62,784,964 16.90% 
42,259 0.01% 
(308,442,833) 83.03% 
1 
463 
225 
1,143 
110,911 
1,249,831 
RF ~4 (11) → run out 
86,629,178 
(23%) 
555,834 0.15% 
86,073,344 23.17% 
53,328 0.01% 
284,798,486 76.67% 
10 
6,638 
4,389 
49 
40,081 
34,765 
SL 10 (~336) → run out 
195,782,092 
(53%) 
503,463 0.14% 
195,278,465 52.57% 
40,394 0.01% 
(175,658,670) 47.29% 
297 
104,327 
157,803 
872 
228,825 
651,148 
AV 
~10 
(>340) 
→ run out 
212,672,507 
(57%) 
49,144,230 13.23% 
163,528,277 44.02% 
2,377,168 0.64% 
(156,431,317) 42.11% 
36 
18,111 
11,628 
1,633 
254,718 
1,684,640 
FL ~24  10,447,502 (3%) 
3,366,192 0.91% 
7,081,310 1.91% 
296,430 0.08% 
(360737060) 97.11% 
1,319 
64,419 
1,902,747 
 
In Figure 6 examples for the presentation of the results of hazard modeling step in the 
MultiRISK Visualization Tool are given. The produced information is shown in three 
different shifts, first the single hazards are displayed, secondly the overlay of three 
hazards and finally the number of hazards with the option to spatially query the 
underlying processes. The map depicting the number of overlapping hazards (Figure 6 at 
the bottom) indicates a high potential of the coincidence of two, three or even four 
hazards, especially on the slopes. Especially the upper slopes are prone to three or four 
processes while the torrent channels at lower altitudes unite mostly only two hazards. 
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Figure 6 Examples for the presentation of the hazard modeling results in the MultiRISK 
Visualization Tool (Note: The brown colors in the lower graphic refer to the number of hazards in 
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Validation  
The sensitivity of all five hazards is rather high with at least 83% in case of debris flows 
and up to 95% for avalanches (Table 5). This means, between 83% and 95% of the 
recorded events are covered by the corresponding hazard modeling results. However, a 
very high sensitivity is to be expected in a worst-case analysis which aims at indicating 
all susceptible areas. In return, a rather low positive prediction power (PPP) can be 
suspected for worst-case scenarios and indeed the good sensitivity results are relativized 
by PPP values below 1% for debris flows and rock falls followed by shallow landslides 
with about 7%. Additionally to the very conservative modeling approach that underlies 
worst-case studies, the inventories of these three processes are particularly small and 
result consequently in low proportions of true positives and low PPP. 
 
Table 5 Presentation of the proportions of TN, FP and FN as well as the quality indicators sensitivity (SY) 
and positive prediction power (PPP) of the modeling results. The highest value for category is marked light 
grey. 
 DF RF SL AV FL 
TP 0.06% 0.15% 0.14% 13.23% 0.91% 
FN 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.64% 0.08% 
FP 16.9% 23.17% 52.57% 44.02% 1.91% 
SY 83.31% 91.25% 92.57% 95.39% 91.91% 
PPP 0.33% 0.64% 7.43% 23.11% 32.22% 
 
The positive prediction power of avalanches is with ~23% only exceeded by the flood 
result with ~32%. The same two processes exhibit also the highest sensitivity values. 
However, the validation results cannot be interpreted without considering the hazard type 
and its specific characteristics (cf. Figure 7). The overall area potentially susceptible to 
e.g. river flooding is probably to a much higher percentage already covered by few 
records of past events since river floods take place in the mostly definite area of the flood 
plain. By contrast, the area e.g. susceptible to the occurrence of shallow landslides is 
much less restricted to a certain region as a flood plain and additionally landslides will 
not recur but only reactivate.  
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Figure 7 Maps of the validation result 
 
This means, the false positive proportion of shallow landslides is most probably always 
higher than for floods due to the process characteristics. Consequently, PPP values 
achievable for flood modeling are probably not realistic for shallow landslide models. 
Furthermore, floods, avalanches, rock falls and debris flows are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, recurring events while shallow landslides may be reactivated but do rarely occur 
in the same or a very similar location as for the first time failure. These different aspects 
complicate a clear ranking of the modeling result. 
For the present study a clear quality difference is notable, at least between the avalanche 
and flood modeling results with comparatively high sensitivity and the outcome of the 
rock falls, debris flows and shallow landslides computation. However, a more detailed 
ranking is difficult and depends on the weighting of sensitivity versus the PPP or the FN 
versus TP and objective of the analysis procedure, respectively. For all hazards an 
overestimation of the actually susceptible area can be assumed due to the way the values 
for the model parameterization were obtained. Especially the susceptibility of 53% and 
57% of the study area to shallow landslides and avalanches suggests an unrealistic 
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modeling result. However, the validation based on mostly rather small inventories does 
not enable a clear judgement. 
In summary, confusion matrices proved well-utilizable in a multi-hazard context. 
However, each single validation result has to be interpreted carefully under consideration 
of the process specificities, the inventory size etc. and also the comparison between 
process validations has to be done with caution.  
 
Exposure 
The lowest exposure results from rock fall with only ~40 km of roads and paths, 49 
buildings and 34,765 m2 of settled area, respectively (Table 4). In contrast, the highest 
numbers exhibit debris flows, floods and avalanches with far more than 1,000 buildings 
exposed. Especially due to river flooding to which only about 3% of the study area is 
susceptible, a very high exposure arises which originates from the close vicinity of many 
cities and villages to the river course. On the contrary, shallow landslides cover more 
than 50% of the area but the exposure concerning buildings and built-up area amounts to 
less than half of the one of avalanches. In Figure 8 an example for the visualization of the 
exposures in MultiRISK is given. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Screenshot of the visualization of exposed elements in the MultiRISK Visualization Tool - 
exposure to debris flows. 
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Summarizing, the analysis of the Barcelonnette case study using the software tool 
MultiRISK proved much more comfortable, user-friendly and much less error-prone than 
the separate modeling of all single steps, previous attempts to step by step perform the 
analysis enabled the authors to come to this conclusion. By means of literature review 
complemented by few expert advices and statistical analyses a worst-case 
parameterization followed by hazard model validation and exposure assessment could be 
carried out. Although an overestimation of the susceptible area has to be strongly 
assumed, long time- and resource-consuming data acquisition has been avoided. 
However, the applicability and usefulness of such an approach for a very first 
approximation of an unknown area has to be examined in future studies together with 
stakeholders. 
5. Overall Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this study the development of a modeling and a visualization scheme was presented, 
their automation in software tools outlined and a case study performed. Thereby, many 
challenges and additional aspects arising in a multi-hazard context were faced. Although, 
many issues and difficulties could be coped with, this study raised even more new 
perspectives and questions which will be discussed in the following: 
1. The comparability of modeling results is one of the main objectives of the analysis 
scheme proposed here. To achieve this goal, similar or at least somehow equivalent 
models should be selected. However, two major problems emerged: a) the existence 
and detection of similar models and b) the question if similar models assure 
comparability. (a) Already in the presented set of hazards difficulties arose with the 
selection of similar models, for instance with respect to methods for source 
identification: while simple empirical methods are commonly in use for rock falls, 
debris flows and avalanches, slopes susceptible to shallow landsliding are usually 
analyzed by statistically and physically based models. Moreover, while two-step 
approaches of source identification and run out modeling are commonly applied for 
rock falls, debris flows, shallow landslides and avalanches, the analysis of floods 
follows completely different procedures, assumptions and decisions. Other processes 
as earthquakes, storms or forest fires differ even stronger from the processes 
presented here, not only with respect to the modeling approaches and the spatial 
extent but also regarding the temporal scale they act at. This leads to difficulties to 
define common scenarios since e.g. the modeling of the 20-year events may be 
possible for floods, rock falls or debris flows but such events are of very low 
relevance in the earthquake context. Likewise, the rock fall or debris flow with a 
1000-year return period is a very rough assumption, while much more in use for 
earthquakes. This does also apply for the worst-case parameterization used for the 
case study. The inclusion of a process of such low frequencies but extremely high 
magnitudes with high spatial extent would lead to a distortion of the result due to the 
dominance of the earthquake threat. (b) Furthermore, the question arises if the 
utilization of similar or even equal methods for the modeling of distinct hazards as in 
the case of run out modeling by means of the angle of reach concept does 
automatically assure comparability of the results. While for debris flows or rock falls 
a large quantity of studies was detected, in case of shallow landslides only two 
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articles were found, an indication of the less frequent use of this technique for shallow 
landslides and possibly a lower suitability of this method. Especially the validation 
results indicate very well, that differences between hazards due to contrasting 
characteristics can not simply be overcome and comparability is not automatically 
assured by the application of the same methodology. Differing suitability and 
applicability of an approach when used for contrasting processes may result in very 
distinct model qualities. However, if the previously proposed attempts to achieve 
comparability do not in any case meet the objective to produce comparable results, 
then how can comparability be assured? By aiming at similar quality and 
uncertainties of the models? How can this be measured and is it possible to meet this 
goal? Or is it sufficient to produce results of the same metrics at a predefined scale 
and all the differences have only to be considered in the interpretation of the 
outcome? Especially when the model choice is constrained by data availability this is 
may be the most realistic strategy.  
2. A challenge becoming apparent in the case study is the parameterization or 
calibration of the models. Despite the fact, that the chosen study area is already 
investigated for many years by several universities, insufficient inventory information 
is available to carry out a complete multi-hazard model calibration. A rather simple 
approach has been chosen with the modeling of worst-case scenarios on the basis of 
literature information, multiple assumptions and generalizations. Although this 
approach apparently led to an overestimation of the susceptible areas and the number 
of exposed elements, it offers the determination of general hazard distributions, 
overlaps and areas of potential risk without data-demanding calibration. By now a 
parameter set is available by means of which a very fast approximation of a 
completely unknown area can be performed and much time can be saved. The actual 
usefulness of this worst-case scenario parameter set and the resulting grade of 
overestimation have to be examined in further regions. Nevertheless, the 
meaningfulness of such a blind analysis depends primarily on the objective and 
restrictions of the respective study. In areas without any inventory information and 
previous hazard analyses such a worst-case analysis may offer helpful indications 
which areas have to be regarded in more detail.   
For better adjusted parameterization or calibration of the models difficulties have to 
be solved in each single situation individually. This means that solutions have to be 
found according to the available data and the legislative framework requiring the 
computation of certain scenarios or the like. Thereby, expert appraisal seems to be an 
indispensible component in multi-hazard risk analyses. Multi-hazard information, 
especially regarding inventory data, is probably always fragmentary and has to be 
complemented and pieced together. Nevertheless, a problem is that only few experts 
have real multi-hazard experience.  
3. Although the presented analysis concept is designed as top-down approach, in this 
study only the first step is outlined, the regional exposure analysis scheme. 
Nevertheless, in the elaboration of a local analysis scheme many additional problems 
will emerge such as the development of a vulnerability analysis scheme. Depending 
on the type of hazard differing methods are used such as curves, matrices or indicator-
based approaches (Kappes et al., in press). For instance, vulnerability curves are 
frequently applied for flood and earthquake modeling but are still not available for 
257
Articles
 -31- 
rock falls. Thus, the question is how to combine different methods or identify one 
method (e.g. vulnerability matrices) which can be applied for all processes. Moreover 
the vulnerability is altered by simultaneous or sequential hazard impacts (Kappes 
et al., in press). Furthermore, local multi-hazard risk analyses require much detailed 
information and although with the regional analysis zones of special interest are 
identified, the acquisition of the necessary information for these areas is a challenge.  
An extension of MultiRISK towards full-hazard and risk at a local scale is planned to 
facilitate detailed examination of those areas determined at a regional scale. 
Moreover, the inclusion of further processes as, for instance, earthquakes and flash 
floods is under consideration. 
4. Aspects not approached in detail in this article are relations and interactions between 
hazards. Since hazard relations are, until now, not automated in the MultiRISK 
Modeling Tool, they were not presented in the present study. Nevertheless, ideas and 
recommendations how to regard for this issue at a regional scale are already presented 
in Kappes and Glade (2011). Primarily the implementation of feedback loops and the 
identification of areas susceptible to hazard chains with the overlay of modeling 
results are proposed. 
5. The multi-hazard modeling is followed by the interpretation of the results which 
includes especially the determination of acceptable and tolerable levels of hazard and 
risk for certain types of use or the planning of mitigation measures. In Switzerland 
and France, broad guidelines for the performance multi-hazard analyses and 
thresholds already exist, directly linked to the implementation of the hazard zones 
into the spatial planning. However, without the provision of a software tool such 
analysis guidelines face the challenge of comparability problems between 
municipalities since distinct methods are used in each administrative unit. The 
analysis performance is often outsourced to consultants. However, this results in low 
transparency and information on the modeling procedure and does not offer the 
option to flexibly compute and examine scenarios, update the analyses, to name some 
topics only. The linkage with a tool, which has to be adapted to the specific 
requirements, legislation and other user-specific needs, would accelerate and simplify 
the procedure and make the results more transparent. Although the first 
parameterization and adaptation to the specific area and user-needs will always 
require expert support from outside the tool itself could stay in the hand of the e.g. 
municipalities and offer flexible and fast rerunning. How realistic the introduction of 
such a tool in administrative bodies and institutions is depends on the legislation, the 
duties of the administrative units and many more aspects. However, an interesting 
example offers HAZUS in the United States, elaborated by and freely available from 
FEMA. HAZUS is a software tool for flood, hurricane and earthquake modeling 
which is delivered together with a nation-wide database offering sufficient 
information to carry out a first overview analysis of any region in the US. 
 
Concluding, multi-hazard settings pose a wide range of challenges. Although several 
difficulties can be solved by a coherent analysis scheme and the automation of the 
analysis procedure, many problems persist and require experience in handling and 
analyzing of multiple hazards but also careful interpretation of analysis results.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Multi-hazard (risk)  
The term ‘multi-hazard’ emerged in the political in-
ternational environment associated with the aim of 
risk reduction and sustainable development (e.g. 
Agenda 21 and Johannesburg Plan). In this context 
the analysis of risk from multiple hazards was iden-
tified as central aspect and basis for risk manage-
ment and thus for the reduction of risk and sustaina-
ble development. Given these objectives, two 
fundamental facets of such an analysis evolve: the 
analysis has to be carried out for the administrative 
unit in charge of risk management, i.e. for the spe-
cific administrative area and yielding the results re-
quired for this purpose. And, the hazards under con-
sideration are all natural processes threatening 
humans, buildings or infrastructure, i.e. all hazards 
posing a relevant risk. Thus, the analysis of multi-
hazard risk is, resuming the most important aspects 
for a definition for this article, the joint investigation 
of all relevant hazards in a defined area. 
Although hazard and risk analysis methods are al-
ready well-established for many natural processes, 
their joint investigation poses a variety of chal-
lenges. Especially, the widely differing characteris-
tics of the single processes as intensity, return period 
or parameters of influence on elements at risk1 
                                                 
1 An example is rock fall in comparison with storm ha-
zard. Rock fall is characterized by its impact pressure 
while storms are mostly represented by the wind force, 
two measures which are not directly comparable. Fur-
thermore they differ in extent, predictability, time of on-
set, duration etc.  
(Tyagunov et al. 2005), but also the varying proce-
dures to estimate/model (Marzocchi et al. 2009), and 
units to quantify them complicate multi-hazard (risk) 
analyses. This leads to the need for an overarching 
analysis scheme to produce single-hazard (risk) re-
sults which are comparable among each other. 
Widespread qualitative and semi-quantitative ap-
proaches are the classification of hazards, vulnera-
bilities and risks according to an overall scheme ad-
justed to each single process (e.g. Heinimann et al. 
1998, Sperling et al. 2007, Thierry et al. 2008 & 
Wipulanusat et al. 2009) or the development of an 
index scheme (e.g. Dilley et al. 2005 & Greiving 
2006). For quantitative analyses of risks a clear de-
finition of the considered timeframe and types of 
damage to be modeled is required to make the sin-
gle-hazard risks comparable and addable to the 
overall multi-hazard risk (e.g. annual risk for human 
life in Marzocchi et al. 2009, or the annual economic 
risk in Bell & Glade 2004). 
Such multi-hazard (risk) analysis schemes assure 
in first place the combinability and comparability of 
the single-hazard (risk) analysis results. However, 
the hazards are usually still considered as indepen-
dent from each other, which cannot be supported by 
observations in the field. 
1.2 Natural hazards as interrelated system 
components  
Natural processes are components of systems (eco-
systems, geosystems, etc.) and only certain characte-
ristics which possibly pose a threat to elements at 
risk convert them into hazards. As components of 
systems these processes are not independent and se-
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parated from each other but are linked and con-
nected. In the investigation and modeling of natural 
hazards, this aspect is still very rarely taken into ac-
count but each hazard is studied discretely. 
The occurrence of natural processes/hazards de-
pends on the disposition, i.e. the general setting 
which favors the specific process, and the triggering 
event which leads to the threshold crossing of a fac-
tor relevant for the hazard incidence (Heinimann 
et al. 1998). 
The disposition can be subdivided into basic and 
variable disposition, which refers to the temporal 
observation scale: the basic disposition is an, over a 
longer time period constant or very slowly changing 
setting, e.g. the relief, climate or the vegetation cov-
er. The variable disposition refers to faster altera-
tions, e.g. seasonal or daily changes (water balance, 
vegetation period, etc.) which lead, in combination 
with the general basic disposition, to the current dis-
position. 
In this setting, the exceeding of an internal thre-
shold (triggering) or an external trigger may start the 
incidence. Processes which pose a possible threat to 
elements at risk are in most hazard analyses only 
seen as the threat. However, from a systemic point 
of view they are components acting within the sys-
tem and shaping it. By shaping the system they may 
alter the general setting, i.e. the dispositions of other 
processes/hazards or act as trigger for other 
processes/hazards. 
In single-hazard analyses the most important 
processes and parameters concerning disposure and 
triggering are identified and integrated in the model-
ing procedure. For most multi-hazard analyses a 
similar approach is now applied, identifying still 
separately the important factors to be considered for 
each single process. After investigating them sepa-
rately only the results are brought together. Howev-
er, a multi-hazard analysis would offer the possibili-
ty to create a framework containing all considered 
processes and taking into account additionally the 
relations and interconnections between them. 
We investigated the relationships between poten-
tially hazardous processes and their relevance for the 
overall risk and risk management, subdivided into 
relations concerning disposition and triggering. 
We will in the first section explain what a system 
approach in combination with the disposition-
triggering model for multi-hazard analyses means 
and give examples of studies in which hazard rela-
tionships are already taken into account. 
Furthermore, we will make the transfer to explain 
why the relations are relevant and to be considered 
for risk management and reduction and how they 
could be taken into account. In a second section we 
will give an example for a medium-scale multi-
hazard analysis and the implementation of hazard re-
lations in this framework. 
2 MULTI-HAZARD INTERACTIONS IN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF DISPOSITION AND 
TRIGGERING 
2.1 Alteration of the disposition 
Each natural process acts in a specific subarea of the 
system area and exhibits its specific footprint, i.e. 
the zone in which it operates. Where process foot-
prints (process activity areas) overlap, the processes 
will influence each other more or less strongly. As 
long as no direct triggering of one hazard by another 
or temporally simultaneous occurrence exists, an in-
fluence will entail alterations of the basic and varia-
ble disposition. One process changes the general set-
ting of another one and thus its disposition towards a 
possibly occurring trigger event. 
Examples: De Graff et al. (2007) mention the “fire-
flood cycle” which describes the relation of forest 
fires and subsequent floods and debris flows due to 
the loss of vegetation, rapid runoff and increased se-
diment washout. Detailed investigations suggest a 
significant increase of debris flow frequency after 
forest fires (Cannon & de Graff 2009). Wichmann 
et al. (2009) examine the sediment cascade consist-
ing of several mass moving processes which fall into 
the category of natural hazards. They model several 
mass moving processes (e.g. rock fall, full depth 
avalanches and debris flows) and subdivide each one 
into the erosion, transport and deposition area. 
Where the deposition zone of one and the erosion 
area of another process coincide direct influence of 
the first process on the disposition of the second one 
and a coupled material transport can be assumed. 
Garcin et al. (2008) include the sea level rise into the 
modeling of storm surges and tsunami hazard for the 
next 100 years. 
Transfer: The consideration of this aspect is of great 
importance to prevent underestimation of slowly or 
rapidly evolving hazards. The first step is the identi-
fication of influences and links between natural 
processes/hazards. If these links are determined, the 
occurrence of one process (A) indicates directly the 
possible alteration of the disposition of another 
process (B) and the need for reassessment of the 
second process’ current hazard level. A very good 
example is given by de Graff et al. (2007) with the 
“Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER)”. For 
the BAER post-wildfire threat (including debris-
flow hazard) shall be assessed within seven days af-
ter a wildfire to ensure that counter-measures can be 
organized before the first storm event strikes. I.e. the 
general relation between fire and debris flows is 
identified, its severity determined and the necessary 
reaction defined. To make the second part, the reas-
sessment, more user-friendly, the direct implementa-
tion of the links into the modeling framework by re-
lating the models “so that the results of one model 
could feed into another” was proposed by Bovolo 
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et al. (2009, p. 925). Such an application offers the 
possibility to test management or model hazard sce-
narios taking into account the wide-ranging implica-
tions they will have. 
2.2 Triggering 
One hazard inducing one or more other threats 
which may again provoke further ones is an aspect 
of multi-hazard studies gaining recently more and 
more attention. The terminology and definition dif-
fers from author to author slightly: Delmonaco et al. 
(2006, p.10) refer to this phenomenon as domino ef-
fect or cascading failure which is a “failure in a sys-
tem of interconnected parts, where the service pro-
vided depends on the operation of a preceding part, 
and the failure of a preceding part can trigger the 
failure of successive parts”. Marzocchi et al. (2009, 
pp. 3 & 9) define them as “coupled events” where 
“an adverse event triggers one or more sequential 
events (synergistic event)”. A difficulty with this de-
finition is that the triggering event has to be a ha-
zard. Processes with low magnitudes might act as 
triggers but not cause damages and other triggers 
might not be hazards but cause several threats. Thus 
it seems reasonable to include in general all chains 
in which two or more hazards are involved, i.e. two 
or more hazards causally linked by triggering. This 
would also incorporate two hazards triggered by the 
same non-hazard event as floods and debris flows 
due to heavy rainfall, although heavy rainfall itself is 
not a hazard. 
Examples: A prominent event chain is the triggering 
of mass movements due to earthquakes (e.g. Meyen-
feld 2008 & Miles & Keefer 2009). Another fre-
quently occurring cascade starts with a landslide 
which dams a river or torrent, this dam breaks and 
the runoff of a mixture of water and debris causes 
considerable damage (Carrasco et al. 2003, Costa & 
Schuster 1988 & Dai et al. 2005). Huggel et al. 
(2003) investigated lake outbursts and the formation 
of a debris flow due to triggering by ice avalanches 
or debris flows. 
Transfer: An important aspect of hazard chains is 
the possible amplification of the overall hazard and 
risk of such causally linked processes in comparison 
to the aggregation of assumedly independent hazards 
(Marzocchi et al. 2009). For example, a debris flow 
resulting from the dam break of a landslide dam 
might be of a higher magnitude than expected chan-
nel or slope debris flows. This possible amplification 
effect does not only refer to direct chaining of ha-
zards but also to threats induced by one common 
trigger which results in temporal coincidence and 
increases the probability of spatial overlapping. Tar-
vainen et al. (2006, p. 84) state that an “additional 
hazard potential [… may arise due to] a possible 
coincidence of different hazards in space and time”. 
They mention the example of a coincidence of a riv-
er flood and a storm surge in the Rhine estuary 
which would have simultaneously a much higher 
impact than the pure sum of both. Thus the amplifi-
cation effect can either be the result of the chaining - 
one hazard triggering and increasing the next - or a 
consequence of the spatial and temporal coincidence 
of both. 
Besides the amplification, a second aspect is that 
the impact of two processes simultaneously or one 
shortly after the other (a landslide triggered by an 
earthquake) exhibit a higher impact on humans, 
buildings or infrastructure than the simple sum of 
both and alter thereby the risk. An earthquake dam-
aged structure is surely much more vulnerable to the 
following landslide than it was in the original state. 
A community under stress due to a flood is already 
in an altered state when the debris flow occurs. 
The third important aspect is the challenge for 
early warnings and emergency management in a sit-
uation of more than one threat. Several events and 
impacts have to be managed simultaneously, often in 
a multi-agency cooperation as shown in the case of 
the Shanghai Multi-Hazard Early Warning System 
(Tang 2009) which poses a high challenge. 
3 CONSIDERATION OF HAZARD RELATIONS 
IN MEDIUM-SCALE MULTI-HAZARD 
MODELING 
Multi-hazard (risk) analyses aim, in accordance with 
the description given in the introduction, at the con-
sideration of all natural hazards in a specified ad-
ministrative unit. Since the data requirements are 
very high for multiple processes and the occurrence 
and spatial distribution of several processes is much 
less clear as in the case of one single process, it 
seems reasonable to adapt a top-down approach. 
Starting with a relatively coarse and low data inten-
sive analysis for an overview and the identification 
of potential risk areas the regions in need for more 
detailed, local studies can be determined. A coherent 
analysis scheme is the fundamental precondition for 
the consideration of multi-hazard relationships. The 
scheme applied in this study will be mentioned only 
shortly since the focus is on the consideration of the 
hazard relations. 
The case study is carried out in the Barcelonnette 
Basin, a valley in the southern French Alps between 
1100 m and 3000 m a.s.l. drained by the Ubaye Riv-
er (for detailed information on the area refer to 
Flageollet et al. 1999, Maquaire et al. 2003, Re-
maître 2006, Remaître et al. 2008). The processes 
considered in the analysis are snow avalanches, rock 
fall, shallow landslides, debris flows and river 
floods. Further hazards threatening the valley in-
clude flash floods and earthquakes which are at this 
point not included into the analysis due to the un-
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availability of models fitting in the set of the other 
five. 
For each process the area affected by a high-
magnitude low-frequency event (worst-case scena-
rio) is modeled by means of relatively simple mod-
els: the mass movement analyses are split in two 
parts, the source identification with empiri-
cal/heuristic criteria (debris flow sources following 
Horton et al. 2008; avalanche sources after Maggio-
ni 2004; rock fall sources based on Corominas et al. 
2003, and shallow landslide sources referring to 
Montgomery & Dietrich 1994) and the run out com-
putation primarily with the angle of reach concept 
(Heim 1932) by means of the model Flow-R (Horton 
et al. 2008). The flood modeling is carried out with 
the model FloodArea (Geomer 2008) on basis of hy-
drograph information. Details about the processes, 
models and parameter choices for the case study will 
be published later, thus we will not describe these 
aspects in the article at hand because of the different 
focus of this contribution. 
The outputs are, as already mentioned, the zones 
possibly affected in a high-magnitude event by each 
one of the hazards. 
In the following we will outline, how the rela-
tions between hazard concerning disposition and 
triggering are taken into account. 
3.1 Disposition 
A general procedure of two steps is suggested: 1) 
identification of the influences and links between the 
different hazards, and 2) the establishment of the 
links between the hazard models adjusted to the 
modeling scale and methods used. For a medium-
scale multi-hazard analysis the following realization 
of the two steps was carried out: 
1) The links between hazards were identified by 
means of a matrix opposing all hazards to each other 
after de Pippo et al. (2008). In the interjacent cells 
the respective effect is shortly explained (Tab. 1). 
 
Table 1. Matrix for the identification of influences of one 
process on the disposition of another one. The process in the 
line is the causing one, the column indicates the affected one. 
2) For the linkage of models (the output of one 
model used as input for the next model) a practical 
approach is the listing of all model inputs and the 
identification which model outcomes can be used to 
update the input layers and parameters. E.g. the ava-
lanche run out zone can be used to roughly estimate 
the area of potential forest destruction and thus to 
update the land cover information (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Implementation of the effect of one hazard, in this 
case avalanche, on the disposition of other processes, in this 
case rock fall and avalanche hazard itself, due to the effect on 
an input parameter (land cover). Feedback loop shown with 
black dashed lines. 
 
This updated information can again be integrated 
in all models using land cover as input (in this case 
only the rock fall and the avalanche model itself 
since e.g. debris flows under forest can, according to 
our opinion, not be excluded completely) and the 
new hazard level assessed. However, at such a small 
scale and with the relatively coarse models and little 
input data used, most of the relations as e.g. change 
of river bed morphology (modeling is done on basis 
of a 10m DEM and volumes are not taken into ac-
count) or material provision (volumes are not taken 
into account) cannot be considered. Such feedback 
loops allow the consideration of the consequences of 
a certain event (scenario modeling) 
3.2 Triggering 
As well as for the relations concerning the disposi-
tion also in the case of triggering a two-step proce-
dure is convenient consisting of the 1) identification 
and 2) establishment of links between hazards.  
 
Table 2. Matrix opposing all considered hazards towards the 
range of identified triggers and hazards taken into account to 
identify triggering relations. 
 
 AV DF RF LS FL 
Avalanches (AV)     x 
Debris flows (DF)     x 
Rock falls (RF)     x 
Landslides (LS)     x 
Floods (FL)    x  
Heavy rainfall x x  x x 
Earthquake x  x x  
 
Avalanche 
Influence on 
vegetation 
cover 
(Removal of 
forest) 
Influence 
on vegeta-
tion cover 
(Removal 
of forest) 
Influence on 
vegetation 
cover 
- 
- Debris flows - - 
Change of riv-
er bed mor-
phology (acc. 
& erosion) 
Increased 
slope 
roughness 
Supply of 
material Rock falls 
Increase of 
load 
Material ac-
cumulation in 
river bed 
Alteration 
of surface 
roughness 
Supply of 
material - Landslides 
Change of riv-
er course 
- 
Remobilisa-
tion of ma-
terial 
- 
Erosion/ sa-
turation of 
landslide de-
posits 
Floods 
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(1) We propose a matrix based on de Pippo et al. 
(2008) as in the previous section, now for the deter-
mination possible triggering effects and comple-
mented by the list of all possible non-hazard triggers 
(Tab. 2). 
(2) While for detailed local studies event trees 
(e.g. Egli 1996 or Marzocchi et al. 2009) are a useful 
method to describe the complete chain with the re-
spective probabilities, its application on a small 
scale is not possible since a huge amount of data and 
information would be necessary. However, these 
event trees have to be designed for areas prone to the 
occurrence of hazard chains and this information can 
be gained in a medium-scale study by overlaying the 
modeled hazard areas of possibly linked hazards. In 
case of floods, landslides might be triggered by un-
dercutting of slopes. The flooded zone can be over-
laid with landside prone regions and where both ha-
zards overlap or occur in a distance lower as the 
range of influence of the flood (due to rising ground 
water table etc.) a possible cascading can be as-
sumed. For the case of one non-hazard trigger induc-
ing two or more hazards likewise the hazard zones 
can be overlaid (e.g. for the case of heavy rainfall 
the process areas of debris flow, shallow landslide 
and flood). First, the overall area possibly threatened 
during/shortly after heavy rainfall can be identified 
and secondly the regions perhaps affected by more 
than one hazard simultaneously or sequentially with 
potentially amplifying effect can be determined for 
further detailed studies by means of event trees. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
Natural systems are not just the sum of its compo-
nents but are a net of interacting parts and we are not 
able to understand and even less to model them en-
tirely. The natural processes we perceive as hazards 
form part of these systems. In single-hazard analyses 
we create subsystems we can handle to model the 
threat “satisfactorily” and according to the data 
availability. The same procedure is applied for mul-
ti-hazard analyses - still creating for each single 
process one subsystem and only the results are com-
bined and compared. However, hazards are, as natu-
ral processes, part of the same overall system, influ-
ence each other and interact. Thus, multi-hazard risk 
contains emergent properties: It is not just the sum 
of single-hazard risks since their relations would not 
be considered and this would lead to unexpected ef-
fects. The relations can, for analysis purposes, be 
subdivided in alteration of the disposition and trig-
gering (cascades and related triggering). 
Multi-hazard (risk) analyses offer the great ad-
vantage to consider a slightly larger part of the over-
all system than regarded in merged single-hazard 
analyses. The major step herein is to identify the re-
lations and establish the respective links. This can be 
done in a very simple way by merely identifying 
which hazards could be interlinked or happening at 
the same time but can also include sophisticated 
event trees and probabilistic what-if scenarios. 
However, the beginning is the decision to include 
the relationships and starts with their identification. 
In the future, amplification towards the perspective 
of complex system research would be desirable since 
also the system theory has its short-comings. Com-
plex systems imply two fundamental conditions: (1) 
The system consists of multiple interactive compo-
nents and (2) these interactions give rise to emergent 
forms and properties which are not reducible to the 
sum of the individual components of observed sys-
tem (Bründl et al. 2010, Keiler in press). Both condi-
tions were highlighted in this study for multi-hazard 
and a new perspective of complex systems research 
will offer new concepts and methodologies to deal 
with multi-hazard and multi-risk. 
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Abstract 
 
Landslides and other hazards are components of natural 
systems and thus are often related to each other. Since these 
relationships may result in unexpected effects, an approach to 
account for these relationships in a regional multi-hazard 
study is proposed. Subdivided into relations concerning 
disposition alteration and hazard chains in which one process 
triggers another process, the hazard links are identified and 
studied by means of GIS-based methods. Two techniques are 
used for the implementation of relations into the analysis 
procedure, the establishment of feedback loops and the 
overlay of hazard areas to determine overlaps. Such a regional 
analysis enables in the first place the definition of those areas 
possibly affected by unexpected effects due to hazard 
relations and indicates the spots to be studied in detail by local 
and detailed methods to quantify the potential consequences. 
 
Keywords multi-hazard, interaction, hazard chains, 
disposition and triggering. 
 
Introduction 
For many years “system theory” has attempted to account for 
the continuous nature of the world and the complex relations 
between components (Chorley and Kennedy 1971). One 
prime example of the implementation of a systems approach 
in geomorphology is the concept of debris or sediment 
cascades (Chorley and Kennedy 1971). In these cascading 
systems “the output of one subsystem forms the input of 
another” (Schneevoigt and Schrott 2006, p. 182). Processes as 
rock falls, debris flows or shallow landslides form part of 
these systems. Due to “certain characteristics which possibly 
pose a threat to elements at risk” these, primarily natural, 
processes may convert to natural hazards (Kappes et al. 2010, 
p. 351). Although this does not change anything concerning 
their affiliation to geomorphic systems, natural hazards and 
among them also the previously mentioned processes are still 
commonly regarded, analyzed and managed separately. 
However, interactions cause consequences, lead to 
modifications, for example of hazard levels and result in 
unexpected incidences. Thus, a reductionist approach is not 
able to account for such effects and thus not advisable. An 
example for hazard relations is the Jubaguerra event: a debris 
slide blocked the Arroyo de Jubaguerra gorge resulting in a 
damming of the stream. As a consequence of the subsequent 
dam break a flood wave rushed down the river and reached 
the mouth of the watershed (Carrasco et al. 2003). Costa and 
Schuster (1988) present a range of examples on formation and 
dam failure events of which several resulted in unexpected 
incidences with high numbers of fatalities. 
The consideration of multiple hazards jointly and the 
inclusion of cascade and interaction effects is still an 
emerging research field. One pioneer project which addressed 
the topic from a geomorphic and system theoretic approach 
rather than from a hazard approach is SEDAG (SEDiment 
cascades in Alpine Geosystems). One main objective of 
SEDAG was to better understand the sediment pathways 
(Wichmann et al. 2009). However, Wichmann and Becht 
(2003) mentioned that the applied models might also be used 
for hazard assessments. By investigating source, transport and 
deposition areas of each process and the identification where 
these zones overlap the sediment routing can be determined 
(e.g. rock fall deposition in locations of debris flow erosion 
leads to cascading propagation of the sediment). 
A practical approach coming from a hazard assessment 
background is proposed by Kappes et al. (2010). According to 
this concept, two types of influences between hazards can be 
distinguished: (1) the alteration of hazard dispositions by a 
hazardous event, e.g. the accumulation of material by rock 
falls and the subsequent availability of this material for debris 
flows or an increase of the load on a slope which destabilizes 
the slope and the disposition to a failure, and (2) the triggering 
of one or more hazards by another hazard, e.g. the triggering 
of rock falls by an earthquake or of lahars by a volcanic 
eruption hitting a glacier. Likewise, the triggering of at least 
two hazards by a process which does not classify as hazard, 
e.g. the triggering of debris flows and landslides by heavy 
rainfall, falls into this category.  
In this study, the practical consideration and 
implementation of interactions in a regional study are 
presented, subdivided into disposition alteration and 
triggering (according to Kappes et al. 2010). For the 
performance of the hazard modelling, the multi-hazard risk 
analysis tool MultiRISK Kappes et al. (in prep) was used and 
the case study is carried out in the Barcelonnette valley, 
located in the South-eastern French Alps.  
 
Consideration of interactions in a regional context 
Multi-hazard analyses suffer several limitations. The extended 
requirements of soil, infiltration, geology, precipitation, 
discharge data and further information are often limiting 
factors. Inventories of past events are of particular relevance 
for the calibration and validation of hazard models. However, 
high quality multi-hazard inventories are extremely scarce. A 
second challenge in a multi-hazard setting is the multi-
disciplinarity of the topic. Seldom is one expert proficient 
with all processes. Thus a first evaluation of the multi-hazard 
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situation, including areas of potential overlay and the 
occurrence of relations and interactions between them is much 
more difficult than the determination in a single-hazard 
environment. Both issues call for a top-down approach in 
multi-hazard investigations. As a first step, an approximation 
of the patterns is obtained. This is done by simple methods 
with low data requirements to ensure its applicability as 
approximation and avoid extensive and time-consuming data 
acquisition. On this basis, the resources can then be applied 
specifically to detailed local analyses in the areas identified as 
potentially prone to hazard interactions and risk. 
 
The medium-scale analysis scheme 
Kappes et al. (in prep) present a simple, GIS-based analysis 
scheme based on low data requirements (Fig. 1). It is designed 
as the first step of a top-down approach for multi-hazard 
exposure analyses. From a digital elevation model (DEM), 
land use/cover and lithological information (dark grey boxes 
at the left side of Fig. 1) multiple derivatives are deduced 
(medium grey boxes). These serve as input for the models and 
GIS operations (light grey boxes with rounded edges). With 
this input the areas of potential rock fall, shallow landslide, 
debris flow and avalanche sources and areas affected by the 
run out as well as the zone susceptible to river flooding are 
modelled. The analysis scheme has been automated in the 
software tool MultiRISK. Herein, the intermediate steps such 
as the computation of derivatives, required format changes 
etc. are automatically computed. The software interface 
guides the user through the modelling process and guarantees 
user-friendly, faster, less error-prone and reproducible multi-
hazard modelling (for further details concerning the analysis 
scheme and MultiRISK refer to Kappes et al. in prep). The 
consideration of hazard relations is still not automated in 
MultiRISK. However, the joint analysis of multiple hazards 
and the option of a fast re-calculation form a solid basis for 
external examinations of hazard cascades, feedback loops and 
other effects.  
To illustrate the application of the concept of dealing 
with hazard interactions, a case study has been carried out in 
the Barcelonnette basin. This high mountain valley is prone to 
a multitude of landslide types and other natural hazards. In 
Kappes et al. (in prep) a worst-case analysis of shallow 
landslides, rock falls, debris flows, snow avalanches and river 
floods has been carried out and the obtained susceptibility 
zones form the basis for the hazard relation analysis which is 
presented in this study. 
 
 
Figure 1 Analysis scheme for medium-scale multi-hazard analyses according to (Kappes et al. in prep)  
 
 
The Barcelonnette valley 
The Barcelonnette valley is situated in the “Département 
Alpes des Haute Provence” in the South-eastern French Alps. 
The altitude ranges between 1100 and over 3000 m a.s.l. 
Autochtonous black marls underlie allochtonous flysch in a 
geological window (Maquaire et al. 2003) and a multitude of 
torrents at the north- and south-facing mountain sides is 
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drained by the Ubaye River. For more detail on the area refer 
to Kappes et al. (in prep). 
The environmental characteristics give rise to several 
landslide types such as rock falls (e.g. RTM 2000), rotational 
and translational landslides (Thiery et al. 2004), mud flows 
(Malet et al. 2004) and debris flows (Remaître 2006). Other 
hazards comprise flash floods (Remaître 2006), river floods 
(Le Carpentier 1963, Sivan 2000), earthquakes (CETE 1987) 
and snow avalanches (MEDD). 
 
Consideration of disposition alteration 
An option to account for an alteration of the disposition has 
already been presented in Kappes et al. (2010). The potential 
influences are identified in a matrix (Tab. 1). Those influences 
relevant at the respective scale are determined and the 
implementation in the modelling procedure is designed. 
 
Table 1 Matrix for the identification of disposition alterations 
between hazards. The hazard in the line causes and the hazard in the 
column receives the influence (modified after Kappes et al. 2010). 
 
In the case of a medium-scale analysis and with the input 
parameters proposed in Fig. 1, the alteration of the land cover 
by snow avalanches, e.g. the destruction of forest which 
protects from rock falls and debris flows but also from further 
avalanches, is the only type of disposition alteration which 
can be considered. River bed morphology, erosion processes 
or material supply are parameters which are not represented in 
the input information of this rather generalised modelling 
approach. By means of a feedback loop the influence of 
avalanches on the land cover can be accounted for as shown 
in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2 Feedback loop (indicated by dashed lines) implemented in 
the (simplified) modelling procedure (modified after Kappes et al. 
2010). 
 
After having modified the land use, the three processes 
depending on this input (rock falls, debris flows and snow 
avalanches - refer to Fig. 2) are re-calculated. This is a fast 
and user-friendly procedure with the MultiRISK software 
although the feedback loop itself is not automated. 
 
Consideration of triggering 
Within the set of hazards under consideration in this study 
only two major hazard cascades have been identified: (1) 
landslides damming rivers or torrents with the potential to 
cause upstream flooding and dam break with downstream 
flooding (e.g. Costa and Schuster 1988), and (2) torrent and 
river floods undercutting slopes and leading to a slope failure. 
If this leads to a damming of the river or torrent, the same 
potential consequences as previously described can also be 
expected.  
The study of Carrasco et al. (2003) is very instructive 
concerning a method to identify spots where such cascading 
events could take place: based on a landslide susceptibility 
analysis, Carrasco et al. (2003, p. 361) determined those 
slopes that are “connected to streams and torrents (gorges)” as 
restrictedly susceptible, i.e. susceptible to a relation between 
slope and stream processes. This approach is broadly adopted 
with modifications. In the following, the adjusted method and 
the GIS operations used for this study are presented and 
applied to the Barcelonnette basin: 
  
1. Undercutting of a slope:  
By using the flood hazard analysis result and overlying it with 
the potential source areas of shallow landslides, zones 
potentially destabilized by high water can be identified. 
However, influences can not only be expected in the overlap 
of both processes but also interferences due to for instance 
water saturation of the slope toe and consequently changes are 
likely in the slope hydrology. This means, the influence may 
reach beyond the area of actual overlap. Simply, this effect 
can be accounted for by introducing a buffer around the 
flooded area. The main challenge is the definition of the 
buffer width, especially the scale, resolution of the DEM and 
specific characteristics of the area are of importance in this 
decision.  
 
Example from Barcelonnette 
For the Barcelonnette study a digital elevation model of 10 m 
was available thus a buffer of 10 m and 20 m was applied to 
the flooded area (Fig. 3). However, a definite decision about 
the buffer width can only be made after observations in the 
field. 
 
 
Figure 3 Identification of zones of potential slope undercutting. The 
area marked with the red ellipse is shown in photograph of Figure 4 
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As shown in Fig. 3 several locations were identified as 
susceptible to undercutting. In a field survey multiple spots 
were examined and proved to be prone to undercutting. An 
example is given in Fig. 4 depicting the area situated in the 
red ellipse of Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 4 Area of potential undercutting of the slope, situated at the 
Ubaye river close to the confluence of the Sanières torrent with the 
Ubaye (area located in the red ellipse of Fig. 3). 
 
2. Damming of a torrent/river by a landslide: 
To identify those torrent and river sections which could 
possibly be dammed by landslide material the river and 
torrent network is overlaid with the landslide run out. 
However, only in “gorge-type” valleys can a damming be 
expected (at least for moderate debris volumes) whereas in 
wide valleys the sliding material is most probably not 
sufficient to block the whole riverbed (Carrasco et al. 2003). 
In Carrasco et al. (2003) gorge-type valleys are valleys with a 
bottom not wider than 25 m and identified with a 
neighbourhood analysis. Since Carrasco et al. (2003) do not 
provide sufficient detail to reproduce the presented 
methodology, the landform classification after Jenness (2006) 
has been applied in this study. The landform classification is 
based on the topographic position index (TPI) proposed by 
Guisan et al. (1999) and Weiss (2001). The TPI operates by 
“calculating the difference between the elevation of the cell 
and the mean elevation calculated for all cells of a moving 
circular window centered in the cell of interest” (Guisan et al. 
1999, p. 110). The application of thresholds for the TPI values 
allows the identification of different topographic positions 
such as ridge, slope, valley, etc. The TPI depends strongly on 
the size of the neighbourhood taken into account: the larger 
the considered neighbourhood, the larger are the classified 
forms. In contrast, small neighbourhoods lead to small-scale 
classification. For the identification of certain landforms 
Jenness (2006) combines two TPIs which differ in the size of 
the neighbourhoods considered for the TPI calculation and 
defines thresholds at both scales for the different landforms.  
When defining the parameters for the landform 
classification, an important aspect is that the size of the 
valleys potentially blocked by landslide masses depends on 
the volume of the slide. This means, large slides can block 
wider valleys whereas the material from small slides may not 
fill the full width of the riverbed. Thus, the definition of the 
TPI neighbourhoods already implies to a certain degree an 
assumption on the volume of the sliding mass.  
The gorge-like torrent partitions are determined by 
overlay of the valleys with the water courses. By a further 
overlay of these partitions with the area susceptible to be hit 
by shallow landslides the areas of potential river/torrent 
damming are identified. 
 
Example from Barcelonnette 
Based on expert judgement, the landform classification of 
Jenness (2006) was carried out with a smaller neighbourhood 
of 3×3 and a larger neighbourhood of 6×6 pixels. With this 
combination, areas known by the authors as valleys with steep 
slopes and small bottoms were determined as best. Fig. 5 
shows the result for one catchment, the Riou Bourdoux, 
situated in the western part of the Barcelonnette basin.  
 
 
Figure 5 Areas of potential damming of the torrent by landslide 
masses, example of the Riou Bourdoux. 
 
Apart from the explicit cascades also the triggering of 
multiple hazards by one event which is not necessarily a 
hazard (e.g. prolonged rainfall) or a process not included in 
the multi-hazard analysis should be considered. In this study, 
this would primarily include floods, debris flows and shallow 
landslides as a consequence of precipitation or rock falls and 
shallow landslides triggered by an earthquake.  
 
Example from Barcelonnette 
Concerning the triggering by precipitation the rainfall patterns 
have to be considered. For the Barcelonnette Basin Remaître 
et al. (2010) identified heavy daily rainfall as trigger for 
debris flows whereas cumulative rainfall, i.e. rainy periods of 
about 30 days, may rather lead to shallow landslide events. 
However, heavy rainfall after antecedent precipitation could 
lead to a combination of landsliding and debris flows. In 
contrast, river floods of the Ubaye, are the result of prolonged 
rainfall in autumn or related to very rapid snow melts in 
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spring (Sivan 2000). Consequently, the creation of one map 
with all three rainfall triggered hazards would not be realistic 
but a splitting into short heavy and long cumulative rainfalls is 
advisable. In Fig. 6 an example is given for the case of heavy 
rainfall with the potential to trigger shallow landslides and 
debris flows. The areas susceptible to the effect of one or both 
are identified. 
 
 
Figure 6 Identification of the area susceptible to being affected 
shallow landslides and / or debris flows triggered by heavy rainfalls 
in the Riou Bourdoux catchment. 
 
Conclusions 
The integration of hazard relations into hazard analyses is 
necessary to avoid facing unexpected effects in the aftermaths 
arising from cascades or feedbacks. The way this can be done 
depends on the scale level, the methods and models chosen 
and the hazards combined. However, by means of general 
identification techniques as matrices a general overview over 
potential effects can be gained. On this basis, methods 
suitable to account for relations relevant at the respective 
scale can be chosen. In this study an example is given for the 
regional scale at which primarily an identification of spots of 
potential relations can be performed. However, this is an 
important starting point for subsequent detailed and time- and 
data-intensive analyses of the full cascades and effects 
possibly resulting at these points.  
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a b s t r a c t
Globally, many built-up areas are threatened by multiple hazards which pose signiﬁcant threat to
humans, buildings and infrastructure. However, the analysis of the physical vulnerability towards
multiple hazards is a ﬁeld that still receives little attention although vulnerability analysis and assess-
ment can contribute signiﬁcantly to risk reduction efforts. Indicator-based vulnerability approaches are
ﬂexible and can be adjusted to the different hazards as well as to speciﬁc user needs. In this paper, an
indicator-based vulnerability approach, the PTVA (Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment), was
further developed to be applicable in a multi-hazard context. The resulting multi-hazard version of the
PTVA consists of four steps: the identiﬁcation of the study area and relevant hazards as well as the
acquisition of hazard information, the determination of vulnerability indicators and collection of data,
the weighting of factors and vulnerability assessment and ﬁnally, the consideration of hazard interac-
tions. After the introduction of the newly developed methodology a pilot application is carried out in the
Faucon municipality located in the Barcelonnette basin, Southern French Alps. In this case study the
vulnerability of buildings to debris ﬂows, shallow landslides and river ﬂooding for emergency planning
and for general risk reduction purposes is assessed. The implementation of the methodology leads to
reasonable results indicating the vulnerable buildings and supporting the priority setting of different
end-users according to their objectives. The constraints of the presented methodology are: a) the fact
that the method is not hazard-intensity speciﬁc, thus, vulnerability is measured in a rather qualitative
and relative way and b) the high amount of data required for its performance. However, the advantage is
that it is a ﬂexible method which can be applied for the vulnerability analysis in a multi-hazard context
but also it can be adjusted to the user-speciﬁc needs to support decision-making.
 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Introduction and aimsQ1
Many places worldwide such as alpine areas, volcano vicinities
or coastal regions are threatened by multiple hazards. Disasters
occur when potentially damaging natural processes interact with
elements at risk and their associated physical, social, economic and
environmental vulnerability (Birkmann, 2006). Therefore, an
important aspect for disaster risk reduction is a better under-
standing of the following factors and their interactions: a) the
hazards causing a signiﬁcant threat and b) the vulnerabilities of the
society, the economy and built and natural environment
(Birkmann, 2006; UN-ISDR, 2005). The main focus in research and
management until recently was on the hazard assessment,
however, in the past two decades, vulnerability assessment has also
emerged as an important research ﬁeld. Yet, the Hyogo framework
recognises as a key activity to develop “systems of indicators of
disaster risk and vulnerability at national and sub-national scales”
(UN-ISDR, 2005, p. 7). These indicators will provide decision-
makers with methodologies to assess the potential impact of
disasters on social, economic and environmental conditions.
Currently, the existing methods to assess vulnerabilities towards
distinct processes vary widely and yet no standard method is
applicable for all hazards (cf. Papathoma-Köhle, Kappes, Keiler, &
Glade, 2010; Walker and Deeming, 2006). The vast majority of
vulnerability assessment methods concern single hazards although
the importance of amulti-hazard approach to riskmanagement has
been often stressed in the recent past (e.g. Greiving, Fleischhauer, &
Lückenkötter, 2006; Kappes, Keiler, & Glade, 2010; Marzocchi
Mastellone, & Di Ruocco, 2009). The importance of a multi-hazard
approach has been also stressed by the UNEP (1992) that called
already for “[u]ndertaking complete multi-hazard research into
risk and vulnerability of human settlements and settlement infra-
structure [.] as one type of risk reduction may increase
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ43 1 4277 48694; fax: þ43 1 4277 9486.
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vulnerability to another (e.g., an earthquake-resistant house made
of wood will be more vulnerable to wind storms)” in the Agenda 21
(UNEP, 1992, paragraph 7.61 a). Moreover, in the Johannesburg Plan
from 2002 is stated that an integrated, multi-hazard risk assess-
ment, which it also includes a vulnerability analysis, and compre-
hensive disaster management “is an essential element of a safer
world in the twenty-ﬁrst century” (UN, 2002, p. 20). However,
multi-hazard risk analyses pose a wide range of challenges - not
only concerning the multi-hazard assessment but - also regarding
the investigation of the vulnerability towards multiple hazards
(Kappes, von Elverfeldt, Glade, & Keiler, in press). Hazards exhibit
very different characteristics such as, time of onset, duration, extent
and the resulting impact on humans and elements at risk which
have to be considered for a multi-hazard vulnerability assessment.
Considering the highlighted challenges the main objective of
this paper is to present and discuss a newly developed GIS-based
approach that allows coherently assessing hazard-speciﬁc phys-
ical vulnerability towards multiple hazards. The method proposed
here is based on the selection of element characteristics which can
serve as vulnerability indicators. In this study, we consider the
physical vulnerability of buildings1 and include information on the
distribution and characteristics of people to assist the decisions-
makers e.g. in guiding an effective response strategy or even
planning preparedness and mitigation measures. However, this
information remains within the boundary of physical vulnerability
while socio-economic aspects such as income, level of education,
level of public awareness, health etc. are not included.
In the following sections a brief overview on vulnerability and
indicators considering deﬁnitions and methods is presented
(Section 2) and the PTVA approach, on which the newly developed
multi-hazard vulnerability methodology is based, is described
(Section 3). Section 4 introduces the newly developedmethodology
and Section 5 demonstrates the application of this methodology in
the Faucon municipality located in the Barcelonnette Basin, France.
This case study illustrates its applicability for several hazards and
users. The ﬁnal sections of the paper provide an analysis and
discussion on the results including the advantages, limitations and
future developments of the method (Section 6) and a ﬁnal
conclusion (Section 7).
Vulnerability and indicators
The term vulnerability is used diversely, therefore, scientists
from various disciplines have an ongoing debate regarding its
deﬁnition. In a study reviewing vulnerability assessment methods
for alpine hazards, Papathoma-Köhle et al. (2010) stated that the
vast majority of the authors with natural sciences and/or technical
background deﬁne physical vulnerability as “[t]he degree of loss to
a given element, or set of elements, within the area affected by
a hazard. It is expressed on a scale of 0 (no loss) to 1 (total loss)’’
(UNDRO,1984). Nevertheless, other scientists (e.g. Birkmann, 2006;
Fuchs, 2009), including the authors of this paper, argue that
vulnerability should not be reduced only to the degree of damage,
although damage assessments can act as important sources of
information regarding physical vulnerability. A more integrative
but less strict delimited deﬁnition would be: “vulnerability is
a characteristic of human behaviour, social and physical environ-
ments, describing the degree of susceptibility (or resistance) to the
impact of e.g. natural hazards’’ (CENAT, 2004; online glossary).
From this perspective, assessing vulnerability should focus on the
identiﬁcation of the variables that inﬂuence and change the
vulnerability of an element at risk, the so-called vulnerability indi-
cators (Birkmann, 2006). According to Birkmann (2006, p. 57)
a vulnerability indicator in the context of natural hazards is deﬁned
as “a variable which is an operational representation of a charac-
teristic or quality of a system able to provide information regarding
the susceptibility, coping capacity and resilience of a system to an
impact of an albeit ill-deﬁned event linked with a hazard of natural
origin”.
Three major approaches are commonly used for the analysis of
physical vulnerability: vulnerability curves, damage matrices and
vulnerability indicators.
The so-called vulnerability-, fragility- or damage-curves are
a widespread approach among natural scientists and engineers (cf.
Merz, 2006). These curves are usually building type-speciﬁc and
link the intensity of a hazard to the expected damages or the cost of
these damages related to the total value at risk. The disadvantage of
this type of approach is the restriction to only one characteristic of
the building, mainly the building type, without considering other
factors that contribute to the vulnerability of the elements at risk
(such as number of ﬂoors, windows or age of the building).
Furthermore, the development of vulnerability curves requires
information on a large number of damaged buildings. For this
reason, they are often used for hazards that impact large areas such
as earthquakes, ﬂoods or storms (e.g. Grünthal et al., 2006) and
rarely for hazards that impact a limited number of buildings such as
rock falls or landslides (Menoni 2006).
In contrast to curves, damage matrices are a simpler and more
widely applicable method (i.e. applicable for more hazards types).
They are composed by classiﬁed intensities and stepwise damage
levels (Menoni, 2006). The advantage of vulnerability curves and
matrices is the quantitative and semi-quantitative result, respec-
tively. However, they also generalise strongly by only distinguish-
ing between certain building types and neglecting the properties of
the element at risks that also contribute to their vulnerability.
Consequently, neither curves nor matrices are suitable for giving
indications on how to reduce risks.
An alternative, mostly rather qualitative, approach is the use of
vulnerability indicators. In the socio-economic ﬁeld, indicators are
already widely used to consider the multiple characteristics of
humans (age, wealth, health, education level etc.), institutions and/
or societies that contribute to their overall vulnerability. Increas-
ingly, this even includes multi-hazard settings as for example in the
studies of Collins, Grinseki, and Romo Aguilar (2009); Cutter,
Mitchell, and Scott (2000); Lazarus (2011) or Wisner Blaikie,
Cannon, and Davis (2004). However, since vulnerability is
primarily regarded as a characteristic of the element at risk, only in
very few cases hazard-speciﬁc vulnerabilities are assessed (hazard-
speciﬁc examples are Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich (2006), the
Disaster Risk Index - DRI (UNDP, 2004)), the Disaster Hotspots
(Dilley, Chen, Deichmann, & Lerner-Lam, 2005) or the Global Risk
and Vulnerability Index Trends per Year - GRAVITY (Dao and
Peduzzi, 2003). By contrast, signiﬁcantly less experience with
vulnerability indicators has been acquired in the physical vulner-
ability context. This may be related strongly to the fact, that in this
ﬁeld vulnerability is regarded to be hazard-speciﬁc. Thus, the
development of an overall multi-hazard approach is much more
difﬁcult due to the differences between hazards as well as the
contrasts between applied vulnerability analysis methods.
An example for an application of indicators in the ﬁeld of
physical vulnerability is the study of Granger, Jones, Laiba, and Scott
(1999). They use indicators in the context of a suitability evaluation
of buildings to serve as shelters from multiple threats. However,
Granger et al. (1999) do not follow up this method to derive
a vulnerability index or measure but they offer only a qualitative
1 The methodology is applied in this study to analyse the vulnerability of
buildings, however, it is transferable to further elements at risk as infrastructures or
agricultural land.
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overview of building characteristics and their relative vulnerability
towards different hazards. Another example of the application of
indicators in the physical context is given by Puissant, Malet, and
Maquaire (2006). In this study the relative damage potential of
the exposed elements is evaluated on basis of some kind of damage
or vulnerability indicators. One of the few methods that take into
consideration a set of vulnerability indicators to carry out an actual
physical vulnerability analysis is the PTVA method (Papathoma
Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment, Papathoma (2003); Papathoma
and Dominey-Howes (2003)). The PTVA method was originally
developed for vulnerability analyses in coastal areas susceptible to
tsunami using a weighted multi-indicator approach (Papathoma,
Dominey-Howes, Zong, & Smith, 2003) and was later on modiﬁed
for landslide hazard areas (Papathoma-Köhle, Neuhäuser,
Ratzinger, Wenzel, & Dominey-Howes, 2007). The method
considers characteristics of the elements at risk themselves as well
as their surroundings. The successful application of this methodo-
logical concept to two different processes indicates a high potential
to transfer and adapt the method to multi-hazard vulnerability
context. Hence, the PTVA was chosen as the basis for the meth-
odology presented in this paper and adjusted to the requirements
of a multi-hazard vulnerability analysis.
The PTVA methodology
The PTVA model was developed using information from historic
tsunami records, post-event surveys and damage assessments
(Papathoma, 2003; Papathoma and Dominey-Howes, 2003).
Papathoma (2003) identiﬁed and ranked on basis of expert judge-
ment, a series of attributes, i.e. indicators (Table 1), responsible for
controlling the type and severity of tsunami damage to buildings.
The methodological steps of the PTVA method are shown in Fig. 1.
The 2004 Indian Ocean event provided data for the method to
be validated and improved (Dominey-Howes and Papathoma,
2007) and further application and testing has recently been
carried out in the United States (Dominey-Howes, Dunbar, Varner,
& Papathoma-Köhle, 2010). In more detail (Dominey-Howes,
Dunbar, Varner, & Papathoma-Köhle, 2010), tested the PTVA-2
Model, an improved updated version of the PTVA, in the Cascadia
subduction zone (Seaside, Oregon, US). In this case study, themodel
was used to calculate Probable Maximum Losses (PMLs) within
a 500-year tsunami inundation zone in Oregon (USA), demon-
strating the ﬂexibility and usefulness of the PTVA approach. A
further improved version of the method has also been used for
tsunami vulnerability assessment in Sydney, Australia (Dall’Osso,
Gonella, Gabbianelli, Withycombe, Dominey-Howes, 2009) and at
the Aeolian islands in Italy (Dall’Osso et al., 2010).
The ﬁrst attempt to apply the PTVA method on a different type
of hazard took place in 2007 (Papathoma-Köhle et al., 2007). The
authors, having recognized the gap in research concerning land-
slide vulnerability assessment, modiﬁed the PTVA method for
landslide related disasters and integrated it in a wider “framework
for assessing the vulnerability of communities to landslides”
(Papathoma-Köhle et al., 2007, p. 765). The modiﬁed PTVA method
was applied on the village of Lichtenstein in the Swabian Alb,
Germany. The limitations of the study included data availability,
lack of information regarding the actual process, lack of informa-
tion regarding other phenomena that could trigger landslides (such
as earthquakes) or occur at the same time (e.g. ﬂoods). The study
stressed the need for the identiﬁcation of the factors that
contribute to the vulnerability of communities to alpine hazards
and the importance of taking multiple hazards into consideration
when looking at the vulnerability of alpine communities. In Table 1
the vulnerability indicators for buildings susceptible to tsunami
hazard and landslides are presented.
An indicator-based vulnerability assessment methodology
for multi-hazards
The four steps of the original PTVA method were slightly
modiﬁed and generalised to ﬁt to the multi-hazard setting (Fig. 2).
The modiﬁcations primarily include merging the third and fourth
step of the original PTVA and adding the examination of the effect
of hazard interactions on the vulnerability. In this study, focus is put
on the vulnerability of buildings, however, the approach is trans-
ferable to other elements at risk as infrastructure or agricultural
areas.
Step 1: Determination of the study area, identiﬁcation of the
relevant hazards and acquisition of hazard information
Determining the objective of the study and the area to be
considered is the ﬁrst step. Practitioners often focus on adminis-
trative units (e.g. municipalities, regions, or countries (c.f.
Fleischhauer, Greiving, & Wanczura, 2006)) or on speciﬁc areas
within the administrative boundaries (for instance for the risk
prevention plans in France only the settled area within a munici-
pality is considered; refer to RTM, 2002). Within these units and
according to the objective of the vulnerability analysis (e.g. risk
prevention, mitigation, event management or reconstruction) all
Table 1
Indicators for the building vulnerability according to Papathoma and Dominey-
Howes (2003) and Papathoma-Köhle et al. (2007).
Tsunamis Landslides
Material of the building X X
Number of ﬂoors of the building X X
Warning signs on buildings X
Characteristics of the slope side wall
(windows or only wall)
X
Condition of the ground ﬂoor X
Building surroundings (e.g. walls) X X
Row of the building X
Presence of sea-defence X
Width of intertidal zone in front of the building X
Fig. 1. Steps of the PTVA after Papathoma and Dominey-Howes (2003).
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relevant hazards have to be identiﬁed based on historical infor-
mation, records or already available hazard analyses. If hazard
analyses are not yet available the necessary investigations have to
be conducted within this ﬁrst step bymeans of ﬁeld surveys, aerial-
photo-interpretation or inventories which form the basis for
heuristic, statistical, deterministic or probabilistic assessment or
modelling (Heinimann, Hollenstein, Kienholz, Krummenacher, &
Mani, 1998; Van Westen, van Asch, & Soeters, 2006).
Step 2: Determination of vulnerability indicators and collection
of the data
Characteristics of elements at risk and their surroundings
inﬂuencing the physical vulnerability have to be identiﬁed.
Furthermore, the importance of each indicator towards the
different hazards has to be assigned. Although very few studies
offer information on indicators and their role in the overall physical
vulnerability of the elements at risk, documentation focussing on
damage assessment and descriptions of past events can provide
this information.
For a multi-hazard vulnerability analysis of buildings in an
alpine environment three major groups of vulnerability indicators
are proposed:
Building-speciﬁc information
This information is related to the characteristics of the building
such as its material, construction type and maintenance, number of
ﬂoors and other characteristics that inﬂuence more or less the
vulnerability to a speciﬁc hazard. Some indications on the role of
these characteristics are already given in a few post-event analyses
and used for the development of vulnerability curves correspond-
ing to different construction types (Borter and Bart, 1999; Keiler
et al., 2006; Romang, 2004; Wilhelm, 1997). Furthermore, infor-
mation on building characteristics can be extracted from the
building codes in some countries. For example, following the
introduction of the legally binding hazard zone maps in Austria,
buildings in the red and in the yellow hazard zone have to fulﬁl
special construction requirements to reduce vulnerability and,
consequently, possible damage (Keiler et al., 2006). Moreover, the
role of some building characteristics in reducing or increasing
physical vulnerability towards a range of natural hazards, can be
found in the literature.
As far as ﬂoods are concerned, Granger et al. (1999) suggest that
ﬂoor height is the most important characteristic for structural
(physical) vulnerability, followed by the number of stories, the
building age, the wall material and the existence of large unpro-
tected windows as well as the plan regularity. Regarding the
buildingmaterial, Menoni et al. (2006) discuss the differences in the
vulnerability of masonry and non-masonry constructions to ﬂoods.
Regarding rock falls hazards, Holub and Hübl (2008) mention
the strength of the outer wall and the existence, size (smaller size
reduces vulnerability) and height of windows above the ground
level (height also reduces vulnerability) as key indicators for the
building vulnerability. The surface of buildings towards the slope
(the smaller the better) and the strength of intermediate ceilings
are also considered very important aspects.
In the case of avalanches, Bertrand, Naaim, and Brun (2010)
suggest that the physical vulnerability of a building primarily
depends on its geometry, the mechanical properties of its material,
the anchorage of its foundations and the existence of openings in
the wall facing the ﬂow. Thus, the construction types of the
buildings are of high importance for the vulnerability assessment
(Keiler et al., 2006).
For landslides, Glade and Crozier (2005) discuss the direct and
indirect impact on elements at risk without emphasising the
importance of building characteristics for the increase or reduction
of its vulnerability. Dai, Lee, and Ngai (2002) recognise that the
vulnerability of a building to landslides depends on its technical
resistance which is subject to its type, nature, age and height. For
debris ﬂow Fuchs, Heiss, and Hübl (2007) and Totschnig, Sedlacek,
and Fuchs (2011) refer to construction materials, number of stories,
existence of a basement and local protection measures such as
reinforced outer walls and sheltered openings as key indicators of
physical vulnerability.
Holub and Hübl (2008) provide a list of the resistance of
different building and opening materials to different processes
(avalanche, debris ﬂow, rock fall, ﬂoods) and offer thus the possi-
bility to compare the level of importance between hazards.
Building surroundings
The surrounding of buildings is still rarely taken into account
although it may play an important role by offering protection from
a range of hazards (Holub and Hübl, 2008). In this category also
local structural protections have to be considered which may
strongly decrease the physical vulnerability (Egli, 1999; Holub and
Fuchs, 2008). Holub and Fuchs (2009) stress for example the
signiﬁcance of protection forests whereas Meusburger and Alewell
(2008) mention the role of the land cover in general in the occur-
rence of landslides. Furthermore, the role of neighbouring buildings
should not be ignored, as buildings can protect other buildings by
reducing the force of water, debris, rocks or snow (Papathoma et al.,
2003). However, single trees, small levees or walls around a house
can usually not be considered with the DEM or land use informa-
tion. Nevertheless, they can have a signiﬁcant positive or negative
effect on the vulnerability of neighbouring structures and therefore
they have to be considered in another way. According to the PTVA
this is done by integration of the building surrounding as vulner-
ability indicator.
Human-related information
Once the physical vulnerability of the individual buildings has
been assessed and its spatial pattern has been illustrated, the next
step is the collection of information regarding the distribution and
the characteristics of the population of the area, which is essential
especially for emergency planners and the civil protection (Cutter,
2003; King, 2001).
After having determined the indicators to be used for the
vulnerability assessment, the information on each of them has to be
Determination of 
the study area, 
identification of the 
relevant hazards 
and acquisition of 
hazard information
Determination of 
vulnerability 
indicators and 
collection of the 
data
Weighting of 
factors and 
vulnerability 
assessment
(Including the 
display of 
vulnerabilities)
Effect of hazard 
interactions on the 
overall 
vulnerability
Fig. 2. Steps of the multi-hazard version of the PTVA.
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collected for each element at risk (at least within the hazardous
area) in order to create a GIS database that will be available for the
end-users. Although the local authorities are usually the main data
providers, ﬁeld surveys and analysis of aerial photos may be also
required.
Step 3: Weighting of indicators and vulnerability assessment
The importance hierarchy of the indicators collected in the
previous step varies signiﬁcantly between hazards as it depends on
 The type of hazard. For example, the height of the building is of
great importance during a ﬂood, but not of the same impor-
tance in case of a rock fall.
 The priorities of the user. The purpose of the study can inﬂu-
ence the weighting of the factors. For example, the height of
a building may be important for the emergency management
because it enables vertical evacuation, however, when the
focus of the study is not the threat to life but the economic loss,
the height of the building might be less important than the
percentage of the building which is affected.
In Table 2 a qualitative assessment of their relative importance
for the vulnerability towards different hazards is provided. While
several indicators show almost the same level of importance for all
processes as e.g. the material or the building condition, others, such
as the roofmaterial or the presence of a basement, are relevant only
to some hazards2.
For each indicator a weight has to be deﬁned which quantiﬁes
the level of importance this indicator has on the vulnerability of the
elements at risk. For every single indicator, again, scores are
assigned to each value this indicator may attain. The scores contain
the information to what degree a certain characteristic (one-, two-
or three-storey building) contributes to the vulnerability of the
building. While the vulnerability scores are supposed to be only
hazard- but not user-speciﬁc, the weights are hazard- and user-
speciﬁc. This is based on the assumption, that e.g. a single-ﬂoor
building is always more vulnerable to ﬂoods than a two-ﬂoor
building but that the number of ﬂoors is of higher importance in
an emergency management context (vertical evacuation is
possible) than in relation to spatial planning. For example, emer-
gency services need to locate potential victims as soon as possible,
therefore, buildings housing vulnerable population groups such as
elderly, children etc. and buildings not offering opportunity for
vertical evacuation (one ﬂoor buildings) are of high importance. On
the other hand, in the preparedness phase, local authorities need to
know where they should focus their mitigation efforts. Therefore,
they need to locate non-reinforced buildings with little or no
protection from their surroundings. Concerning hazards for which
short-time warning and evacuation is nearly impossible, as in case
of rock fall, structural and non-structural measures as protections
nets or room use in the building (no bedrooms towards the slope
etc.) have to be adapted. Insurance companies are additionally
interested in the vulnerability of the content of a building. Thus,
information regarding the use of the ground ﬂoor and the existence
of large windows on the slope or river side (depending on the
hazard) is relevant for this investigation. According to the PTVA
method, the vulnerability computation is done by means of the
weighted linear combination method (Papathoma and Dominey-
Howes, 2003; Papathoma et al., 2003; Papathoma-Köhle et al.,
2007): multiplying each factor with a weight and assign a Building
Vulnerability (BV) to each element at risk. In the present study, the
building vulnerability is computed as a Relative Vulnerability Index
(RVI) of each single-hazard according to the scheme shown in Fig. 3
and using the following formula:
RVI¼
Xm
1
wm,ImSn (1)
With the weights w1wm (with
Pm
1 wm ¼ 1) for the different
indicators (I1Im) and the inﬂuence to vulnerability (I1s1Imsn, with
a value between 0 and 1). This Relative Vulnerability Index is not
dependent on the hazard intensity but it rather expresses a relative
vulnerability for each building for different hazards and user
deﬁned objectives.
After the vulnerability computation - using e.g. a GIS software
for the whole database to calculate the vulnerability of all elements
at risk - those elements actually at risk are identiﬁed by means of
overlay with the hazard information. In the case of time- or data-
constraints the overlay of hazard zones and buildings can be
done in advance to carry out the vulnerability analysis only for the
exposed elements. However, this impedes the analysis of multiple
hazard scenarios since the necessary vulnerability information on
newly exposed elements may be lacking.
Step 4: Effect of hazard interaction on the overall vulnerability
Where hazards overlap, elements may be exposed to multiple
hazards or even suffer the simultaneous impact of two events.
Since this may lead to an alteration of the vulnerability, the
relation of multiple hazards has to be considered. This refers to
the spatial (overlap) as well as to the temporal coincidence
(simultaneous occurrence). The merging of the spatial and the
temporal component of hazard coincidences leads to four
possible combinations (cf. Table 3): elements are located in zones
of only spatially (1), neither spatially nor temporally (2), spatially
and temporally (3) or only temporally coinciding hazards (4). In
more detail:
Table 2
Vulnerability indicators for several alpine hazards (avalanche (AV), rock fall (RF),
ﬂood (FL), shallow landslides (SL), debris ﬂow (DF), ﬂash ﬂoods (FF)) and their
relative2 importance for each hazard (black: high importance, grey: medium
importance, light grey: low importance and white: no importanceQ2 ).
AV RF FL SL DF FF 
Building-specific information 
Material 
Floors 
Condition 
Openings towards slope (size and condition) 
Height of lowest opening 
Presence of warning signs of landslides (jammed doors, 
cracks, broken utility lines, etc.) 
Basement 
Roof material 
Foundation type 
Building surroundings 
Building row (towards slope) 
Building row (towards river) 
Protection by vegetation 
Protection measures 
Movable objects that can be carried away by water or snow 
Human-related characteristics 
Use 
Vulnerable pop. (hospitals/schools etc.) 
Population density (winter/day) 
Population density (winter/night) 
Population density (summer/day) 
Population density (summer/night) 
2 Relative between the hazards listed in this table. This appraisal is no ﬁnal
evaluation but an example to illustrate the hazard-speciﬁc importance of the
indicators.
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Type 1 has implications for building codes and design of miti-
gation measures etc. The loads due to different hazards can be
contradictory, for instance, a measure to reinforce an element at
risk towards one hazard might destabilise it towards another
(Gibbs, 2003). In the framework of the indicator-based approach
proposed here, contradictory characteristics can be identiﬁed when
assigning the scores to the different categories of each indicator and
further consideration of this aspect can be encouraged. However,
the inclusion of this aspect into the presented methodology is
restricted to the identiﬁcation, while more detailed engineering
knowledge is necessary to develop building codes.
Type 2 is of no importance to physical vulnerability. However,
for the awareness and education of the population and their
behaviour this aspect might be of interest. The consideration of
this aspect in the presented approach is neither necessary nor
possible.
Type 3 is the result of several hazards caused by the same
trigger, one hazard triggering the next or completely coincidental
occurrence of various hazards at the same time or timely close with
additional spatial overlapping (Kappes et al., 2010). For the result-
ing vulnerability a distinction has to be made between sequential
and simultaneous hazards. According to Zuccaro, Cacace, Spence,
and Baxter (2008, p. 417), the timely close occurrence of events
(a so-called event-sequence) has the effect of “a progressive dimi-
nution of the resistance characteristics of the buildings”. For
example, an earthquake, having caused damage to a number of
buildings, can have triggered landslides. These landslides will have
a larger impact on the already affected buildings than on intact ones
since the physical vulnerability of the buildings has been increased
due to earthquake damages (Zuccaro et al., 2008). In order to
examine the effect of such sequences amatrix may be developed. In
this matrix, a ﬁrst hazard is opposed to a potentially sequential
second hazard, and the way the impact of the ﬁrst event could alter
the vulnerability of a building towards a second process is identi-
ﬁed (Table 4).
The simultaneous impact of two events provokes a cumulative
vulnerability that is potentially different from the sum or sequence
of the vulnerabilities of both single events. An example is the
impact of an earthquake on a snow covered building which leads to
a higher vulnerability of the structure as the sum of both individ-
ually occurring events (Lee and Rosowsky, 2006). However, the
investigation of the resulting overall vulnerability is an engineering
problem and cannot be solved by the method proposed here.
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind, that the simultaneous
impact of two hazards on a building in most cases will not only
cause more damage than the two processes would cause if they
would occur individually.
Type 4 is a challenge for the emergency planners since two
incidences within e.g. an administrative unit have to be coped with
simultaneously. Likewise, the reactions of the affected inhabitants
Table 3
Types and effects of hazard relations on the resulting vulnerability.
Spatially overlapping Spatially not overlapping
Not simultaneous Elements are affected by
different hazards at
different times (1)
Different elements within the
area under consideration are
affected by different hazards
at different times (2)
Simultaneous or
timely close
Element are affected by
two hazards at
the same time (3)
Different elements are affected
at the same time by different
hazards (4)
Relative Vulnerability
Index (RVI)
Relative Vulnerability
Index (RVI)
Indicator I
2
Indicator I
2Indicator I
1
Indicator I
1 Indicator I
m
Indicator I
m
W
1
W
m
Score 1Score 1
Score 2Score 2
Score 3Score 3
Score 4Score 4
s1
s2
s3
s4
Score 1Score 1
Score 2Score 2
Score 3Score 3
Score 4Score 4
s1
s2
s3
s4
Score 5Score 5
s5
Score 1Score 1
Score 2Score 2
Score 3Score 3
s1
s
…
sn
>0
No importance
Very low importance
Very high importance
0
>0
1
Not relevant
Low vulnerability
High vulnerability
0
1
Indicator I
..
Indicator I
..
Score 1Score 1
Score 2Score 2
Score 3Score 3
Score 4Score 4
s1
s2
s3
s4
W
2
W
…
Indicator weight Score      
Fig. 3. Vulnerability computation framework.
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will be altered by two simultaneous events. However, the purely
physical vulnerability is not modiﬁed and this aspect is therefore
not included in the methodology proposed in this paper.
In the following section, the presented methodology is tested in
a case study.
Application of the methodology in the Faucon municipality,
Barcelonnette Basin, France
The chosen area for the application and testing of the proposed
methodology is the municipality of Faucon in the Barcelonnette
valley, Alpes des Haute Provence, France.
In France, the development of risk prevention plans (Plan de
prevention des risques naturels previsibles, PPR - or previously PER,
Plans d’exposition au risques) at the municipal level is obligatory in
areas which are threatened by natural hazards. The prefect of the
“Département” is responsible for deﬁning which municipalities
have to elaborate a PPR. The area considered in such a plan is
conﬁned to the settled parts of themunicipality. The PPRs designate
three types of risk zones, red, indicating high risk, blue, for medium
risk and white, for zones of no signiﬁcant risk. However, the indi-
vidual vulnerabilities of the single buildings are not considered but
a kind of standard building is assumed to deﬁne the risk level. The
objective of this pilot study is to assess the vulnerability of the
buildings situated in the ofﬁcial high and medium hazard zones of
the Faucon municipality and demonstrate its spatial pattern.
The case study area
The Barcelonnette Basin (Vallée de l’Ubaye) is situated in the
department “Alpes-de-Haute-Provence”, located in the South
French Alps. The valley stretches between about 1100 m at the
lowest point to over 3000 m on the surrounding peaks and is
drained by the Ubaye river which is fed by numerous torrents
(Flageollet, Maquaire, Martin, & Weber, 1999). Geologically, it
constitutes a structural window with autochtonous black marls
underlying allochtonous Eocene thrust sheets which are composed
by limestones, sandstones and ﬂyschs (Évin, 1997, p. 32; Maquaire
et al., 2003; Remaître, Malet, Maquaire, & Ancey, 2003a). The
geological setting gives rise to the speciﬁc morphology of the
slopes: the upper slopes above 1900m on the thrust sheets are very
steepwith over 45 while the lower-lying area below 1900m in the
black marls exhibits gentle slopes of 10e30 (Remaître, 2006).
Despite the generally dry and mountainous Mediterranean
climate with mean annual rainfall of 700e800 mm, heavy rainfalls
during summer storms and spring rains on deep snow cover lead to
high discharges (Flageollet et al., 1999; Maquaire et al., 2003). The
area is exposed to a high number of freezeethaw cycles with about
130 freezing days per year (Maquaire et al., 2003).
These boundary conditions give rise to a variety of natural
hazards such as shallow landslides (Thiery, Malet, Sterlacchini,
Puissant, & Maquaire, 2007), large earthﬂows (e.g. Poche, La Val-
ette and Super Sauze, (Malet, Maquaire, Locat, & Remaître, 2004))
as well as high debris ﬂow and ﬂash ﬂood activity (Remaître et al.,
2003b). After nearly complete deforestation which started in the
17th century and entailed increasing torrent activity, reforestation
and construction of mitigation measures, particularly check-dams,
were initiated in 1864 (Remaître and Malet, 2010).
Due to the risk posed by the different hazards, all municipalities
of the Barcelonnette basin are obliged to elaborate risk prevention
plans. The “Commune de Faucon de Barcelonnette” is one of the
eight municipalities forming the Community of Communes “Vallée
de l’Ubaye” (Fig. 4). The last damaging event was a debris ﬂow in
the Faucon catchment in 2003 that affected nine houses and led to
a closure of the main road through the valley for several hours. In
2002, the local risk prevention plan (Plan de prevention des risques
naturels previsibles, PPR) was elaborated (RTM, 2002).
Although avalanches and rock falls endanger certain zones of
the basin, the settled part of the municipality Faucon is not affected
by these processes. In contrast, landsliding, torrential processes as
debris ﬂows, ﬂash ﬂoods (especially in the Faucon and Bourget
catchments) and river ﬂoods (Ubaye) pose a signiﬁcant threat.
Application of the methodology
Step 1: Determination of the study area, identiﬁcation of the
relevant hazards and acquisition of hazard information
The hazard information is taken from the PPR of Faucon and
accordingly the area under consideration refers to the built-up
zone. For endangered areas three different risk zones are distin-
guished: the red (high risk), blue (medium risk) and white (no
signiﬁcant risk) zone and, thus, this classiﬁcation is used in this
study. The difference between high and medium risk is not
attributed to changes in vulnerability or the value at risk but to
different levels of hazard. Thus, for the high risk zone a high
hazard level and likewise for the medium risk zone a medium
hazard level can be assumed. The different zones are described as
followed: the red zones are deﬁned as those regions in which no
effective and economically acceptable protection measures are
possible for this hazard level. Therefore, further construction is
Table 4
Matrix to identify the effect of hazard event sequences on building vulnerabilities. The column indicates the ﬁrst, the row the second hazard.
Earthquake Landslide Flood Storm
Earthquake Cracks and especially structural damages
may increase the vulnerability to the
second impact
Destabilisation of the underground
due to the water-saturated
soil/erosion
/ Alteration of the condition indicator / Alteration of the condition
& foundation indicator.
Landslides
(including
rock fall)
Structural damages may
increase the vulnerability
to the second impact
Destabilisation of the underground
due to the water-saturated
soil/erosion
A storm may unroof a building and
“open” the building towards an
impacting rock
/ Alteration of the condition
& foundation indicator
/ Alteration of the roof characteristics/ Alteration of the
condition indicator
Flood Cracks and damages increase the
vulnerability
/ Alteration of the condition and the
lowest opening
Storm Cracks and damages increase the
vulnerability
/ Alteration of the condition indicator
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prohibited in this area. The blue zone exhibits medium level risk
and preventive measures can be applied effectively. For the
construction of further buildings certain requirements (building
codes) are imposed in accordance to the type of hazard. Finally,
the white zone indicates areas where no signiﬁcant risk was
identiﬁed (the seismic threat is considered at national level and
not included in the PPRs), thus no building codes concerning
natural hazards are applied in these areas. Finally, although these
risk or hazard zones, respectively, do not indicate exact hazard
intensities, they offer information on high and intermediate
hazard for multiple processes which can be used for a relative
vulnerability analysis within the zones.
Step 2: Determination of vulnerability indicators and collection
of the data
In this case study, we focus on building vulnerability. Indicators
from Table 1 which were already available or rather easy to obtain
were chosen (Table 5). Building-speciﬁc information was available
from the LIVE Institute (Laboratoire Image, Ville, Environment) of
CNRS, University of Strasbourg. Information on the building
Fig. 4. The municipality «Faucon de Barcelonnette» lying between the municipalities Jausiers, Enchastrayes, Barcelonnette and St. Pons.
Table 5
Indicators chosen for the vulnerability analysis.
Indicator Source of information Values
Building-speciﬁc information
Type of building LIVE Apartment buildings Residential houses Hut/Cottage Storage buildings
or Hangars Monuments (e.g. churches)
Use LIVE Agricultural Emergency services Garage Groundwater extraction
Industrial/technical Lodging Public administration Pumping station
Recreational Religious Residential Transformators
Building condition (This indicator is
a combination of age and maintenance)
LIVE Good Medium Bad Ruin (partly destroyed or very bad shape)
Material LIVE Concrete Metal Mixed Traditional brick wall Wood
Floors (Including the cellar) LIVE Number
Building surroundings
Row towards the slope Orthophoto interpretation First Second Third  Fourth
Row towards the river Orthophotos interpretation First Second Third  Fourth or far from the river
Row towards torrents Orthophotos interpretation First Second Third  Fourth or far from any torrent
Trees towards the slope Orthophotos interpretation No trees Few trees Closed tree line Located in the forest
Trees towards the river Orthophotos interpretation No trees Few trees Closed tree line Located in the forest
Trees towards torrents Orthophotos interpretation No trees Few trees Closed tree line Located in the forest
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surroundings was obtained by means of aerial-photo-interpreta-
tion of images from 2000.
Step 3: Weighting of factors and vulnerability assessment
The application of the methodology will be demonstrated
through the production of several vulnerability maps for three
different hazard types (debris ﬂows, shallow landslides and river
ﬂooding). Two exemplary users are considered: ﬁrst, emergency
services and rescue teams having evacuation-planning as their
focus (later on referred to as emergency scenario). Secondly, local
authorities, insurance companies or even private individuals such
as house owners that focus on reinforcement of buildings in order
to reduce vulnerability (later on referred to as general scenario).
The deﬁnition of the vulnerability scores and the indicator
weighting for each hazard (debris ﬂow, ﬂood and shallow land-
slide) for the different users was done on basis of expert appraisals
and is presented in Fig. 5. According to these schemes, the relative
vulnerability index was calculated for each building for the three
hazards (debris ﬂow, river ﬂood and shallow landslides). The
results for each hazard and user are presented in Fig. 6. The
buildings were classiﬁed in three classes (high, medium, low
vulnerability) using the quantile classiﬁcation method (equal
number of buildings per class but only concerning those buildings
situated in the respective hazard zones). Thus, this classiﬁcation
provides assistance for the prioritisation of buildings for evacuation
or vulnerability reduction measures. In this study, we assess the
vulnerability of all buildings including also buildings which are
located in the risk/hazard zones. Although this is not relevant for
identifying hotspots but it might be necessary for the assessment of
future scenarios. Especially the buildings located close to the
hazard zones should be considered for future scenarios.
In Fig. 6 the maps illustrate the spatial patterns of the physical
vulnerability for debris ﬂows (Fig. 6a and b), river ﬂoods (Fig. 6c and
d) and landslides (Fig. 6e). The maps in Fig. 6a/c/e result from
assigning the weights by considering the ability of the building to
withstand the impact of the process. The resulting information may
be used by local authorities, individual building owners or insurance
companies for the planning of vulnerability reductionmeasures and
reinforcement of buildings. Regarding debris ﬂows (Fig. 6a), espe-
cially for four buildings located veryclose to the torrent (Faucon) and
on the border to the red zone the results indicate a strong recom-
mendation to speciﬁc measures for reducing the vulnerability.
Actually, these buildings were affected during the 2003 debris ﬂow
in the Faucon torrent. In contrast, the buildings located further down
the torrent or in the second or third building row beneﬁt from the
shadowing effect of the structures and show lower vulnerabilities. It
becomes evident that, for this group of buildings, the indicator on
building location (in relation to the other buildings) captures and
inﬂuence the relative vulnerability index since thebuildings are very
similar as far as the rest of their characteristics are concerned (all
two-storey houses except two three-storey houses). More detailed
information, suchas size andheightofwindows towards the slopeor
reinforcement of walls, could give a more nuanced picture of their
physical vulnerability. The vulnerability pattern of the buildings
towards riverﬂooding (Fig. 6c) suggests that twobuildings (assigned
to the high vulnerability class and marked in red) should be clearly
the priority when planning measures to reduce the vulnerability.
Thus, the four buildings that display intermediate and low vulner-
ability should be given lower priority. However, the risk zone (red)
indicates ahighhazard level and, therefore, a nevertheless highneed
for risk reduction measures. For landslides, Fig. 6e shows a rather
heterogeneous picture for both, hazard and vulnerability levels. This
pattern complicates the prioritization of buildings for which
vulnerability reduction measures have to be applied since the
rankingbetweenbuildingsbelonging todifferent hazard zones is not
possible. Due to the very general hazard information available from
the PPR it is not possible (without making assumptions) to rank
a building of high vulnerability located in a blue risk zone with
a building of medium vulnerability in the red risk zone. However,
since fewer buildings are situated in the red zone (especially build-
ings with high vulnerability) there is no doubt about the priority
ranking. For vulnerability reduction, the buildings classiﬁed as
highly vulnerable that are locatedwithin the landslide hazard zones
should be considered for protectionmeasures such as reinforcement
or protections walls. Moreover, the function of these buildings
should be known and controlled, thus, it should be ensured that no
vulnerable groups use these buildings (e.g. children, elderly,
disabled).
The weighting for the vulnerability assessment in Fig. 6b/d aims
at highlighting the most important buildings for the emergency
services. In other words, indicators relevant e.g. for the vertical
evacuation in case of a ﬂood such as the number of ﬂoors have
received higher weights. According to this procedure, the rescue
teams may prioritise their actions in the response phase following
a disastrous event. The emergency scenario map depicting the
vulnerability towards debris ﬂows (Fig. 6b) illustrate only minor
differences compared to the general scenario (Fig. 6c). Several
additional buildings exhibit high vulnerability and would need
immediate support in case of an event (e.g. the building situated
north of the four buildings with high vulnerability (red) located in
the red zone close to the torrent). However, in general, the priori-
tization is very similar to the one suggested for general risk
reduction and protection measures. There are no dramatic differ-
ences between the vulnerability maps for general and emergency
scenarios. This can be explained by the fact that the available
indicators for the pilot study were limited. Especially the inclusion
of information on the characteristics of the population would
highly increase the usefulness of the emergency scenario. Having
more indicators available could lead to two very differentmaps, one
showing clearly the buildings that should be reinforced and the
other showing the buildings that the rescue teams and emergency
services should concentrate on in the response phase.
The municipality of Faucon already identiﬁed risk/hazard zones
(blue and red) for a range of different hazards. However, Fig. 6a, b, c,
d, e illustrate the physical vulnerability to all the relevant hazards of
the buildings in the entire area and not only in the hazard zones. A
municipality with limited resources may limit the vulnerability
assessment of buildings within the hazard zones, identifying in this
way the hotspots and focus on speciﬁc buildings that will most
likely experience the impact of a process. Although, in order to use
vulnerability assessment for disaster risk reduction strategies for
future scenarios we ought to consider that these hazard zones are
supposed to represent the hazard levels based on past events but
they do not represent possible future scenarios. Especially in the
context of climate and global environmental change, future
scenarios of processes behaviour have to be considered and,
therefore, also hazard frequency and magnitude will change in the
settled run-out area indicated as hazard zones (cf. Keiler, Knight, &
Harrison, 2010). For example, in Fig. 6d highly vulnerable buildings
are located only a few metres away from the border of the hazard
zone. A similar situation can be observed in Fig. 6e where highly
vulnerable buildings (orange) are located a fewmetres south of the
landslide hazard zone border. The local authorities and rescue
teams will have access to this information also if in the future an
event has a larger impact than expected.
Step 4: Effect of hazard interactions on the overall vulnerability
Since the PPR of Faucon does not indicate spatially overlapping
hazards the effect of hazard interactions on the vulnerability cannot
be considered within this case study.
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Fig. 5. The vulnerability indicators, the weighting and score for debris ﬂows, river ﬂoods and shallow landslides for two different objectives (vulnerability reduction & rein-
forcement (blue) and evacuation & rescue (red)). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 6. Physical vulnerability maps.
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Advantages, limitations and future developments
In this paper a newly developed GIS-based approach that allows
coherently assessing hazard-speciﬁc physical vulnerability towards
multiplehazards ispresented.This approach isbasedontheselection
of element characteristics which serve as vulnerability indicators. A
pilot study in Faucon, France demonstrated the advantages of the
method but also its limitations. Moreover, a range of possible future
developments are proposed here that could improve and strengthen
an already valuable tool for planners and decision-makers.
Advantages
The method presented herein is a valuable tool in the hands of
decision-makers offering a common platform for various users to
use according to their needs and objectives. The advantages of the
newly developed methodology are described in the following
paragraphs.
Indicators: The innovation of the methodology lies on the fact
that multi-hazard vulnerability indicators are used. All the building
characteristics considered as relevant in a multi-hazard context can
be taken into account in the assessment of its vulnerability, in
contrast to other vulnerability methods that consider only one (e.g.
building type).
Flexibility: A major advantage of the method is its ﬂexibility.
There is no standard and inﬂexibleweighting of the indicators. Each
user can adjust the weighting according to his/her objectives needs
and priorities. Moreover, themethod can be used for different types
of hazards assisting in this way the decision-making in a multi-
hazard setting.
Not hazard-intensity speciﬁc: Themethodology canwork also in
absence of hazard intensity information. The “relative” vulnera-
bility index enables prioritization of risk reduction actions although
it does not assign an absolute vulnerability value to each building.
GIS: The use of GIS makes the database easy to update and to
extend by including indicators for more hazard types or additional
indicators (e.g. socio-economic data). Moreover, it can be accessed
by various end-users and it enables the visualisation of the results.
Future scenarios: The database containing the vulnerability
indicators includes all buildings and not only the ones that are
located within the hazardous zones. In this way, the vulnerability of
the buildings for future scenarios that consider also climate and
environmental change can be also assessed, as the impact of future
events can be larger than expected.
Local scale: The unit for the vulnerability assessment is the
individual house and not building blocks or entire regions as in
other vulnerability assessment methods. Working on a local scale is
appropriate not only for decision-making but also for emergency
planning and vulnerability reduction prioritisation.
Limitations and future developments
The modiﬁcation of the PTVA for multi-hazards and the
implementation of the methodology in a pilot study area was
a challenging task. Some of the main limitations of the method are
listed below.
Hazard zones: The method we proposed in this article is a ﬁrst
attempt to consider multi-hazard vulnerability in a hazard-speciﬁc
way. However, this poses a wide range of challenges, among others
the link to the hazard intensity. It is understood that buildings that
are vulnerable to a process of a speciﬁc intensity might be less or
not vulnerable when the same process occurs having a lower
intensity. Ideally, the hazard zones should include information
regarding the intensity/magnitude and the probability of occur-
rence of each process. However, in this study due to lack of relevant
data and in the interest of applicability and transferability the
vulnerability of each element at risk is assigned as a relative
vulnerability index rather than as an absolute score that expresses
the vulnerability of the element to a speciﬁc intensity.
Availability of data: In order to implement the proposed meth-
odology a large amount of detailed data at local scale is required
that is not always available to the local authorities or cannot be
collected by orthophotos or other remote sensing methods.
Therefore, applying the methodology includes a considerable
amount of time-consuming ﬁeldwork that could make the meth-
odology unattractive to potential users. For this reason, the
minimum of data necessary to derive useful results has to be
identiﬁed and furthermore alternative methods of data collection
should be considered.
Weighting of factors: The weighting of factors in this study has
been done on basis of expert appraisal. Better documentation of
events and damage assessment would provide more information
regarding the impact of physical processes on buildings that at the
moment is not available.
However, the assumptions and limitations listed above may be
used constructively in order to improve and strengthen the
methodology. The main points which have to be considered for
a future development of the presented indicator-based vulnera-
bility assessment for multi-hazard research are:
Alternative methods of data collection and additional data: One
of the major drawbacks of our methodology is the lack of data.
Conducting such a study requires a great amount of detailed data
that cannot always be collected on site or are not always available
by the authorities. In this case, alternative methods of data collec-
tion should be considered such as the use of street views (e.g.
google street view if available) or questionnaires that should be
completed by the inhabitants of the hazardous areas. This could be
part of a public education and awareness program. Complementary
data would improve the vulnerability assessment considerable.
This could include:
 Data regarding open spaces such as the use of the open space
and the population density when this is in use (e.g. camping
sites) and whether it is paved or not.
 Data regarding the accumulation of movable objects (car parks,
machinery, etc.) that could be carried away from water and
cause additional damage to infrastructure and people.
 Data regarding infrastructure and agricultural areas: infra-
structure and agriculture are very important for a community.
Disruption of transport routes and lifelines can make the work
of rescue teams very difﬁcult. Damages on agriculture will have
a signiﬁcant impact on the economy of the area. For this reason,
in a future development of the present methodology, data
regarding the physical vulnerability of infrastructure and
agriculture should be included.
 Socio-economic data: the database can be also populated with
socio-economic data that would determine the social vulner-
ability of the population which in combination to the physical
vulnerability would constitute valuable information for deci-
sion-makers.
Improvement of the weighting of indicators and validation of
results: The weighting of the indicators in the present study has
been based in expert judgement and for this reason it bears many
uncertainties. An interesting future development would be to base
the weighting on documentation of past events. This would require
detailed information on the characteristics of the buildings, the
damage that the building has suffered and the intensity of the event
on the speciﬁc building. Based on this information, the importance
of the indicators can be identiﬁed by looking at the damages of
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buildings that, although they experience the same intensity of
a process, they suffered different degree of damage. It is understood
that in order to conduct such a study documentation containing
detailed information on the damage of individual buildings is
needed which is rarely available. Detailed damage assessment for
individual buildings following an event can provide valuable
information regarding the vulnerability of the structure and for this
reason it has to be improved and optimised where needed.
Physical Vulnerability Index for multi-hazard: Last but not least,
an ambitious development of this study would be the development
of a Physical Vulnerability Index for areas exposed to multiple
hazards which could combine all these indicators and determine
the overall vulnerability to multi-hazards.
Conclusion
In this paper a new vulnerability assessment method for multi-
hazards in alpine environments is introduced. The speciﬁc meth-
odology is based on an existing methodology for tsunami vulner-
ability assessment (PTVA) and it was modiﬁed to include a multiple
alpine hazards. The main idea was to create an indicator-based
methodology for physical vulnerability assessment that also
enables assessing building vulnerability for multi-hazards
perspective. A further innovative aspect of the methodology is
that not only vulnerability “to” different hazards (hazard-speciﬁc)
but also vulnerability “for” a range of users (user-speciﬁc) is
considered. In other words, the indicators database can be applied
by a range of end-users adapting the methodology according to
their objectives. The results of this study show that the proposed
methodology make it possible: (a) to assess comparable physical
vulnerability for multi-hazards (e.g. debris ﬂows, shallow land-
slides and river ﬂooding) and to (b) to provide information to
different stakeholders in order to identify hotspots and focus their
efforts in speciﬁc buildings and areas. The presented approach is
a ﬂexible method which can be applied for the vulnerability anal-
ysis in a multi-hazard context but it can also be adjusted to the
user-speciﬁc needs to support decision-making processes. These
advantages and a further improvement of the method will help to
meet the challenges for vulnerability as well as risk assessment
arising from global change under the consideration of changing
natural systems and social systems as well as complex interaction
between both systems. Nevertheless, the results also demonstrate
the requirement for data regarding the indicators themselves and
a better documentation of damage assessment. Better damage
documentation could provide further information concerning the
importance of each indicator for the vulnerability assessment
towards a range of hazard types.
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PREFACE 
 
MultiRISK is a multi-hazard risk platform consisting of the MultiRISK Modeling Tool and the MultiRISK 
Visualization Tool to enable rapid, consistent, user-friendly and easily reproducible multi-hazard risk 
analyses and clear visualization of the results. This platform has been developed in the framework of 
the Mountain Risks Project, a Marie Curie Research and Training Network, 7th Framework Programme, 
2007-2010, Contract number MCRTN03598. 
 
 
 
 IN SHORT: THE MULTIRISK PLATFORM… 
 
… is a software consisting of a Modeling and a Visualization Tool. 
…  consists of four steps: (1) hazard modeling, (2) hazard model validation, (3) exposure analysis 
and (4) visualization of the results. 
 
THE MODELING TOOL 
…  is a software for the analysis of multiple hazards jointly. The processes currently included are 
debris flows, rock falls, shallow landslides, floods and snow avalanches. 
… includes three of the four steps the MultiRISK Platform consists of, namely (1) hazard modeling, 
(2) model validation and (3) exposure analysis. 
…  offers a fast computation and rapid & easy recalculation.  
… is designed as top-down approach. 
…  is based on ArcGIS, programmed in Python and includes several single-hazard models in one 
framework.  
 
THE VISUALIZATION TOOL 
…  offers a user-friendly visualization with a clear and lucid layout. 
… is a web-application elaborated in CartoWeb and based on MapServer 4 Windows (free of 
charge). 
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Introduction 
Risk analysis and management strategies are often reactive and restricted to single hazards. However, 
for a coherent reduction of the overall risk posed by all relevant natural hazards affecting an area, a 
complete multi-hazard approach is necessary. While the analysis of single hazards and risks is for most 
processes already rather well established, multi-hazard analyses are still rare, pose a range of 
additional challenges and can therefore not be computed by just summing the single-hazard risks (cf. 
Kappes et al. subm). The main challenge is the huge differences between the characteristics of different 
hazards. This comprises e.g. the scale at which hazards act, their predictability, return period, extent 
etc. Furthermore it affects the metric in which hazards are measured: impact pressure of rocks, 
inundation depth of floods or peak ground acceleration of earthquakes. Consequently, also the methods 
to assess the hazards are very diverse. Last but not least, the scale at which hazards and risks have to 
be assessed depends on the objective and requirements defined by the end-users who need the 
information for decision-making purposes in the framework of risk management.  
The Multi-Hazard Risk Modeling Tool “MultiRISK” is a software application for the analysis of mountain 
hazards consisting of the MultiRISK Modeling Tool and the MultiRISK Visualization Tool. MultiRISK 
follows a top-down approach where a general regional overview to identify areas at high hazard risk is 
followed by more detailed analyses of these zones. This first MultiRISK version does currently consist of 
the regional scale analysis of the hazards rock fall, debris flows, shallow landslides, avalanches and 
river floods. More hazards and detailed local scale models will be implemented in a following version of 
the MultiRISK Modeling Tool. 
The Modeling Tool is programmed in Python and running on basis of ArcGIS for the joint analysis of the 
hazard susceptibilities and the elements which are exposed. It consists of an assemblage of GIS-based 
methodologies (e.g. the source identification of avalanches according to Maggioni), ArcGIS extensions 
(e.g. Shalstab and FloodArea) and stand-alone models (Flow-R running on Matlab) which are 
connected by means of the Python script. It is an application with the aim to simplify the joint analysis of 
multiple hazards and risks by carrying out preparative and intermediate steps automatically (as the 
computation of DEM derivatives, the conversion of formats etc.). This reduces possible errors and 
makes the analyses clearer and faster.  
The MultiRISK Modeling Tool is connected to the MultiRISK Visualization Tool which offers a clearly 
structured display of the previously produced results. The Visualization is designed in CartoWeb on a 
MapServer engine acting as local host and shows the results in a browser window (preferably Firefox). 
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1. Theoretical background of the Modeling and Visualization Tool 
 
The first step in the development of a multi-hazard risk analysis tool is the development of an analysis 
concept. However, before entering into the topic a short definition of the most important terms is 
provided: 
 
 
BRIEF DEFINITION OF THE BASIC TERMS (c.f. Kappes et al. prep): 
 
Exposure: is according to (UN-ISDR 2009, p. 6) defined as “[p]eople, property, systems, or 
other elements present in hazard zones that are thereby subject to potential losses”. In this 
manual the definition is extended from elements lying in hazard (i.e. full-hazard) zones to 
susceptibility zones as well. The decisive difference to risk is the negligence of hazard intensity 
specific vulnerability of the elements. 
Hazard: is “[a] dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may 
cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and 
services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage” (UN-ISDR 2009, p. 7. 
However, in a technical context hazard refers often to quantitative information of “likely 
frequency of occurrence of different intensities for different areas, as determined from historical 
data or scientific analysis” (UN-ISDR 2009, p. 7. In a multi-hazard context both definitions of 
hazard are needed: hazard according to a general definition is needed when referring to the 
totality of multiple potentially threatening processes and the technical one is needed to 
describe the level of information available for a certain process (in contrast to susceptibility). To 
be able to distinguish between the two meanings the second (technical) definition will be called 
Full-Hazard in the following. 
Risk: relates to the “[e]xpected losses (of lives, persons injured, property damaged and 
economic activity disrupted) due to a particular hazard for a given area and reference period” 
(WMO 1999, p. 2).  
Susceptibility: refers in contrast to full-hazard to the purely spatial information, i.e. indicating 
areas possibly hit by a certain threatening natural process offering only spatial probabilities 
without (detailed) information about temporal probabilities. 
 
 
MultiRISK is based on a top-down approach. Top-down refers to the performance of a simple, rough 
large scale and fast analysis which is followed by a more detailed, local and sophisticated analysis. The 
large-scale analysis shall serve as overview over a certain area and support the identification of threat 
hotspots where more detailed local analyses have to be carried out (c.f. Kappes et al. prep). This 
assumption is first underpinned by the fact that multi-hazard analyses exhibit very high data 
requirements and a step-wise analysis enables an efficient concentration of resources on those areas 
actually at high threat. Second, in a multi-hazard concept the overlap of hazards and potential 
interactions in the overlapping areas are an aspect which shall not be neglected and finds more and 
more attention in the recent literature (Tarvainen et al. 2006, Marzocchi et al. 2009, Kappes et al. 2010, 
European Comission 2011). Overview analyses offer a very good opportunity to identify the respective 
zones and indicate where interactions have to be analyzed in detail.  
The MultiRISK Modeling Tool consists at the present state of the regional analysis for a first overview 
and the inclusion of local models will be done in a second step. The data requirements for an overview 
analysis have to be kept down to ensure the effectiveness of a top-down approach. Important aspects in 
this context are the decisions to model full-hazard or only susceptibility and exposure or risk. Hitherto, 
MultiRISK has in first place been developed to model susceptibility and analyze (Kappes et al. prep). 
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However, the single models exhibit the potential to be applied for full-hazard. E.g. the flood model is 
anyways designed for full-hazard modeling and for rock fall, debris flows, avalanches and shallow 
landslides certain assumptions could enable the user to compute full-hazard as well  (e.g. Blahut et al. 
2010). 
1.1. Flow chart of the analysis/modeling scheme 
 
The analysis scheme is the background concept of the software. It was developed under consideration 
of the need to compute comparable hazards and risks on basis of well-available spatial data to enable a 
fast and easy analysis without the necessity for time-consuming field work and data acquisition (for a 
more detailed description refer to (Kappes et al.prep).  
 
 
Figure 1: Flow chart of the analysis/modeling scheme 
 
The required input for the MultiRISK Modeling Tool is a digital elevation model (DEM) and optionally 
land use/cover and lithology information of which a number of derivatives is computed as e.g. planar 
curvature, forest cover or limestone outcrops (Figure 1). These information layers form the actual input 
for the modeling. The modeling is done either by external models, by ready-to-use ArcGIS extensions 
for the modeling of certain hazards or by methodologies which are implemented directly in ArcGIS by 
means of the basic tools in the toolbox. 
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1.2. Data input (original data) 
 
 
INFORMATION ON THE DATA REQUIREMENTS: 
 
Scale: Regional ~1:25.000 (max. range 1:10.000 - 1:50.000) 
Resolution of the rasters: 10m (MultiRISK is currently adjusted to a resolution of 10m although it 
could as well be adapted to 20m and potentially still to 30m. The resolution is restricted by the run 
out model Flow-R which requires a raster resolution which is divisible by 10)  
Data/Information:   
 Spatial data: DEM (raster file) 
 Land use/cover (polygon shape file) 
 Lithology (polygon shape file) 
 Drainage network (raster file) 
 Non-spatial information: Hazard information: to calibrate the single models information is 
necessary for each process. Details will be given in the following 
sections. 
Inventory data (if an automatic validation shall be carried out. 
Alternatively to data on past events, areas mapped on basis of expert 
appraisal could be entered into the validation as well. Alternatively 
other validation approaches as a field survey are also possible. 
Elements at risk (if an exposure analysis shall be carried out). Potential 
options are points, lines or polygons (e.g. buildings) which will be 
treated as units (already a partial exposure leads to the indication of 
the label exposed), lineal elements as infrastructure of which the 
exposed stretch will be identified and finally polygons (e.g. land use 
units)  of which the exposed part will be determined. 
 
 
1.3. Processing 
 
In the first processing step, the DEM is resampled to a resolution of 10m and adjusted to coordinates 
divisible by 101.  
An exception is the input for the model FloodArea for river flood modeling: the elevation differences in 
floodplains are rather low but significant and a resampling to 10m (if the resolution of the original DEM is 
better) means a loss of detail. Therefore, as input for FloodArea, the original DEM is only processed 
with „fill sinks” but no resampling to a 10m resolution etc. is carried out. 
The shape file inputs (land use/cover, lithology and the rivers) are converted into rasters exactly aligned 
to the processed DEM raster. The elevation information is assigned to the pixels of the river raster as 
input for the flood model FloodArea. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Coordinates divisible by 10 are needed for the model Flow-R by means of which the run out of rock fall, avalanches, debris 
flows and landslides is computed. Flow-R itself is (in the MultiRISK independent version) applicable at a resolution of 10, 20 
or 30m, however, the way it is included in MultiRISK (this refers especially to the data preparation) offers currently only the 
10m application. For the modeling with a resolution of 20m or 30m MultiRISK would have to be readjusted! 
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1.4. Computation of derivatives (model input) 
 
The following derivatives are computed with the default algorithms of ArcGIS (see Figure 1): 
DEM:  slope [°], planar curvature [m-1], flow accumulation [m2] and ridges (derived on basis of 
curvature and slope (change) of aspect).  
The class information of land use/cover and lithology are reclassified according to decisions made by 
the user (e.g. the exclusion of dense forest for the avalanche initiation leads to a classified file indicating 
the existence of forest 1/noData). 
 
1.5. Hazard modeling methods 
In the following the methods and models used for the hazard analyses are described. 
 
1.5.1. Avalanche sources  
The source identification is carried out according to the methodology proposed by Maggioni and Gruber 
(2003) and simplified by Barbolini et al. (2009). The basic assumptions are: 
→  Where enough snow accumulates (on ridges or too steep terrain this is mostly not possible) and 
can, due to a sufficiently high slope angle, get into movement and is not stabilized by dense forest 
an avalanche can possibly be initiated. Translated to modeling criteria the following three 
parameters have to be considered: 
1. Slope: A range between around 30° and 60° can be assumed as potentially avalanche producing 
since below a certain angle the slope is too flat to start the movement and above a specific angle 
the snow is not accumulating. The exact thresholds are defined by the user. 
2. Land use/cover: Specific land use/cover types as e.g. dense forest can usually be excluded as 
possible source for avalanches. 
3. Ridges: Due to the exposed situation and the effect of wind-induced snow-drift, ridges are excluded 
as possible sources. Ridges are, according to Maggioni (2004), identified by the slope of aspect of 
>40° and positive curvature values >1/100m. This is done automatically and cannot be modified by 
the user. 
 
 
1.5.2. Shallow landslide sources  
The sources are identified with the model Shalstab (Montgomery and Dietrich 1994) in the version of the 
slope stability package (a script running in ArcGIS 8.x & 9.x) after Montgomery and Greenberg (2009) 
which is included in MultiRISK. Shalstab couples a “hydrological model to a limit-equilibrium slope 
stability model to calculate the critical steady-state rainfall necessary to trigger slope instability at any 
point in a landscape” (Montgomery et al. 1998, p. 944) till obtaining the following equation for the critical 
steady-state rainfall (Qc): 
 





  



tan
tan1
/
sin
w
s
c ba
TQ                Equation 1                                                                                 
 
with the soil transmissivity T [m2/day], the hillslope angle θ  [°], the drainage area [m2] a and the outflow 
boundary length b [m], the water bulk density ρw [kg/m3], the soil bulk density ρs [kg/m3] and the angle of 
internal friction   [°].  
Shalstab can be used without specific calibration or can be calibrated in detail. Without specific 
calibration, it indentifies the “areas with equal topographic control on shallow landslide initiation” 
(Montgomery et al.1998), p. 945). The following data and parameters, respectively, have to be entered: 
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1. DEM: the digital elevation model is directly (after the general pre-processing) inputted into Shalstab 
which computes the necessary derivatives a, b, θ and performs the susceptibility computation.  
2. The soil bulk density ρs (one value for the whole area has to be defined). Dietrich and Montgomery 
(1998) propose the assumption of a value between 1600 and 2000 kg/m3 for the use without 
specific calibration. 
3. The angle of internal friction (friction angle) θ has to be inputted. 
4. The critical steady state rainfall has to be determined for which the unstable areas are computed. 
5. After the susceptibility analysis in Shalstab, identified unstable areas lying in certain lithological units 
which generally do not lead to landsliding as e.g. outcropping limestone can be excluded. 
→  Where the material is adequate and the topography favorable, possible landslide sources are 
identified. 
 
 
1.5.3. Rock fall sources  
Rock falls initiate at rock walls / outcropping rocks which exhibit usually rather steep slopes. Rock fall 
initiation is thus strongly correlated to steep slopes and a common method to identify potential sources 
is the classification of the slope gradient (derived from a DEM) with a threshold angle above which rock 
detachment and fall is assumed (Wichmann and Becht 2006). This applies especially for certain 
lithological units as limestone or granite while e.g. clays and marls do usually not produce significantly 
large and stable blocks with far movement (Corominas et al. 2003).  
In total, three criteria are used within MultiRISK for the rock fall source identification: 
1. Slope: the area exhibiting a slope angle above a certain threshold which has to be defined by the 
user is assumed to possibly produce rock fall. For Information on slope angles used in scientific 
studies see for example Corominas et al. (2003), Wichmann and Becht (2006), Guzzetti et al. 
(2003), Ayala-Carcedo et al. (2003), Jaboyedoff and Labiouse (2003) or Frattini et al. (2008). 
2. Lithology: certain lithological units which most probably do not lead to significant rock fall as clays 
and marls can be excluded. 
3. Land use/cover: the usefulness of this layer depends on the detail and information content offered. 
Outcropping bedrock, sealed areas or dense forest could give valuable information for inclusion and 
exclusion, respectively, according to the effect on rock fall initiation. 
→  Where the slope angle is high enough and neither the land use/cover nor lithology information 
indicate an exclusion as possible source the zone is marked as possible rock fall source. 
 
 
1.5.4. Debris flow sources  
The source identification was done according to the methodology proposed by Horton et al. (2008) and 
carried out with the model Flow-R which is operated by MultiRISK. The following criteria are used for the 
source identification (Horton et al. 2008):  
1. Slope in combination with upslope area: A certain slope angle is necessary to put material and 
water in movement, however, the availability of these two components is strongly influenced by the 
size of the drainage area. Therefore, slope and upslope area can be considered as dependent and 
related variables, respectively. For rather big upslope areas moderately steep slopes are sufficient 
to start a movement (high material and water availability) while for small contribution zones only 
rather steep slopes lead to mass displacement (Figure 2). One of the two curves, the rare or the 
extreme fitting, can be chosen for the debris flow modeling. 
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Figure 2: Slope threshold in dependence on the upslope area 
 
2. Planar curvature: the existence of a concave shape is assumed to be an important factor for the 
accumulation of material and water for the formation of debris flows as well (Delmonaco et al. 
2003). The user defines a planar curvature threshold below which an area is identified as gully 
which may lead to material and water accumulation and contributes in further consequence as one 
parameter to debris flow formation. 
3. Lithology: Potential sources lying in certain lithological units as e.g. outcropping limestone which is 
assumed to not be susceptible to debris flow initiation can be excluded as possible sources. 
4. Land use/cover: Units as e.g. dense forest can be excluded, if a respective indication gives rise to 
the assumption that below dense tree cover no debris flows are initiated in this area.  
→  Concave and steep areas with a sufficiently big upslope area to accumulate enough material and 
water and explicit stabilitzation due to certain land use/cover or lithological characteristics are 
designated as potential debris flow sources. 
 
 
1.5.5. Run out modeling for debris flows, rock falls, shallow landslides and avalanches  
The run out computation is done by means of the model Flow-R. Flow-R combines three algorithms, two 
flow direction and one run out distance algorithm: 
1. The flow direction is primarily based on the multiple flow direction method after Quinn et al. (1991) 
which was enhanced by Holmgren (1994) resulting in the following formula: 
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               for all tan β > 0                               Equation 2 
 
with I,j the flow directions (1..8), fi the flow proportion (1..0) in direction i, tan βi the slope gradient 
between the central cell and cell in direction i and x an exponent introduced by Holmgren (1994) (for 
more detail on the model see Horton et al. (2008), Kappes et al. (2011) or Blahut et al. (2010)). For 
x = 1 it converts into the basic multiple flow direction after Quinn et al. (1991) and for x→ it turns 
into a single flow. 
2. The flow direction is influenced by the persistence of the flow which describes its inertia to changes 
of the flow direction. It is a function of the change in angle from the last flow direction (Horton et al. 
2008). 
3. The run out distance is delimited by means of a constant friction loss angle. For each transition of 
the mass from one pixel to the next the kinetic energy is computed while the angle of constant 
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friction loss is subtracted. This is done by the subtraction of the constant friction loss angle from the 
angle between the two pixels. The kinetic energy is thus computed by the following equation: 
 
 
i
loss
i
pot
i
kin
i
kin EEEE  1                            Equation 3 
 
 
with the time step i, the kinetic energy Ekin, the change in potential energy ∆Epot and the constant 
loss Eloss. The flow stops when the kinetic energy drops below zero. 
 
 
1.5.6. River floods  
For the river flood modeling the ArcGIS extension FloodArea developed by Geomer (2008) is 
implemented in MultiRISK. FloodArea offers a number of modeling options and model parameters of 
which only the following two options are included in MultiRISK: 
1. Modeling of the water level (static flood modeling): On basis of a DEM, the drainage network and a 
specific water level above the elevation of the drainage network, the extent of the water surface is 
computed with the corresponding water depth in each pixel. 
“Using the option Water level (elevation of a drainage network) assumes that flooding is initialized 
by the entire drainage network, meaning from all grid cells other than NoData). Water levels can 
vary spatially but remain temporally constant during the simulation process” (Geomer 2008, p. 12). 
2. Modeling by means of hydrograph information (static or dynamic flood modeling): On basis of a 
DEM and one or more hydrographs at various points the spatial and temporal course of the flooding 
can be modeled. “Using the option Hydrograph (input by single cell) water enters the model at 
defined locations. This option makes temporal variation (hydrograph) of water levels possible” 
(Geomer 2008, p. 12). 
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1.6. Hazard model validation 
If inventories of past events exist or mapping of e.g. areas susceptible to landsliding can be mapped a 
validation can be carried out2. For the validation step confusion matrices are chosen which are based on 
an overlay of the modeling results with either expert assessment from the field or aerial photos / records 
of past events (Beguería 2006). The result is subdivided into four classes, the True Positives, True 
Negatives, False Positives and False Negatives (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Confusion matrix, numbers either in [m2] or [%] 
 
 Modeled Not Modeled 
Event True Positive False Negative 
No Event False Positive True Negative 
 
This method gives an indication which area / percentage of area has been modeled correctly (true 
positives), i.e. the positive modeling result can be confirmed by recorded events. Likewise it shows with 
the false negatives which percentage of past events could not be identified by the model. The false 
positives have to be interpreted as areas which will possibly fail in the future. The true negatives are the 
ones most difficult to evaluate since inventories contain normally only areas affected by hazards but not 
areas surely not affected (i.e. safe). Thus they are indeed no “true negatives” because no recorded 
“negatives” are mapped and entered into the validation process. 
In summary, especially the true positives and the false negatives are valuable measures to assess the 
quality of the procedure. The percentage of false positives to the overall area modeled might 
furthermore give an impression if the model does strongly overestimate the as possibly threatened 
marked area. However the extent of the inventory has to be taken into account. If only few events are 
available for the validation, a “high overestimation” is to be expected while in the case of a very 
extensive inventory the “overestimation” shall be lower. Thus, although the confusion matrix method 
does not require a certain minimum amount of recorded events, the number/area of the records 
influences the true positive rate in comparison to the false positive rate strongly. 
 
1.7. Multi-hazard exposure/risk analysis 
By means of overlaying the susceptibility zones with the elements at risk those e.g. buildings, roads or 
areas which are exposed are identified.  
 
1.8. Concept of the visualization 
The result of a multi-hazard risk analysis consists of a multitude of single files: the single susceptibilities 
(sources and run out) and the exposure to the different hazards, but also the overlaps of hazards. The 
visualization of all these single files is not only a time-consuming work by assigning each one of them 
color and design but should furthermore follow cartographic rules to assure clearness and facilitate the 
understanding of the content. This means in first place to not overload a map with too much information 
which makes it confusing and the message unclear but also to follow the cartographic principles 
                                                 
2 Alternatively a validation based on expert appraisal of the resulting maps or with the maps in the field is possible 
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concerning the layout of a map etcetera. To communicate the susceptibility and exposure information 
the following three steps were set up:  
1. General setting: Provision of general information on the study - among others e.g. land 
use/cover and lithology, slope and planar curvature, components of the models and contributing 
to the modeling results. 
2. Single hazards: Each hazard is visualized separately and in detail. This option shall give the 
user the possibility to recognize hazard patterns for each single process and get familiar with 
the distribution of each single one.  
3. Overlaying hazards: Up to three hazards can be overlaid to identify the areas where they 
overlap and possibly interact. 
4. Number of overlapping hazards: Here the number of processes lying one above the other is 
visualized. This is an extension of the previous visualization mode but the information on the 
type of processes overlapping is taken out to.  
5. Past events: Visualization of the recorded past events which are the basis for the validation. 
6. Validation: The validation result (True Positives, False Negatives and False Positives) are 
shown. 
7. Exposure: Highlighting of the exposed elements. 
 
The colors for the visualization of the hazards are chosen according to the “Symbolbaukasten”, a 
symbol kit for the mapping of natural hazards after Kienholz and Krummenacher (1995). 
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2. The implementation: MultiRISK - the Modeling Tool 
2.1. Installation (Read-me file) 
 
DESCRIPTION:  
The MultiRISK Modeling Tool is a software for the analysis of the hazards rock fall, debris flows, shallow 
landslides, avalanches and river floods at a regional scale. 
 
ATTENTION 
Space-characters as well as specific symbols are not allowed in any path used in the program! 
Furthermore, names must not start with a number! 
 
REQUIREMENTS: 
 ArcGIS 9.3 with ArcInfo license and ArcInfo Workstation (incl. Python)    
 FloodArea + FloodArea Toolbox 
 wxPython - Download:  http://wxpython.org/download.php  
(wxPython2.8-win32-unicode-py25 for windows 32 bit and python 2.5) 
 MCRInstaller - Download:  
ftp://igar.org/Flow-R/Matlab%20Compiler%20Runtime/v%207.11%20(2009b)/ 
 
 
INSTALLATION  (The requirements have to be installed already!!!) 
 Unzip MultiRISK.zip (e.g. to C:\Programs) Space-characters are not allowed in the Path! 
 Browse the location of Toolboxes in the ArcGIS installation and change the path in MultiRISK.py (it 
is located in the MultiRISK folder, open it with e.g. notepad or the like) in line 17. 
 Browse the location of FloodArea.tbx and change the path in MultiRISK.py (in the MultiRISK folder) 
in line 18. 
 Update the system registry: 
1. Browse \\ArcGIS\ArcToolbox\Scripts.  
2. Double-click the file RegisterAmlAsExecutable.reg.  
3. Click Yes to add this information to the registry.  
If the modeling of shallow landslides still does not work follow the indications in the box below or 
on this web-page: (http://resources.arcgis.com/content/kbase?fa=articleShow&d=29077) 
 Setup the shallow landslide toolbox: 
1. Start ArcGIS. 
2. Right-click the ArcToolbox window and click Add Toolbox.  
3. Left-click to the “+” in front of the stability Toolbox. 
4. Right-click ArcStability – click “Properties…” and then on the “Source” tab   
5. Browse to the location of the ArcStability.aml in the MultiRISK folder and click OK. 
 
 
315
Articles
 - 17 - 
ALTERNATIVE WAY TO ENABLE THE .aml FILE 
If the modeling of shallow landslides still does not work after having updated the system registry, 
follow the indications in this box (they were copied from the web-page specified below) or on this 
web-page:  
(http://resources.arcgis.com/content/kbase?fa=articleShow&d=29077 
Alter the RegisterAMLasExecutable.reg file so that it works correctly with Windows XP SP2. To do 
this, insert the full path to the arc.exe file in the .reg file. 
 WARNING: The instructions below include making changes to essential parts of your operating 
system. It is recommended that you backup your operating system and files, including the registry, 
before proceeding. Consult with a qualified computer systems professional, if necessary.  
 
ESRI cannot guarantee results from incorrect modifications while following these instructions; 
therefore, use caution and proceed at your own risk. 
 
Follow the steps below. 
1. Navigate to ...\\ArcGIS\ArcToolbox\Scripts. 
2. Locate the file named RegisterAmlAsExecutable.reg. Right-click it and select 'Edit'. 
3. At the line:    
@="arc.exe \"&run\" %0 %*" 
 
Replace arc.exe with the full path to arc.exe. For example, if the path to arc.exe is 
C:\arcgis\arcexe9x\bin\arc.exe, the new line appears as follows:  
 
@="\"C:\\arcgis\\arcexe9x\\bin\\arc.exe\" \"&run\" %0 %*" 
Notice that the \ is an escape character that must be inserted before all quotation marks 
and back-slashes. 
4. Save the file. 
5. Double-click the file to run it. Click 'Yes' when prompted to add the information to the 
registry. 
START 
a) Start the MultiRISK from Python by double-click on MultiRISK.py or 
b) Start the program from ArcGIS by adding it as Toolbox: Right-click on ArcToolbox window and 
choose "New Toolbox". Right-click on the Toolbox you created, point to Add and choose "New 
Script". Choose Name and Label for the Script and click next/weiter. Upload the python script 
MultiRISK.py. Untick “Run Python script in process” and tick “Show command window when 
executing script”.  In the last panel just Finish has to be clicked. Now the script is added and it 
can be started by double-click on the script-name and push OK in order to confirm. 
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2.2. The Hazard Modeling 
In the following the modeling procedure is explained and illustrated with screen-shots. The bold-written 
terms refer directly to terms in the screenshots. 
 
2.2.1. Project naming and data upload 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In case you want to start a new Project choose a Workspace (the folder in which all results will be 
saved) and enter a Name for the Project (this name will be given to all output files, complemented by 
abbreviations indicating the content of the file. For an overview of the abbreviations used to name the 
output files see section 3.5 Terminology.). Then browse and upload the input Data (Digital elevation 
model, Land use and Lithology). 
 
 
 
General remark: during the whole computation a 
DOS window is open - please do not close it 
because this cancels the modeling procedure. 
Furthermore, in this window the progress of the 
modeling procedure is shown and possible errors 
are specified. 
If you choose a Digital elevation model of the raster format “grid” it will not be 
shown as single file but as folder. Open the folder and choose any of the files 
inside (e.g. sta.adf, w001001.adf, w001001x.adf, hdr.adf etc.). When clicking 
“return” the right path and file name will be written in the edit line. This does not 
apply for e.g. .asc or .img DEMs – they are depicted as single files - browse 
them in the normal way. 
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DATA SPECIFICATION: 
 
Name:  Name of the Project you create (e.g. projna) or you upload. 
Workspace: Path of your working directory. 
Predefined data: You can upload the input data (Digital elevation model, Land use, 
Lithology) from a previously performed project. The predefined 
data file is automatically produced and located in the Workspace of 
the project for each run.  (eg.:projna_data.xml). 
Predefined parameters: You can upload the parameter specification from a previous 
modeled project in order to use the same modeling parameters. 
This file is automatically produced and located in the Workspace of 
the project for each run. (eg.:projna_parameters.xml). 
Digital elevation model:  Any ArcGIS compatible raster format (e.g. asc or grid). 
Land use / cover:  Polygon shape file in which one column has to indicate the 
different land use / cover classes. The name of this column and the 
classes can be chosen freely by the user.  
Lithology Polygon shape file in which one column has to indicate the 
different land lithology classes. The name of this column and the 
classes can be chosen freely by the user.  
In case you want to continue a Project you already worked on in a previous session, select the 
Workspace in which you located it before and choose the Name of the project. Automatically the Data 
paths you chose when you started the project will be filled in below. When continuing with Next > you 
will get the following options: 
 
 
 
 
By selecting Yes/Ja you will skip the hazard modeling part and jump directly to the validation, exposure 
analysis and visualization. By selecting No/Nein, you can complement the hazard modeling by those 
processes you have not worked on last time or update (overwrite) the previous results. By selecting 
Cancel/Abbrechen you can choose a new Project Name to avoid overwriting of previous results or 
make any other type of changes. 
 
By browsing Predefined data or Predefined parameters (see a more detailed description on these two 
files below) selections made previously can be uploaded. This means the data or the parameter 
selection is automatically input into the respective fields - but this does not impede to make changes. 
With the button Abstract you will get the option to enter background information on the modeling you 
perform and this text will directly be saved in the metadata of the file (you can access the metadata 
information with ArcCatalog). This option is very helpful to remind the objective of the model run, 
reasons for certain parameter choices etc. afterwards. Together with the abstract also the model 
parameters are saved in the metadata file. 
 
 
318
Articles
 - 20 - 
2.2.2. Choice of hazards to be modeled 
 
 
 
 
Select the hazards you want to model - the processes you do not choose will be disabled in the 
following steps. If you already modeled a hazard within this project the former results will be overwritten. 
If you model a process you have not worked on before, only this hazard will be computed while the 
other processes and results are not overwritten or modified. However the .xml files will be overwritten 
(projna_data.xml and projna_parameters.xml) and especially in the case of the parameters only those 
chosen for the last modeling run will be available. 
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2.2.3. Parameterisation of the models 
(For details about the models and parameters please have a look at the previous section) 
 
General options occurring in the parameterization of several hazards: 
 
General options used for several hazard refer to the run out modeling (a) and the exclusion of land 
use/cover and lithology classes as potential sources (b). After having presented these two procedures 
the hazard model parameterizations will be explained one by one 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each hazard one tab is available. By clicking on the tab the record 
card is opened and the parameters can be specified. Those hazards not 
chosen in the previous step are grey and not modifiable. By going back 
you can change your hazard choice without loosing the parameter 
choices you already made. 
For the processes debris flows, 
rock falls, shallow landslides and 
avalanches the parameter choice is 
subdivided in two steps: the 
Source parameters and the 
Runout parameters.  
Since the possible choices for the 
run out parameters are the same 
for all four processes, they will only 
be explained once. 
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a) Run out modeling of the processes debris flow, rock fall, shallow landslides and avalanches: 
 
As already mentioned, these four processes are modeled in two steps, the source identification and the 
run out. Three options exist for the performance of these two steps: i) Both steps can be carried out in 
MultiRISK, ii) Predefined sources can be uploaded and their run out is computed or iii) only the 
sources are identified, the run out is not considered (skip runout). Within MultiRISK these options can 
be chosen as described below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DATA SPECIFICATION: 
 
Predefined sources:  .asc file with the pixel value 1 for the sources and NoData for the 
non-source areas. The resolution and alignment of the raster has 
to fit the characteristics of the recalculated DEM!  
 
Only sources are modeled if 
the run out is skipped 
Only the run out is 
computed if predefined 
sources are uploaded 
Exponent in the formula x
j j
x
i
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1
)(tan
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For x = 1 it converts into the basic multiple flow direction after Quinn et al. 1991, i.e. a 
very wide spreading, and for x →  it turns into a single flow, i.e. no distribution of 
the flow to all lower-lying cells any more but only to the lowest only (see Equation 2). 
The mass is transferred from pixel to pixel and 
for each transition the constant friction loss 
angle is subtracted from the angle between the 
two pixels.  
(Choose any value between 1 and 45) 
Modeling modi  
Overview:  only superior sources are modeled. Quick is the better 
option for a fast overview. 
Quick:  superior sources are modeled first and if lower once are 
likely to take a similar way with similar velocity they are not 
modeled. 
Complete:  each source pixel is simulated without any condition 
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b) Exclusion of certain land use/cover and lithology classes 
 
For the source identification of several processes the Exclusion of certain land use/cover or lithological 
classes is offered. Please find here the general description how to use this option: 
Click the button Land use/cover or Lithology to exclude certain classes from being potential sources 
of instabilities. In the window which opens choose the column containing the Land use/cover or 
Lithology class names. Subsequently all classes of this column will be listed. Choose one or more of 
them to be excluded as possible source (e.g. outcropping limestone as source for debris flows). 
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Debris flows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See Figure 2 for an 
explanation of the possible 
choices. 
10m/ 20m indicates the 
raster resolution for which 
the curve shall be used. 
Currently MultiRISK is 
designed for a 10m 
resolution, thus select the 
_10m options.  
Threshold of Planar 
curvature below which the 
existence of a gully / 
concave structure is 
assumed, e.g. inf-02 
equals to -2/100m-1 
equals to -0.02m-1 
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Rock fall:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slope angle above which 
the existence of a rock wall 
(which is the possible 
source of rock fall) is 
assumed. 
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Shallow landslides:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameters according to 
Equation 1 
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Snow avalanches: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between the lower and 
upper slope angle threshold 
avalanche initiation is 
considered possible 
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River Floods:  
 
For the modeling of river floods, two approaches are available, the definition of a Water level and the 
implementation of Hydrograph information. 
 
a) Modeling of a defined Water level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DATA SPECIFICATION: 
 
Drainage network: Raster file of the drainage network (river layer) with the altitudinal information 
for each pixel with the same pixel size and alignment as the original DEM which was uploaded. 
 
 
Height of the water 
above the altitude of 
the indicated drainage 
network which is then 
extrapolated into the 
area. 
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b) Modeling by means of Hydrograph information: 
 
 
 
 
The Duration of simulation refers to overall time (real time, not modeling time) which is modeled and 
saving interval to the time steps after which an output file is produced. For the case of e.g. 3600min of 
duration of simulation and a saving interval of 600min a total of 6 files is saved.  
 
 
DATA SPECIFICATION: 
 
The Hydrograph file is a simple .txt file. The first column indicates the time step, the second 
column the discharge values [m3/s] of the point with the first set of coordinates, the third column the 
discharge values of the second point etc. The columns are separated by tabs. 
e.g.  0.00   50   5  
05.00 100 10 
10.00 480 15 
15.00 120 10 
20.00   50   5 
 
Coordinate File: The coordinates are entered by means of a .txt file as well. Each line describes 
one coordinate with its x and y information separated by space-slash-space and complemented by 
the following sequence: / -1 / 0 / 0 
e.g.     941024.5 / 244220.8 / -1 / 0 / 0 
 941060.3 / 244230.1 / -1 / 0 / 0 
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2.2.4. Confirmation of the parameter choice 
 
 
 
 
The parameters chosen previously are resumed. If errors are discovered or generally changes have to 
be made go back with the button < Back, the parameter choice will not be erased by this step. With 
RUN you start the modeling which can, according to the size of the study area, the quantity of sources 
identified for which subsequently the run out is computed or the time period the flood modeling is 
computed, take several days. However, you will see the advances of the modeling in the DOS window 
and the results are one after the other saved in the workspace folder. 
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2.3. Hazard model validation 
 
The validation is done by an overlay of the modeling results with recorded events (alternatively field 
assessments of possibly unstable areas etc.). It is carried out within the following interface in which you 
upload the information on past/potentially threatened areas:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Browse and upload the event information (click on , see the explanation for the data upload below) 
and start the validation by clicking the button Validate after the uploading is finished. 
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When clicking  the following window opens: 
 
 
 
 
For the validation two options are offered: validation of the Sources (especially useful option if the 
validation is done on basis of expert assessment of possibly unstable areas in the field) and validation 
of the Complete area (sources and run out - especially useful for recorded events where source and 
run out cannot be distinguished anymore as e.g. the case for shallow landslides). However you can only 
upload files for hazards you modeled previously - in this interface the processes which were not 
computed are grey shaded, i.e. inactive. 
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After pressing the OK button the previous interface reappears and by clicking on Validate the validation 
is initiated. 
 
 
 
 
DATA SPECIFICATION: 
 
Inventory data: Upload polygon shape files of either recorded events or expert assessment in the 
field, on basis of aerial photos or the like. 
If you modeled several flood time 
steps, you will get the choice which 
one you want to use for the 
validation. 
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The confusion matrix - result of the validation: 
 
The result of the validation is (additionally to the shape files of the overlay) a confusion matrix opposing 
the number of modeled and the recorded pixels. After the validation finished, the interface displayed 
below is automatically shown. 
 
 
 
 
In the resulting shape file the classes are termed in the following way (called confusion_matrix.txt and 
located in the workspace folder): 
 
 Modeled Not Modeled 
Event 1 -1 
No Event 2 0 
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2.4. Multi-hazard exposure analysis 
Please browse first the risk elements and start then the analysis by pushing Exposure analysis. 
Three formats of elements at risk can be uploaded: 
Quantity of elements at risk: Points, lines or polygons can be entered and are identified as 
exposed/affected if they lie at least partly inside the hazard zones - i.e. they are treated as 
units. 
Length of lineal elements at risk: Linear features can be uploaded (e.g. roads, railway lines etc.) and 
the length lying inside of hazard zones is identified. 
Area at risk: Polygons can be uploaded (e.g. settled area if information at single building level is not 
available) and the percentage of the area/the area [m2] lying in hazard zones is computed 
 
 
At the current state, only an exposure, not a full risk analysis can be carried out since the vulnerability is 
assumed to be 1 and values of the elements are not directly considered.  
 
 
DATA SPECIFICATION: 
 
Quantity of elements at risk:   Point, line or polygon shape files 
Length of lineal elements at risk: Polyline shape files 
Area at risk:    Polygon shape files 
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After having uploaded the elements and when clicking Exposure Analysis those hazards which have 
been modeled before can be chosen for the analysis. Those which have not been computed before are 
shaded grey and inactivated. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the hazards you select the risks will be analyzed for the sources and the complete area. 
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The result is the following interface: 
 
 
 
This information is saved in a file called exposure_matrix.txt in the workspace. 
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2.5. Terminology of the output files 
 
The files produced during the whole modeling procedure are saved in the folder which has been defined 
as Workspace in the first interface. The Project Name (max. 7 letters) forms the first part of each file. 
This name is complemented by the following abbreviations to clearly label each of the files and to avoid 
confusion and effort of the user when searching for / defining names. 
 
 
 
FILE NAMING: 
 
Hazard modeling 
Rock falls     _rf 
Shallow landslides   _sl 
Avalanches    _av 
Debris flows   _df 
Floods     _fl   or   _f   
Sources     _s 
Run out     _r 
Complete (sources + run out) _c 
Reclassified run out   _rc    (only used for the visualization) 
Number of overlapping hazards _nr    
Multi-hazard   _mh    
Past events    _pe    
 
 
Validation 
Validation sources   _vl_s  
Validation complete   _vl_c 
 
 
Risk analysis 
Risk (number of units)  _ru 
Risk (length)   _rl 
Risk (area)    _ra 
 
Elements (units)   _eu 
     _el  (the file el only produced for the visualization) 
     _ea 
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E.g. the results of full debris flow modeling, validation and exposure analysis for a project called 
“Barcelo” could be: 
 
 Barcelo_df_s  Modeled debris flow sources (raster file) 
 Barcelo_df_r  Modeled debris flow runout (raster file) 
 Barcelo_df_vl_s Validation of modeled debris flow sources (shape file) 
 Barcelo_df_vl_c Validation of the complete area affected by debris flows (shape file) 
Barcelo_df_ru  Elements (units as e.g. buildings) which are according to the modeling 
results exposed to debris flows are marked 
 Barcelo_mh  Shape file containing the information of the distribution of all hazards 
 Barcelo_nr  Raster file with the information of the number of overlapping hazards 
 
 etc. 
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2.6. Connection to the MultiRISK Visualization Tool 
 
The MultiRISK Modeling Tool is directly linked to the MultiRISK Visualization Tool: 
 
 
 
 
By pushing the View results button:  
 
 all produced results are copied in the folder C:\MutliRISK\rev_vis 
 the MultiRisk Visualization Tool is updated 
 After launching the internet browser and navigating to the MultiRisk Visualization Tool 
(http://localhost/cartoweb3/htdocs/MHRA.php) the just produced output of the MultiRISK 
Modeling Tool can be explored. 
 
IMPORTANT: PLEASE CLOSE YOUR WEB-BROWSER BEFORE CLICKING VIEW RESULTS AND 
LAUNCHE IT ONLY AFTER THE SCRIPT RAN COMPLETELY THROUGH!!! 
 
(This does only apply if you already installed the Visualization Tool - see the instructions below) 
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3. The implementation: MultiRISK - the Visualization Tool 
3.1. Installation (read-me file) 
 
 Installation of MapServer 4 Windows (MS4W 2.2.9.) with the default setting. Download at: 
http://dl.maptools.org/dl/ms4w/ms4w-2.2.9-setup.exe  
Although there are more recent versions available, this one is the currently last stable one in 
combination with CartoWeb. For all versions and manually access to MapServer versions look at: 
http://dl.maptools.org/dl/ms4w/  
 Open your browser and browse localhost to check if the MapServer 4 Windows has been installed 
properly. If information on MS4W appears the installation has been successful. 
 Installation of CartoWeb3 as well as the Third Party’s Gettext (you are asked during the CartoWeb 
installation if you want to install Third Party’s Gettext and after CatroWeb is installed the second 
installation will be launched automatically if you selected it before). 
 Open your browser and browse “localhost” - now one application (CartoWeb) is installed (Check at 
the bottom of the page, in “Applications” paragraph). 
 Copy the folder MHRA into the folder C:\ms4w\apps\cartoweb3\projects\ 
 Go to C\ms4w\apps\cartoweb3\htdocs, copy the file democw3.php and paste it in the same folder.  
Rename the copied file into “MHRA.php”, open it and change “democw3.php” into “MHRA.php”.  
“Publish” the data in the folder - This is done by lunching MHRA_WEB.py  
 Enter the Visualization Tool with your browser under http://localhost/cartoweb3/htdocs/MHRA.php 
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3.2. The Visualization 
The visualization (to be entered with your internet browser under 
http://localhost/cartoweb3/htdocs/MHRA.php) consists in total of seven tabs and maps, respectively, 
which show different contents to transmit the multi-dimensional information step by step. 
 
3.2.1. General setting 
 
 
 
 
 
This first map is dedicated to give general information about the area under consideration. For now, 
slope, planar curvature, lithology and land use/cover information is shown since they are the basis for 
the modeling procedure. Further information as orthophotos from different periods or the like could be 
integrated in the future and according to the needs of the user.  
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3.2.2. Single hazards 
 
 
 
 
 
In this map the details on each process are given. To not overload the map only one hazard can be 
visualized at a time, subdivided into source and run out area for the three landslide types and the 
avalanches. This map shall enable the user to identify single-hazard patterns without getting confused 
by e.g. overlapping of hazards. 
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3.2.3. Overlapping hazards 
 
 
 
 
 
In the third tab, the focus lies on the areas where two or three hazards overlap. To not confuse the map 
reader, no details are given on the single hazards, but the footprint of the hazards are overlain to reveal 
the areas of overlapping hazards. The overlay is restricted to three processes since already for four 
hazards the distinction of the different combinations would get very difficult.  
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3.2.4. Number of hazards 
 
 
 
 
 
Since more than three processes can hardly be visualized at a time without overloading the map, by 
visualizing the simple presence of hazards and summing them up those areas affected by only one, 
two, three, four or event five hazards are depicted. However, to offer the possibility to identify which 
processes sum up to this number the user can use the spatial query button  and get the information 
which hazards overlap at a certain point by clicking on the point of interest. 
Spatial query to identify which processes contribute to the 
number of hazards. 
Further information is available when clicking on the hyperlink 
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3.2.5. Past events 
 
 
 
 
 
The past events are the basis for the validation step and are thus shown before the result of the 
validation is depicted in the next tab. If the user uploaded potentially hazardous zones (e.g. potential 
sources for shallow landslides) those areas are shown. 
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3.2.6. Validation 
 
 
 
 
 
In this tab the result of the validation by means of overlaying modeled and recorded/potential events 
resulting in a confusion matrix is given. The “True Negatives” are not visualized since normally no 
records of “no Event” exist and the simple fact that no event has been recorded does not mean that no 
event has happened till now or will happen in the future.   
 
 Modeled Not Modeled 
Event True Positives  False Negatives 
No Event False Positives True Negatives 
 
 
 
 
Hyperlink 
to the 
confusion 
matrix 
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By clicking on the red M – Confusion matrix (hyperlink) another tab opens which contains the 
information on the confusion matrices, e.g. the surface in m3 which is falls in each of the classes. 
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3.2.7. Exposure 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally the exposed elements are depicted in yellow:  
1. entire units (points, lines or polygons treated as units), 
2. linear elements of which the segment actually threatened is identified and 
3. polygons of which the area possibly affected is determined. 
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By clicking on the red M – Exposure matrix (hyperlink) another tab opens which contains the 
information on the number of exposed elements, the length of exposed infrastructure and the area 
exposed. 
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Conclusions and Outlook 
 
The platform consists of two tools, the Modeling and the Visualization Tool which offer together 
standardized, fast and repeatable modeling and the clear visualization of the results. Until now the 
MultiRISK Modeling Tool offers only the performance of a regional susceptibility and exposure analysis.  
Several further developments are planned for the future: 
 An expansion of MultiRISK towards a local, full-hazard and risk analysis including a more 
sophisticated vulnerability concept.  
 Complementation of the current set of hazards by further processes as e.g. flash floods, storms and 
others. 
 The automated consideration of hazard interactions. This would for example include feedback loops 
(e.g. the destruction of forest by avalanches and the loss of the protective effect towards rock fall 
and further avalanches) or the triggering of one hazard by another (e.g. river or torrent damming 
due to landslides) etc. Conceptually several ideas exist already (refer to (Kappes et al.2010) but the 
automation is still difficult. 
 The full transferability of the two Tools. Up to now several adjustments have to be done manually 
which shall be automated in the future. 
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B. English and German Summary
B.1. Zusammenfassung
Viele Gebiete der Erde sind von multiplen Naturgefahren betroffen wie beispielsweise
Bergregionen und Ku¨stenzonen. Um jedoch das Gesamtrisikos in diesen Gebieten zu
verringern, ko¨nnen Maßnahmen nicht auf einzelne Prozesse beschra¨nkt bleiben sondern
mu¨ssen alle relevanten Gefahren einbeziehen. Hierbei liefern Risikoanalysen die notwendige
Information, um in Multi-Gefahrensituation Risiken beurteilen und Maßnahmen planen
zu ko¨nnen. Noch ist die getrennte Analyse der Einzel-Gefahren und das Zusammenfu¨hren
der Analyseergebnisse erst fu¨r die Risikobeurteilung und Entscheidungsprozesse u¨bliche
Praxis. Sich jedoch Multi-Gefahren Risikoanalysen wirklich nur die Summe von Einzel-
Gefahren Risikoanalysen? Und ko¨nnen die Ergebnisse von getrennt voneinander unter-
suchte Einzel-Gefahren am Ende problemlos zusammengefu¨hrt werden? Ziel dieser Arbeit
ist es, diese Fragen auf Basis eines Literaturreviews und der Entwicklung eines Multi-
Gefahren Risikoanalyseschemas im Detail zu untersuchen.
Auf Basis einer umfangreichen Literaturanalyse von Multi-Gefahren Studien werden sieben
wesentliche Multi-Gefahrenaspekte zusammengestellt: (1) hoher Datenbedarf von Multi-
Gefahren Risikoanalysen, (2) Skalenunterschiede zwischen Prozessen, (3) unterschiedliche,
prozess-spezifische Modellierungsansa¨tze, (4) Beziehungen zwischen Prozessen, (5) unter-
schiedliche Einheiten fu¨r die Gefahrenquantifizierung, (6) Vielzahl der Einzelschritte einer
Multi-Gefahren Risikoanalyse und (7) Schwierigkeiten bei der u¨bersichtlichen Darstellung
der Analyseergebnisse. Unter Beru¨cksichtigung dieser Multi-Gefahrenaspekte wird ein
top-down Ansatz bestehend aus einer regionalen und einer lokalen Skala entworfen. Dabei
werden auf der regionalen Skala, auf Basis eine Expositionsanalyse mit geringen Daten-
anforderungen, Gebiete sich u¨berlagernder Prozesse und mo¨glichen Risikos identifiziert,
welche daraufhin auf lokaler Skala im Detail untersucht werden ko¨nnen. Mit dem Analy-
sekonzept verbunden ist ein Visualisierungskonzept, welches der u¨bersichtlichen Darstel-
lung der vielschichtigen Analyseresultate dient. Zusa¨tzlich wurde fu¨r eine eher lokale Skala
ein indikatorenbasierter Ansatz fu¨r die Abscha¨tzung der physikalischen
Vulnerabilita¨t gegenu¨ber multiplen Gefahren entwickelt.
Die konzeptionellen Ansa¨tze wurden in als Modellierungs- und Visualisierungstool in
die MultiRISK Software Plattform umgesetzt, welche schnelle und wiederholbare Anal-
ysen multipler Gefahren, sowie eine klare und u¨bersichtliche Darstellung der Ergebnisse
ermo¨glicht. Um die Plattform wie auch die zugrundeliegenden Konzepte zu u¨berpru¨fen
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wurde eine Fallstudie in Barcelonnette, Frankreich, durchgefu¨hrt.
Vor dem Hintergrund der gewonnenen Erfahrungen werden die identifizierten Multi-
Gefahrenaspekte ero¨rtert und die Anfangsfrage diskutiert. Dabei wird deutlich, dass
durch die Kombination unterschiedlicher Prozesse im Rahmen von Multi-Gefahren Risiko-
analysen Herausforderungen und Pha¨nomene entstehen, welche u¨ber die Summe getrennt
durchgefu¨hrter Einzelgefahrenanalysen hinausgehen. Darunter za¨hlen Prozessinter-
aktionen, ein eventuell ho¨herer Bedarf an Information und die Notwendigkeit die un-
terschiedlichen Skalen verschiedener Prozesse einander anzupassen, aber auch Vorteile wie
eine erho¨hte Effektivita¨t durch die gemeinsame Analyse multipler Gefahren.
Im Zusammenhang mit Maßnahmen zur Risikoreduzierung soll die vorgestellte Plattform
eine Diskussionsgrundlage mit Akteuren in diesem Feld bieten. Auf Basis dieses ersten
Vorschlages ko¨nnen der praktische Nutzen solcher Programme und Ansa¨tze wie auch
notwendige Anpassungen besprochen und geplant werden.
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B.2. Summary
Despite the increasingly recognised need for joint multi-hazard risk analyses, current prac-
tice is still the separate analysis of each natural hazard and the risk it poses. In the final
stage for decision-making for risk reduction purposes the single-hazard results are com-
bined. However, is a multi-hazard risk analysis really just the sum of multiple single-hazard
risk analyses? Can single hazards be studied separately and can the final results be com-
bined that easily? The objective of this study is to investigate these questions in detail by
means of the examination of the work currently done in this field and the development of
a multi-hazard risk analysis approach.
Based on an extensive review of current studies in the multi-hazard context seven major
multi-hazard issues are compiled: (1) high data requirements of multi-hazard risk anal-
yses, (2) scale differences between hazards, (3) differing hazard-specific model principles,
assumptions and uncertainties, (4) relations between hazards, (5) differing metrics for
hazard quantification, (6) multitude of steps multi-hazard risk analyses consist of and (7)
difficulties to visualise the multi-dimensional analysis outcome.
These issues receive specific attention during the development of an analysis and visuali-
sation scheme according to a top-down approach consisting of two scales, a regional and a
local scale. At the regional level, an exposure analysis based on low data requirements is
proposed to indicate zones of possible hazard relations and potential risk for the detailed
investigation at a local level. The related visualisation concept aims to communicate the
multi-dimensional content of the analysis output in a structured way. Additionally, in
a step towards a more local and detailed analysis, an indicator-based approach for the
assessment of physical multi-hazard vulnerability has been developed.
The completed conceptual approach was implemented as a Modelling and Visualisation
Tool into the software platform MultiRISK which offers fast and repeatable analysis of
multiple hazards and clear and structured visualisation of the results. To test the appli-
cability of the MultiRISK Platform and the underlying conceptual approach, a case study
has been carried out in the Barcelonnette basin, France.
In the light of the experiences gained, the identified multi-hazard issues are recapitulated
and the initial questions are discussed. Thereby, it becomes apparent that in multi-hazard
risk analyses several challenges and phenomena emerge due to the combination of multiple
hazards that lie beyond the sum of separate analyses. This refers to difficulties such as
additional information requirements or differing hazard scales but also to advantages such
as the efficient analysis of multiple hazards.
The elaborated software platform is supposed form a suitable base for discussions with
stakeholders about the practical utility of such tools and required adjustments to meet
their needs.
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